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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation argues that American literary postmodernism was profoundly shaped by 
midcentury intellectual workers’ resistance to the bureaucratization of their labor. An 
Introduction establishes the significance of the dissertation to debates over both postmodernism 
and the New York Intellectuals, and summarizes each chapter’s contribution to the overall 
argument. Part I, “Class Unconsciousness,” then offers three chapters that detail the birth, 
growth, and eventual eclipse of a theory of “brain workers” as a class in the labor-radical circles 
of the New York Intellectuals. In the 1930s and 40s, authors Tess Slesinger, Mary McCarthy, 
and Lionel Trilling sounded an increasingly shrill alarm over what they imagined was a pro-
Soviet intellectual class of bureaucratic mental workers in America. I argue that while their 
class-conscious fictions laid foundations for postmodernism’s arrival decades later, their 
increasingly indiscriminate hostility toward a class-conscious left nevertheless also hindered later 
recognition of the intellectual and class origins of postmodernism.  
Part II, “The Groves of Postmodernism,” begins with an Interlude that offers a theory of 
the literary and sociological meanings of the postwar campus novel in America. Three final 
chapters then explain how the antibureaucratic academic fictions of Trilling, McCarthy, and 
Vladimir Nabokov helped create the characteristic themes and even forms of this emerging 
genre—and thence of postmodernism itself, whose early canon includes such campus novels as 
Nabokov’s Pale Fire (1962) and John Barth’s Giles Goat-Boy (1966). I contend that these 
authors’ liberal satire of academia, influenced by the earlier theory of an intellectual class, was 
rooted in a passionate desire for intellectuals’ autonomy, and a corresponding critique of their 
bureaucratic labor in the academy. Thus I argue that the early postmodern, even for such 
avowedly apolitical writers as Nabokov, may be read as the protest of mental and professional 
 iii 
workers against the bureaucratic confines of their work. Against recent accusations that 
postmodernism represented a “libertarian turn” colluding with the New Right, a brief Epilogue 
then insists on the importance of this early and antibureaucratic postmodernism to the successes 
of the New Left in the 1960s, as well as to present-day academic workers seeking their own 
autonomy in a rapidly proletarianizing workplace. This dissertation thus excavates a history of 
postmodernism’s labor-left origins, thereby challenging familiar accounts of postmodernism’s 
roots in a 1950s or 1980s political conservatism, as well as notions of the New York 
Intellectuals’ hostility toward or irrelevance to postmodernism. Along the way, it suggests 
postmodernism’s continuing relevance to white-collar anxiety and academic activism. 
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Introduction 
 
 
This dissertation offers a prehistory of literary and intellectual postmodernism in 
America. I offer this prehistory knowingly at an autumnal, if not indeed posthumous, moment in 
the history of postmodernism. Arguably near fifty years old now, “postmodernism” is an at best 
faded movement. Its aesthetic practices have become predictable, and its central ideas 
conventional academic wisdom. That venerable and Congressionally-celebrated institution The 
Simpsons has taught us metafiction for years now, for example, and the idea that power functions 
through a multitude of cultural (or “disciplinary”) practices as much or more than it does through 
states no longer surprises. As one letter-writer to the PMLA already remarked in 2006, “Over a 
decade ago, when the word postmodern seemed to be part of every fifth book title exhibited at 
the MLA convention, any discerning critic should have realized that it was time to move on” 
(Galef). The postmodern has become, shall we say, familiar. 
My hope here, however, is precisely to revise a number of now overly-familiar and 
sometimes wrong or simplistic narratives about American postmodernism that have accrued to it 
during the half-century of its existence. In the chapters that follow, I trace a history of political 
and cultural forces and ideas on the American socialist left in the 1930s that ultimately 
contributed to the emergence of postmodernism in literary-intellectual thought and practice in the 
1960s. My argument is that the postmodern emerged in significant part from the resistance of 
intellectual workers to the bureaucratization of their labor—to the potential reduction of the 
range and scope of their thought as they entered academic institutions, especially and 
specifically; and that these intellectuals staked their proto-postmodern resistance in the name of a 
universalism often expressed in the terms of realist fiction’s hopes to comprehend the whole of a 
society. Approaching my subject through intellectual history as much as the sociology of 
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previous critics’ approaches, I identify the New York Intellectuals in particular (though not 
exclusively) as a vanguard of materialist and politicized intellectual workers—often academics—
from the 1930s through the 1950s whose ideas about and critiques of their own labor’s move into 
bureaucratic institutions created a structure of thought and feeling from which the postmodern 
emerged in the 1960s. Examining the works and days of Tess Slesinger, Mary McCarthy, Lionel 
Trilling, and Vladimir Nabokov, I show that essential roots of postmodern literature and thought 
in the 1960s and beyond lay in intellectual workers’ decades-long resistance to the 
proletarianization of their labor. 
With this prehistory of the postmodern, I seek to challenge some standard accounts of the 
nature and importance of postmodernism in American fiction and thought. But I also hope to 
show hitherto unremarked facets of the cultural and political significance of the New York 
Intellectuals, who have been widely acknowledged as among the most important intellectual 
influences on mid-century American literary and intellectual culture—and in their earlier years 
as the most important group of socialist intelligentsia the U.S. has produced to date. Before 
moving on to a more detailed, chapter-by-chapter summary of the dissertation’s argument, then, I 
would like to elucidate more fully these broadly revisionist aims regarding both the New York 
Intellectuals and postmodernism. 
The standard account of the New York Intellectuals in relation to postmodernism is that 
when postmodernism first emerged in the 1960s, the New York Intellectuals served merely as 
“disgruntled guardians of high modernism, defending its monuments from the pigeons of the 
new,” in George Cotkin’s amusing summary. Monographs on the New York Intellectuals have 
most fully drawn the picture. Hugh Wilford pityingly speaks of the New York Intellectuals as 
“cultural Modernists who for most of their lives inhabited post-modernity” (246), while Neil 
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Jumonville and Harvey Teres each spend an entire chapter of their books expounding on the 
supposedly fundamental antagonism between the New York Intellectuals and 1960s politics and 
culture, including postmodernism. Teres nicely covers the greatest hits here, from Norman 
Podhoretz’s 1958 recriminations against Beats such as Kerouac, whose novel On the Road 
apparently required responsible critics everywhere to deny aloud “that incoherence is superior to 
precision, that ignorance is superior to knowledge” (qtd. on 233), to Irving Howe’s 1968 
sneering attack on the “new sensibility” of a postmodernism “impatient with literary structures of 
complexity and coherence,” which wanted instead a literature “as absolute as the sun, as 
unarguable as an orgasm, and as delicious as a lollipop” (qtd. on 235). In contrast, I argue at the 
broadest level that the New York Intellectuals actually if unwittingly contributed significantly to 
postmodernist cultural and intellectual expression. Specifically I argue that the New York 
Intellectuals’ experiences of and ideas about intellectuals as a coherent social group, conveyed so 
vividly in their essays and fiction from the radical 1930s through the more liberal 1950s, were 
important precursors and goads to the postmodern literature and thought that incubated during 
this period before hatching in the 1960s. When it arrived, postmodernism in the United States 
took a substantial number of its themes from, and even created a number of its formal techniques 
in response to, a zeitgeist strongly influenced by the New York Intellectuals’ attempts to think 
the social and political significance—dystopian dangers and utopian potentials alike—of their 
own labor. 
Another widely-accepted truth about the New York Intellectuals is that as they became 
comfortably middle class in their later years, their once biting political criticisms of America 
faded into toothless irrelevance. They “sold out.” The facts behind this accusation are well 
known. Eschewing the revolutionary fervor of their socialist beliefs in the 1930s, by the middle 
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of the century many espoused various forms of liberal anti-Communism, and in some cases even 
a strident Cold War and thence “neo-” conservatism.1 Estimable New York Intellectual Philip 
Rahv may have first articulated the economically-based accusation that followed. In 1952, 
Partisan Review initiated a forum titled “Our Country and Our Culture,” asking representative 
intellectuals and writers to comment on intellectuals’ growing comfort with U.S. politics and 
culture. Rahv argued that the general postwar boom, and particularly the boom in higher 
education, had given intellectuals steady and respectable work. This had inevitably affected their 
opinions. “We are witnessing a process that might well be described as that of the 
embourgeoisement of the American intelligentsia,” he declared, “a process that is plainly not 
unconnected with the changes of mind and mood we are analyzing in this symposium” (306). 
Later critics have been wary of this idea of embourgeoisement and subsequent 
conservatism, without outright denying it. They have asserted the need for more than a vulgar 
Marxism in order to understand why the New York Intellectuals moved rightward.2 But in all 
that follows I want to take the New York Intellectuals’ entry into the middle class seriously, not 
in order to understand their undeniable shift to the right, but on the contrary in order to 
demonstrate a fundamental continuity in belief from their earlier radical class politics. This was a 
continuity expressed in the 1940s but especially in the 1950s, I will argue, by their often prickly 
relationship to employment in middle-class institutions, specifically those of higher education. 
As Wilford notes, the “relation between Intellectual and institution was never harmonious.                                                         
1 This narrative is so standard as to not require documentation; but Wald’s The New York Intellectuals is the most 
detailed about their political shifts. 
2  Wilford explicitly rejects it, arguing that the rightward march was “less the result of cynicism or careerism” than 
of “various recuperative, hegemonic processes that were so powerful the Intellectuals could not withstand them” 
(viii). Wald similarly calls the embourgeoisement idea a “moralistic oversimplification” (New York 309), and 
speaking of Sidney Hook in the 1950s, for example, argues that his growing conservatism could be accounted for 
not only by “the postwar prosperity that resulted in a loss of ability to view the world from the class perspective of 
the oppressed,” but by “social pressures brought on him and his generation” (i.e. McCarthyism) (293). Interestingly, 
though, neither seems to take seriously the possibility that various New York Intellectuals might have simply 
changed their minds on the merits as they saw them. 
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Instead it was fraught with tension and conflict” (12). I argue specifically that the New York 
Intellectuals’ entry into the bourgeoisie was conditioned by an early and widely-held theory of 
intellectuals as an autonomous class located between capital and proletariat; and that this theory, 
with its focus on intellectuals as workers, caused the New York Intellectuals (here represented 
principally by Lionel Trilling and Mary McCarthy) to be markedly sensitive precisely to the 
proletarianization of the middle class they were entering. They expressed their anxieties and 
misgivings about the now-institutional labor of the middle class, with its newly constricted 
autonomy (compared to older and more independent structures of middle-class work), in the 
form of fictions about academic labor—most notably in Mary McCarthy’s “invention” of the 
postwar genre of the campus novel in 1952.3 This, then, is my second thesis on the New York 
Intellectuals: even if (and this is an “if”) the New York Intellectuals’ movement into the class of 
the bourgeoisie resulted in embourgeoisement, a rightward political shift resulting from their 
new-found economic comfort, the shift did not mean that they simply gave up their class 
consciousness. The New York Intellectuals’ upward mobility was accompanied by a cogent 
critique of downward pressure on the middle-class institutions and labor that they now 
experienced. 
This dissertation’s revisions of central narratives about postmodernism often follow from 
this understanding of the New York Intellectuals as figures retaining insights from their radical 
youth. To begin with, I seek to complicate the prevalent notion that postmodernism is rooted in 
political exhaustion and pessimism, whether that of the 1950s or of the 1980s. Thomas Schaub 
postulates that the postmodern refusal of certainty and truth emerged from a particularly 
conservative 1950s liberalism and “politics of paralysis” (190). And a number of Marxists have                                                         
3 I will elaborate on the ways in which the “campus novel” can be said to have been “invented” by Mary McCarthy 
in the 1950s, both in the Interlude that begins Part II and of course in Chapter Five, which examines The Groves of 
Academe in depth. 
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likewise understood postmodernism to be aligned with a triumphant and cynical New Right in 
the 1980s. David Harvey, to take one prominent example, offers up the “ex-movie actor, Ronald 
Reagan,” as his chief image of the “mediatized politics shaped by image alone” characteristic of 
the postmodern (330). Cultural movements rarely if ever have one political meaning, and thus 
there is more than enough truth to these formulations of a postmodernism born from political 
stasis in the 1950s, and disturbingly cozy with a brutal round of capitalist expansion in the 1980s. 
Especially as far as the earliest postmodernism goes, this dissertation indeed expands upon 
Schaub’s insight about postmodernism’s origins in the surprisingly conservative “new 
liberalism” of the 1950s, the liberalism of Arthur Schlesinger’s “vital center.” (See Chapters 
Three through Five in particular.) But while I don’t wish to dispute outright such conclusions 
about postmodernism’ political origins, I do seek to offer a compelling alternative to them. Most 
importantly, I draw out a more optimistic (from a left point of view) prehistory of the 
postmodern. For the early postmodern also had many origins in distinctly Old Left, class-radical 
concerns and aspirations involving the political possibilities of intellectual labor. 
Postmodernism’s class-radical potential, I will show, inhered at the start—even in such 
comparatively apolitical authors as Vladimir Nabokov. 
The materialist politics of the New York Intellectuals also entailed certain literary and 
theoretical commitments that the dissertation seeks to illuminate, further challenging our 
standard conceptions of postmodernism as a result. The very name of “postmodernism,” to begin 
with, reveals a curious linearity in literary-historical thought. Whether the “post-” in 
postmodernism is taken merely as a chronological marker of that which comes after modernism, 
or as a more agonistic name for an aesthetic movement that presumably “challenges [the] earlier 
legitimating narratives” of modernism (Appiah 353), the term undeniably serves to put “the 
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postmodern” in dialogue with modernism, and modernism alone. Our best and oftentimes most 
historicist critics of postmodernism have reinforced this notion, if unintentionally. Writing 
against “The Myth of the Postmodernist Breakthrough” way back in 1979, for example, Gerald 
Graff insisted that the postmodern was only a return to a modernism itself rooted in romanticism 
(31-62). Ihab Hassan’s also early and now canonical writings on the postmodern offered iconic 
charts counterposing the postmodern to the modern (267-68). In the mid-eighties, Andreas 
Huyssen and Charles Newman both posited postmodernism as a reaction to the 
institutionalization and academicization of modernism.4 Marxist critics have also seen the 
postmodern and the modern in such bipolar terms. Fredric Jameson magisterially reads 
postmodernism as the cultural logic of a late capitalism defined against an earlier monopoly 
capitalism that underwrote the practices of modernism (Postmodernism 36), while Harvey 
interprets postmodernism as the cultural logic of a post-Fordist mode of production opposed to 
the Fordism of the modernist era—complete with an Hassan-like chart, as he himself notes (340-
41). Thus the postmodern has been figured continually as either a continuation of modernism (a 
hyper-modernism, or even a hyper-romanticism to boot, in Graff’s case) or as a more or less 
decisive break from modernism. 
 The most exclusively literary aim of this dissertation, however, is to demonstrate that the 
early postmodern was very much a response to contemporary difficulties within a still-living 
realism, as much as it was a response to the flagging energies of modernism. Though they have 
become celebrated as some of the chief institutionalizers of modernism in America, the New 
York Intellectuals whose thoughts on intellectual labor I will trace here were nevertheless all 
passionate devotees of literary realism, and their thoughts and realist depictions of their 
intellectual labor all lay foundations for postmodernism’s most treasured ideas and habits. For                                                         
4 See Huyssen’s chapter on “Mapping the Postmodern,” 178-221, and Newman’s chapters 18 and 20. 
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these authors, realism was not merely a style, but a social commitment to represent society in 
imaginative but still faithful terms. Realism was a categorical imperative that followed from their 
socialist and then liberal politics, in short; serious authors had an obligation to represent society 
accurately by whatever means worked best. And my dissertation suggests that even as they 
recorded some of their worries about the fate of realism, the New York Intellectuals made 
possible the ideas and practices of the earliest postmodernism. Crucially often through their 
theories about realism’s troubles, they created a milieu in which postmodernism might thrive. 
 The last and perhaps grandest revisionary aim of this dissertation parallels this literary-
historical argument about realism on the plane of theory. We have become accustomed to 
understanding the postmodern as a rejection of totalization and the universal. Here the name of 
Lyotard is prominent, though one could find literally scores of others registering similar 
opinions. 1979’s The Postmodern Condition, which did more than most any other book to 
solidify the theoretical existence of something called the “postmodern,” sympathetically defined 
the postmodern as an “incredulity toward metanarratives” (xxix), and in supposedly postmodern 
spirit proceeded to declare any impulse toward totality and universality as a form of intellectual 
“terror” seeking to shut down legitimate disagreement (46, 63-64). The totalizing aspirations of 
reason were politically dubious at best, in this formulation. Large sections of the academic 
cultural left have since then adopted a similar credo, heralding a postmodern hostility toward 
universality and totalization as solid theoretical armature for attacks on white, straight, Western, 
etc. men’s pretenses to universal subjecthood. 
Critics on the left who have been more enamored of claims to universality have 
nevertheless largely accepted the idea that the postmodern was hostile to them. Two years before 
Lyotard, in a 1977 conclusion to the volume Aesthetics and Politics, Jameson discussed the 
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“emergence in full-blown and definitive form of that ultimate transformation of late monopoly 
capitalism variously known as the societé de consommation or as post-industrial society” 
(208)—what he would later call the postmodern era itself, in other words. He then called for “a 
new realism” in response (212), one which, while adopting the modernist emphasis of a “violent 
renewal of perception” (213), would nevertheless “resist [in the spirit of Lukács] the power of 
reification in consumer society and . . . reinvent that category of totality which, systematically 
undermined by existential fragmentation on all levels of life and social organization today, can 
alone project structural relations between classes as well as class struggles in other countries, in 
what has increasingly become a world system” (212-13). Jameson’s more famous 1984 article on 
postmodernism, with its call for “an aesthetic of cognitive mapping—a pedagogical political 
culture which seeks to endow the individual subject with some new heightened sense of its place 
in the global system” (Postmodernism 54), essentially elaborated on this Lukácsian realist and 
totalizing imperative. In the same year as Lyotard, and also calling on the spirit of Lukács, 
Gerald Graff likewise declared himself willing to support a form of postmodernism only if it 
would recognize epistemological uncertainty precisely as a problem, something to account for—
a sadly rare form of postmodernism that would “subserve a higher realism” by satirizing radical 
indeterminism or despairing over it, but would also in either case acknowledge the value of 
universal reason itself in the process (57).5 
Left enthusiasts and left critics of the postmodern have thus disagreed about the value of 
universal norms and totalizing thought in the realm of theory. Both have agreed, however, that 
the history of postmodernism is one primarily opposed to Enlightenment calls for reason in the 
realm of politics, including such calls from the Old Left. My dissertation suggests to the contrary                                                         
5 Given Graff and Jameson’s invocations of him, perhaps this is the moment to say that the monumentally 
problematic Lukács makes several appearances in this dissertation, and is indeed one underlying theoretical 
inspiration for it, despite comparatively few citations of him. 
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that Old-Left-rooted hopes for a universal reason and comprehension of the world were 
constitutive features of postmodernism at its start. Drawing on a hostility toward bureaucratic 
intellectual labor that was derived from 1930s theories of intellectuals as a class, I argue, the 
early postmodern registered intellectual workers’ fundamental desire to comprehend, and work 
upon, precisely the whole of a concept, rather than that partial fragment that work in a 
(bureaucratic, academic) department afforded. Despite later assaults on the concept of totality, I 
argue here, the early postmodern found its origins in precisely that Enlightenment desire for 
universality and understanding of the whole. 
 In sum, this dissertation seeks to reveal a surprising origin of postmodernism in the 
midcentury New York Intellectuals’ essentially still-radical hopes for an aesthetic practice and 
set of philosophical-political commitments rooted in intellectual workers’ desire for autonomous 
and dignified labor. With that aim in mind, the remainder of this Introduction offers a summary 
of the dissertation’s argument in more depth, chapter by chapter, providing necessary social 
contexts along the way.  
 
* * * * * * * * * * 
 
The Argument 
Class Work is divided into two major parts. While critics have long been familiar with the 
existence of “proletarian fiction” in the 1930s, Part I examines a lesser-known, more middle-
class counterpart to this genre, what I will call “intellectual labor fiction,” or novels about (and 
by) class-conscious intellectuals during the 1930s and ’40s. Eschewing the revolutionary 
optimism of most proletarian fiction, however, the intellectual labor fiction of the early New 
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York Intellectuals displays a growing and corrosive skepticism of what they understand to be 
their protagonists’ class, that of intellectual workers. This skepticism of an “intellectual class,” I 
contend, ironically promoted a mid-century discomfort with or even dismissal of class as a 
category of analysis, and thereby contributed to the later occlusion of postmodernism’s class 
origins. Part II, however, shows that this discomfort with class analysis did not succeed in 
expunging the social concern of New York Intellectual and other novelists in the forties and 
fifties. Instead, I argue, these authors transposed the earlier intellectual class theory into an 
extensive critique of intellectual workers’ increasingly bureaucratic working conditions, one that 
lay at the heart of the birth and then surprising growth of the campus novel as a popular genre in 
the fifties and sixties. I conclude that this new genre, richly bearing the marks of brain-worker 
fiction, created a space for, and even substantially influenced, the forms and themes of American 
literary postmodernism in its infancy. 
 
Part I: Class Unconsciousness, 1932-1950 
Suddenly vulnerable to economic shocks from which it had previously been shielded, the 
American middle class was hit hard by the Great Depression. In New York City—where all but 
one of the novelists studied throughout this dissertation lived in the early 1930s (Nabokov lived 
in Berlin, itself devastated by the worldwide depression)—this was especially true. There, “one 
out of five charity patients in the hospitals were salaried employees” in 1933, and a 1934 
government study of urban relief cases “revealed among them 649,000 professionals and clerical 
and other salaried employees” (Corey, Crisis 22). A full “40% of the needy seeking relief jobs 
were white collar workers, professionals and intellectuals” (25). Furthermore, as Robert Cantwell 
noted in 1934, “The crisis struck the New York literary world almost as hard as it struck the steel 
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industry. The number of novels printed dropped from about forty-five million in 1929 to about 
nineteen-million in 1931; and as the prominent novelists began writing book reviews for a living, 
book reviewers began living with their wives and families” (53). In no sense did the middle 
class, and especially the literary wing of the middle class in New York City, escape the 
Depression. 
In response, many intellectuals and other professional workers became radicalized. 
Though this dissertation focuses less on the Communist Party than on those Trotskyist 
organizations that opposed the Party from the left in the 1930s, the Party’s history is nevertheless 
distinctly representative of intellectuals’ leftward lurch. “During the thirties,” Nathan Glazer has 
observed, “the party was transformed from a largely working-class organization to one that was 
one-half middle class” (114). While the rolls of “five major districts” were reported as being only 
five per cent “office” and “intellectual” workers in January of 1932, by 1941 a survey of the 
entire party indicated that a full forty-four per cent of the Party were professional and white-
collar workers (114). Though the Communist Party traditionally had proclaimed itself “the 
vanguard of the proletariat,” then, “from the middle thirties to the early fifties, the period of its 
greatest size and its greatest influence, the party was rather more successful in becoming ‘the 
vanguard of the intellectual and professional workers’” (Glazer 130). In the largely New York-
centered and Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party, discussed in Chapter Two, Trotsky himself 
recognized similar social dynamic at work during a famed 1939 split. He proclaimed the schism 
the result of “A Petty-Bourgeois Opposition in the Socialist Workers Party” (98), and angrily 
declared that “When a few thousand workers join the party, they will call the petty-bourgeois 
anarchists severely to order. The sooner, the better” (“Open Letter” 162). However one felt about 
it, then, it is clear that intellectual workers drove much of the debate on the radical left in this era. 
 13 
Within this context of intellectuals’ radicalization, Part I of this dissertation traces the 
history of an idea debated frequently on the left in the 1930s and ’40s: that of intellectuals as a 
class. Though the theory is mostly known today, if at all, in one of its 1970s incarnations—as the 
neoconservative bête noire of the “New Class,” or the ambiguous socialist hope of Barbara and 
John Ehrenreich’s “Professional-Managerial Class” (PMC), for instance—the idea of a class of 
mental workers distinct from capital and proletariat has a much longer pedigree. It is a truly 
international theory that, depending how loosely one defines it, might be traced back as far as the 
French Enlightenment, when social philosophers like Saint-Simon argued for government by 
technocrats; or to British Romanticism, with Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s hope for a beneficent 
class of educated “clerisy” to guide the nation morally, expressed in his 1830 book The 
Constitution of Church and State.6 But Part I follows the expression of the idea in novels and 
essays from its specifically American and largely Communist birth during the fall of 1932, 
through to its career, on the dissident Trotskyist left in the later 1930s and 1940s, as the 
increasingly skeptical theory of a “new class” that ruled via a system of “bureaucratic 
collectivism.” I argue that as this theory grew more important in socialist circles during the era, 
its influence increasingly served to create skepticism about the role of intellectuals in proletarian 
                                                        
6 For a brief summary of Saint-Simon’s theories, see Bruce-Briggs 10; for discussion of the idea of a “clerisy” in 
Coleridge, see Kirk 142-43. The literature on the intellectual class (“New Class”) idea is large and still growing. 
Here I will offer a preliminary bibliography for those new to the idea. Coming from opposed political perspectives 
(neoconservative and socialist, respectively), B. Bruce-Briggs and Barbara Ehrenreich nevertheless both offer 
among the most admirable short summaries of the intellectual class idea’s history, and I benefited greatly from them 
when starting out: see Bruce-Briggs’s introduction to The New Class? (1-18), and the fourth chapter of Ehrenreich’s 
Fear of Falling (144-95). Daniel Bell, a critic of the neoconservatives’ New Class idea (“a muddled concept” in 
Bruce-Briggs) whose thought nevertheless has had a selective influence on neoconservatism, presents a more 
international and characteristically encyclopedic history of it in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, pp. 80-112. 
For him, it should be noted, the concept of a new class is thoroughly enmeshed with that of bureaucracy—a concept 
central to Part II of this dissertation. Lawrence Peter King and Iván Szelényi offer a comprehensive summary of the 
idea in their 2004 book Theories of the New Class. Haberkern and Lipow’s Neither Capitalism Nor Socialism 
gathers together some of the key essays on “bureaucratic collectivism” that I discuss in Chapters Two and Three, 
though a perusal of my citations will reveal other sources. One subsidiary aim of this dissertation, particularly the 
first three chapters, is to explicate the idea’s travels and consequences in American intellectual history, in more 
depth than has appeared to date in the cited publications. 
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politics. Part I allows us to see that such skepticism could lead in two opposed directions: first 
toward the sometimes antipolitical and always antileftist “end of ideology” ethos that 
characterized 1950s intellectual life; and second toward a profound liberal but potentially still 
radical left critique of intellectuals’ isolation from social and political life itself. Both these 
trends, I contend, were important to the emergence of literary and intellectual postmodernism in 
the 1960s. 
Chapter One examines the earliest attempts of 1930s intellectuals to work out the 
political complications of their class position, and then analyzes how such debates were 
comprehended in Tess Slesinger’s first and only novel, The Unpossessed (1934). The fall of 
1932 saw two of the first U.S. articulations of the theory of an intellectual class: Culture and the 
Crisis, the influential manifesto of the League of Professional Groups, which urged intellectuals 
to vote Communist; and “White Collars and Horny Hands,” Max Nomad’s controversial article 
describing intellectuals’ typical sabotage of proletarian revolutions. Both acknowledged at least 
the possibility of intellectual workers’ legitimate participation in proletarian revolution. But I 
argue that both also shared a revealing and historically momentous ambivalence about the exact 
purpose of intellectuals in a revolution. Were truly revolutionary intellectuals simply to follow 
the revolutionary working class, or to lead it? Were they merely to participate in a broader social 
movement, or direct it from outside? Slesinger’s The Unpossessed encapsulates these works’ 
commonalities and contradictions, I suggest, by depicting a class of foundering, self-involved 
Communist intellectuals through the Freudian lens of narcissism. Narcissistically intent on 
seeing themselves as leaders of a revolution, the novel’s intellectuals cannot comprehend the 
bodily and political existence of a proletariat outside their imaginations, and so fail to create even 
the first issue of a radical literary magazine. This intellectual class is thus not capable of leading 
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a revolution, certainly, let alone following one. Yet these intellectuals’ defining (and isolating) 
high-mindedness and insistence on their own autonomy, the novel suggests in a sentimental 
moment, may still afford them an important leadership role to play after the revolution, when 
economic necessity will take a back seat to other social values. Slesinger’s Janus-faced political 
critique and appreciation of intellectual workers’ independence and autonomy from other 
classes, I conclude, lay foundations for both the postmodern skepticism of bureaucratic 
(“disciplinary”) institutions whose social isolation thwarts democratic control, and the 
postmodern valorization of an essentially independent play, undecidability, and indeterminacy. 
Chapter Two demonstrates how Mary McCarthy’s first novel, 1942’s The Company She 
Keeps, engages with a contemporary Trotskyist theory of the intellectual class that attempted to 
explain the failure of the Soviet Union under Stalin. The theory of “bureaucratic collectivism” 
posited that a new class of intellectual workers in Russia—sometimes later called the New 
Class—had subverted Lenin’s proletarian revolution by creating a vast government bureaucracy 
that dominated proletarians and capitalists alike. I argue that by extending Slesinger’s technique 
of class psychoanalysis, McCarthy’s novel portrays a potentially revolutionary class of 
American, New Deal intellectuals whose narcissistic attraction to power may be used for either 
the good of democratic socialism, or—more likely, in the novel’s rendering—the ill of an 
American version of bureaucratic collectivism. This critique of bureaucracy in relation to 
intellectual work, I argue, would prove fundamental to the emergence of a fundamentally 
antibureaucratic postmodern literary, social, and political thought two decades later. 
Chapter Three shows how such comparatively obscure theories of intellectual labor were 
catapulted into the mainstream of American literary and political thought via what Cynthia Ozick 
has called the “now nearly incomprehensible influence” of Lionel Trilling’s fiction and criticism 
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of the forties (115). Reading Trilling’s 1947 novel The Middle of the Journey, as well as his 
seminal essay collection The Liberal Imagination (1950), the chapter argues that Trilling’s 
account of the New Class in these works not only contributed to an increasingly conservative and 
anti-intellectual “new liberal” movement in the U.S., but transmuted the theory of an ambitious 
and authoritarian intellectual class into an influential account of the conceptual and political 
dangers of “ideology.” The “end of ideology” ethos that subsequently dominated U.S. 
intellectual life, I argue, was a largely moralizing rhetoric that obscured the earlier, more 
materialist and class-based explanations of the growing social significance of intellectual labor—
explanations that might have more fully accounted for postmodernism when it arrived in the 
following decades. 
 
Part II: The Groves of Postmodernism, 1943-1962 
While Part I shows how the intellectual class idea could be forgotten, Part II nevertheless 
suggests the ways in which it was not forgotten. I argue specifically that the genre of the campus 
novel was an important inheritor of 1930s and ’40s intellectual labor fiction, and thus of 
intellectual class theory in America, and that the campus novel was in turn a critical participant 
in the emergence of postmodern fiction in the 1960s.  
If intellectual class theory is the intellectual underpinning of Part I, the campus novel’s 
meaning as a genre likewise forms the lynchpin of my argument in Part II, and indeed of the 
dissertation as a whole. But as a popular genre often dismissed as more fun than significant, the 
campus novel is, as the saying goes, “undertheorized.” Thus a brief Interlude at the start of Part 
II offers a theory of the genre. I distinguish between the campus novel—a postwar genre 
satirizing professors and administrators—and the academic novel more generally, which includes 
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all novels about academic life, and which has a history in America stretching back to Nathaniel 
Hawthorne’s debut novel, 1828’s Fanshawe, set at Hawthorne’s alma mater Bowdoin College. 
While from the 1880s onward the academic novel in America was bound up in middle-class 
hopes for success in the newly-dominant professions, I argue, the campus novel’s emergence in 
the 1950s was distinguished by its chiefly sardonic attitude toward the labor of a middle class 
now increasingly employed by large bureaucratic institutions. 
 This understanding of the genre in hand, we turn to the specific professor-cum-authors 
whose academic fictions and criticism contributed strongly to the ethos of postmodernism when 
it emerged in the 1960s. Lionel Trilling did not write any campus novels, but his best-regarded 
(and most earnest) depiction of faculty life, 1943’s short story “Of This Time, Of That Place,” 
may still be understood as an important contribution to the emergence of the satirical campus 
novel of the 1950s—a contribution that suggests, moreover, the campus novel’s roots in the 
intellectual class theory described in Part I. Chapter Four examines Trilling’s short story 
alongside his now better-known critical essays from this period, revealing that Trilling regarded 
academic labor as intellectual class labor par excellence: it is on his account fundamentally 
bureaucratic, narrow and given to simplistic pigeon-holing. But this chapter also argues that the 
famously moderate Trilling nevertheless nurtured a utopian hope for a type of academic labor, 
both wide-ranging and creative, that would transcend such bureaucratic constrictions. I go on to 
show that Trilling’s antibureaucratic ambivalence toward academic labor, expressed both in 
fiction and essays, lies at the center of his 1948 conception of a novel of ideas as opposed to 
ideology. And this specifically realist genre’s self-consciousness and insistence on intellectual 
complexity, I argue, possesses striking affinities with the postmodern novel’s famed embrace of 
metafiction, and its valorization of indeterminacy. 
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Chapters Five and Six then expand upon the possibilities revealed by Trilling’s 
simultaneous hopes and fears for academic labor, detailing the outsized role of the 
antibureaucratic campus novel in the creation of the postmodern novel. Chapter Five examines 
what is often dubbed the “first” campus novel, Mary McCarthy’s The Groves of Academe 
(1952). Writing with her friend Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) fresh in 
her memory, McCarthy depicts a quintessentially bureaucratic campus awash in the reified 
pseudo-information characteristic of bureaucratic and segmented organizations such as those of a 
totalitarian state. I argue that her scathing depiction of campus politics in fact offers a key to 
understanding her political ideal in this era, which is that of a precisely universalist—trans-
departmental, if you will—liberal politics. Borrowing some ideas from McCarthy’s early sixties 
essays on the troubles of realistic fiction, I conclude by demonstrating that in her inaugural 
campus novel’s uneasily realist satire of professors as political intriguers, lodged in a radically 
decentralized system devoted to its own perpetuation rather than to any notion of truth, we have 
an accurate if profoundly anxious preview of both postmodern fiction and postmodern 
(especially Foucauldian) theories of power. 
Chapter Six turns to Soviet refugee Vladimir Nabokov’s much-celebrated campus novel, 
1962’s Pale Fire, now often read as an iconic exemplar of the postmodern itself. The novel’s 
depiction of academic life and its parody of literary-critical discourse, I contend, satirize 
bureaucratic existence and thought as simplistic and narrow-minded. Simultaneously, the novel 
glorifies the complexity of aesthetic experience as an antidote to bureaucracy. Offering a brief 
synopsis of potential Derridean and Foucauldian readings of Pale Fire, I go on to argue that the 
antibureaucratic animus of the novel makes it not only a prototypical novel of 1950s late 
modernism, but also of 1960s early poststructuralism and postmodernism. I conclude by 
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demonstrating that Pale Fire’s proto-poststructuralist themes and sheer writerly exuberance 
valorize the aesthetic not only as a complex experience of readerly consumption, but also as an 
authorial craft labor opposed to the increasingly “deskilled,” Taylorized intellectual labor of the 
postwar academy. As an intellectual-class satire of the bureaucratization of intellectual work, and 
a celebration of the potential for a more creative and autonomous labor, the mock-academic 
aesthetic of Pale Fire helped create the content and form alike of early postmodernism. 
A brief Epilogue takes stock of the political meanings of postmodernism in both the 
1960s and today. As against recent critics who have suggested that postmodernism represents a 
“libertarian turn” in literary and intellectual history, effectively aiding the New Right’s 
dismantling of the welfare state, I offer a reckoning of the historical and contemporary political 
value of the postmodernism I have limned here. The early postmodern hope for intellectual 
workers’ autonomy, I argue, served the New Left well, and might offer us guidance still.  
 
* * * * * * * * * * 
 
Fredric Jameson notes that the class origins of postmodernist culture may be understood 
as “the expression of the ‘consciousness’ of a whole new class fraction,” called variously the 
“new petit bourgeoisie, a professional-managerial class, or more succinctly as ‘the yuppies’” 
(Postmodernism 407). The ideologies of any such “class fraction,” Jameson goes on to 
emphasize, do not have to directly articulate those of the ruling class; they only have to 
“articulate the world in the most useful way functionally, or in ways that can be functionally 
reappropriated” (407). And, he concludes,  
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Why a certain class fraction should provide these ideological articulations is a 
historical question as intriguing as the question of the sudden dominance of a 
particular writer or a particular style. There can surely be no model or formula 
given in advance for these historical questions; just as surely, however, we have 
not yet worked this out for what we now call postmodernism. (407) 
Agreeing with those who understand the postmodern as the expression of something like a 
“professional-managerial class,” this dissertation helps answer Jameson’s historical questions. It 
suggests why and how a class fraction of intellectual workers from the 1930s through the 1950s 
provided key ideological articulations of postmodernism in the 1960s. Most importantly, by 
revealing an unfamiliar ancestry of postmodernism in American fiction and thought—one 
ultimately rooted in the socialist, realism-inspired, antibureaucratic universalism characteristic of 
the New York Intellectuals—this dissertation proves that intellectual workers’ earliest 
expressions of recognizably postmodern sentiments were not by any means wholly friendly to 
any “ruling class” in America. And ultimately the genealogy I present here should help us to 
understand and advance the labor-left heritage of the literary and political moments I document. 
For the histories of realism and postmodernism, of Old Left and New Left, may have much to 
tell us still about the present-day struggles of intellectuals for dignified labor. 
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Part I 
 
Class Unconsciousness, 1932-1950 
 
 
 
 
The reform of consciousness consists only in enabling the world to clarify its 
consciousness, in waking it from its dream about itself . . . 
—Karl Marx, “For A Ruthless Criticism of Everything Existing” (1844) 
 
[T]he organisation of the revolutionaries must consist first and foremost of people 
who make revolutionary activity their profession . . . . In view of this common 
characteristic of the members of such an organisation, all distinctions as between 
workers and intellectuals . . . must be effaced. 
—V. I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement (1902)
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Chapter One 
 
Professional Revolutionaries:  
Tess Slesinger and the Origins of Intellectual Class Theory in America 
 
 
1. Personal and Political 
Relatively unknown today, Tess Slesinger’s The Unpossessed (1934) is an entertaining 
and yet sometimes poignant satire of intellectuals in the 1930s. Detailing the personal lives of 
three male Marxist (or at least pseudo-Marxist) intellectuals and their wives and lovers in New 
York City, it chiefly chronicles its intellectuals’ hapless attempts to found a literary and political 
magazine. At the start, Miles Flinders and his wife Margaret are stuck in a foundering marriage, 
with Miles regularly receiving cuts in his salary at work; the egocentric Jeffrey Blake writes 
vapid novels while perpetually cheating on his maternal and (perhaps only seemingly) oblivious 
wife Norah; and Bruno Leonard teaches college English and dreams one day of starting a 
magazine with Miles and Jeffrey. The real action comes when one day they all agree to actually 
start the (soon-capitalized) Magazine, hoping that the militant working-class student group 
known as the “Black Sheep” will provide political stimulus for the enterprise. In the burst of 
activity following this decision, the intellectuals’ personal lives become animated and happier. 
Miles and Margaret conceive a child, and Miles for once seems to be able to accept his wife’s 
love; Jeffrey Blake is able to have affairs while convincing himself he is advancing the cause of 
revolution through them. Bruno sets aside his unconscious attraction to young Emmett 
Middleton, one of the Black Sheep’s number, in favor of an attraction to his cousin Elizabeth, 
who is arriving back in America after a bohemian life in Paris. This period of animation ends 
sadly, though, when one of the Black Sheep (Cornelia) faints from hunger during a planning 
meeting for the Magazine. Her fainting reminds the intellectuals of the bodily seriousness of the 
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political issues that they are, finally, only playing at. At a fundraising party for the Magazine, it 
all comes apart in a rambling, tragicomically self-denigrating speech about intellectuals and 
politics given by Bruno. The novel ends poignantly and symbolically with Margaret’s regretful 
and bitter trip to the hospital for an abortion. 
Meditating on the less-than-universal subject of the political and personal lives of Marxist 
intellectuals in the 1930s, then, one would expect The Unpossessed to be a novel for specialists 
alone. But despite its seemingly narrow appeal, the novel has proved surprisingly popular. It’s 
been reprinted regularly, if not frequently—by Avon in 1966, The Feminist Press in 1984, and 
most recently New York Review Books in 2002. Critics interested in left politics have taken up 
the novel repeatedly. Most have understood the novel as a roman à clef about specific 
contemporaries—or at least historically, as a document of a particular moment in Marxist and/or 
feminist experience and history. Murray Kempton, Lionel Trilling, and Alan Wald, for example, 
have all read the novel in the context of the evolution of the Menorah Journal that Tess Slesinger 
contributed to frequently in her youth—a magazine dedicated to issues of Jewish identity, whose 
editors and contributors moved leftward over the course of the 1930s, eventually constituting a 
significant portion of those writers who revamped the Partisan Review as a Trotsky-sympathetic 
journal in 1937. Wald has offered the fullest person-for-person correspondences for the novel in 
this vein, for example, identifying the characters of Bruno Leonard as Elliot Cohen, the journal’s 
editor; Miles Flinders as Slesinger’s ex-husband Herbert Solow, who went on to serve as one of 
Trotsky’s chief American defenders against Stalin; and Jeffrey Blake as Max Eastman, the 
eventual translator of Trotsky and a Marxist theorist in his own right, with whom Slesinger had 
an affair—much as the character of Margaret Flinders does with Blake in the novel (68).1                                                         
1 In 1955 Murray Kempton saw the novel as “almost our only surviving document on a group of intellectuals who 
were drawn to the Communists early in the thirties and left them very soon,” and was the first to recognize in print 
 24 
Feminist critics have latched on to the novel as well, with Janet Sharistanian arguing that “its 
specific focus is the relationship between politics and sexual politics” (371), and Paula 
Rabinowitz reading it as “a political evocation of [the] dilemma [of the] female intellectual” 
caught in a patriarchal Marxist intellectual milieu that did not countenance women’s concerns as 
political ones (149).2 
But whatever their focus, what has united political critics of the novel has been the 
feeling that the novel is conspicuously thin in its political content, despite its knowing depiction 
of characters supposedly immersed in politics. Phillip Rahv’s review of the novel in the New 
Masses started the trend, complaining that the novel “fails to give a disciplined orientation” for 
recently radicalized intellectuals (“Storm” 26). Soon thereafter Robert Cantwell noted in The 
New Outlook that the political and economic background of the book is “neglected,” and 
lamented that “The real confusion through which the intellectuals moved in the period covered 
by the book . . . had more meaning than is given to it here” (57). In later years, literary critics 
have agreed with Cantwell’s assessment. To the extent that the novel concerns itself with 
“documenting” the New York Intellectual scene, Trilling took the time to observe in 1966, the 
                                                        
that its main characters were modeled on the people who would be central in the creation of a new Partisan Review 
in 1937 (122). A decade after that, Lionel Trilling admitted that the novel had some “evidential” value (5), and spent 
time describing the Menorah Journal as valuable context for this (7-15), as well as its more Marxist roots (15-20). 
Wald, too, sets the novel primarily in the context of the Menorah Journal group (64-74). Janet Sharistanian, while 
not primarily concerned with real-world correspondences, has also identified Margaret Flinders and Elizabeth 
Leonard each as representatives of Slesinger herself, respectively a “socially conscious, yet confused, educated, 
middle-class young woman of the 1930s” and a 1920s “flapper” (376-77). 
The pursuit of real-life correspondences has not resulted in unanimity, however. When Kempton seemed to 
identify Lionel Trilling (“a critic of notable powers” [122]) as a model for Bruno Leonard, Trilling took care to 
disavow any resemblance (“Novel” 19). (Indeed, the manically funny Bruno Leonard would seem to be a poor fit for 
the more reserved and serious Trilling.) And Diana Trilling identifies Jeffrey Blake as Melvin Levy, a friend of 
Slesinger’s (Beginning 137), rather than as the more famous Max Eastman that Alan Wald spies in Blake. (On 
Slesinger’s affair with Eastman, however, see Biagi 226-27.) 
2 Oddly enough, Lionel Trilling, of all published critics, appears to have been the first to note legitimate “ground” 
for a feminist reading of the novel. The Unpossessed might be understood, he wrote, as “that so often graceless 
thing, a novel of feminine protest.” But he then asserted that such a reading would miss the novel’s “real intention” 
to portray a dialectic between “life” and “the desire to make life as good as it might be” (23, my emphasis)—
between a seemingly implacable reality and the political urge itself, we might translate. 
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novel fails because it lacks respect for its prototypes’ detailed knowledge of politics (18-19). 
Wald quotes Sidney Hook to the effect that “There is no coherent presentation of any political 
idea” in the novel (New York 40), and—though he clearly admires the novel more than Hook—
he ultimately also finds the novel essentially “limited” (64) because of its “failure . . . to portray 
the political essence of the [Menorah Journal] group” (72). Sharistanian summarized the 
consensus view quite pithily in 1984, noting an “uneven density” to the novel: “though it 
dramatizes the intersection between private and political spheres of commitment and action,” she 
writes, it contains “more depth in presentations of the former sphere than of the latter” (372). The 
novel’s politics, critics have agreed, pale in comparison to its psychological portraits. 
I agree too. The Unpossessed is wonderfully long on understanding its characters’ 
personal motivations, and relatively short on political analysis of their intellectual and political 
milieu. But nevertheless I think the novel’s attention to contemporary Marxist thought deserves 
more serious attention than it has received to date. For The Unpossessed, I will argue in this 
chapter, is engaged with a specific, important, and influential theoretical debate of Marxism in its 
day—that over the concept of an intellectual class. This concept would go on to have a 
remarkable career throughout the twentieth century, often under such more familiar latter-day 
names as the New Class or Professional-Managerial Class (PMC). I will therefore first examine 
the contemporary theoretical debate over intellectuals as a class that occurred in radical New 
York City circles during the early 1930s. A manifesto and a journal article on the topic of 
intellectuals’ roles in revolutionary politics helped legitimize the idea that intellectuals were a 
class, I will show. But they also revealed key fissures in the concept, fissures that would have 
profound consequences for the idea’s political uses throughout the twentieth century—a history 
that this dissertation examines in some depth. I will then examine The Unpossessed’s roots in 
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this contradictory theory of an intellectual class, arguing first for its ultimate political (and not 
just personal) skepticism about this intellectual class’s ability to offer any aid to proletarian 
politics. But secondly I will argue for its perhaps surprising sympathy for the class’s need for 
autonomy from such politics. In dramatizing this alternately skeptical and enthusiastic (yet 
always revolutionary in intent) concept of an intellectual class, I conclude, Tess Slesinger’s 
novel helped launch key debates over intellectual labor that would become central to 
postmodernism’s emergence several decades later. 
 
2. The Political Contradictions of the Intellectual Class Idea 
Amidst spreading unemployment and poverty that affected not only the working class but 
salaried professionals as well, the American theory of an intellectual class was born in New York 
City in the fall of 1932.3 That September, a group of “over fifty American writers, painters, 
teachers and other professional workers” gathered together to support William Z. Foster and 
James W. Ford’s bid for the presidency under the Communist ticket (League 31). They soon 
formed the League of Professional Groups for Foster and Ford, one of the “most important 
organizations of revolutionary intellectuals that existed during the early 1930s” (Wald, New York 
54). Centered in New York City, they wrote a brief press release announcing their support for the 
CPUSA and its candidates. The next month, they wrote and published forty thousand copies of a 
manifesto urging other professional workers to do so as well (58). It took the form of an election 
pamphlet titled Culture and the Crisis: An Open Letter to the Writers, Artists, Teachers, 
Physicians, Engineers, Scientists, and Other Professional Workers of America. An unillustrated, 
thirty-two-page booklet printed on plain paper and published by the relatively obscure Workers                                                         
3 See the Introduction for more on the social context of middle class hardship during the Great Depression, 
especially in New York City. 
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Library Publishers, its appearance was modest, even drab. Yet it would be difficult to 
overestimate the significance of Culture and the Crisis as a founding document of the 1930s 
literary and intellectual left. Its fifty-three signatories constitute a who’s who of that decade’s 
radical intellectuals and writers. The literary figures alone include Sherwood Anderson, Fielding 
Burke, Erskine Caldwell, Malcolm Cowley, Countee Cullen, John Dos Passos, Theodore 
Dreiser, Waldo Frank, Granville Hicks, Langston Hughes, and Edmund Wilson; prominent 
intellectuals such as Sidney Hook, Matthew Josephson, James Rorty, and Lincoln Steffens also 
signed on. According to Michael Denning, the manifesto represented “the first . . . attempt by the 
[American] left to theorize the social and political significance of modern mental labor” (99). As 
such, Culture and the Crisis also marked the American left’s first attempt to theorize modern 
intellectuals and intellectual work in Marxist terms. 
Those terms were specifically those of class. For this founding document of the 1930s 
left regards intellectuals as part of a class of “brain workers” separate from both the proletariat 
and the capitalists. The authors begin by identifying themselves as a group “listed among the so-
called ‘intellectuals’ of our generation,” and then ask 
Why should we as a class be humble? Practically everything that is orderly and 
sane and useful in America was made by two classes of Americans; our class, the 
class of brain workers, and the “lower classes”, [sic] the muscle workers. . . . 
[W]e reject the disorder, the lunacy spawned by grabbers, advertisers, traders, 
speculators, salesman, the much-adulated, immensely stupid and irresponsible 
“business men.” (3) 
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Located between the productive “lower classes” of muscle workers and the greedy and stupid 
“business” class of capitalists, the self-described “intellectuals” authoring the letter claim a 
common class with all professional workers. 
This idea, of the class identity of a group of brain workers located between capital and 
labor, would become central to an influential generation of intellectual and literary figures in 
New York City, a group sometimes referred to as the New York Intellectuals. Their shared idea 
of a class of intellectual workers is the subject of Part I of this dissertation. In this section of the 
chapter, then, I will lay out the theoretical origins of the idea as represented in Culture and the 
Crisis, and in a now much more obscure article published in the Autumn 1932 issue of The 
Modern Quarterly: Max Nomad’s “White Collars and Horny Hands.” If one knows these two 
works well, the notion of yoking them together as representative of a common theory of an 
intellectual class will undoubtedly seem counterintuitive. One of the main authors of Culture and 
the Crisis—radical economist Lewis Corey—had felt the need to denounce Nomad’s thesis 
before readers read it, after all: in the editorial for the issue of The Modern Quarterly where 
Nomad’s article appeared, Corey declared that the journal “disagrees thoroughly with the article 
by Nomad,” and was publishing it only because “it may be useful to expose the theory in 
advance” of its possible dissemination to increasingly revolutionary masses, who might be 
misled by it (“Role” 10).4 But as I will soon demonstrate, Corey’s manifesto and Nomad’s article 
have more in common than either of their authors would have wished to admit. I will argue 
specifically that while Culture and the Crisis championed a revolutionary ideal of intellectuals’ 
                                                        
4 Denning calls Corey the “main writer of Culture and the Crisis” and provides a brief biography of this fascinating 
figure, calling him the “great theorist of the Popular Front social movement, the American Antonio Gramsci” (99); 
see 99-101. Wald, however, reckons Corey as only one of the manifesto’s authors (though first on his list), giving 
credit also to “[Malcolm] Cowley, [James] Rorty, [Sidney] Hook, and [Matthew] Josephson” (New York 58). In any 
case, Corey was clearly a main contributor. For more on Corey, see Paul Buhle’s biography, A Dreamer’s Paradise 
Lost.  
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autonomy from capital—an ideal that would unify and sustain the remarkable appeal of the 
theory of an intellectual class throughout the twentieth century—Culture and the Crisis and its 
nominally opposing article “White Collars and Horny Hands” nevertheless exhibited a common 
and central ambivalence about whether intellectuals should be leaders or followers of the 
working class in revolutionary socialist politics. This key dichotomy ultimately hints at the 
intellectual class idea’s contradictory political uses in the years that followed. Last but not least, I 
will suggest that Nomad’s article revealed from the outset the method by which many of the 
intellectual class idea’s proponents would attempt to unravel the uncertain intentions of 
intellectual workers’ involvement in radical politics: psychoanalysis. In short, these initial 
expositions of the theory of an intellectual class reveal in embryo the paradigmatic features of its 
consistently idealistic but ultimately contradictory political trajectory over at least two decades. 
Culture and the Crisis begins its description of an intellectual class by allying its “brain 
workers,” the intellectual class, with its “muscle workers,” the working class. Professionals have 
more and more in common with the working class as capitalism declines, it argues. The “brain 
workers who give technical or educational services are not spared” from the economic crisis 
engulfing the nation (9): teachers, librarians, architects, and engineers are unemployed too. Like 
the industrial workers displaced by new forms of technology, for example, musicians are subject 
to “technological unemployment through the development of radio, talking-movies and the like” 
(10). The professional class is just as injured as industrial workers in the crisis.  
But if Culture and the Crisis attempts to cultivate cross-class solidarity by citing the 
common fate of all workers under capitalism, it also cites—as the title might lead one to 
expect—the cultural effects of capitalist crisis. Here it tried to appeal to the specific and distinct 
class concerns of cultural workers: their autonomy from capitalists. “What we see ahead is the 
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threat of cultural dissolution,” the preface warns (3); capitalism has rotted “the fibre [sic] of our 
culture, and stultifies large sections of our people” (14-15), leading to widespread censorship and 
propaganda, as well as reduced arts funding. Capitalism is “hostile to the genuine culture of the 
past and present and bitterly opposed to the new cultural tendencies which have grown out of the 
epic of working class struggle for a new society” (29). The “immensely stupid” business men 
who run the country also hope to run intellectuals’ lives. But intellectual workers must resist this. 
“We claim the right to live and to function,” the manifesto asserted. “It is our business to think 
and we shall not permit business men to teach us our business” (3). Thus while the pamphlet 
argues that capitalism threatens mass unemployment of proletarian and professional alike, it 
strenuously warns that the specific concerns of the professional class—culture, ideas, and above 
all intellectual autonomy—are threatened by capitalism, too. 
Communism, on the other hand, promises to protect these professional class concerns. It 
is conservative: it will “save civilization and its cultural heritage from the abyss to which the 
world crisis is driving it” (30). And it is revolutionary as well: it will usher in “a new cultural 
renaissance” of culture and ideas (30). Under the planned economy of communism, intellectuals 
will have a freer hand in their “business,” having been released from the irrationality and 
ugliness spawned by the profit motive. Under communism 
the engineer need consider only the efficiency of his work, the economist and 
statistician can purposively plan the organization, management and social 
objectives of industry, the architect is released from profit and speculative 
motives and may express his finest aspirations in buildings of social utility and 
beauty, the physician becomes the unfettered organizer of social preventative 
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medicine, the teacher, writer, and artist fashion the creative ideology of a new 
world and a new culture. (18) 
Preserving and nurturing the “genuine culture” of the past, present, and future, communism will 
also enable intellectual workers to work more freely. The communist revolution will provide 
bread, yes; but it is “also and necessarily a cultural revolution” that will provide those particular 
roses favored by the professional class (22). In short, communism promised intellectual and 
creative autonomy for the intellectual class. 
This promise and ideal would resonate with intellectual workers for the duration of the 
twentieth century, as the rest of this dissertation will show: intellectual autonomy remained a 
lodestar for intellectuals’ politics. But another aspect of the manifesto would resonate for 
intellectuals throughout the century as well, both directly and indirectly, and with much less 
predictable effects. For Culture and the Crisis was confused about the role intellectuals were to 
play in any socialist revolution. Scholars of the intellectual class idea in America should 
understand this confusion—and indeed the whole theory’s origin—within the context of the 
American Marxist left’s understanding of revolutionary theory after the founding of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics in 1917. Specifically, the American intellectual class theory we are 
tracing here arose from a debate over Vladimir Lenin’s beliefs regarding intellectuals’ roles in 
revolution, which departed from Marxist tradition in significant ways.  
Some background is required. When Marx and Engels had written about proletarian 
revolution, they did not imagine any great role for intellectuals. As the capitalist era comes to an 
end, the Manifesto of the Communist Party predicted in 1848, the breakdown of the ruling class 
and indeed society itself assumes “such a violent, glaring character, that . . . a portion of the 
bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, 
 32 
who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement 
as a whole” (481). This was all. As Ralph Miliband notes, “Marx and Engels attributed no 
special ‘role’ to the intellectuals-cum-ideologists who had ‘gone over’ to the proletariat” (60).  
With Lenin, however, this changed. In 1902’s What Is To Be Done? he argued that “The 
history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to 
develop only trade-union consciousness, i.e. the conviction that it is necessary to combine in 
unions, fight the employers, and strive to compel the government to pass necessary labour 
legislation, etc.” (31-32). For Lenin, the working class could not create a revolution on its own. 
But the “theory of socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical, and economic 
theories elaborated by educated representatives of the propertied classes, by intellectuals” such 
as Marx and Engels themselves, he noted (32). And thus while workers knew intimately the 
conditions in factories and the like, they needed and wanted intellectuals to supply them with 
revolutionary theory and political knowledge (72-74). Consequently any political party truly 
capable of forming a revolution would have to fuse intellectuals and workers together, joining 
revolutionary theory with revolutionary practice. Once part of the revolutionary party, 
intellectuals and workers alike would have to lose their character as intellectuals or workers, 
Lenin argued, and instead become “professional revolutionaries” above all (107, emphasis in 
original)—“people who make revolutionary activity their profession” (109), who dedicate their 
whole lives to fomenting revolution. As party members, then, intellectuals had a special role to 
play in Leninist working-class revolutionary politics. These party intellectuals were required to 
impart revolutionary theory to workers who would otherwise only come to trade-union 
consciousness.5                                                         
5 In this summary I have attempted to avoid certain Cold War caricatures of Lenin’s position—partisan 
misinformation often promoted by figures discussed in this dissertation. The misinformation is familiar enough even 
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Writers and intellectuals on the American left reacted to this theoretical development—
the revolutionary theory of a leader who had, after all, seemed to produce the world’s first 
successful socialist country—in contradictory ways. Specifically, while Culture and the Crisis 
confidently promised a cultural renaissance in the Communist future, it was considerably more 
ambivalent about what role intellectuals were to play in the present, especially in relation to what 
it still understood as the essentially “working class struggle for a new society” (29, my 
emphasis). The pamphlet begins by identifying its authors as intellectuals, to be sure, but in a 
curiously bashful manner: they are only “listed” (by whom?) “among the so-called ‘intellectuals’ 
of our generation” (3). It proceeds to elaborate on the intellectuals’ social function. “We . . . [are] 
people trained, at least, to think for ourselves and hence, to a degree for our time and our 
people,” it starts, but then quickly admits that “we have no faintest desire to exaggerate either our 
talents or our influence” (3). The author-intellectuals of the pamphlet are reluctant to identify 
themselves as intellectuals in the first place, and reluctant to identify the intellectual as one with 
the specific, let alone important, social function of thinking, “to a degree,” “for our time and our 
people.” 
As the “Open Letter” continues, however, the intellectual increasingly becomes a 
creature of “responsibilities” who might be morally justified in taking power. The motif of 
responsibility sounds throughout the pamphlet. The “irresponsible ‘business-men’” (3) who                                                         
today to warrant debunking in a footnote. Though Lenin assumes intellectuals’ initial superiority over workers in the 
knowledge of revolutionary theory, he never advocates for intellectual workers’ (as opposed to manual workers’) 
control of the Party. Indeed, as I have indicated in the main text, in What Is To Be Done? Lenin advocates just the 
opposite: upon entering the Party, he wanted both workers and intellectuals to shed their previous identities, 
becoming equal “professional revolutionaries” first and foremost. In a revolutionary party, he asserts with emphasis, 
“all distinctions as between workers and intellectuals . . . must be effaced” (109). Thus the Cold-War assertion that 
Lenin planned for intellectual workers to control the working class does not hold water. Once again, Miliband is a 
sure guide on the matter: in the main, he tells us, the “workerist” Lenin mistrusted intellectuals’ tendency toward 
individualism and their consequent political ineptitude; and it was only “as members of the Party and through its 
mediation that he saw . . . intellectuals involved in the service of the workers’ cause” (61, emphasis in the original). 
For a more recent and thorough-going reexamination of Lenin’s beliefs about workers, intellectuals, and 
“professional revolutionaries” in What Is To Be Done? and elsewhere—one that also counters Cold War 
interpretations of Lenin—see Lih. 
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presently rule the United States—via a Republican administration that fails to be “a responsible 
element in modern civilization” (12)—are both implicitly and explicitly set off from the 
“responsible intellectuals” who have authored the manifesto (3). Toward its close, Culture and 
the Crisis finally sheds hesitance and ascribes to intellectuals a national and indeed world-
historical importance: “If we are capable of building a civilization,” it intones, “surely it is time 
for us to begin; time for us to assert our function, our responsibility; time for us to renew the pact 
of comradeship with the struggling masses, trapped by the failure of leadership in the blind 
miseries of a crumbling madhouse” (29). The open letter here imagines that the intellectual class 
will be the leaders of this movement to create a new civilization: society as a whole is figured as 
an irrational and uncomprehending “madhouse” of “blind” suffering, while the working class 
is—crucially—“struggling” and “trapped” by a “failure of leadership.” The class of intellectual 
workers, by contrast with such a helpless, leaderless proletariat, has the almost naturalized 
“function” and “responsibility” of “building a civilization.”  
But such a point of view, it is crucial to note, is not consistent or even dominant in the 
letter. It goes on to warn these professionals in a much more orthodox Marxist manner that they 
“do not constitute an independent economic class in society. They can neither remain neutral in 
the struggle between capitalism and Communism nor can they by their own independent action 
effect any social change” (29, my emphasis). Intellectual workers’ power is dependent on the 
working class. And accordingly, intellectuals are now not the responsible leaders of that class: 
rather, they may choose to be “allies and fellow travelers” of the working class (29). Positing a 
class of intellectuals and professional workers distinct from the working class below, Culture 
and the Crisis thus offers a somewhat contradictory meditation on intellectuals’ role in 
revolutionary politics. If at one moment it exhorts brain workers to provide much-needed 
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leadership to a helpless and trapped working class, thus becoming the responsible creators of a 
new civilization, at another it urges the professional class merely to join an antecedent working 
class struggle that requires only its aid. 
In this tension, Culture and the Crisis is much like Max Nomad’s “White Collars and 
Horny Hands,” published in The Modern Quarterly at roughly the same time, in the Autumn 
1932 issue. Though ultra-left and revolutionary in its intent, this article was arguably the first 
American exposition of an idea that would mutate in the 1970s into the neoconservative theory 
of a “New Class” of self-interested and state-bureaucracy-loving professional workers; and it 
remains an important entry in the annals of theories about intellectuals’ involvement in Marxist 
politics.6 Nomad (born Nacht) was an Austrian refugee who had come to the United States in 
1913 (Bruce-Briggs 12). “White Collars and Horny Hands” explicated his Polish mentor Waclaw 
Machajski’s critiques of Marxist revolutionary strategy in such books as The Evolution of Social 
Democracy (1899) and The Intellectual Worker (1904).7 Machajski charged that Marx and 
Engels “showed an incomplete understanding of the class antagonism in modern society” by 
failing to recognize that intellectuals constituted a “rising, privileged bourgeois stratum” with                                                         
6 I will have more to say about the neoconservative “New Class” theory—a theory of intellectuals as a class founded 
in recoil from the student activists of the New Left—in Chapter Three. For the sake of theoretical precision, we 
ought to note that unlike the neoconservatives who followed him (or for that matter the Trotskyist dissidents we will 
examine primarily in Chapter Two), Nomad understood intellectuals to be a stratum within the bourgeoisie, and not 
a separate class. Nevertheless, my chief justification for including his article amongst the founding documents of the 
theory of an intellectual class is its surprising influence on subsequent theories of intellectuals as a class, and on 
theories of the social importance of intellectual work more generally—a mostly conservative influence that 
undoubtedly would have horrified this revolutionary. Nomad’s work was important to Daniel Bell’s sociology from 
the 1950s onward, for example. 1960’s The End of Ideology, largely basing its account on Nomad, hails Nomad’s 
mentor Machajski as a prophet of the failure of socialism and hence of the “end of ideology” itself (355-357). And 
in 1973’s The Coming of Post-Industrial Society Bell again recognized Nomad and Machajski’s centrality to the 
theory of the Soviet Union’s domination by a bureaucratic “New Class” (96)—an ancestor, as Bell acknowledges, of 
his own theory of postindustrial society. (Bell’s “postindustrial society,” of course, itself went on to be a frequent 
citation in discussions of postmodernism.) Nomad’s work also inspired the neoconservative theorists of a New Class 
in the 1970s. 1979’s The New Class? is dedicated to his memory, strangely, and his work and its influence is 
discussed in the introduction (12-14). 
7 The publication dates of Machajski’s two books are taken from Bell, End 355-56. Most of Machajski’s works, 
including these, are still not translated into English. For a summary of his life and works, though, see Shatz. Nomad 
tells us to pronounce Machajski’s full name as “Vatzlav Makhayski” (69). 
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class interests distinct from the proletariat they often claimed to speak for.8 As a result of such 
distinct interests the “white collars” had regularly sabotaged the revolutionary movements of 
“horny hands.” Their vision of socialism was ultimately only “the ideology of the discontented 
intellectual workers in their struggle for taking over the inheritance of the parastic [sic] private 
capitalist” (Nomad 75). The Paris insurrection of 1848, for example, had been put down not only 
by the capitalists, but by “the whole mass of privileged employees of the capitalist State, lawyers, 
journalists, scholars—even by those who, not long before, had sung to them songs about 
‘organization of labor’ and ‘workers’ associations’” (Machajski qtd. in Nomad 70, emphasis in 
original). The Russian Revolution of 1917 was in danger of following this pattern too, Machajski 
argued in 1918. The intelligentsia still ruled the government there, and maintained their higher 
incomes as well: despite the slogans, the Soviet Union hadn’t yet secured workers’ control of 
anything, for “The intelligentsia . . . defends its own interests, not those of the workers” 
(Machajski qtd. in Nomad 75). Mistrustful of pseudo-revolutionary socialist intellectuals who 
would finally only work for either bourgeois social democracy or a state-run capitalism 
controlled by a bureaucratic elite (71), Machajski instead advocated a long-term revolutionary 
strategy for economic equality, based on continual and exclusively working-class pressure for 
the bread-and-butter demands of jobs and higher wages (73). 
But even as “White Collars” espouses this deeply skeptical theory of intellectuals’ 
involvement in revolutionary class politics, like Culture and the Crisis it simultaneously 
promises an eventually heroic role for intellectuals in revolution. For the article dreams that if the 
working masses do continue their fight for bread-and-butter demands, and eventually thus 
understand social democracy and state-run capitalism to be merely intellectual workers’ self-                                                        
8 The first quotation is from Machajski, as quoted in Nomad 70; the second quotation is in Nomad’s words on page 
71. 
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interest, they will at last “force part of their old leaders to take a new course, and win over some 
of the adventurous, romantic intellectuals and self-taught workers who will then lead them 
forward in a victorious struggle for economic equality”—for the classless and thence stateless 
society promised by Marx (75). In other words, if socialist intellectual workers are at present 
only self-deceived parasites hoping to live off working-class resistance, in the genuinely 
revolutionary future the “adventurous” and “romantic” among them may hope to lead the 
working class. 
Once again, though, it is crucial to note that—much as in Culture and the Crisis—the 
precise role these dashing intellectuals will play in revolutionary politics remains unclear. They 
will be “forced” by the working class to “lead” the working class, we are told. But this offers a 
paradoxical scenario for intellectuals at best. For Nomad’s formulation of intellectuals being 
“forced” to lead the working class unconvincingly attempts to solve the dilemma originally 
offered by the article, which was that intellectuals have separate interests from the working 
class. Why won’t intellectuals, once forced to lead, simply advance their own interests instead of 
those of the manual workers? Or to put the matter more positively—the way readers of the 
Modern Quarterly and other left intellectuals likely would have put it at the time—how can 
intellectual leaders with class interests implacably opposed to the working class still be allies of 
that working class? 
 In answer to this constructive question of intellectuals’ involvement in working-class 
politics, Nomad’s article makes a move which would become familiar to theorists of an 
intellectual class, and suggestive to many a chronicler of intellectual life in New York in this 
period: it discusses the psychology of the truly revolutionary intellectual. Nomad tells us that 
Machajski was aware of “the apparent contradiction that the class struggle of the manual workers 
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may be championed by men not of their own class,” and that he had an answer for it. Machajski 
argued that 
there was a manifest and fundamental difference between the purely material 
causes of the class struggle of an emerging social group—whether it be manual 
workers in their struggle for economic equality or the intelligentsia in its struggle 
for power and privilege—and the purely personal motives prompting the 
altogether disinterested stand of those who play an heroic part in it. (75) 
A particular intellectual’s political motivations might differ from the class interests of 
intellectuals as a whole, in short. What “purely personal motives” might allow intellectuals to 
lead a working class revolution, then? Nomad summarizes Machajski’s rudimentary 
psychological portrait of such intellectuals:  
These personalities . . . as a rule, motivated by the wrongs or aspirations of their 
own group, are not urged by the prosaic desire for comforts or the more common 
aspects of power. Their will-to-power often takes on the aspects of personal self-
denial and sacrifice for the sake of fame or immortality. And some of them, for a 
multiplicity of motives—once the more crude form of egoism is eliminated—
occasionally may assume the leadership of social groups below their own. (75) 
In short, these intellectuals—perhaps alienated from their fellow-intellectuals, or seeking 
recognition from them—will lead for the sake of glory rather than material goods. The test of 
honest revolutionary intellectuals, in other words, is to be found in the psychology of “purely 
personal motives.” And while the vocabulary here is Nietzschean (“will-to-power”), the passage 
offers what might just as well be understood as a discerningly Freudian view of politics. Leaders 
will as a matter of course act according to “a multiplicity of motives,” not all altruistic: in short, 
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intellectual leadership of the working class will be overdetermined. The only trick is to make 
sure that “the more crude form of egoism is eliminated.” It is as if Nomad and Machajski were 
appropriating Freud’s famous aphorism regarding the goal of analysis, “Where the id was, there 
shall ego be” (New Introductory 100). If the intellectual’s political id of self-interest is held in 
check by a self-aware political ego that truly sought the good of the working class, even if in part 
for the sake of his or her personal glory, they argue, then the intellectual’s leadership of the 
working class could be a respectable, indeed adventurous and noble, pursuit.9 Thus despite its 
deep skepticism of intellectuals’ class politics, “White Collars and Horny Hands” ultimately 
offers a proto-Freudian criterion to determine the merits of individual intellectual leadership of 
working-class struggles.10 
The American theory of an intellectual class was first articulated, then, largely by one 
Italian (Lewis Corey) and one Austrian (Max Nomad) émigré to New York City in the early 
1930s.11 Despite its sometime neoconservative employment in later years, the theory originated 
in passionate attempts to analyze and promote intellectuals’ involvement in revolutionary 
politics. Holding that intellectuals belonged to a class other than the proletariat, the theory 
appealed to intellectuals’ desire for autonomy at work as a primary reason for their participation 
in revolution. But its articulation in Culture and the Crisis and “White Collars and Horny Hands” 
shows us that from the beginning this theory provoked at least two critical political questions. 
First, if intellectuals are part of a separate class, can they sincerely be committed to the 
proletariat in itself, or will self-interest always find its way into their political commitments?                                                         
9 The fuller passage in Freud runs thus: psychoanalysis’s “intention is, indeed, to strengthen the ego, to make it more 
independent of the super-ego, to widen its field of perception and enlarge its organization, so that it can appropriate 
fresh portions of the id. Where the id was, there shall ego be” (New Introductory 99-100). 
10 Though not in Culture and the Crisis, in his 1935 work Crisis of the Middle Class Lewis Corey also sometimes 
conceived of his middle class in terms of psychology: “The middle class today is wholly a split personality, 
tormented by the clash of discordant interests” (151). 
11 Corey was born as Luigi Carlo Fraina in Italy in 1892, and moved to New York City when he was three (Denning 
99). 
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Second, and consequently, are intellectuals to help lead the working class in a revolutionary 
movement, or simply to be its ally? Born in the hyphen of that uneasy synthesis that Stalin had 
only recently come to call “Marxism-Leninism”—at the uncertain intersection between Marx’s 
sense that intellectuals might only follow the working class once revolution was inevitable, and 
Lenin’s belief that revolutionary working-class politics and parties required some element of 
intellectual leadership—questions of political psychology and strategy animated the theory of an 
intellectual class from its earliest days.12 Part I of this dissertation demonstrates that prominent 
and influential New York novelists and essayists of the 1930s and ’40s, often living only blocks 
away from where the theory was hatched, and friends with its original proponents, wrestled with 
these same questions as well. Tess Slesinger’s first and only novel, we shall see now, breathed 
emotional life into them early on. 
 
3. Narcissism and Autonomy in The Unpossessed (1934) 
Slesinger’s connections to the creators of intellectual class theory were plentiful and 
direct. Largely through her marriage to Columbia graduate Herbert Solow in 1927, she began her 
literary career as one of a small group of intellectuals and writers gathered around Elliot Cohen 
and his Menorah Journal in the late 1920s, an “elite carefully selected by Cohen, [its] creator 
and molder” (Wald, New York 32). The bond between Cohen and Slesinger was particularly                                                         
12 Though this is not the place to make a full case for it, I would argue that such questions of group psychology and 
strategy continued to animate debates over even 1970s descendants of the theory, such as Barbara and John 
Ehrenreich’s Marxist account of a Professional-Managerial Class (PMC) and the neoconservative theory of a New 
Class. The Ehrenreichs essentially offered a New Left update of Lewis Corey’s work in Culture and the Crisis and 
(especially) The Crisis of the Middle Class, insisting on the need for a revolutionary alliance between an ascendant 
middle class (the PMC) and the traditional working class. The neoconservatives meanwhile explained away the 
student New Left by adopting a particularly cynical version of the Machajskian thesis that intellectual workers 
would only pursue their own class interests to the detriment of the working class. The substance of the 1970s split 
between left and right versions of the intellectual class idea, in other words, was present from the theory’s 
exclusively left beginnings in the 1930s. For the Ehrenreichs’s argument, see their lead essay in the Walker 
anthology Between Labor and Capital; for the neoconservative argument, see for example the Introduction to Bruce-
Brigg’s The New Class? 
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strong: he gave her work “a good deal of attention” and she in turn “strongly admired” him 
(Sharistanian 363). These marital and mentoring associations with Solow and Cohen put her in 
the ambit of many of the early proponents of intellectual class theory. For the Menorah Journal 
group also included Solow’s friend Felix Morrow, a signatory to Culture and the Crisis, and it 
was Elliot Cohen who convinced James Rorty in 1932 to become the secretary of the League of 
Professional Groups (Wald, New York 58), which soon wrote and published the manifesto with 
its rhetoric of a class of “brain workers.”13 There were thus only a very few degrees of separation 
between Slesinger and the creators of the theory of an intellectual class. 
The connection between Slesinger’s novel and the authors of Culture and the Crisis did 
not go unnoticed upon its publication, either. Selecting the novel as his “Outlook Book Choice of 
the Month” for New Outlook in June of 1934, Robert Cantwell framed the book’s genesis as 
follows: 
In 1932 a group of writers, organized to work for the election of the Communist 
candidate for President, quickly became a rallying point for the most devoted 
opponents of the Communist party. It was a time of resignations from committees, 
of quarrels between friends, of political disputes in the offices of literary 
magazines. . . . 
“The Unpossessed” deals brilliantly with one segment of this apparent 
chaos and expresses the bewilderment and waste almost perfectly. (53) 
While Cantwell connected Slesinger’s novel to the League of Professional Groups for Foster and 
Ford at the outset, however, he did not elaborate on its significance. And in the nearly eighty 
years since Cantwell’s review, the novel’s connection to the League has gone almost entirely                                                         
13 For biographical material on Slesinger, see Biagi, and especially Sharistanian 359-71. Wald also offers 
biographical “portraits” of Cohen (31-33) and Solow (37-42). 
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unremarked.14 While the novel’s relationship to the Menorah Journal group has been explored 
by critics in depth, no critic has examined the particular political and literary significance of the 
novel’s connection to the League of Professional Groups. 
In this concluding section I will attempt to do so. For the intellectuals depicted in the 
novel all understand themselves as part of the class of intellectuals that the League’s manifesto 
envisioned; and Slesinger herself and some of her novel’s first critics on the left explicitly 
grappled with this relatively new idea that intellectuals might constitute a class separate from 
both capital and proletariat. The novel’s satire serves to criticize this intellectual class. Viewing 
intellectuals through the prisms of race and sex, but above all through the psychological concept 
of narcissism, The Unpossessed characterizes the intellectual class as one politically isolated 
from both the proletariat and society at large. In both comic and heart-rending ways, the 
intellectuals of The Unpossessed are too narcissistically cut off from society to have any real role 
in it. But while this critique seems to be the novel’s chief intent, at the margins it also offers an 
appreciation of intellectuals’ isolation: their lack of participation in the world, the novel admits at 
certain moments, does serve the real purpose of preserving a measure of unbiased judgment for 
the world. While the novel mostly satirizes intellectuals as a class cut off from the politics of the 
real world, then, it nevertheless simultaneously posits the need for an “objective” stratum of 
thinkers who preserve a type of thought that is independent and autonomous. I will suggest in 
conclusion that this political ambivalence toward the intellectual class—an ambivalence 
encapsulated in the founding documents of intellectual class theory reviewed in the previous 
section, and dramatized in Slesinger’s novel—had a far-reaching influence on both later 
portrayals of an intellectual class, and on the postmodern itself.                                                         
14 The sole exception I have found is Alan Wald, who notes only in passing that its characters are “composites 
designed to express a variety of themes emanating from the milieu engaged in . . . the League of Professionals” 
(New York 68). 
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In its satire of three male intellectuals attempting to form a Marxist magazine, The 
Unpossessed presents characters who—despite their hopes to be engaged in proletarian 
struggle—nevertheless persistently understand intellectuals as a class separate from the 
proletariat. Their understanding is, like all else that they believe in the novel, subject to debate 
and qualification and hesitation; yet it is continuous. Two of the novel’s debates between the 
Black Sheep and its male intellectuals, for instance, inspire speculation about the class status of 
intellectuals. Bruno reflects on the difference between the working-class Black Sheep and 
intellectuals like himself: “it was not merely their youth that set them off, that blinded as it fired 
them, it was their poverty. Perhaps poverty, undercutting everything else, removed them a priori 
from the class of intellectuals,” Bruno meditates (199-200). Intellectuals are a separate class 
from the working class. Bruno however then separates intellectuals from “the class war,” 
declaring that “it’s not our war; we’re not eligible. We’re neither fish nor flesh nor good red 
herring. Just lousy intellectuals.” But even if Bruno here follows Marx’s belief that the only two 
classes of ultimate consequence are capitalists and the proletariat, he still thinks of intellectuals 
as a distinct (if less consequential) class: “He was aware that he was sentimental, that he drew a 
gold line around the intellectuals and put them in some holy place beyond the economic; but 
each man for his class . . .” (205). Intellectuals occupy a place at least “sentimentally” “beyond 
the economic,” but Bruno also casually and confidently refers to intellectuals as both a “class” 
and more precisely “his class.” Bruno’s class consciousness is that of an intellectual. 
A running debate between Miles and the Black Sheep at the concluding party also 
addresses the issue of intellectuals’ class status. The narrative figures the hubbub of conversation 
in fragmented form, capturing its fervor: 
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“only two classes,” Firman said “and no use trying to bridge them over” said a 
Maxwell “nor inventing smaller classes inbetween” said Little Dixon “because in 
a war after all,” said Cornelia leaning forward, “there can only be two sides” “the 
fellows in No Man’s Land in between are shot from both trenches” said Firman, 
taking Cornelia’s hand. “But intellectuals,” said Miles. (292, emphasis in the 
original) 
Here Miles argues for intellectuals as a third class distinct from capitalists and proletariat, as 
against the Black Sheep’s more rigid conception of two classes alone. Yet later on even Firman 
unceremoniously offers that “intellectuals as a class . . . are dying out, their function’s dead—
nobody’s left to support them” (302): even the Black Sheep in the end interpret intellectuals as a 
third class, if a dying one. Both Miles and Firman, then, like Bruno, understand intellectuals as a 
distinct class. 
A letter from Slesinger herself to publishers Simon and Schuster offers authorial 
imprimatur for the idea as well. Furthermore, it may be considered part of the original text, as it 
was printed on the back right flap of the novel’s 1934 dust jacket.15 Slesinger there asserts that                                                         
15 Since the first edition of the novel is no longer easily obtainable, I take this opportunity to reproduce its 
autobiographical back flap in full: 
About Tess Slesinger 
In a letter to her publishers 
MISS SLESINGER writes: 
“I was born with the curse of intelligent parents, a happy childhood and nothing valid to rebel against. So I 
rebelled against telling the truth. I told whoppers at three, tall stories at four, and home-runs at five. From six to 
sixteen I wrote them in a diary. Instead of being spanked I was dressed up one day for a visit to the psychoanalyst; 
he listened while I lied for an hour and agreed that I might as well settle down to writing my lies for a career. My 
further equipment for writing is an insatiable memory for unimportant details, and (still more uninteresting) the fact 
that unlike most of my writing friends I get a kick out of writing. 
“Although the background of my novel is New York, the idea in my head is intellectuals anywhere (but 
Russia) in the twentieth century. I discovered when travelling abroad that national barriers were nothing compared 
to class barriers, and similarly that class bonds were stronger than any bond I could have, even in Budapest, with a 
New Yorker who hadn’t read Proust. Whether we like it or not I think intellectuals are a class by themselves, 
belonging rather less than any other class to society as it functions today; which is why I called the novel The 
Unpossessed. I can’t attempt any dogmatic definitions, because many intellectuals seem unintelligent; but let’s say 
the doubters, the worriers, the weighers of the world; the class interested in things not essentially economically 
remunerative. 
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“Whether we like it or not I think intellectuals are a class by themselves, belonging rather less 
than any other class to society as it functions today.” Indeed this whole assertion of intellectuals’ 
class identity apart from the rest of society “is why I called the novel The Unpossessed.” 
Slesinger gave the novel its very title based on the concept of an intellectual class, in other 
words. She first defines that class by way of intellectuals’ qualities of mind: “I can’t attempt any 
dogmatic definitions because many intellectuals seem unintelligent; but let’s say the doubters, 
the worriers, the weighers of the world . . . .” Seemingly uncomfortable with such an idealist 
definition, however, Slesinger’s next clause explains intellectuals more as an economic class, 
albeit a quasi-bohemian class aloof from the profit-motive: “the class interested in things not 
essentially remunerative.”16 The book’s dust jacket thus told Slesinger’s original readers that 
intellectuals are a “class by themselves,” and that the definition of intellectuals as an independent 
class was important enough to be, echoes of Dostoevsky’s The Possessed aside, the primary 
reason for the novel’s very title.17 
Slesinger’s dust-jacket assertion and her use of the concept in her novel were bold 
enough to elicit objection from her more left-leaning reviewers at the time, moreover, making the 
idea of an intellectual class an important part of the novel’s reception on the left. Philip Rahv’s 
New Masses review, for example, protested the idea that intellectuals are “a socially independent                                                         
“I picture them—us, my contemporaries, my fraternity-brothers—‘on board the fast twentieth century 
express, the twentieth century unlimited, hell-bent for nowhere’ on which one of my characters very consciously 
pictures herself. 
“I do not mean at any point to treat my characters lightly or view their quandaries with nasty amusement. 
Neither do I wish to portray them as singularly tragic. But I have attempted to catch them at the vital point in their 
lives, both individually and collectively, the point from which they split off and save themselves or acknowledge 
and face their defeat. If they seem unusually hard-hit and too self-knowing, it is because I have tried to picture them 
on the level in their own consciousness where they are forced to tell themselves the truth.” 
16 In using the phrase “quasi-bohemian class” I am primarily alluding to the idea of bohemia advanced by Pierre 
Bourdieu in his essay “Flaubert’s Point of View,” a bohemia which created an “upside-down economy where the 
artist could win in the symbolic arena only by losing in the economic one (at least in the short term) and vice versa” 
(201). In other words, Slesinger’s “class interested in things not essentially remunerative” seems akin to Bourdieu’s 
later bohemian literary field (rather than class) and its “upside-down economy.” 
17 Dostoevsky’s novel may now be more familiar with the English-language title of Demons; but during Slesinger’s 
time (and for many years thereafter) it was best known in Constance Garnett’s translation as The Possessed. 
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group” (26). Joseph Freeman’s review in The Daily Worker addresses the issue both more 
directly and at more length. He asserts that “all reviewers read” Slesinger’s letter and that “many 
of them [took] their cue” from it, and then charges that a “metaphysical notion leads the author 
into one of the commonest errors extant among the intellectuals about themselves, and among 
other classes of the population about the intellectuals—the illusion that ‘intellectuals are a class 
by themselves.’” But “Intellectuals are not a separate class,” Freeman boldly insists; they are 
instead merely “the auxiliary troops of the various contending social groups. They are an integral 
part of the social class into which they are born or with which, under pressure of events or 
voluntarily, they affiliate” (bold in the original). A significant part of the novel’s reception on the 
left thus revolved around its portrayal of intellectuals as a class. 
 These reviewers were astute, for indeed much of the novel is devoted to understanding 
the ways in which the intellectual class it depicts is “separate” (Freeman) and “socially 
independent” (Rahv) from the other classes, and indeed the world itself. The novel pursues this 
single thought with a range of metaphors. Perhaps most uncomfortably for readers today, the 
novel partakes of two kinds of biological argument to instantiate its point about the separation of 
intellectuals from society at large: race and sex. We will start with race. The novel’s main 
characters consistently mix “race” with “class” as conceptual categories to describe their social 
function. This slippage is most evident at the party. When Firman explains that “intellectuals as a 
class . . . are dying out, their function’s dead,” Miles asks a page later, “what happens to the 
intellectuals . . . if our race is dying out?” (303). Bruno’s speech at this same party again brings 
in both racial and class conceptions of intellectuals. “We have no parents and we can have no 
offspring; we have no sex; we are mules,” he begins (327). Intellectuals are a dying race, as 
Miles has suggested earlier. Bruno then even denies, temporarily, his earlier conception of 
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intellectuals as a coherent class: “We have no class,” he pronounces with frustration; “our tastes 
incline us to the left, our habits to the right; the left distrusts, the right despises us” (327-28). 
This denial is only to again assert intellectuals’ identity as a race, one dying in much the same 
way that Firman thought the intellectual class was: “Our race . . . is dying out; our function’s 
dead, our blood is blue” (328). The intellectuals of The Unpossessed thus frequently figure 
themselves as a race in danger of extinction. 
 One might dismiss Miles’s and Bruno’s talk of race as mere metaphor—as the somewhat 
melodramatic trope of characters who despair of their ability to connect to people unlike 
themselves, or to serve some social purpose. But this won’t do, for the plot of the novel itself 
countenances the idea of intellectuals as a “dying race.” Conspicuously, none of its middle-class 
intellectuals reproduce. Isolated in intellectual circles, Norah has even forgotten that people still 
have children (“I thought they’d gone out, like horse-cars” [305]). She and Jeffrey—neither of 
whom indicate any belief that intellectuals are a dying race—have personally refused to have 
children because, as Norah blithely relates, they are “making some sort of protest against 
something . . . sometimes I forget just what” (305). Similarly, Bruno’s two main possible sexual 
interests in the novel are Emmett Middleton, the youngest of the Black Sheep, who often acts 
like a prepubescent boy, and Elizabeth Leonard, his cousin. Neither are consummated. The novel 
thus depicts Bruno as a man whose sexual interests are either homosexual (with an insinuation of 
pederasty) or incestuous, and accordingly it strongly suggests that this representative intellectual 
will never produce a healthy progeny. Last but not least, the novel ends grimly with Margaret’s 
abortion. Margaret understands her abortion in explicitly social terms of a fear about 
intellectuals’ inability to reproduce: looking at the ordinary people on her street, Margaret thinks 
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These are the people not afraid to perpetuate themselves (forbidden to stop, 
indeed) and they will go on and on until the bottom of the world is filled with 
them; and suddenly there will be enough of them to combine their wild-eyed 
notions and take over the world to suit themselves. While I, while I and my Miles, 
with our good clear heads will one day go spinning out of the world and leave 
nothing behind . . . only diplomas crumbling in the museums. . . . (354, ellipses in 
the original) 
Here the novel unfortunately participates, perhaps unwittingly, in a longer tradition of 
nineteenth-century pseudo-scientific fears about the education of women. As Lillian Faderman 
notes, 
Most of the attacks on women’s higher education centered on the ways in which it 
would render them unfit for the traditional roles that the writers believed vital to 
the proper functioning of society. . . . Even into the twentieth century such 
writers, often imbued with racist and classist theories of eugenics, feared what 
they called ‘race suicide’ and prophesied that since ‘the best [female] blood of 
American stock’ went off to college and probably would not marry, the mothers 
of America would eventually all be ‘from the lower orders of society’ and the 
country would be ruined. (13-14, brackets in the original) 
Coming after Norah’s blithe reference to her childless marriage, and Bruno’s failure to couple 
even with his female cousin, in short, Margaret’s understanding of her “failure” to reproduce 
summarizes the novel’s fear that intellectuals constitute a separate “race” from the non-
intellectuals, a sterile race incapable of leaving behind anything but diplomas. Thus the plot of 
the novel, along with many of its characters, recognizes intellectuals as a biologically separate 
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race in decline. This biological theory/fear underpins one significant part of its larger portrayal of 
an intellectual class fundamentally isolated from the rest of the world. 
 An essentialist conception of gender also enters into the novel’s indictment of the 
intellectual class’s isolation from the rest of society. This may best be seen again in the case of 
Margaret, whose meditations on her marriage—invariably centered around a tension between 
(male) politics and her (female) bodily needs—open and close the novel. Margaret’s struggle to 
reconcile her ostensibly internationalist politics with her own distinctly local, New York-
centered personal experience is perhaps the key motif of the first chapter—and thus a major 
motif of the novel itself: 
Now you and Miles, you live in a room on Charles street [sic] . . . you have never 
been out of your country or even to the south of it; yet you make out checks from 
your meager income to the Scottsboro boys quaking in Alabama jails; you 
subscribe to a German paper which names writers you will never read; you visit 
Russian movies whose characters you comprehend no more than you do their 
machines. (7) 
She is troubled by the disconnection between her intellectual milieu’s Marxist politics—often 
formidably abstract—and her own more daily life: “it was some thread, some meaning she was 
looking for; some way of finding the world without reading papers from Germany . . .” (11, 
ellipses in the original). This disconnection explains the otherwise strange metaphor she employs 
when buying groceries in the novel’s first scene: “Oh no,” she thinks of saying to the grocer, 
“give me the world all wrapped in bundles; let me carry it home resting on my breast; let me 
bring it home to Miles and lay it at his feet. A dash of salt, a skillful stir; and I will serve him the 
world for his supper” (4). She hopes her cooking will make “the world” of politics personal and 
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authentic to her—and she hopes to bring the political world, after cradling it on her breast, quite 
literally into the body of her dour husband. Thus in the first chapter she hopes to assimilate 
(masculine, abstract) politics into her feminine body, and thence return this more organically 
lived politics to her husband as a gift. 
 Margaret’s attempt to make politics somatic, a bodily experience rather than a mental 
abstraction, grows more pointed as the novel moves along and we see that her true hope is to 
have a child. “Norah, why don’t we have children?” (93), Margaret imagines asking out loud 
when pinpointing the entire trouble with her intellectual circle, the intellectual class she inhabits. 
Margaret’s subsequent pregnancy then underlies the upswing of the novel, the period of worldly 
activity and intellectual ferment surrounding the creation of a magazine, which is itself figured as 
a kind of fecundity. Bruno at one point jokingly searches for the magazine “under Norah’s skirt” 
(77), and when they indeed decide to create the magazine, the narrative is symbolically 
interspersed with Margaret’s thoughts of when she might give birth if she were to conceive that 
night (“Why, it might be in August!” [99]). She does conceive, but the sad point of the novel’s 
figuring of intellectuals as men is brought home in the novel’s final chapter, with her abortion. 
Margaret and Miles agree to an abortion because “in a time like this . . . to have a baby would be 
suicide—goodbye to our plans, goodbye to our working out schemes for each other and the 
world—our courage would die, our hopes concentrate on the sordid business of keeping three 
people alive, one of whom would be a burden and an expense for twenty years” (349-50). A 
child’s physical life might, in short, overtake the abstract political “schemes” Miles imagines 
himself to be engaged in.18 Though Margaret accedes to this rationale, she nevertheless resents 
                                                        
18 Slesinger’s friend Lionel Trilling asserts the novel’s veracity on this point, noting that in the 1920s and 1930s 
“intellectual men thought of [children] as ‘biological traps,’ being quite certain that they must lead to compromise 
with, or capitulation to, the forces of convention.” “That Tess, like Margaret Flinders . . . should want to be a parent 
and should avow her wish,” he concludes, “was a cultural choice of no small import” (“A Novel” 7). 
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the results in the most bitter and bluntly sexual of terms: “He was a man, he could have made her 
a woman. She was a woman, and could have made him a man. He was not a man; she was not a 
woman. In each of them the life-stream flowed to a dead-end” (350). The last words of the novel 
then suggest how the decision to have an abortion—the intellectual suppression of Margaret’s 
female body—has irrevocably sealed her and Miles off from “the world” at large: “she had 
stripped and revealed herself not as a woman at all, but as a creature who would not be a woman 
and could not be a man. And then they turned . . . and went in the door and heard it swing to, 
pause on its rubbery hinge, and finally click behind them” (357). By implication this ending 
summarizes the novel’s indictment of an entire and specifically male-dominated intellectual class 
whose unrelenting abstraction causes it to be isolated from society at large, from the bodily, 
experiential “world” that Margaret Flinders seeks. Margaret’s hope in the first chapter, to 
assimilate the male world of politics into her female body, is repudiated. The abstraction of 
masculine intellectual class politics triumphs over the bodily reality of female reproduction. 
But if the novel thus engages the biological rhetorics of a dying race and a disembodied 
male sex in an attempt to understand the social isolation of the intellectual class it depicts and 
satirizes, the most important of its registers for analyzing the intellectual class—and the most 
influential for the tradition this dissertation examines—is that of psychoanalysis. The 
Unpossessed in fact offers its fullest account of the class character of intellectuals precisely in its 
development of character, and Slesinger developed her intellectual characters along a Freudian 
model. Freud permeated Slesinger’s family life. In the 1920s, her mother Augusta had secured 
Freud’s former colleague and thence opponent, Alfred Adler, as a teacher at the New School for 
Social Research. As her daughter wrote fiction in the 1930s, Augusta Slesinger became a lay 
analyst herself, and soon thereafter a patient and student of both Erich Fromm and Karen Horney 
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(Sharistanian 360). Tess Slesinger herself saw a psychoanalyst early on in her life, once again 
according to the original edition’s dust jacket: Slesinger relates that “Instead of being spanked” 
for her youthful habit of lying, she was instead “dressed up one day for a visit to a 
psychoanalyst; he listened while I lied for an hour and agreed that I might as well settle down to 
writing my lies for a career.” Most importantly, of course, Freud permeates the novel itself. 
Often he does so in caricature: his chief emissary in the novel is the comical character of Dr. 
Vambery, Emmett Middleton’s mother’s Hungarian psychoanalyst. Dr. Vambery is often inane. 
He opines on the subject of proletarian revolution, for example, by asking sententiously, “What 
makes you think . . . that revolution is superior to war? Are they not both killing? Are they not 
both fruit of the same psychological germ?” (198). Having efficiently dismissed any political 
dimension to human existence, he then pronounces that “War . . . will be on earth for as long as 
men are born of mothers” (198). Through Dr. Vambery, in short, the novel lampoons the new fad 
of psychoanalysis, and perhaps offers us a narrow-minded stand-in for Freud himself. 
But despite such caricature, it is important to note that the novel nevertheless also depicts 
its male intellectuals—and thus its male intellectual class—as neurotic in an attentively Freudian 
fashion. More specifically and most importantly for my argument, it depicts intellectuals as a 
narcissistic class. A brief summary of Freud’s account of narcissism is needed here. We should 
first note that Freud uses “narcissism” as a dispassionate clinical term, rather than the character 
flaw now denoted by colloquial use of the term.19 For Freud, one’s first and healthy primary 
libidinal attachment is to oneself—this is “primary narcissism” (“On Narcissism” 75). But with 
the advent of parental and social admonitions, the child creates a secondary form of narcissism in 
the creation of an “ego ideal”: denied the pure satisfaction of “primary narcissism,” one loves an                                                         
19 Freud’s term “egoism” comes closer to this latter sense. See the Introductory Lectures: “When we speak of 
egoism, we have in view only the individual’s advantage; when we talk of narcissism we are also taking his libidinal 
satisfaction into account” (519, emphasis in the original).  
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idealized conception of oneself instead (93-94). Freud describes these libidinal attachments using 
the metaphor of an amoeba, with its extending “false feet,” or pseudopodia. Just as the amoeba 
moves a part of itself outward in the form of pseudopodia in order to capture food, so does the 
healthy adult ego form libidinal attachments to others while still retaining its narcissistic 
attachment to the ego ideal (75-76). But in the neurotic forms of narcissism, Freud explains, the 
libido has been frustrated in its goal of attaching to some external object, and hence “regresses” 
to its earlier attachment: the libido reattaches itself to the ego ideal, or, to use Freud’s analogy, 
the amoeba removes its pseudopodium (Introductory 524). Hence the self-love characteristic of 
narcissistic neurosis in its most recognizable form, named for the mythological character 
Narcissus, who fell in love with his own reflection. 
 On a quite personal level, the three male intellectuals of The Unpossessed all suffer from 
a form of narcissistic regression. The physically beautiful Jeffrey Blake suffers from narcissism 
in the most obvious sense. He literally loves himself, or more accurately his romantic perception 
of himself. During his seduction of Margaret Flinders, Margaret notes that he was “obsessed with 
the importance of himself and his enthusiasms” (63), and eventually that he was “trying, at 
bottom, to seduce himself” (69). In a later seduction, Jeffrey more directly reveals his love of his 
own idealized self (or “ego ideal”), this time as reflected in his lover. His conquest is would-be 
communist Ruthie Fisher, whose main claim to political authenticity, it would seem, involves 
having slept with some eminent Russian communists. Yet this is enough for Jeffrey to seduce a 
suitably romantic image of himself. Fisher’s 
experience became his. He was Comrade Turner lying with Comrade Fisher in his 
arms and planning the tactics of the strike. He was the raw-boned mill-worker 
who led the strike. He was the many mill-hands singing the International. . . . He 
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was the personal medium for the strike, the interpreter of Lenin, the battlefield for 
revolution. He was the strike. He was the revolution. His blood rose; his fingers 
grew tense as claws; gratitude toward Comrade Fisher overwhelmed him like 
love. (232) 
“Like” love, indeed, but really only what Freud might have diagnosed as a megalomaniac 
libidinal attachment to his own ego ideal. In a very real sense, Jeffrey Blake is the “lone wolf” he 
perpetually claims to be when seducing women (66). His seductions involve no true libidinal 
attachment to anyone other than himself. 
 Bruno Leonard’s two quasi-romantic attachments in the novel involve narcissistic 
regression as well. Bruno recognizes in Emmett Middleton a reflection of his own weakness and 
indecision: he wonders “what weakness in himself had made him choose the weakest of [the 
Black Sheep’s] number to befriend” (119), and ultimately “knew he had . . . allowed the boy to 
grow dependent [on him], through a shameful corresponding weakness in himself” (162). Bruno 
likewise recognizes that his cousin Elizabeth is a “reflection of himself” (125), and Emmett 
jealously notes that she is “closer than a wife” to Bruno: “they bent along together closely 
parallel, following each other’s devious routes” (260). Thus when all three stay in the same 
apartment, Elizabeth, talking to Bruno, rightly dubs the circumstance not a “ménage à trois,” but 
a “ménage à toi” (285): a narcissistic household of the familiar “you,” rather than three. For this 
reason, Bruno’s love for Elizabeth is not especially sexual (138, 169). Furthermore, in depicting 
Bruno’s attachment to Emmett the novel seems to reflect Freud’s understanding of homosexual 
attachment as a narcissistic perversion.20 In Freudian terms, then, Bruno’s two romantic 
attachments involve types of narcissistic regression. 
                                                        
20 See for example “Narcissism” 73, 88, 90, 96; and Introductory 530. 
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Finally, Miles Flinders suffers from a different type of narcissistic regression, which 
Freud names melancholia. This pathology occurs when the narcissistic libido reacts to the loss of 
a love-object—lost for example via the object’s death, as in the case of mourning, or lost more 
metaphorically, as in the case of, say, romantic rejection (“Mourning” 245). The libido is 
ambivalent toward the object, which it loves but also now hates because it has been frustrated by 
that object (250-51, 256). Unable to consciously admit such ambivalence, though, the 
melancholic libido turns its aggression on the ego rather than the object. Melancholia—what we 
more familiarly describe now as depression—is thus on Freud’s account the narcissistic 
projection of one’s unconscious hatred of an external object onto the ego, oneself, instead (257). 
The novel partially explains Miles’ self-hatred by recourse to Miles’ New England Puritanical 
heritage, it is true; but it also and more fully explains it through a Freudian family drama leading 
to Miles’ melancholia. The second chapter details his childhood encounters with the domineering 
father figure of his Uncle Daniel. This uncle is a taciturn and stern man who punishes Miles with 
floggings (14), and consequently offers the young boy little if any libidinal satisfaction: Uncle 
Daniel was one “whose approval he had struggled for and never won” and whose approval “even 
now he desired and could never win” (43). His uncle’s cruel behavior furthermore provokes 
Miles to wish him dead. When his uncle does die, Miles thus feels guilty for it, and believes he is 
owed punishment: “he had killed him . . . . Did not some sort of justice point . . .” (43, second 
ellipses in the original). Miles’ anger at his Uncle Daniel for not loving him is thus repressed and 
instead projected onto himself. This displaced anger at his uncle then becomes the origin of 
Miles’ melancholic existence, a neurotic self-hatred that ultimately defines accepting the love of 
his wife as tantamount to going “soft” (345). 
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 But crucially, these depictions of narcissistic regression do not remain solely personal in 
the novel. By depicting each of the novel’s three male intellectuals as suffering from some type 
of narcissistic regression personally, the novel also makes an implicit argument about the 
political narcissism of intellectuals as a class. For the intellectual class’s politics are a form of 
fantasy in The Unpossessed; their political thought is, if you will, the manifest content of a latent 
personal wish. Jeffrey’s fantasy of himself as the leader of revolution has already been cited, and 
provides perhaps the most obvious example of the intellectual class’s politics as wish fulfillment. 
Miles’ haunting recollection of an early familial trauma offers a less obvious but no less 
compelling example of narcissistic regression’s effects on the intellectual class’s politics. The 
reverie details the death of the family’s beloved dog, King, who makes the mistake of 
enthusiastically killing several chickens on a neighbor’s farm. This canine libidinal frenzy is 
punished by Miles’ Uncle Daniel, who—though King was “the only living thing he loved” 
(50)—nevertheless grimly metes out the dog’s penalty with a shotgun. (To use later Freudian 
terminology, it is as if Uncle Daniel were an impersonal superego punishing the dog’s 
momentary outburst of id.) This uncompromising and emotionally difficult form of punishment 
on the part of Uncle Daniel then symbolically constitutes the young Miles’ ideal of politics and 
justice itself: “Miles knew well that day that there was something bigger in men than themselves, 
that could drive them to do what alone they would never have dared” (53). Desperately seeking 
his Uncle’s approval, the young Miles begins to identify justice itself with self-punishment—a 
not-too-difficult trick, since Miles’ melancholic libido is already given to self-punishment. The 
novel thus understands Miles’ particularly dour brand of communism as a politicized form of his 
identification with, and unrequited love for, his Uncle Daniel, and his consequent hatred of 
himself. 
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 Bruno’s ending speech at the party summarizes and indeed confirms such an 
understanding of intellectuals’ politics as neurosis. After a great deal of wittily ironic self-
flagellation—itself a symptom of ego-punishing melancholy—the speech reaches one of its 
climaxes in a rare earnest moment: 
“The only way,” he continued as though he pulled his finger from his verbal 
dykes, “to come to this cause is to come ‘clean’—that is to come not in order to 
solve one’s individual neuroses, but to come already free of them. My friends and 
myself are sick men . . . You may think me sentimental; but the lie in our private 
lives is important, it makes our public lives unreal and fraudulent—a man can’t do 
good work with an undernourished psychic system.” (330-331) 
Intellectuals’ politics are the projection of a “private lie.” But Bruno goes on to identify not just a 
psychoanalytic, but a social explanation of intellectuals: “In each individual case a Vambery 
could give you valid special reasons—but when an epidemic’s so widespread, it has a deeper 
basis than the individual. I suppose we’re victims of the general social catastrophe in some way 
we’re too close to figure out” (331). That “deeper basis than the individual,” the novel 
suggests—and in their clearer moments the novel’s intellectuals may also realize—is class. The 
intellectuals of The Unpossessed have never seen a proletarian (302, 331), a communist (325), 
communism (331), or “life” itself (331), as Bruno suggests in his speech. Their political 
existence is pure narcissistic fantasy. And thus the neurotic libidinal attachment of the 
intellectual class is neither to the workers nor to communist revolution, but to itself. 
 The chief irony and source of satire in The Unpossessed is that its politically-obsessed 
intellectual class doesn’t get around to politics. Jeffrey, Miles, and Bruno’s narcissistic fantasies 
manifest themselves as promiscuity, self-aggrandizement, unrequited domestic love, witty but 
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ultimately debilitating self-irony, and above all an unlaunched Magazine—but never as actual 
socialist activism. That isolation from proletarian politics and society itself—expressed through 
metaphors of race, sex, and psychoanalysis—is, as we have seen, the novel’s chief analysis (and 
satire) of the intellectual class. It is the critique that lies at its heart. In a mode more comical than 
genuinely mistrusting, Slesinger’s novel suggests, along with Nomad’s “White Collars and 
Horny Hands,” that intellectuals as a whole are incapable of standing in solidarity with 
proletarian workers’ struggle.  
But we may now see in the novel one last important motif in relation to its depiction of an 
intellectual class, and one with surprisingly contradictory meanings. That is the theme of 
intellectuals’ freedom. Most often, “freedom” is a word to watch warily in The Unpossessed: the 
novel is deeply critical of intellectuals’ commitment to a certain conception of freedom. Bruno’s 
cousin Elizabeth, for example, goes to Paris in part at Bruno’s urging. He has told her that in 
order to be an artist “you’ve got to be free, my dear, free, as free as a man, you must play the 
man’s game and beat him at it” (131). Elizabeth accordingly runs through a string of lovers, 
making herself more and more unhappy and lonely. She starts with Ferris, who, when Elizabeth 
asks him if moving in with him just days after his old girlfriend had moved out wasn’t “a little 
bit cheap,” replies, “Cheap—what you see around here isn’t cheap—why it’s better than that, he 
said, laughing and laughing—it’s free!” (132, emphases in original). The most recent lover in 
Elizabeth’s cycle is Denny, whom she mentally asks a telling question while leaving him: “What 
will become of us, Denny my dear, my lost abandoned unloved lover . . . we wept because we 
could not weep, we wept because we could not love, we wept because we loved before, we care 
about nothing, believe in nothing, live for nothing, because we are free, free, free—like empty 
sailboats lost at sea . . .” (136). Elizabeth’s pitifully ironic summary here speaks for the novel in 
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regretting a certain conception of freedom, one that conceives individual freedom as the absence 
of commitment to both other people (“we could not love”) and ideals (“we care about nothing, 
believe in nothing”). In a personal as well as political register, she regrets her friends’ conception 
of freedom as a freedom from, rather than a freedom to. And the theme is not limited to 
Elizabeth, either. Margaret’s abortion, recall, is also the sorrowful result of (male) intellectuals’ 
claims to an extreme conception of intellectual freedom and autonomy: “in a régime like this, 
Miles said, it is a terrible thing to have a baby—it means the end of independent thought and the 
turning of everything into a scheme for making money . . . goodbye to our plans, goodbye to our 
working out schemes for each other and the world” (349). The novel thus consistently implies 
that an essentially negative (and male) conception of freedom, always a freedom from rather than 
a freedom to, results in loneliness and an absence of any personal or political purpose and 
meaning in life.21 
But while this is the novel’s main engagement with its intellectuals’ attachment to 
notions of freedom and autonomy—a belief that intellectuals’ “freedom” is often a fetish 
designed to avoid having to feel any mundane sense of humanity—the novel does seem to allow                                                         
21 We may note briefly here that the novel’s scorn for intellectuals’ conception of “freedom” as only a detached 
“freedom from” in essence critiques what Isaiah Berlin would later call (and defend as) “negative liberty,” the type 
of liberty favored by political liberalism. In this sense, it seems to me that The Unpossessed implies an at least 
nascent political philosophy, again via its psychological insight into character. In critiquing intellectuals’ individual 
lack of commitment in personal and political realms—their “unpossessed” nature, as it were—the novel essentially 
rejects so-called “radical” intellectuals’ politics as a mere procedural liberalism, as a failure to posit any substantive 
and thus to her mind genuinely political conception of the good. On “negative liberty,” see Berlin’s “Two Concepts 
of Liberty.” 
One might even speculate that Slesinger’s frustrations with liberalism’s emphasis on negative liberty—
more specifically with what she considered to be intellectuals’ promotion of a “freedom” free of any actual personal 
or political commitments—encouraged her support for communism under Stalin in the years after writing her novel. 
With a lightly scolding tone Trilling reminds us that Slesinger “found it possible to give her assent” to Stalinism 
“during her Hollywood years” as a screenwriter after writing The Unpossessed (“Novel” 19); and Dickstein notes 
more specifically that Slesinger even signed a “notorious letter attacking the Dewey Commission” which had after 
study “exonerated Trotsky from the heinous charges of betrayal that the Soviets had leveled against him” (Dancing 
512). However we should not take such speculation about Slesinger’s support for an illiberal Stalinism too far: Alan 
Wald’s correspondence with Slesinger’s widow and friends reveals that though she continued to support the Soviet 
Union until her death in 1945, she nevertheless “became significantly disillusioned with the Soviets at the news of 
the Hitler-Stalin pact” in 1939 and may have even reconciled with some of her erstwhile-Trotskyist friends before 
dying (New York 65).  
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for at least one sense in which intellectuals’ dedication to such ideals might be important and 
valuable. The novel expresses this belief in its portrayal of a running conflict between Bruno and 
the Black Sheep over the nature of the Magazine. For the Black Sheep, there is no such thing as 
intellectual objectivity and autonomy, and accordingly they don’t want a magazine that has any 
other goal than the expression of forthright political views. Reacting to Bruno’s rejection of 
“propaganda” for the Magazine, their leader Firman insists that “Every written word is 
propaganda”—no need to understand opposing points of view, he seems to imply. And as for art, 
likewise, the Black Sheep assert that poetry is only an “opiate,” or “propaganda for spending 
your life sitting on your ass reading it” (117). Most chilling, however, is Firman’s political 
distillation of such arguments about art’s social uselessness. “I’d have all the lyric poets jailed 
for counter-revolutionaries,” he remarks simply (117). The Black Sheep’s proto-fascist denials of 
the values of objectivity and art thus reveal their least attractive qualities, from the novel’s point 
of view. And though their extremism is often excused as youthful political fervor in the novel, 
The Unpossessed nevertheless certainly depicts them as narrow-minded ideologues in the 
present, rather than as true intellectuals.22 
Bruno, by contrast, defends his position on the Magazine in earnest, and his defense 
suggests that the novel itself supports intellectuals’ dedication to intellectual freedom and 
autonomy. “Myself I’m frankly after two things: truth, regardless of propaganda; and art,” he 
declares at a meeting about the Magazine (197). Acknowledging that the material problems of 
“full bellies” must be attended to first in politics, he nevertheless also asserts that in                                                         
22 Morris Dickstein supposes that Slesinger identifies most with the Black Sheep’s activism, as against intellectuals’ 
defining “ambivalence, reflectiveness, and self-consciousness” (Dancing 511), and thus he deprecates the novel’s 
anti-intellectualism. I think he is right to bring attention to this troubling facet of her work. But I also think that the 
novel’s pointed satire of the Black Sheep’s proto-fascism—which Dickstein does not note—demonstrates that 
Slesinger never wholly sympathizes with any of her major characters. This refusal to simply side with any of her 
characters, I would argue then, marks Slesinger as more of an ambivalent, reflective, and self-conscious intellectual 
than Dickstein gives her credit for. 
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revolutionary politics “someone’s got to take the long view, someone’s got to keep his eye on 
what comes after [the revolution] . . . We—the intellectuals—have to step in and show them 
what else there is; keep them from aiming at a fuller and fuller belly to the exclusion of 
everything else” (201). Intellectuals have a valuable social role to play precisely because they 
won’t engage in mere propaganda. Bruno recognizes the privilege that underpins his position: he 
knows that intellectuals “come of a long and honorable line of full bellies” (200). Indeed he 
wishes to defend that privilege as necessary to intellectuals’ existence; recall that in reflecting on 
the Black Sheep, Bruno thinks “it was not merely their youth that set them off, that blinded as it 
fired them, it was their poverty. Perhaps poverty, undercutting everything else”—undercutting, 
in other words, their ability to be objective in the pursuit of truth—“removed them a priori from 
the class of intellectuals,” he speculates (199-200). He accordingly thinks that “intellectuals 
engaged in a property war would lose their identity as intellectuals” (206). Intellectuals need 
their privilege of “full bellies” in order to keep their neutrality, the dedication to intellectual 
freedom and autonomy that he insists is a socially and politically important belief. “Being an 
intellectual,” he asserts, “surely implies . . . to some extent the power of rising above individual 
or immediate circumstances . . . the privilege of bringing to the conflict something abstract, 
something resembling a universal truth—something else beyond the status of his private person 
and his bank account” (197, second ellipses in the original). When set against Firman’s proto-
fascist exclamations in particular, Bruno’s measured and undeceived defense of intellectuals’ 
autonomy appears to be nothing less than the novel’s own. Bruno’s defense represents a rare 
moment of sympathy for intellectual endeavor in a novel otherwise given to a thorough-going 
satire of the intellectual class’s “politics.” Like Culture and the Crisis two years earlier, The 
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Unpossessed believes in—indeed justifies and promotes—the intellectual autonomy of the 
intellectual class. 
Thus while the great bulk of the novel’s energies are spent in criticizing intellectuals’ 
separation from proletarian politics and society at large—in figuring the intellectual class as a 
sterile race, as men disconnected from bodily life, and above all as narcissists unable to 
acknowledge the existence of others—it nevertheless does imagine some benefit in intellectuals’ 
seclusion, in their autonomy from the currents of active politics. Imaginatively engaging with the 
debates about an intellectual class started by her acquaintances in the League of Professional 
Groups for Foster and Ford, and exhibiting some of the classed skepticism about intellectuals’ 
role in proletarian politics reflected in Max Nomad’s article on “White Collars and Horny 
Hands,” Slesinger created a novel that largely skewers the intellectual class’s habit of living in its 
own narcissistic world apart from the rest of the society and from genuine political action. But 
following Culture and the Crisis’s appeal to the values of intellectual autonomy, her novel also 
finally admits—against the spirit of her Communist milieu—the value in having an intellectual 
class set apart from the narrowest sorts of political demands. In unequal measure to be sure, then, 
the American intellectual class’s first fictional portrait allowed for both the political dangers and 
the political virtues of an intellectual class separated from society and politics at large. 
In Slesinger’s 1934 novel of Marxist intellectuals, we are seemingly a long way from the 
postmodern moment of the 1960s. Rooted in 1930s debates over the role of intellectuals in 
revolution, The Unpossessed is most often read, and rightly so, as a satire on the difficulties of 
intellectuals’ participation in a particular era’s (proletarian) politics. But the novel’s reflections 
on the simultaneous political dangers and values of intellectual autonomy, we shall see, were 
foundational for the emergence of postmodernism decades later. For in The Unpossessed’s 
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critique of intellectual detachment from the world of proletarian experience and politics, as well 
as in “White Collars and Horny Hand”’s sense that intellectuals had class interests implacably 
opposed to those of the working class, we have the beginnings of what would become a 
surprisingly widespread and influential critique of intellectual labor in the twentieth century. As 
we shall see in the remainder of Part I, The Unpossessed’s broad critique of an intellectual class 
detached from the proletariat was subsequently given greater theoretical heft and political 
consequence in the Trotskyist critique of a proletarian Russian Revolution co-opted by the 
“bureaucratic collectivism” of a separate class of government mental workers. And as a result, 
Slesinger’s critique of intellectuals’ social isolation also lay behind a 1950s campus novel that 
mocked academic workers’ bureaucratically isolated and narrow habits of thought. The critique 
of intellectual workers’ isolation in fact ultimately underlay even much of postmodernism’s 
1960s metafictional self-consciousness about that increasingly institutionalized intellectual labor 
known as the writing of fiction. But in both Culture and the Crisis’s and The Unpossesssed’s 
celebration of intellectuals’ autonomy, in their sense that intellectuals had to look after the truth 
above all, we also have important roots of the campus novel’s consistent promotion of 
intellectual freedom and aesthetic autonomy—and thus, I will argue, of postmodernism’s brief 
for undecidability, for the inherent unpredictability of a world still in need of (intellectuals’ free) 
interpretation. In both satirical and sympathetic fashion, then, The Unpossessed marks an early if 
relatively light-hearted fictional expression of intellectuals as a class isolated from society at 
large. And from the debates about intellectual labor that the novel helped spark, some of the most 
important roots of postmodernist literature and thought themselves were laid. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Portrait of the Intellectual as a Bureaucratic Collectivist:  
Mary McCarthy’s Neurotic New Class 
 
 
1. “A Minor Furor” 
Reviewing Mary McCarthy’s first novel in the New York Times Book Review when it 
appeared in May 1942, Edith Walton predicted that it was “probably destined to create a minor 
furor.” For one thing, The Company She Keeps’s “original and sensational” (i.e., sexually active 
and frequently adulterous) heroine was “open to debate, query, revulsion and downright 
disbelief.” For another, in its success in recreating New York intellectual circles on the page, 
parts of the novel rivaled another novel of New York intellectuals: “Miss McCarthy comes as 
close as did Tess Slesinger, when she wrote ‘The Unpossessed,’ to reflecting the exact talk and 
temper of certain circles in New York.” Like Slesinger, McCarthy had “viciously and unfairly” 
modeled some of her characters on “actual literary figures” in New York City.  
Walton was right about the novel’s effect, at least. It did indeed, like The Unpossessed, 
create a minor furor in New York City intellectual circles, setting the pattern for many of 
McCarthy’s novels to come. (Her next novel, 1949’s The Oasis, based one of its main characters 
quite closely upon her ex-lover Philip Rahv. Rahv sued to try to stop its publication.) Clifton 
Fadiman, writing a short review in The New Yorker—a piece whose bile would make you think 
he had been personally attacked1—was also perturbed by what he took as the novel’s ad 
hominem tone. “One has the feeling that her characters are drawn from life and that all of them 
are really much pleasanter and decenter people than Miss McCarthy gives them credit for being,” 
                                                        
1 Perhaps he wasn’t wrong, of course: Wald suggests that McCarthy indeed may have meant to attack Fadiman 
(among many others) in her portrayal of Jim Barnett, since like Barnett, Fadiman “in no sense had the theoretical 
abilities or sense of commitment to be central to the formation and development of the anti-Stalinist left” (156). 
Fadiman, incidentally, was Slesinger’s editor at Simon & Schuster (Sharistanian 363). 
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he groused (61). As a parting shot, he offered the dubious compliment that the book has “the 
definite attraction of high-grade back-fence gossip” (61). A minor furor in the tradition of 
Slesinger’s The Unpossessed, indeed.2 
Unfortunately, a furor of gossip has tended to dominate what little critical discussion of 
the novel there has been. In 1967 Doris Grumbach could testily and truthfully note of Mary 
McCarthy’s critics that “It is remarkable that such a small amount of good prose has produced so 
much bad criticism” (13). Fifty years after the novel’s publication, Carol Brightman surveyed the 
continuing impressionistic remarks and fascinated gossip about McCarthy as intellectual 
celebrity, and then remarked with equal justice that “McCarthy hasn’t received the critical 
attention she deserves” (Writing xvi). Regarding Company’s “Portrait of the Intellectual as a 
Yale Man,” she could honestly note that “one looks in vain in the 1940s, or later for that matter, 
for a critical discussion of its content” (229). Today, seventy years after the novel’s publication, 
one still looks mostly in vain for an extended critical discussion of the content of any of the 
“episodes” contained in The Company She Keeps, her first and (I think) best work of fiction.3 
The book as a whole has suffered a similar fate, especially in academic quarters. Paula 
Rabinowitz’s Labor and Desire (1991) discusses the book for a scant four pages (12-15). The 
MLA database turns up only one article, and that’s also a mere five-page commentary, of which 
two pages are given over—helpfully, it must be said—to quoting the entire text of the first 
                                                        
2 Speaking of high-grade back-fence gossip, there was one other connection between McCarthy and Slesinger. In the 
mid-to-late 1930s McCarthy became friends with Slesinger’s ex-husband Herbert Solow, who was not only the 
original of Miles Flinders, but a major architect of the Dewey Commission, which exonerated Trotsky of Stalin’s 
accusations against him in the late 1930s. McCarthy later indignantly told a the story of  how Solow had invited her 
out alone once in the summer of 1937, despite knowing that she was sharing an apartment with Philip Rahv, who 
had even answered the phone when Solow called (Intellectual Memoirs 84). 
3 “Episodes” is the book’s acknowledgment’s word for the chapters of this novel; to call them “short stories,” as 
some critics do, tends to undermine the paradoxically fragmented unity which McCarthy achieves with the novel. 
See McCarthy’s own comments on the novel’s composition and eventual unity in her Paris Review interview with 
Elisabeth Niebuhr (“Art” 7). 
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edition’s dust-jacket.4 The Company She Keeps has never received the close reading it so richly 
merits. 
 This is a pity for many reasons, but high among them is the fact that it is difficult to 
overestimate McCarthy’s importance to the portrayal of intellectuals in the twentieth-century 
American novel. Nearly all her fictional output, from 1942’s The Company She Keeps through to 
1979’s Cannibals and Missionaries, was devoted to understanding intellectuals: at first the 
influential intellectuals of New York City, and then a much wider swathe. And accordingly, I 
will argue in this chapter, McCarthy’s first novel had more in common with Tess Slesinger’s 
Unpossessed than its first reviewers knew. The Company She Keeps, too, imagines its 
intellectuals as a class, and examines that class through the lens of psychoanalysis. We should 
not agree without qualification, however, with Paula Rabinowitz’s statement that the novel 
accordingly demonstrates “that the leftist intellectual was best read [at the time] through 
narratives of psychoanalysis rather than political economy” (143). For The Company She Keeps 
updates its literary portrayal of an intellectual class beyond where Slesinger began it eight years 
earlier, and engages quite directly with a theory of political economy. Substantially influenced 
by the late 1930s’ and early 1940s’ Trotskyist debates over a New Class of intellectuals, The 
Company She Keeps takes the political desires of its intellectual class more seriously, if no less 
satirically, than Slesinger’s debut. More specifically, it offers a portrait of intellectuals as a class 
caught between a politically dangerous desire for higher status under a system of what her 
Trotskyist friends scornfully called “bureaucratic collectivism,” and a more salutary and genuine 
desire for economic justice under a democratic form of socialism. This opposition to the 
                                                        
4 See Crowley. The only study of Mary McCarthy not yet mentioned, Sabrina Fuchs Abrams’ Mary McCarthy, 
focuses on McCarthy’s postwar work and thus offers only cursory discussion of this novel. 
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bureaucratic, I will suggest in conclusion, laid further and crucial foundations for a 
postmodernism that emerged only decades later. 
 
2. The American Question 
Mary McCarthy first came to political consciousness during the Moscow trials of 1936, 
when Stalin accused Trotsky and other Bolsheviks of counterrevolutionary plots and 
conspiracies. Her belief that Trotsky was entitled to a fair hearing led her to begin attending 
meetings of the Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky with her friend the novelist James 
Farrell and her soon-to-be-lover Philip Rahv (who had reviewed Slesinger’s The Unpossessed for 
the New Masses only two years earlier). With the still-radical Sidney Hook for an instructor 
(Brightman, Writing 311), McCarthy educated herself in Marxism and Trotskyism thereafter, and 
soon helped found the newly born, Trotsky- and modernist-friendly Partisan Review.5 Through 
this involvement in the Trotskyist intellectual circles of New York, McCarthy was privy to some 
of the earliest and most historically influential elaborations of the intellectual class theory first 
promulgated in 1932’s Culture and the Crisis and “White Collars and Horny Hands.” 
Consequently, the concept of an intellectual class is a foundation of her first novel. 
The Trotskyist influence on the theory of intellectuals as a class stems from the debates 
surrounding Trotsky’s analysis of the class character of the Soviet Union under Stalin. In 1937’s 
The Revolution Betrayed, he argued that the democratic and communist revolution of the 
Bolsheviks had been undermined by Stalin’s subsequent leadership of the Bolshevik party. 
Under Stalin the democratic revolutionists of Lenin’s generation had been swept aside to make 
way for an “administrative apparatus” (135) of “chinovniks,” the “professional governmental                                                         
5 Brightman’s Writing Dangerously offers a fine summary of the intellectual and biographical milieu of McCarthy’s 
introduction to Trotskyism and the Partisan Review, 130-50. 
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functionaries” of a bureaucracy that wielded state power for its own interest (98). This 
bureaucracy of professionals was a ruling stratum, and not a class, Trotsky was careful to argue. 
It had “neither stocks nor bonds,” and was “recruited, supplemented and renewed in the manner 
of an administrative hierarchy, independently of any special property relations of its own” (249). 
Under this bureaucratic ruling stratum, the new Soviet Union was still a “workers’ state,” but one 
with a “dual character” (52): it was socialist to the extent that property had been nationalized, but 
capitalist to the extent that the distribution of “life’s goods” was still unequal (54). It was a 
“transitional” society that could either go forward toward a truly democratic (soviet) form of 
socialism, or slide back into capitalism (254). In sum, the revolution had been betrayed, but not 
yet overthrown, by Stalin’s bureaucratic stratum of professional functionaries (252). 
In the small but influential Trotskyist circles of the New York City-dominated Socialist 
Workers Party (SWP), the events surrounding the outbreak of World War II quickly made this a 
contested analysis. In August of 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany signed a non-aggression 
pact, enabling Hitler to invade Poland on September 1st and thus begin the Second World War. 
Two and a half weeks later the Soviet Union invaded and occupied the eastern part of Poland. 
While Trotskyists came better prepared to comprehend such actions of the Soviet Union than did 
those Stalinists who still believed in the unqualified success of the Russian Revolution, the 
actions nevertheless provoked many crucial political and intellectual questions on the Trotskyist 
left. A bitter factional fight in the SWP ensued. What did the USSR’s alliance with Nazi 
Germany mean? Was the Soviet Union still a kind of workers’ state, as Trotsky had said, or had 
it turned its back irrevocably on the revolution which had given it birth? How should the SWP 
view the Soviet Union now, and how should revolutionary socialists act in relation to the USSR? 
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In short, what was the class character of the Soviet Union, and should the SWP support it in the 
war?  
Trotsky himself, along with the majority faction of the SWP led by James Cannon, 
insisted that the Soviet Union was still a “workers state,” however “degenerated” (“Again” 73, 
emphasis in original), and therefore should be defended. No doubt, the Soviet Union’s invasions 
supported Hitler’s imperialist aims. But the invasions and occupations were not imperialist in the 
Marxist sense. Coming from a merely “degenerated” workers state, they did not stem from the 
economic impulse of capitalist expansion (71). And whatever the intentions behind them, the 
invasion and occupation of Poland (and later Finland) constituted an attack on private property; 
the Soviet Union was wresting the means of production from capitalists in Europe and giving it 
to a state. To this extent the Soviet Union was waging a progressive war (“USSR” 60-62, “Petty-
Bourgeois” 116-18). The state in question was Stalinist, of course, and so the proletariat would 
still have to revolt against the bureaucracy and seize state power, and hence the means of 
production. But despite its degeneration under Stalin and its aid to Hitler, the Soviet Union 
retained the character of a workers’ state and was on that basis (and that basis alone) worthy of 
“unconditional defense” (“Again” 75)—i.e., a defense not predicated on the condition of Stalin’s 
overthrow—in the event that it was attacked by Allied troops.  
The minority faction, whose intellectual leaders were New York University philosophy 
professor James Burnham and long-time socialist Max Shachtman, disagreed. The Soviet Union 
had joined forces with Germany and was engaged in imperialism plain and simple, they asserted. 
Revolutionary Marxists thus ought to oppose both the Scylla of a familiar Anglo-French 
imperialism and the Charybdis of a new joint Nazi-Soviet imperialism. Declaring themselves 
adherents of a “Third Camp” fighting for international socialism as against these twin 
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imperialisms, they split from the SWP to form the Workers Party (WP) in April of 1940. There 
they began to elaborate their new diagnosis of the class character of the Soviet Union, a theory 
they soon labeled “bureaucratic collectivism.”6 The Soviet Union, they argued, was an 
unpredicted and more stable formation than Trotsky’s “degenerated workers state” precariously 
caught between socialist property forms and a bureaucratic ruling stratum. It was instead a 
collectivist economy ruled quite securely by an exploiting bureaucratic class. This unexpected 
and new class, sometimes later in fact called the New Class, could, like the capitalist class, 
practice its own form of imperialism.7 
The debate in the SWP thus often hinged on what was called “the Russian question.” 
What was the class nature of the USSR under Stalin? In the newly-formed WP, however, this 
first theoretical destination was soon followed by what I will dub “the American question.” What 
was the class nature of the U.S.A. under Roosevelt’s New Deal? Could a new class of 
bureaucrats arise at home, as it had in Stalin’s Russia? In a New Deal rife with bureaus—a 
rapidly proliferating alphabet soup of acronyms—the state had taken hold over much of the 
economy. To a remarkable extent, the state had been seized by what Max Shachtman called, in 
                                                        
6 Ironically, Macdonald and eventually (though not immediately) Shachtman adopted this term from Trotsky, who 
named the theory for them in 1939 while rejecting it during the SWP split (“USSR” 50-52). When naming the term, 
Trotsky himself cited the work of the eccentric Italian ex-Trotskyist and sometime fascist Bruno Rizzi, who had 
self-published his Bureaucratization of the World in France that year. Rizzi’s work was not widely available to 
American readers until after the war, and there is no real evidence that anyone who participated in the SWP schism, 
save Trotsky, was aware of the book’s arguments—nor in any substantial way of the origin of the term “bureaucratic 
collectivism”—at that time. See Rizzi, and especially the informative introduction by Adam Westoby. 
7 For the remainder this dissertation, then, I will frequently use the shorter term “New Class” when referring to the 
concept of an intellectual class. 
The SWP split described in these two paragraphs was epoch-making for Trotskyism in the U.S. For a fuller 
account of the schism, see Wald, New York 182-92. For readers seeking primary sources, Trotsky’s side of the 
debate over the Soviet Union (as opposed to the questions of party organization raised by the dispute)—along with 
Burnham’s final rebuttal (“Science and Style”) and letter of resignation from the WP—is collected in Trotsky’s In 
Defense of Marxism. The debate may also be followed in contemporary issues of the SWP’s Internal Bulletin and 
the New International; Shachtman and Burnham took over the New International (the SWP’s theoretical organ) for 
the WP when they left the SWP. Last but not least, some key works contributing to the theory of “bureaucratic 
collectivism,” including those of Shachtman, Burnham, and Dwight Macdonald (on the latter two of whom more 
below), are gathered together in Haberkern and Lipow’s Neither Capitalism Nor Socialism. 
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the Russian context of bureaucratic collectivism, “a whole host and variety of experts” (200). 
Furthermore, such changes were occurring under the leadership of a strong executive who had 
assembled the bureaucracy. If not quite a dictator like Stalin, Roosevelt—with his immensely 
popular “fireside chats,” an unprecedented third term in the offing, and a legislative record 
deeply influenced by his Brains Trust of academic advisors—was certainly a charismatic leader 
who had awarded an unusually large share of executive power to bureaucratic agencies and 
mental workers. Given all this, the “American question” asked, what were the chances of a 
bureaucratic collectivist U.S. ruled by the New Class? 
In the Trotskyist and ex-Trotskyist circles in which Mary McCarthy ran, a number of 
thinkers expounded at length on both the Russian and the American questions. McCarthy was 
undoubtedly familiar with SWP schism leader James Burnham’s work: her first novel references 
Burnham’s idea of “the Managerial Revolution” as a topic of “official conversation” amongst the 
protagonist’s intellectual friends (287). Burnham had written his best-selling treatise, The 
Managerial Revolution: What Is Happening in the World Today, shortly after declaring himself 
no longer a Marxist and resigning from the WP he had helped to form in 1940. Published in 
1941, the book explicated in popular form Burnham’s disagreement with Trotsky over the class 
character of the Soviet Union. World-wide capitalism was ending, the book asserted, but it 
would not be replaced by socialism, as Marxists (like Trotsky) thought. Rather, capitalism was 
giving way to a third type of society, “managerial society,” in which a new class of managers—
those who possessed technical knowledge of production processes, including both corporate 
managers and governmental bureaucrats and administrators—dominated the state-planned 
economy and continued to exploit workers. This “managerial society” was best typified by the 
Soviet Union (221), but Nazi Germany and even New Deal America were managerial too. The 
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somewhat dystopian (if still scientific-sounding) book predicted that the new managerial class 
would rob the proletariat of its current capitalist freedom to find another employer, since the 
manager-run state would be the only employer (131-32). Furthermore, it asserted, the managerial 
class might not need or desire truly democratic governance when its bureaucratic agencies had 
full authority to plan the economy (168-71). The book did not include cultural intellectuals such 
as Burnham himself in its more technical-minded class of managers,8 but it nevertheless offered 
a significant and influential contribution to theories of a New Class of mental workers who seek 
their own class power rather than that of the capitalists above or the working class below—even 
when they claim to represent the working class.9 
In addition to being familiar with Burnham’s popularization of the theory, McCarthy was 
also directly familiar with the SWP split, as she confirmed years later in an interview with 
Elisabeth Niebuhr.10 Most likely, she became aware of the divide at the time through her 
friendship with schism participant Dwight Macdonald, whom she had known since 1936 
(Brightman, Writing 142) and who joined the editorial board of the newly-organized Partisan 
Review with her in late 1937 (Wald, New York 141). With Burnham’s editorial encouragement, 
Macdonald began writing for the SWP’s New International in 1938; he then joined the SWP                                                         
8 Burnham, a professor of philosophy at the time, states that his “personal interests, material as well as moral, and 
my hopes are in conflict” with his belief that managerial society is the most likely result of the contemporary 
developments he presents (273). 
9 Burnham is sometimes considered a New York Intellectual: see Wald’s portrait, New York 175-182, and passim. 
For an account of Burnham’s career early to late—from Communist to arch-conservative—see Chapters 4 and 8 of 
Diggins’ Up from Communism; the story of his break with Trotsky and its result in The Managerial Revolution is 
told on pp. 184-198. Latter-day New York Intellectual Daniel Bell, recognizing the interconnectedness of New Class 
theory and theories of bureaucracy (a connection important to the early development of the campus novel, as I will 
argue in Part II), explicates Trotsky’s and Burnham’s ideas in The Coming of Postindustrial Society 86-94.  
The Managerial Revolution’s dystopian picture made it the first deradicalization of New Class theory 
published in America—its first use to suggest that capitalism would be preferable to anything concocted by 
knowledge workers whose supposed passion for controlled economies would exploit more ruthlessly than the 
capitalists ever could. From there, the theory became important on the intellectual right: its historical importance for 
neoconservatives’ New Class theorizing in the sixties and seventies is confirmed by its frequent citation in Bruce-
Briggs’ anthology The New Class?, for example. 
10 In this 1962 interview, she makes brief reference to “a split in the Trotskyite movement” during World War II 
(“Art” 14). 
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soon after Hitler and Stalin signed their non-aggression pact (Wald, New York 200-01). Like 
Burnham, Macdonald sparred with “the Old Man” in print during the schism, enough to receive 
jabs back. In an article published soon after the split and Burnham’s declaration of apostasy from 
Marxism, Trotsky called Macdonald “not a snob [like Burnham], but a bit stupid” (“On” 275), 
and prophesied that he would “abandon the [Workers] party just as Burnham did” (277). (He was 
also careful, and catty, to note that “possibly because he is a little lazier, it will come later” 
[277].) Having quit the SWP to form the WP with Burnham, Macdonald did indeed quit the WP 
soon after Burnham did. His involvements with the SWP and the WP alike were thus relatively 
short-lived. 
But intellectually they were quite fruitful, and certainly influential: a full review of 
Macdonald’s resulting thoughts on “bureaucratic collectivism” and the American question is 
indispensable to understanding McCarthy’s portrait of an intellectual class in The Company She 
Keeps. In the late spring of 1941, Burnham published a summary of his managerial thesis in 
Partisan Review.11 But Macdonald rejected Burnham’s idea of a managerial society. Reviewing 
the book, Macdonald astutely decried it as “so vague, unhistorical and often self-contradictory, 
that it would take another book to correct errors of fact and to qualify, unravel and properly 
define his terms” and assailed it, inaccurately but no less passionately, as an “attempt . . . to 
justify fascism in terms of materialistic progress” (“Burnhamian” 76). Despite such 
disagreements, it is important to realize that, as Macdonald himself noted, he and Burnham 
nevertheless agreed that “a new non-capitalist and non-socialist form of society” had emerged in 
the world (76). For both thinkers, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany were of “essentially the 
same politico-economic nature” (“End” 429), neither capitalist nor proletarian. 
                                                        
11 See “The Theory of the Managerial Revolution.” 
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The nature of Nazi Germany in particular fascinated Macdonald in the first years of the 
war, and Macdonald’s understanding of the Nazi regime offers us his fullest vision of what he 
meant by “bureaucratic collectivism” and the emergence of a new class. Germany’s bureaucratic 
collectivism functioned as a kind of “black socialism,” Macdonald asserted (“National” 253). It 
combined the imperialist war-mongering which constituted “the most hideous social and political 
features of decaying capitalism” with “the centralized state power and conscious economic 
planning of socialism” (253). In Germany, the centralized planning of bureaucratic collectivism 
had thus produced a formidable war economy whose technical successes were all too apparent in 
Hitler’s numerous victories. At first Macdonald thought that it “didn’t seem to be true” that the 
Nazi bureaucracy constituted a new ruling class (256); the bureaucracy was instead simply a 
temporary development necessitated by the German war economy. But he soon changed his 
mind. In his obituary of Trotsky, published in the September-October Partisan Review of 1940, 
he described the bureaucratic collectivism of the Soviet Union as a “new form of class 
exploitation” (“Trotsky” 350). By May 1941, his opinion had solidified regarding Nazi Germany 
as well. The governmental bureaucracy which had produced this German war economy was “a 
new ruling class” by virtue of its control of the means of production (“Fascism” 84). In his 
discussions of the German war machine, Macdonald, like Burnham, thus promoted a form of 
New Class theory that spied a convergence between the Nazi and Soviet political economies. 
Macdonald was also one of the WP’s premier theorists regarding the American question, 
most often in relation to the German question. New Deal America was still an essentially 
capitalist society, he realized. But the economic difference between New Deal America and Nazi 
Germany was only one of degree. For as in bureaucratic collectivist Nazi Germany, “two 
economic systems” (emphasis in original) existed in the U.S. at once:  
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the familiar capitalist system with its apparatus of prices, profits, private property, 
money, the market, etc.; and a new sort of system, which might be called 
bureaucratic collectivism, in which production is ordered not by the interplay of 
capitalist factors but by official decrees and regulations based on a plan worked 
out consciously by state bureaucrats . . . the diehard Republicans are right when 
they detect in various New Deal measures (SEC, TVA, Wages and Hours Act, 
Wagner Act, AAA, RFC, FCC, FDIC) a non-capitalist tendency. The question is: 
which of these systems is dominant? 
In America, he finished, capitalism was “clearly” dominant (“Fascism” 84), despite the New 
Deal’s anticapitalist tendencies. The New Deal was part of a “trend towards bureaucratic 
collectivism” in America (“End” 430, emphasis in the original), but the trend hadn’t yet borne 
fruit, and might not ever. 
While Macdonald thus understood America to be clearly capitalist in the present, he also 
held that if America were to defeat a German war machine which owed its monstrous birth to the 
undoubtedly effective “production for use” (rather than profit) of bureaucratic collectivism, the 
American economy would very soon require still more centralized planning itself, possibly along 
the lines already hinted at in the New Deal. The U.S. would need, in short, a non-capitalist 
“totalitarian economy” of its own if it were to defend itself against Germany’s imperialist 
aggressions (“American” 46). Macdonald imagined three ways that such a planned war economy 
could come about. The first was “a mass political movement like fascism” (46), as had happened 
in Germany. The second and more probable option was an economic plan “imposed 
administratively, from the top” by Roosevelt—what Macdonald dubbed a “‘white’ or ‘cold’ 
fascism” (46). Last and best, of course, was the possibility of a revolutionary and democratic 
 76 
socialism, with the economic goals planned by the working class rather than a bureaucracy. But 
in any case, it was clear that only such a revolutionary socialism, or an American fascism—a 
bureaucratic collectivism to rival Germany’s—could produce an American war economy capable 
of defeating Hitler. 
In the late spring of 1941 it was “a question in [Macdonald’s] mind” whether the U.S. 
could produce a fascist movement from below (“End” 430). But a mere four months after 
Macdonald declared the U.S. “clearly” capitalist, famed literary critic Van Wyck Brooks gave a 
speech at Columbia University that shook Macdonald’s relative optimism. In “Primary Literature 
and Coterie Literature,” Brooks declared that modernist heroes Joyce, Eliot, and Proust were 
pessimistic and elitist “secondary” writers arrayed in opposition to such optimistic and popular 
“primary” writers as Tolstoi, Dickens, and Thomas Mann, who wrote literature that “somehow 
follows the biological grain” and “in some way conduces to race survival” (qtd. in 
“Kulturbolschewismus” 450). Macdonald was quick to warn the readers of Partisan Review that 
Brooks’ paper heralded something in America very much like the anti-intellectual literary 
propaganda of the Soviet Union, with Nazism’s racial tinge. In short, his article title declared, 
“Kulturbolschewismus”—Stalinism’s so-called “Bolshevik culture,” with a German accent—“Is 
Here.” (This incident explains the appearance, in The Company She Keeps, of “Van Wyck 
Brooks” as a topic of “official conversation” immediately following Burnham’s “Managerial 
Revolution” [287].) For Macdonald, Brooks’s attack represented the leading edge of a “growing 
official esthetic” (451) that threatened the “free inquiry and criticism of the intelligentsia” (450). 
If the intelligentsia were to preserve that freedom, he argued, the “old battles” for modernism in 
its 1920s heroic phase would have to be “fought again, the old lessons learned once more” (451). 
The once “clearly” capitalist U.S.A. was now only a precious few degrees removed from the 
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official culture of bureaucratic collectivism, and all intellectuals who loved freedom of thought 
must fight such fascist-inclined avatars of bureaucratic collectivism as Brooks. For Macdonald, 
then, America was capitalist, but only thinly so. The danger of bureaucratic collectivism foisted 
upon America by such intellectuals as Brooks was conspicuously real to him. 
Thus both Burnham’s theory of a managerial revolution and her friend Dwight 
Macdonald’s fight against Brooks’ bureaucratic collectivist “Kulturbolschewismus” had been on 
McCarthy’s mind enough to be labeled as topics of the protagonist’s “official conversation” in 
The Company She Keeps. Last but not least, then, we should note that such theories about the 
role of mental workers in the creation of a bureaucratic form of socialism were almost certainly 
part and parcel of McCarthy’s home life at the time as well. For her second husband, the eminent 
literary critic Edmund Wilson, had, like so many other intellectuals of his generation, signed his 
name to 1932’s Culture and the Crisis, and hence to an understanding of intellectuals as a 
distinct class. After his marriage to McCarthy in 1938, he spent two more years finishing his 
classic account of the European revolutionary intellectual tradition, To the Finland Station 
(1940), with its warm if critical portrait of Trotsky.12 Wilson’s analysis of both Nazism and 
Stalinism indeed reflected his familiarity with “the Russian question” in Trotskyist circles. More 
precisely, his analysis of both Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany apparently borrowed quite 
heavily from his friend Macdonald’s picture of a New Class-run bureaucratic collectivism. In 
Hitler’s Germany, Wilson wrote in 1941,  
a new kind of middle class, as in Russia, came out of the petty bourgeoisie and 
did not find the slightest difficulty in enlisting ambitious members of the working                                                         
12 Interestingly, the acknowledgments for that book thank Max Nomad (xxxiii), who had, recall, written 1932’s 
“White Collars and Horny Hands,” which promoted Machajski’s precocious accusation that intellectual workers had 
hijacked the Russian revolution. It’s likely that Wilson would have consulted Nomad for information on the 
anarchist tradition, including a chapter on Bakunin, whose criticisms of Marx are often cited as an early source of 
New Class theory. 
 78 
class. This group succeeded in setting up a new kind of state socialism, in which 
the government planned and directed in the interests of the new governing class, 
without actually taking over the industrial plant, but eliminating the big 
capitalists, if necessary, and seeing to it that the working class were well enough 
off so that they did not become seriously recalcitrant. (“Marxism” 489) 
For Wilson, the New Class of both Germany and Russia was a “new kind of middle class,” one 
that emerged from the “petty bourgeoisie” to become the shrewd and ruthless “governing class” 
of a society that represented neither the capitalism of Adam Smith nor the socialism envisioned 
by Karl Marx. Thus while he used the term “state socialism,” Wilson nevertheless seemed to 
believe in something quite similar to Macdonald’s theory of a “bureaucratic collectivism” run by 
a new class. 
And again like Macdonald (and Burnham), Wilson feared the development of something 
similar in America. “By the early 1940s,” Carol Brightman notes, “a few intellectuals . . . had 
begun to enter the state apparatus via Archibald MacLeish’s new Office of Facts and Figures” 
(Writing 211). The liberal poet and New Deal supporter MacLeish was in fact a quite potent 
symbol of the sudden rise to power of select intellectuals during the early years of the war. In 
1939, he had become Librarian of Congress. In the early 1940s he became director of the Office 
of Facts and Figures, and deputy director when the agency was renamed the Office of War 
Information—the office principally responsible for the American propaganda effort in World 
War II. There he vigorously promoted the war as a struggle to preserve and indeed extend the 
promise of New Deal America abroad (Brinkley 313). By the end of World War II, he was 
assistant secretary of state. Wilson’s friend Malcolm Cowley had himself joined MacLeish in the 
Office of Facts and Figures (Brightman, Writing 211), but he nevertheless mistrusted the trend of 
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intellectual involvement in the New Deal state. Writing to Wilson in 1940, he considered that the 
“character assassinations” so common to contemporary literary and political journalism “would 
be real murders . . . if the intellectuals controlled the state apparatus” (qtd. in Brightman, Writing 
210-11). Soon thereafter similar fears of an intellectual-run American state crept into Wilson’s 
thoughts about literature’s role in politics. He and Mary’s friend Macdonald had worried that 
Roosevelt’s administration might impose a bureaucratic collectivist fascism “administratively, 
from the top” (“American” 46). In June of 1942, as reviews of his wife’s first novel came in, 
Wilson similarly wondered whether “second and third-rate writers” like MacLeish and 
playwright Robert Sherwood might “represent merely the beginning of some awful collectivist 
cant which will turn into official propaganda for a post-war state socialist bureaucracy.”13 “With 
MacLeish and Sherwood at the White House as they are now,” he went on, “the whole thing 
makes me rather uneasy.” If Macdonald’s reaction to the stirrings of bureaucratic collectivist 
sentiment in the aesthetic field (“kulturbolschewismus”) was to urge a renaissance of modernist 
aesthetics, Wilson’s strategy for fighting state socialism was to return to a different, but no doubt 
related, tradition: “It may be necessary for a subsequent set of writers to lead an attack on phony 
collectivism in the interests of the American individualistic tradition” (“To” 385). Having once 
advocated intellectuals as a potentially revolutionary class in 1932’s Culture and the Crisis, a 
decade later McCarthy’s husband feared that authors might provide ideological ammunition for 
                                                        
13 Wilson was likely thinking here of MacLeish’s “The Irresponsibles,” a widely-read and highly controversial 
article written for The Nation in 1940, in which MacLeish indicted “scholars” and literary “writers”—the 
eponymous “irresponsibles”—for not using their work to decry the rise of fascist and communist tendencies at home 
and abroad. Against such a comparatively instrumentalist conception of intellectual and literary politics, Wilson had 
expressed his own view three years earlier:  
from the moment one is not trying to function as an organizer or an active politician (and agitational 
literature is politics), one must work in good faith in one’s own field. A conviction that is genuine will 
always come through—that is, if one’s work is sound. You may say, This is not the time for art or science: 
the enemy is at the gate! But in that case you should be at the gate: in the Spanish International Brigade, for 
example, rather than engaged in literary work. There is no sense in pursuing a literary career under the 
impression that one is operating a bombing-plane. (“American Critics” 650) 
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their fellow knowledge workers to create a stifling “state socialist” regime from the raw 
materials of New Deal America. 
Mary McCarthy was no Marxist (or ex-Marxist) theorist like Burnham, her friend 
Macdonald, or even her generally less theoretically-inclined husband, Wilson. In 1953, she 
wittily claimed that after meeting “the learned young men” who attended the Trotsky Committee 
meetings, she had concluded that Marxism was “something you had to take up young, like ballet 
dancing” (“My Confession” 102). The joke is a good one, vintage McCarthy both in its satirical 
deflation of intellectual politics and in its feminization of subjects conventionally understood as 
masculine. Who else but Mary McCarthy would think to compare the rigors of Marxist theory to 
those of ballet dancing? But it is also overly self-deprecating. For if she was neither so self-
conscious nor even so interested as her friends, and had even begun, like her husband, to move 
away from Marxism more generally, McCarthy was nevertheless a better student of Marxist 
debates of the era than she admitted in this article written at the height of the (Senator) McCarthy 
era.14 In the Intellectual Memoirs she was working on upon her death in 1989, for example, we 
learn that the idea of an intellectual class was very much present in her daily life around this 
time. “I liked to think that I came from a superior class [to the middle class], the professionals,” 
she recalled (35). She defended the values of “the professional class I issued from” when arguing 
with her lover Philip Rahv in 1936, too (68-69). She also felt some identity with victims of 
                                                        
14 Despite taking McCarthy’s intellectual life more seriously than the Gelderman and Kiernan biographies, Carol 
Brightman’s Writing Dangerously nevertheless generally follows the later McCarthy in downplaying her investment 
in political Trotskyism: McCarthy was attracted to the “novelist’s Trotsky,” and not “the author of theories about 
Permanent Revolution,” Brightman remarks (134). But she makes a point similar to mine about the 1953 “My 
Confession” article. “In her own way,” Brightman notes, “Mary McCarthy—who repudiated that other McCarthy 
and his trials in a few lectures at the time—had nevertheless accommodated herself to the end-of-ideology ethos that 
ruled the period. By embracing the role of chance in politics, she had, in effect, reduced her own political ‘turning-
point’ to a harmless level of anecdote” (135, emphasis in original). Diana Trilling feels similarly about the essay, 
which she calls McCarthy’s “light-minded romp through her fellow-traveling youth”: McCarthy “made the 
radicalism of the intellectuals the target of her sharp wit and allowed it no seriousness of purpose,” she complains; 
accordingly McCarthy had done “a disservice to history” (Beginning 206). 
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Stalin’s Moscow trials (she mentions Zinoviev, Kamenev, Radek, Pyatakov, and Bukharin by 
name) because they were “brain workers like ourselves” (86)—a class consciousness, not to 
mention a theoretical vocabulary, she likely would have gained from attention to her Trotskyist 
friends’ publications and conversation. New Class theory was hard to avoid in the Trotskyist 
circles of the late 1930s and early 1940s, and it is difficult to imagine that McCarthy was 
unfamiliar with the debates. 
And more to the point, her first novel itself understands intellectuals as a class. John 
Crowley speculates that the original dust-jacket for The Company She Keeps may have been 
written by McCarthy herself (113). But in any case, the first edition’s jacket material prompted 
readers to see the setting of the novel in terms of class: “The milieu is the world of advertising 
men, radicals, writers, publishers, lawyers, teachers—glorified white-collar workers and 
declassed professional people” (qtd. in Crowley 112). Such a description, it is relevant to note, 
comes very close to Trotsky’s own designation for the “intellectuals and white collar workers” 
whom he believed to constitute the minority faction in the SWP (“Scratch” 181). Writing against 
Max Shachtman and the rest, including Dwight Macdonald, Trotsky typically branded them as 
representative of “the declassed petty bourgeoisie” (199). Thus the novel’s original dust-cover 
suggested that its characters were to be understood as part of the “white-collar workers and 
declassed professional people” whom Trotsky excoriated in the SWP split, and whom McCarthy 
called her friends. 
More importantly, the plot bears all the marks of this class milieu, particularly through its 
intellectual protagonist, Margaret Sargent, who is indeed a white-collar worker always 
threatening to be “declassed.” Despite her obviously thorough education and ample cultural 
capital, Margaret temporarily works an awful secretarial job for a shady art dealer in “Rogue’s 
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Gallery,” and later loses employment at a magazine in “Portrait of the Intellectual as a Yale 
Man.” Understandably then, Margaret is ambivalent about her class status. Much like McCarthy 
herself at the time, she reviles the “ugly cartoon of middle-class life,” but fears that she is still, at 
least economically, of that class: “Ah God, it was too sad and awful, the endless hide-and-go-
seek game one played with the middle class. If one could only be sure that one did not belong to 
it, that one was finer, nobler, more aristocratic. The truth was that she hated it shakily from 
above . . . ” (260). Feeling sociocultural superiority over “the middle class” (and of course the 
working class), but economically having only “some [money] but not enough” (260), Margaret 
resides in a middle class that is not quite the middle class. She is, in short, an intellectual. 
In “The Genial Host,” McCarthy’s novel even depicts its intellectuals engaged in nothing 
short of class conflict with a capitalist, or at least a bourgeois representative of capital. Pflaumen, 
the eponymous host of the story’s party, is a prosperous German-Jewish American who aspires 
to be a man of society (139-141). Of his working life we are only told that he has an “office” 
(141), but his smoking jacket and “carefully exercised body” suggest wealth (139). His guests 
however are almost all hard-working professionals, those whom Culture and the Crisis had 
identified as part of the intellectual class of brain workers. In addition to Margaret, the Trotskyist 
bohemian-intellectual writer, the party’s attendees include a Communist (Stalinist) literary critic, 
a publisher, a psychoanalyst, a writer for Time, and a Marxist law professor. The one possible 
exception to this overwhelmingly professional company, a banker, comes as close as a banker 
can to being a part of the intellectual class. He is described as “a bright young man” whose wife 
“painted pictures” (151), and this atypical banker takes an enthusiastic interest in Margaret after 
her outburst about the murder of Trotskyist Andrés Nin in Spain (158). Thus while Pflaumen is a 
seemingly idle man of some wealth, his guests represent an intellectual class beneath him. 
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Accordingly, the relationship between Pflaumen and his guests is one of domination and 
subordination. Pflaumen’s professional friends are invited to his party not because he likes them 
individually or even collectively, but because their attendance confirms his own cultural 
distinction, and, more meanly, his very economic power over them. In the words of the story’s 
second-person narration, “he loved you for that patched fur. It signified that you were the real 
thing, the poet in a garret, and it also opened up for him the charming vistas of What He Could 
Do For You” (141, emphasis in original). For Margaret in particular, he offers the possibility of a 
salary: he gives her letters of introduction to several employers (143-45). His party also offers his 
guests a chance to overcome their isolation, at least superficially. Margaret unenthusiastically 
initiates an affair with Erdman, the Marxist law professor, and “What had happened to you with 
Erdman was happening with others all over the room. Men were taking out address books or 
repeating phone numbers in low voices. There was a slight shuffle of impatience; nothing more 
could be done here; it was time to go and yet it was much too early” (158). Thus Pflaumen grants 
the intellectual class he befriends a chance to gain employment and love alike. But he does this 
only insofar as such acts ensure his own social and economic gain: his house was “a house of 
assignation, where business deals, friendships, love affairs were arranged, with Pflaumen, the 
promoter, taking his inevitable cut” (161). Pflaumen’s intellectual friends are thus collectively 
embarrassed by their dependence on him: “you poor [friends] knew that he had bought your 
complaisance with his wines and rich food and prominent acquaintances, and you half-hated him 
before your finger touched the doorbell” (139); with a kind of self-loathing each wonders what 
“weakness,” “flimsiness of character,” “opportunism or cynicism” had made the other befriend 
him (157). Socially and economically dependent on Pflaumen, the intellectual class at the party 
resents him.15                                                         
15 For my purposes here it isn’t essential to define Pflaumen’s exact class location. Thus in the previous paragraph I 
 84 
The crux of the story occurs when Margaret, finally unable to tolerate this dependence, 
resists Pflaumen’s power. She refuses to let him know about the possibility of a future affair with 
Erdman. He responds by attacking her reputation: “‘You’re not drinking too much, are you?’ he 
asked, in a true stage whisper” (160). The specifically economic aspect of his control over her is 
made clear in the startling metaphor describing Margaret’s reaction to this attack: “At last, you 
thought, the bill had come in. The dinners, the letters of introduction, the bottle of perfume, the 
gardenias, the new Soviet film, the play, the ballet, the ice-skating at Rockefeller Plaza had all 
been invoiced, and a line drawn underneath, and the total computed” (160). In the end, Margaret 
capitulates to Pflaumen, accepting another of his arranged dinner invitations (this time with the 
banker and his wife) for both social and economic reasons: “you were still so poor, so loverless, 
so lonely” (163). Her attempt to rebel against Pflaumen’s control fails. 
The story is thus in essence an allegory of the class conflict between an intellectual class 
and capital. The intellectual class gathered at the party sells its labor-power of ideological 
production and cultural distinction in exchange for Pflaumen’s ability to grant them employment 
and emotional satisfaction. Margaret’s refusal to tell Pflaumen about her personal life thus 
constitutes a kind of intellectual strike; for a time, she refuses to give Pflaumen some part of 
what she normally sells him, her cultural distinction. The sad and bitter point of the story is that 
Pflaumen, like any capitalist, can “fire” intellectual workers who refuse to produce. Pflaumen 
                                                        
write only that he is “a capitalist, or at least a bourgeois representative of capital.” But it is worth noting that because 
of his ability to give his guests employment a good case can be made for viewing Pflaumen as a capitalist plain and 
simple. E. P. Thompson famously reminds us that a class “is a relationship, and not a thing” (Making 11). And 
following Thompson, Harry Braverman notes specifically that though “the operating executives of a giant 
corporation are employed by that corporation, and in that capacity do not own its plants and bank accounts,” they 
nevertheless possess great wealth, direct the flow of vast amounts of capital, and control the labor of masses 
working beneath them: thus they “are the rulers of industry, act ‘professionally’ for capital, and are themselves part 
of the class that personifies capital and employs labor” (280). They are in short “the form given to capitalist rule in 
modern society” (280). Arguably, McCarthy instinctively understood the capitalist class in a similar fashion. Thus I 
would argue that she created Pflaumen as a character who, while he does not himself own the means of production, 
nevertheless functions as a capitalist, by virtue of his economic control over the party-goers. 
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can ruin her reputation, and refuse to find work for her in the future. But it is important to realize 
that his power extends not just to an individual, though Margaret Sargent’s actions here 
dramatize his power; his power extends collectively over all his poorer “friends” at the party. In 
effect, these “friends” symbolically constitute an intellectual class subordinate—at least for the 
time being—to capital.16 
Born amid and occasionally referencing the aftermath of the SWP schism and its 
attendant intellectual debates over a new class, The Company She Keeps thus represents its 
American intellectuals as part of a class of professionals and brain workers in the tradition of 
Culture and the Crisis, chafing against capitalist control. In historical context, its main characters 
are part of a “whole host and variety of experts” who might, in the minds of James Burnham, 
Dwight Macdonald, and Edmund Wilson, constitute the New Class of a managerial, bureaucratic 
collectivist, or state socialist society in the United States. Even if it doesn’t do so quite “in the 
interests of the American individualistic tradition,” McCarthy’s book nevertheless may fulfill her 
then-husband’s hope that writers would “lead an attack on phony collectivism.” And more 
precisely, through the psychoanalysis of its main character, The Company She Keeps offers a 
satirical but sympathetic critique of an American New Class drawn to the Nazi and Stalinist 
bureaucratic collectivism McCarthy and her friends feared. 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
16 This paragraph’s allusions to “cultural capital” and “distinction” refer most familiarly to Bourdieu’s work in 
Distinction; but Alvin Gouldner’s work on cultural capital as a new alternative to “moneyed capital,” part of his 
1979 theory of the New Class, is probably more relevant to the discussion. (See The Future of Intellectuals and the 
Rise of the New Class, especially Thesis Five.) If McCarthy’s work is crucial to the depiction of a New Class in 
American literature, part of what her first novel documents, too, with a sometimes dazzlingly cynical glow, is the 
growing importance of cultural capital in relation to moneyed capital in at least certain New York City circles in the 
1930s. 
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3. “Clinical Authenticity”: Super-Ego in The Company She Keeps (1942) 
Six years after publishing The Company She Keeps, McCarthy would deride novelists 
who provided their characters with “the Oedipal fixation or the traumatic experience which 
[gives] that clinical authenticity that is nowadays so desirable in portraiture” (Cast 163).17 But 
like Trotskyism, psychoanalysis was an integral part of McCarthy’s intellectual and personal life 
while she wrote her first novel, and it shaped her sense of character there. She had studied The 
Interpretation of Dreams while at Vassar (Brightman, Writing 70), and a few years later in New 
York City went to a debate on “Freud and/or Marx” that she remembered well enough to recount 
over a decade later (“My” 83). Beginning an affair with Edmund Wilson in 1937, McCarthy 
could only have increased her familiarity with Freud. Wilson believed that artistic achievement 
was inseparable from psychological disease, and eventually said so in book form with 1941’s 
The Wound and the Bow. And only four months into their already rocky marriage, Wilson 
committed McCarthy to a hospital for psychiatric observation. Even after being released, she 
continued to see a steady stream of analysts, including one of the few in America to have 
undergone treatment by Freud himself (Gelderman, Mary McCarthy 91; Brightman, Writing 
181). Psychoanalysis thus unsurprisingly supplies the setting for the autobiographical last story 
of The Company She Keeps, “Ghostly Father, I Confess.” And while Margaret is suspicious of 
therapeutic practice—she criticizes it as an operation to remove the conscience and all traces of a 
distinct personality (276)—she nevertheless wittily recognizes herself as the clichéd Freudian 
character McCarthy would soon lampoon. “She was a real Freudian classic,” she thinks; so 
predictable as to be “faintly monstrous, improbable, like one of those French plays that 
demonstrate as if on a blackboard the axioms of the Romantic movement” (262). Margaret is                                                         
17 This sardonic remark comes from McCarthy’s autobiographical narrative “Yonder Peasant, Who Is He?” It was 
first published in The New Yorker in 1948, and was then included in 1950’s Cast a Cold Eye, from which it is cited 
here. It finally constituted a chapter in 1957’s Memories of a Catholic Girlhood. 
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thus not only representative of the novel’s intellectual class; she is by her own admission a figure 
of quite some “clinical authenticity.”18 
That clinical authenticity may be traced readily through Freud’s thinking on the 
narcissistic origins of the development of an ego ideal and super-ego. More specifically, as I will 
argue in this section of the chapter, Margaret’s adult personal life is largely conditioned by the 
drive of a powerful—indeed, sometimes overpowering—super-ego intent on gaining a 
narcissistic satisfaction denied it in childhood. We will recall that for Freud all children are born 
with what he calls a “primary narcissism,” where the infantile ego understands itself to be perfect 
in every respect. This primary narcissism is greatly diminished, however, with the advent of 
parental and social admonitions against various childhood behaviors. Freud tells us that in 
reaction to this loss of primary narcissism, the ego seeks to restore its ideal vision of itself; it 
creates an “ego ideal” which represents all the perfection the ego had once understood itself to 
represent. Since it is in essence a reaction to those forces that denied the primary narcissism, the 
ego ideal is created as an amalgam of parental and then more generally social norms. Another 
psychical agency is created to see that the ego lives up to its new ideal, and hence that 
“narcissistic satisfaction from the ego ideal is ensured” (“On Narcissism” 95). Freud names this 
                                                        
18 Katie Roiphe celebrates McCarthy as a principled critic of Freudian psychoanalysis, arguing that McCarthy 
rejected psychoanalysis as a “paralyzing” force that replaces individual agency with reductive theories (132). But 
while this is true of McCarthy in her later years, Roiphe overstates The Company She Keeps’ hostility to 
psychoanalysis. Noting Margaret’s bitingly humorous criticism of Freudian therapy in general and of her therapist in 
particular, Roiphe writes that “[i]n the competition [between Margaret and her therapist] for interpretation [of her 
life], the push and pull for control over the narrative that characterizes Meg’s relation to the psychiatrist, such a 
vivid comic perspective [as Meg’s] gives the victory to her” (132). But the contest is more of a tie than this 
acknowledges, and Roiphe’s reading shortchanges the subtlety of McCarthy’s portrait of Margaret. One joy of the 
novel’s last chapter is precisely the fine balance McCarthy keeps between Margaret’s spot-on satire of her therapist, 
and her therapist’s nevertheless telling revelations about Margaret. That a dull-witted and predictably Freudian 
psychiatrist can nevertheless make such incisive observations about her is part of the ironic joke: Margaret is 
struggling against psychoanalysis both for legitimate reasons, and as an all-too-predictable form of resistance. 
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agency the “super-ego.” The super-ego is thus responsible for ensuring the narcissistic 
satisfaction of living up to an ego ideal.19 
The purposefully disjointed form of the novel admittedly obscures Margaret’s 
development along such lines. The first four episodes of the book represent Margaret’s adult life 
in an only quasi-linear fashion. “The Man In the Brooks Brothers Shirt,” for example, takes place 
in the midst of the action of “Portrait of the Intellectual as a Yale Man,” placed two stories 
afterward.20 And it is only at the end of the novel, in “Ghostly Father, I Confess,” that we are 
finally given the bulk of Margaret’s childhood history, to make sense of all that has come 
before—and there we must sort it out from the novel’s stream-of-consciousness narrative. 
Nevertheless, her childhood follows the Freudian narrative quite closely. She remembers her 
early childhood in such idyllic terms as befit primary narcissism. She had been, she remembers, 
“such an elegant little girl” (262), a “pretty little girl” dressed in an ermine neckpiece and muff 
and diamond finger rings (263). But Margaret’s primary narcissism is assailed in a particularly 
brutal fashion: her mother dies in the 1918 epidemic of influenza, and thereafter her Protestant 
father takes her to live with her cruel and Catholic Aunt Clara. Her Aunt Clara’s sense of 
discipline is “antiquated” and vicious (265); she scolds and beats Margaret for being “stuck-up” 
when she wins a prize for her writing (263), locks her in closets, and forbids her to read, have a 
doll, or see the movies (270). Along with these physical attacks on her original narcissism, 
Margaret’s self-regard continues to be indexed sartorially. The ermine accessories and diamond 
                                                        
19 1914’s “On Narcissism” establishes the development of an ego ideal from the loss of primary narcissism. It only 
speculates about the existence of an agency that would enforce the demands of the ego ideal. Years later, in The Ego 
and the Id, Freud confirmed this earlier observation and named the enforcing agency the “super-ego.” For the very 
basic purposes employed here, Freud’s arguments about the super-ego are nicely summarized in the essay on “The 
Dissection of the Psychical Personality” in the New Introductory Lectures, 71-100. Readers wanting more detail 
should consult The Ego and the Id (1923).  
20 “Portrait” has Jim Barnett recalling that after her affair with him, Margaret had gone “out West somewhere, where 
she came from,” in order to “secure her father’s blessings for her second marriage” (209). A few pages later she is 
“back from the Coast and—mysteriously—no longer engaged to be married” (212).  
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rings are put away, and “long underwear, high shoes, blue serge jumpers that smelled, and a 
brown beaver hat two sizes too big for her” become the order of the day (263). In no small 
measure, Margaret thus loses her love of self through the actions of her aunt. 
But her father is also complicit in this loss. Though he does not approve of the harsh 
discipline his daughter is subjected to, he nevertheless watches on in silence, out of a misplaced 
scruple of religious tolerance for his sister-in-law’s (and his former wife’s) Catholicism (268-
73). Margaret knows that he loves her, but cannot see why he will not protect her. She seeks his 
attention as compensation, often through bad behavior: one particularly poignant episode finds 
her running away to hide in a museum, behind a cast of the famous statue of Laocoön, only to be 
discovered by her disappointed father the next day (267). This action in itself, we may note in 
passing, reveals the novel’s Freudian sense of unconscious motivation. Where else would the 
young, suffering future writer trained in Latin classics wish to go, but behind a work of art, and 
furthermore behind one that depicts a Roman father valiantly defending his offspring from 
attacking serpents? But unfortunately the action remains only Margaret’s unconscious attempt to 
realize a fantasy. Her aunt indeed attacks her, and her father does not protect her. 
Thus the young Margaret feels on some unconscious level that her father has conspired 
with her Aunt Clara to punish her (289-91). She accepts their judgment that she is morally 
deficient; she believes that she has deserved her Aunt Clara’s cruel discipline. For her Freudian 
analyst Dr. James, this feeling of inferiority stems from a perfectly normal female castration 
complex and ensuing penis envy (257): “you suspected that you would have been treated 
differently if you were a boy,” Dr. James explains to Margaret (290); she felt that she would 
have been undeserving of punishment if she had had a boy’s organ. “You began to think that 
there was something ugly about being a girl and that you were being punished for it” (290). 
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Margaret’s discovery that she lacks a penis leads to a feeling of inferiority and guilt which her 
aunt’s tyrannical actions and father’s silence only seem to confirm, Dr. James believes. For her 
part, however, Margaret declares her disbelief in the castration complex (257). She shoots back 
at her therapist with a proto-feminist refusal of the gender politics implicit in the theory. “You 
think I ought to welcome my womanly role in life,” she accuses him; “keep up [her husband 
Frederick’s] position, defer to him, tell him how wonderful he is, pick up the crumbs from his 
table and eat them in the kitchen” (281). Like her protagonist, McCarthy herself rejected the 
Freudian account of a female castration complex as, in the words of one of her more 
understanding male therapists at the time, “a very masculine idea” (Brightman, Writing 177). But 
neither we nor the novel need accept Freud’s masculinist theory (nor Dr. James’ diagnosis) of 
penis envy in order to understand the larger and simpler truth that Margaret is indeed forced to 
trade some of her primary narcissism, her original healthy self-regard, for a feeling of inferiority, 
through the brutality of her aunt and complicit silence of her father.21 
Accepting this judgment of herself, she creates an ego ideal to replace the feeling of her 
lost primary narcissism, an ego ideal profoundly influenced by her aunt’s overwrought brand of 
Catholicism, and her father’s in some ways just as strenuous, if less shrill, moral sense—one 
typified by his misplaced but nonetheless inarguably firm adherence to a principle of religious 
tolerance in letting his daughter be punished by his sister-in-law. She then seeks to gain 
narcissistic satisfaction from this ego ideal via the creation of a particularly demanding, indeed 
unreasonably demanding, super-ego. Thinking about the moment she broke from her Aunt Clara 
and her Catholic school, Margaret perpetually wonders, “Would she have had the courage . . . to 
have taken up that extreme position if she had not known, unconsciously, that deep down in his 
soul her father was cheering her on?” (273). Would she have had the courage to do it without                                                         
21 Freud offers a short account of his theory of girls’ castration complex in the New Introductory Lectures, 154-162. 
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help? “It had not been a real test” (273), she thinks, since she had not been utterly alone. This 
causes Dr. James correctly to observe to Margaret that “You have set yourself a moral standard 
that nobody could live up to” (275). Lacking parental love and indeed having a surfeit of parental 
admonitions and abuse, Margaret creates a zealous super-ego that attempts to attain the 
narcissistic satisfaction imposed by her high ego ideal. 
The adult symptoms of this strict super-ego are reflected in the novel’s representation of 
Margaret’s repeated tendency to wish for, and sometimes feel as though she had, an audience for 
her everyday life. Never having received praise as a child, Margaret desires the public 
approbation of an audience to give her narcissistic satisfaction. In “Cruel and Barbarous 
Treatment,” for example, she imagines her affair as a form of theater in which the audience 
grows larger as the action progresses. She conceives of her early public appearances with her 
secret lover as “private theatricals” where “it was her own many-faceted nature that she put on 
exhibit, and the audience, in this case unfortunately limited to two, could applaud both her skill 
and her intrinsic variety” (6). Eventually, however, the affair could not be kept secret: “it needed 
the glare of publicity to revive the interests of its protagonists” (8), she thinks. And the love 
triangle had to be resolved not only because “It was not decent” to carry it on, but also because 
her watching friends “would be bored” if it weren’t (15). Her super-ego thus imagines her friends 
as an audience that gains pleasure from her actions, which somehow, despite her immorality, 
offers her love and approval. 
At other times, however, her imaginary audience judges her more harshly, as her Aunt 
Clara did in her youth. Freud notes that the existence of the super-ego allows us to understand  
the so-called “delusions of being noticed” or more correctly, of being watched, 
which are such striking symptoms in the paranoid diseases . . . . This complaint is 
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justified; it describes the truth. A power of this kind, watching, discovering and 
criticizing all our intentions, does really exist. Indeed, it exists in every one of us 
in normal life. (“On Narcissism” 95, emphasis in original) 
Something of this paranoia may be glimpsed in the course of Margaret’s affair with the man on a 
train in “The Man in the Brooks Brothers Shirt.” Her first thoughts about the still only potential 
affair are suggestive of her constant self-surveillance:  
the whole thing would be so vulgar; one would expose oneself so to the derision 
of the other passengers. It was true, she was always wanting something exciting 
and romantic to happen; but it was not really romantic to be the-girl-who-sits-in-
the-club-car-and-picks-up-men. She closed her eyes with a slight shudder: some 
predatory view of herself had been disclosed for an instant. She heard her aunt’s 
voice saying, “I don’t know why you make yourself so cheap,” and “It doesn’t 
pay to let men think you’re easy.” (83-84) 
Her speculations about the passengers reveal Margaret’s keen sense of an audience, and her 
recollection of her aunt’s voice reminds us of the foremost influence on her ego ideal—an 
influence still powerful enough to make Margaret physically close her eyes, unconsciously 
wishing to be spared for once the act of watching herself. Later, drinking with the man in a 
compartment with an open door—it feels “exactly as if they were drinking in a shop window” 
(88)—she talks to him “as if he were an audience of several hundred people” (95). In this 
recurring motif of an audience, whether admiring or judging, Margaret’s strong super-ego is 
consistently on display. 
Margaret’s many love affairs, adulterous and not, are, I would argue along with Dr. 
James, motivated by this same strong super-ego. The affairs bear all the marks of the Freudian 
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compulsion to repeat. They are motivated by her super-ego’s desire to pose the “real test” of 
surviving her childhood over again (273). At first, this compulsion causes Margaret to seek 
power over her lovers, to “morally” dominate them in the manner of the aunt who dominated 
over her in childhood. For example, Margaret begins her first marriage happily enough, but soon 
starts to cry frequently and to heap abuse upon her husband—with just the same vocabulary and 
mannerisms, she realizes, as those of her Aunt Clara (293). For a time this particular return of the 
repressed repeats with every serious love affair as well (295). As she gets older and stronger, 
however, Dr. James notes, she is able to come closer to recreating her actual home life in an 
unconscious attempt to repeat that trauma and gain control over it (297). She attempts to recreate 
her childhood state—the feeling of being unjustly punished by a tyrannical aunt, and held 
hostage by an unsympathetic father—in order to see whether she can extricate herself without 
help this time, as her super-ego demands.  
The novel confirms this analysis amply in “The Man in the Brooks Brothers Shirt,” 
where Margaret’s affair with the Man clearly replays her childhood trauma. She often identifies 
the man with her own father. He speaks in a “kind, almost fatherly voice” (87), and his use of the 
word “visit” takes Margaret “straight back to her childhood and to her father, gray-slippered, in a 
brown leather chair” (95). The contradiction between the man’s occupation and his political 
attitudes—he works as an executive for a steel company (87) but secretly wants to vote for the 
socialist candidate Norman Thomas (92)—also reminds her of the “former day” of her father’s 
Progressive Era youth, when, she thinks, a “wildcat radical” who fought the railroads could 
eventually become a corporation lawyer, without ever feeling a fundamental change in values. 
The man in the Brooks Brothers shirt “was not even a true survival” from her father’s youth, she 
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knows, for he must be thirty years younger than her father (96). But her unconscious association 
and compulsion to repeat is strong enough to overcome such anachronisms. 
After a drunken and tawdry night—the then-scandalous sex scene in the story, which led 
Delmore Schwarz to refer to it privately as “Tidings from the Whore” (Brightman, Writing 
206)—the man insists over Margaret’s objections that she take a bath. The event fully brings to 
light the ways in which Margaret’s affairs unconsciously replay her childhood traumas. A maid 
runs the bath for her, but  
though, ordinarily, the girl had no particular physical modesty, at this moment it 
seemed insupportable that anyone should watch her bathe. There was something 
terrible and familiar about the scene—herself in the tub, washing, and a woman 
standing tall above her—something terrible and familiar indeed about the whole 
episode of being forced to cleanse herself. Slowly she remembered. The maid 
was, of course, her aunt, standing over her tub on Saturday nights to see that she 
washed every bit of herself . . . . Not since she had been grown-up had she felt this 
peculiar weakness and shame. It seemed to her that she did not have the courage 
to send the maid away, that the maid was somehow the man’s representative, his 
spy, whom it would be impious to resist. (116-17) 
The scene replays her aunt’s power over her (with the Catholic tinge: it would be “impious” to 
resist), reinforced by her father, for whom the aunt is only a “spy.” The feeling of weakness and 
shame, of powerlessness to resist, is that quintessential feeling of her childhood which her super-
ego here tries, unsuccessfully as yet, to repeat and overcome. 
As Dr. James astutely explains to Margaret, her marriage to Frederick (depicted in the 
last story) is the strongest case in her life yet of this repetition compulsion, and more generally of 
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the super-ego-driven dynamic that has dominated her life. She marries Frederick, gets rid of her 
former friends, and quits her job. In so doing, she recreates the social isolation and economic 
powerlessness of her childhood. Furthermore, Frederick’s “own insecurity makes him tyrannical 
and overpossessive; his fear of emotional expenditure makes him apparently indifferent. On the 
one hand, he is unjust to you, like your aunt; on the other, like your father, he pretends not to 
notice your sufferings and to deny his own culpability in them” (298). Frederick is aunt and 
father rolled into one, in other words. He is a trap she wants to be strong enough to escape: “You 
have run a terrible risk, the risk of severe neurosis, in putting yourself to this test. For that’s the 
thing you are asking: will I be able to get out?” (298-99). Her affairs and now her marriage are 
all attempts to pose moral tests for herself. Having endured a tyrannical aunt and complicit father 
who lead her to create a strenuous ego ideal, Margaret’s vigorous super-ego consistently attempts 
to gain the narcissistic satisfaction denied her in her youth. Thus in one way or another, the 
vigorous strivings of her super-ego seem to inspire all the significant actions of her adult 
personal life. The key to understanding the character of Margaret—to understanding the primary 
representative of the intellectual New Class depicted in The Company She Keeps—is recognizing 
the seminal nature of the super-ego. 
 
4. Psychoanalyzing the New Class 
 Margaret’s romantic strivings are thus the result of her childhood development of a lofty 
ego ideal and correspondingly strong super-ego. But the effects of such trauma do not limit 
themselves to her romantic life. They reveal themselves in her political life as well, as Dr. James 
notes (297). The psychological causes of Margaret’s politics are indeed central to The Company 
She Keeps’s project of evaluating the politics of the intellectual class more generally. Theorizing 
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that politics is always motivated by the super-ego, the novel posits two contradictory facets of 
that ego ideal which the super-ego seeks to attain. On the one hand, the ego ideal may be a 
shallow sort of social ego ideal, one constituted by cultural capital alone—an ideal of superiority 
and status. On the other hand, that ego ideal may be concerned with and desire justice itself. The 
super-ego may thus be understood as the source of a shallow or a sincere politics, a goad 
alternately to status-seeking or a conscience. The political difference between these objects of 
the super-ego in the novel, I will now argue, constitutes the difference between the New Class-
dominated bureaucratic collectivism of the Soviet and Nazi type, and a truly democratic form of 
socialism. Viewing intellectuals as a New Class precariously caught between the desire for class 
status and for universal justice, between a politics of bureaucratic collectivism and democratic 
socialism, The Company She Keeps suggests that the crucial psycho-political task of the New 
Class is to be able to recognize the difference between these desires and their corresponding 
politics. 
The efforts of Margaret’s super-ego in the novel often result in nothing more than a faux-
socialist politics that serves as a veil for the acquisition of cultural capital and status. As noted 
earlier, as an intellectual Margaret considers herself to be in a middle class that is not the middle 
class. But this is as much passionate desire as it is dispassionate analysis: she “detest[s]” “the 
ugly cartoon of middle-class life,” and longs to “be sure that one did not belong to it, that one 
was finer, nobler, more aristocratic” (260). Her elevated ego ideal is thus not composed of 
simply personal desires, but also of class desires. This socialism, she then reflects, isn’t primarily 
motivated by sympathy for the poor; it is more a rebellion against the “ugly cartoon” of middle-
class life. It has nothing to do with a revolt against capitalist exploitation of the working class: “it 
was not really the humanitarian side of socialism that touched her” (261). Margaret senses that 
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this psychological truth about herself is related to a sociological truth about intellectuals’ politics 
in general. Accordingly, she transposes her super-ego’s desire for status into the socialized 
language of “snobbery”: 
her proletarian sympathies constituted a sort of snub that she administered to the 
middle class, just as a really smart woman will outdress her friends by relentlessly 
underdressing them. Scratch a socialist and you find a snob. The semantic test 
confirmed this. In the Marxist language, your opponent was always a parvenu, an 
upstart, an adventurer, a politician was always cheap, and an opportunist vulgar. 
But the proletariat did not talk in such terms; this was the tone of the F.F.V. What 
the socialist movement did for a man was to allow him to give himself the airs of 
a marquis without having either his title or his sanity questioned. (260-61, 
emphases in the original) 
In such moments of insight, the novel understands the intellectual class’s socialism as a form of 
“social anxiety” stemming from the need to see itself as better than the middle class (260), a need 
that the novel readily explains in Margaret’s case as a function of her particularly demanding ego 
ideal. 
This view of socialism as snobbery is also borne out by the intellectual class gathered in 
the story “The Genial Host.” In that tale, the professionals collected at the party understand 
politics and political discourse as one more social nicety. The voices of the guests rise “in lively 
controversy over the new play, the new strike, the new Moscow trials, the new abstract show at 
the Modern Museum” (146). But this air of “lively controversy” ultimately seems performed 
rather than felt; the desire to discuss these topics simply stems from the fact that they are “new.” 
Since neither aesthetics nor proletarian political struggle is at the last taken seriously by anyone 
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present at this party, “Nobody was incoherent; nobody made speeches; nobody lost his temper. 
Sentences were short, and points in the argument clicked like bright billiard balls” (146). 
Paramount to the party are social graces: “Everyone felt witty” (146). When the exiled Russian 
Jew Erdman, whose “Marxist study of jurisprudence had created a stir,” refuses a glass of wine, 
the guests are thus outraged: “This act of abstention was a challenge to everyone at the table, an 
insult to the host” (148). His decision not to drink strikes them as an irruption of true (if obscure) 
ideological fervor into an otherwise pleasant party. After a tense minute, someone at last asks 
him why he has refused, whereupon he explains that the alcohol would go to his head and he 
doesn’t want to embarrass himself. The guests are relieved; “Thank God, was the general feeling, 
he had turned out not to be one of those Marxist prigs!” (149). The intellectual class’s politics are 
here not so much socialist as socialite, a form of snobbery which cringes at true political belief.  
If psychoanalytic and sociological concerns explain Margaret’s attraction to socialism in 
general, her status-oriented ego ideal also helps explain, as she herself recognizes, her self-
appointed role as “angry watchdog of the left” (275). Even her Trotskyism is in part an attempt 
to gain status over the Stalinists of the 1930s intellectual class. As with her socialism in general, 
her Trotskyism in particular thus typically fails to embrace a specific political program or 
agenda. In “Portrait of the Intellectual as a Yale Man,” the editors of the Nation-like magazine 
called the Liberal discuss what they perceive as Trotsky’s poor political judgment in publishing 
an article in the bourgeois press deriding Stalin.22 Though newly hired and hence subordinate, 
Margaret angrily and intelligently defends him, even insulting the Liberal’s leftist credentials 
along the way. But afterwards she admits to Jim Barnett that she is not truly a “Trotskyite,” as 
                                                        
22 Here again we may see the influence of both Dwight Macdonald and the SWP schism more generally on 
McCarthy’s first novel: this argument is based loosely on Macdonald’s criticism of Trotsky’s decision to publish a 
comparison of Hitler and Stalin in the January 27, 1940 issue of Liberty magazine. For Trotsky’s rebuttal to this 
particular criticism, see “Back to the Party!” 237-38. 
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she had seemed in the dispute. “I’m not even political” (194), she asserts. She just hates the 
“smug” and complacent politics of those who edit the Liberal. She does “admire Trotsky” (my 
emphasis), of course, but only because “He’s the most romantic man in modern times” (194). For 
Margaret, Trotsky is not so much the brilliant leader of the Russian Revolution and political 
theorist in the tradition of Marx and Lenin, as a sort of left intellectual’s Rudolph Valentino—
dashing, but without much political point. Thus Margaret’s socialist politics are satirized as the 
mere desire for a certain “romantic” image of herself, the result of an ego ideal that compels her 
to be better than the middle class, and better than the Stalinists around her. 
Yet one should not overstate the satire of Margaret’s politics offered in the novel. If 
Margaret’s socialism and Trotskyism are shallow, they are nevertheless certainly more 
thoughtful and just than the “smug” liberalism and/or Stalinism of the rest of the intellectual-
class company she keeps. Her ego ideal of Trotskyism is based not just on status, but also on 
justice. And if the super-ego as goad to status-seeking is the object of the novel’s satire, the 
super-ego as true conscience is also the novel’s only hope against the New Class’s leanings 
toward bureaucratic collectivism. The novel’s satire of the intellectual attraction to bureaucratic 
collectivism, in the form of Jim Barnett, indeed reveals its sympathy for something much like 
Margaret’s Trotskyism. Jim Barnett becomes attracted to Communism in 1932 (170)—an iconic 
year representing that entire generation’s intellectual attraction to Communism, as epitomized by 
the publication of Culture and the Crisis. As an open-minded and pragmatic (read: politically 
superficial) Yalie (172), however, Barnett never commits to any specific school or system. He 
flirts first with (Stalinist) Communism, then with Lovestoneism, then with Trotskyism, and then 
with a Farmer-Labor party some friends from Yale were starting (171). Confused in his political 
opinions, then, in intellectual practice he is willing to support bureaucratic collectivism in its 
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budding American and more fully-formed Soviet incarnations. Thinking about an on-going 
argument with his boss Mr. Wendell over the abuses of human rights under Communism, he 
considers that surely no regime has ever allowed equal liberties for everyone. Thus he supposes 
that “you could probably trust Mr. Roosevelt and Comrade Stalin to abrogate liberty only just so 
much as was absolutely necessary—and always in the right direction, that is, to abrogate your 
opponent’s liberty rather than your own” (179). Politically shallow and uncommitted, Jim 
Barnett represents the thoughtless attraction of a New Class to bureaucratic collectivism in the 
late 1930s. 
But upon meeting Margaret while working at the Liberal, Jim’s agreeable—i.e., only 
loosely principled—political ego ideal begins to reform. He becomes attracted to Margaret 
precisely because she functions as a kind of political super-ego for him, and thus allows him to 
fulfill some part of his ego ideal of himself as a daring political intellectual. “For almost as long 
as he could remember,” Jim reflects of himself, “there had been two selves, a critical principled 
self, and an easy-going, follow-the-crowd, self-indulgent, adaptable self” (226)—an ego ideal 
based in a passion for justice, and an ego ideal concerned only with status, we might translate. 
These warring urges had existed comfortably together before he met Margaret, allowing him a 
successful (if in the end uninspiring) career at the Liberal. But now “it was as if, during the 
Moscow trials” that sparked Margaret and her creator’s identification with Trotskyism, “the 
critical principled self had thrown up the sponge; it had abdicated, and a girl’s voice had intruded 
to take over its function” (226). In political terms, the “easy-going” nature of his status-oriented 
ego ideal had made Jim a confused pseudo-Stalinist. But his newly-acquired feminine “critical 
principled self” irritates him toward something closer to Margaret’s Trotskyism, which doesn’t 
support the abrogation of liberties under either Mr. Roosevelt or Comrade Stalin. He begins to 
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believe it might be true that some Trotskyists were being blacklisted from magazines (219ff.), 
and signs on to a letter condemning the Moscow trials, despite the Liberal’s support for them 
(229). For as long as Margaret functions as Jim’s political super-ego, he takes principled stands 
against Stalinist bureaucratic collectivism. 
But this period of principle in Jim’s intellectual career collapses quickly. When Margaret 
is dismissed from the Liberal, Jim quits in protest. Still under the sway of the high ego ideal 
Margaret has loaned him, he hopes to begin a book with the promising topic of “the 
transportation industries and their relationship to the Marxist idea of the class struggle” (230).23 
But the book doesn’t work out. Despite his new ambitions, Jim has neither the intellectual depth 
nor the literary skill to finish it. In the meantime he loses touch with Margaret and begins to 
write for a respectable magazine called, frighteningly enough, Destiny. Much like the real-life 
Fortune magazine of Henry Luce’s empire, Destiny was “the businessman’s Vogue” (239), 
whose publisher “was a reactionary in many ways—potentially, he might even be a fascist” 
(242). His friends who in the past have admired Jim’s non-dogmatic but seemingly still 
principled politics think he must hate his work there, but “The truth was that he enjoyed working 
on Destiny” (240). He is well-paid, and relatively unconcerned about his ability to be heard on 
political matters. If he writes an article that is deemed “too ‘strong,’” he reflects contentedly, “it 
was given to someone else to modify” (240). Happy without Margaret as his super-ego, Jim turns 
into “a comfortable man, a man incapable of surprising or being surprised” (244). Thus ends the 
Intellectual as Yale Man’s struggle with his Trotskyist conscience. Easily sliding from a 
thoughtless and uncommitted Stalinism into a bland and uncommitted liberalism, and poised                                                         
23 Yet again, another event borrowed from her friend Dwight Macdonald’s life. Macdonald had written a four-part 
series on U.S. Steel for Fortune magazine. When the last article, complete with an epigraph from Lenin’s 
Imperialism, was severely edited for publication in the spring of 1936, Macdonald resigned in protest. He then 
attempted, unsuccessfully, to turn the articles into a book on the history of the steel industry. Like his fictional 
counterpart Jim Barnett, Macdonald had also graduated from Yale. See Brightman, Writing 141-42. 
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under the thumb of a “potentially fascist” publisher, Jim Barnett typifies the dangers of a New 
Class without a super-ego in the sense of a true conscience. 
The novel’s hope for a conscience-driven politics, on the other hand, is perhaps best 
embodied in Mr. Wendell, Jim and Margaret’s boss at the Liberal. A liberal from the previous 
generation, Mr. Wendell holds views that cause him to be seen as “a tiresome old fuddyduddy” 
with “failing powers” by “most of his staff and many of his readers” (179). But driven by his 
conscience, he retains his unfashionable opinions nevertheless. In many ways his conscientious 
politics represent a point of view that would have pleased McCarthy’s (ex-) Trotskyist friends 
who were opposed to the “bureaucratic collectivism” they saw in Germany and Russia, and 
worried about at home:  
Mr. Wendell was uncompromisingly against what he called, in a public-
auditorium voice, this new spirit of bureaucracy, this specter that was haunting the 
world under the name of progressivism or communism. He believed in socialism, 
but he held out for an economy of abundance, for a free judiciary, and trial by 
jury. He stood for inviolable human rights rather than plans or programs; and no 
plan, he declared, was worth a nickel that would sacrifice these rights at the first 
hint of trouble. (179) 
The integrity and candor of these beliefs break like a breath of fresh air in the otherwise fetid 
atmosphere of intellectual political discourse in the novel. Mr. Wendell’s upright support of such 
liberal and universalist principles—for the “inviolable human rights” of a “free judiciary, and 
trial by jury”—as would have meant justice for Trotsky, while still supporting a socialist (but not 
“bureaucratic”) economy that does not exploit the working class, makes him unusual in a novel 
full of shallow and insincere intellectual carping. His speech is the exception that proves the 
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satirical rule of intellectual politics as neurotic social climbing in the novel. Mr. Wendell is, in 
other words, the novel’s tattered standard of intellectual-political sincerity, of a super-ego-driven 
politics that is wholly honorable. 
But it is ultimately the protagonist Margaret Sargent who most fully reveals the novel’s 
simultaneous skepticism and hope regarding the psychology of New Class politics. The 
importance the novel assigns to New Class psychology may be shown by the fact that its last 
words and pages are preoccupied by them. There Margaret recalls a dream she has recently had. 
In this dream, she is attending “Eggshell College” (302). In an outing cabin nearby, Margaret 
attends a “rude party” with, among others, three tall men who looked “like the pictures of Nazi 
prisoners that the Soviet censor passes” (302). She kisses one of the men, thinking “There was 
something Byronic about him” (303). But the Byronic air quickly fades when he gives her a 
“coarse, loutish” kiss, and she recognizes him as the more Nazi-like figure she had originally 
seen. But soon he looks Byronic again. When he kisses her a second time, “she kept her eyes 
shut, knowing very well what she would see if she opened them, knowing that it was now too 
late, for now she wanted him anyway” (303). Her dream then ends.  
Margaret analyzes the dream and realizes that in some sense she is the Nazi prisoner, in 
the sense that like the Nazi she becomes Byronically beautiful only in someone else’s 
imagination. Still under the influence of her aunt’s harsh judgments, she imagines herself as 
morally corrupt like the Nazi, and Byronic only in another’s eyes: “it was some failure in self-
love”—in her ability to live up to her high ego ideal—“that obliged her to snatch blindly at the 
love of others, hoping to love herself through them, borrowing their feelings, as the moon 
borrowed light” (303). “The mind was powerless to save her,” she thinks hopelessly; “Only a 
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man” might give her the narcissistic satisfaction she has lost (302), and which she seeks to regain 
through a thousand stratagems of personal and political behavior. 
Margaret’s analysis of her “failure of self-love,” and her desire to make it up through 
relationships with men, is astute. It explains among other things why each of the chapters of The 
Company She Keeps revolves around Margaret’s relationship to some male figure. In some cases 
the relationship is straightforwardly romantic, as with the Young Man, the Man in the Brooks 
Brothers Shirt, and the Yale Man. In others the attachment is more professional, though still 
emotional, as in the case of Mr. Sheer of “Rogue’s Gallery.” The last chapter finally sums up the 
novel’s combination of New Class theorizing and psychoanalytic critique by depicting an 
attachment that is equally professional and libidinal. In a very funny portrayal of the 
transference, Margaret ends her session “like a girl in love” (301), imagining that Dr. James, the 
psychoanalyst or “Ghostly Father” to whom she confesses, is in love with her. (The “Father” 
joke is surely Freudian as well as Catholic.) She eventually shakes off the idea that she might be 
in love with him, too, but not before wondering what she would do if he wanted to run off with 
her. Would she be able to recognize him for the “fussy, methodical young man” he is (302), so 
dull and “deplorably YMCA” a representative of the intellectual class (296), and resist his 
advances? 
This speculation is indeed what causes her to recall her dream again. For she knows that 
she is not only the Nazi in the dream, receiving love from others who can perceive her as 
Byronic. She is in the dream as herself, too. Margaret’s description of “matriculating at Eggshell 
College” (250 and 302) articulates a “womb fantasy,” as Margaret herself recognizes (250), and 
as the Latinate roots of the twice-spoken word “matriculating” also suggest. This “womb 
fantasy,” Margaret’s unconscious hope to regain the original sense of wholeness found in the 
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mother’s womb, or the primary narcissism experienced in her childhood before her mother’s 
death, recreated in the form of an ego ideal, consists of knowingly committing herself to a Nazi-
like figure who sometimes reminds her of the romantic figure of Byron. Her narcissistic 
attachment is of course to the Byronic figure, who represents the ego ideal Margaret is 
perpetually trying to fulfill. Byron was “the most romantic man” of the Romantic era itself, we 
might say, recalling Margaret’s earlier description of her attraction to the more modern Trotsky. 
But what her dream reminds her is that the dream-figure is, after all, not the old Romantic rebel 
Byron, who had died fighting in the Greek revolution—nor the modern romantic rebel Trotsky, 
who had died while fighting for a permanent, international revolution—but in fact a Nazi 
prisoner modeled on “the pictures . . . that the Soviet censor passes.” His image thus condenses, 
in much the same way as the idea of “bureaucratic collectivism,” Nazi Germany and the Soviet 
Union. The man she kisses is in short an avatar of that New Class-run state which McCarthy’s 
friend Dwight Macdonald and her husband Edmund Wilson feared: the “white” or “cold” 
fascism potential in Roosevelt’s New Deal, and in Van Wyck Brooks’s antimodernist 
“kulturbolschewismus”; the state socialism which might arise after the war, with Archibald 
MacLeish and Robert Sherwood as its mediocre literary apologists. On the political level, the 
dream signifies that in her relatively thoughtless and status-driven attraction to such figures as 
Trotsky, Margaret may in fact embrace the bureaucratic collectivism that so many other 
nominally socialist movements, in Germany and Russia alike, had come to. The political danger 
is as real to her as the romantic one. “[I]f she had not yet embraced a captive Nazi,” she thinks, 
“it was only an accident of time and geography, a lucky break” (303). 
 Margaret takes from the dream a hope that she may “still detect her own frauds” (303). 
By detecting these frauds, she hopes to recognize her emotional needs as just those, and to meet 
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them herself rather than through domineering lovers like the man in the Brooks Brothers shirt 
and Frederick—or through domineering states like Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. “She 
could,” she says hopefully, “still distinguish the Nazi prisoner from the English milord, even in 
the darkness of need” (304). Margaret’s prayer to retain this ability to distinguish between Nazi 
and Byron, the closing passage of the book, should thus be understood politically as well as 
personally: “‘Oh my God . . . do not let them take this away from me. If the flesh must be blind, 
let the spirit see. Preserve me in disunity. O di,’ she said aloud, ‘reddite me hoc pro pietate mea” 
(304) (“O gods, grant me this in return for my piety”). She prays that her disunity, her super-ego-
driven desires for intellectual status on the one hand and a truly democratic form of socialism on 
the other, may be preserved by one newly strong ego which comprehends and thus discriminates 
between such desires. 
If this prayer for political wisdom is the book’s closing hope for Margaret and the 
intellectual class she represents, its political analysis—lightly summed up in the book’s last 
sentence—nevertheless remains skeptical of the prayer’s efficacy: “It was certainly a very small 
favor she was asking, but, like Catullus, she could not be too demanding, for, unfortunately, she 
did not believe in God” (304). A prayer for intellectual-political wisdom, predicated on an atheist 
supplicant’s piety, stands only a dubious chance of succeeding. American intellectuals like 
Margaret (and Jim, and the guests at Pflaumen’s party) might indeed be drawn toward the 
“phony collectivism” which was the essence of a bureaucratic state socialism, and whose seed 
was already contained in the New Deal.  
The Unpossessed’s intellectual class of 1934 consisted of comically deluded narcissists 
who were incapable of creating communism in America. With McCarthy’s first novel, however, 
the fictional portrayal of intellectuals as a class grew simultaneously more serious and more 
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skeptical. In 1942’s The Company She Keeps, the American New Class would need to cast a cold 
eye indeed on its libidinal-political attachments, if it were to distinguish between the admirable 
narcissistic satisfaction of a truly democratic socialism, and the more ominous narcissistic 
satisfaction of its own class power under a system of bureaucratic collectivism like that of Nazi 
Germany and the Soviet Union. Recognizing and acting upon that distinction was the intellectual 
class’s central psychological, political, and ethical task. 
Looking ahead we may now note briefly and in conclusion that this stressed political 
distinction, with its fiercely antibureaucratic charge, formed one important root of 
postmodernism’s most characteristic traits when it emerged decades later. The New York 
Intellectuals of McCarthy’s generation in the late 1930s and early 1940s fought passionately with 
Trotsky and his followers over whether the Soviet Union was an only temporarily degenerated 
workers’ state governed by a “bureaucratic ruling stratum,” or instead an example of a new and 
more permanent system of “bureaucratic collectivism” that could engage in a straightforward 
form of imperialism. But no one in this era-defining Trotskyist fight doubted that the problem 
was bureaucracy. Bureaucracy was the enemy of all on the socialist left who refused to believe 
that the Soviet Union had achieved a workers’ democracy. The spirit of struggle against a 
bureaucracy that constricted or even eliminated free inquiry—whether in the Soviet Union, Nazi 
Germany, or even the U.S.—would thus go on to become central to the New York Intellectuals’ 
sense of not only their own politics, but of what ailed “the culture,” as they called it, at large. 
And the 1960s postmodernist attacks on a “disciplinary” society, and promotions of a self-
conscious metafiction appropriate to an era of fiction produced in academic institutions, we will 
see, emerged in part as a reaction to the New York Intellectuals’ generational sense that the 
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bureaucratic organization of politics and culture was a central and disturbing feature not merely 
of middle-class, but of all modern cultural, social, and political life itself. 
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Chapter Three 
 
From Intellectual Class to Ideology:  
Lionel Trilling’s Masked Will and the New Liberal Imagination 
 
 
1. Trilling’s “Great Decade” 
Publishing his first short story in 1925 and his last essays in 1975, Lionel Trilling wrote 
thoughtful and often influential prose for five decades. Yet the 1940s in particular were 
definitive both for Trilling himself and for his subsequent prestige in American intellectual and 
cultural life. Mark Krupnick rightly calls the era Trilling’s “great decade,” a time when Trilling 
“carved out his distinctive role as a critic in recoil against the dominant left-liberal values of his 
New York intellectual milieu” (17). Having established himself with a widely-praised study of 
Matthew Arnold in 1939, Trilling’s reputation as a literary critic grew exponentially over the 
next ten years as he published a string of noteworthy essays in such venues as Partisan Review, 
The Kenyon Review, and The Nation. The subtle yet firm moral and political force of these 
essays, combined with their consistent elegance, made men and women of letters take especial 
notice. After seeing his work come out in periodicals or hearing it read from platforms, many 
wondered what Trilling “ha[d] been up to all along,” noted R. P. Blackmur (166). During this 
same period, Trilling’s short stories—unjustly neglected today—established him as a fiction 
writer to watch in the intellectual communities of New York City and beyond. Two stories 
especially, “Of This Time, Of That Place” (1943) and “The Other Margaret” (1945), compelled 
immense interest, and the latter provoked heated debate among readers on the literary left.1 
When Trilling published his first and only novel, 1947’s The Middle of the Journey, Commentary                                                         
1 In The New International James Farrell assailed “The Other Margaret” as “reactionary,” while Irving Howe 
defended the story in the first of his many articles for Partisan Review—see Wald, New York 236-39. Incidentally, 
Wald’s work nicely demonstrates that Trilling’s “The Other Margaret” still provokes heated criticism on the literary 
left. For him, Trilling’s presentation of the story’s main theme represents nothing less than “an aesthetic and 
intellectual catastrophe” (235). Chapter Four will offer a close reading of “Of This Time, Of That Place.” 
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magazine observed only a few months later that it was “already one of the two or three most 
widely discussed books in intellectual circles today” (Warshow 538). 
Finally, when Trilling revised some of his strongest essays and collected them in 1950’s 
The Liberal Imagination, he secured his reputation in the world at large—not simply as a literary 
critic and writer of fiction, but much more profoundly as an observer and critic of American 
culture itself. Blackmur’s review of that volume in fact suggested that Trilling had purposefully 
cultivated a “public mind” (169), one which thought with the public in an effort to become “an 
administrator of the affairs of mind” who exerted conscious influence (168). If Blackmur was 
correct about Trilling’s cultural ambitions in the forties, then Trilling succeeded admirably. By 
1957, sociologist Daniel Bell—striving to be a “public mind” himself—could matter-of-factly 
list Trilling among the “intellectual nestors” of his scarcely younger generation, a figure to be 
reckoned with alongside such diverse literary-political eminences as Sidney Hook, Edmund 
Wilson, Reinhold Niebuhr, and John Dos Passos (End 300).2 
 And indeed, Trilling was not only widely-read and respected, but a formative influence 
on a whole generation of both literary and intellectual figures. Allen Ginsberg was a devoted if 
rebellious student of Trilling’s, as were Norman Podhoretz, Cynthia Ozick, John Hollander, 
Steven Marcus, Carolyn Heilbrun (a.k.a. mystery writer Amanda Cross), John Berryman, and 
Morris Dickstein, the latter of whom has called Trilling one of the “Critics Who Made Us.”3 
Expanding further outward, Trilling’s protégés, readers, and formal reviewers constitute a who’s 
who of mid-twentieth-century thought, cutting across several aesthetic and political boundaries:                                                         
2 Though I cite 1960’s The End of Ideology here, I have dated Bell’s remarks on his “intellectual nestors” from 1957 
because they were first published in the April 1, 1957 edition of the New Leader (End 450). 
3 Some of this list comes from Diana Trilling’s memoir of her marriage to Lionel, The Beginning of the Journey (86, 
401). For an interesting explication of Allen Ginsberg’s relationship with Trilling and thence to literary modernism, 
see Genter. Podhoretz discusses Trilling in many publications; see for example the excerpt of Breaking Ranks in 
Rodden’s Lionel Trilling. Ozick’s “The Buried Life” recalls her experience of Trilling in class and speaks of his 
“now nearly incomprehensible influence” (115), while Heilbrun’s When Men Were the Only Models We Had 
recounts the effect Trilling had on her career.  
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Raymond Williams, R. P. Blackmur, Richard Chase, Stephen Spender, Joseph Frank, R. W. B. 
Lewis, Russell Kirk, Daniel Bell, C. Wright Mills, George Steiner, and a host of others grappled 
with Trilling’s work at some point in the fifties or sixties.4 In ways that we sometimes forget 
now, Trilling’s ideas circulated widely not only in mid-century American literary circles, but in 
the larger English-speaking intellectual world. Beginning with the essays and fiction of the 
1940s—of his “great decade”—Trilling at the least exercised an immense influence not just upon 
the hothouse life of New York City’s intellectuals, in short, but upon American literary, 
intellectual, and political culture as a whole. 
Thus by studying Trilling’s 1940s career in this chapter and the next, we move from an 
investigation of the margins of New York City’s intellectual left to an attempt to comprehend the 
center of American literary and intellectual life itself in this period. In this chapter I will make 
three related arguments about Trilling’s ideas in these crucial early years of his critical maturity. 
First, I will draw out a neglected, but nevertheless fundamental, source of Trilling’s most 
important ideas in the decade. As a detailed examination of his criticism from the early thirties 
through the late forties will show, during his “great decade” the newly liberal Trilling essentially 
accepted the revisionary Trotskyist, anti-Stalinist critique of intellectual workers as a power-
hungry New Class attempting to gain hegemony in both the Soviet Union and the United States. 
With this theory he in fact fashioned one his most characteristic concepts of the late forties, that 
of a “masked will” that proclaims the intellectual’s political virtue while secretly desiring 
nothing more than his or her own dominance. Second, through a reading of The Middle of the 
Journey I will show that Trilling’s particular imagination of the New Class did not merely parrot                                                         
4 Most of these wrote reviews of Trilling’s work; see Rodden’s invaluable anthology, Lionel Trilling and the Critics. 
But the influence may also be traced outside of reviews. C. Wright Mills approvingly cites Trilling several times in 
White Collar, and thanks him for his advice (355), while Russell Kirk’s seminal work on The Conservative Mind 
took Trilling’s critique of liberalism as proof that the time had come for a renewed conservative intellectual 
movement (480). 
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the Trotskyist account, but instead drew out the idea’s more conservative implications, indicting 
intellectuals’ leftist politics with so broad a brush as to make its political affinities largely 
unfamiliar to his now-deceased friend Tess Slesinger and his acquaintance Mary McCarthy.5 
More specifically I will argue that his work anticipates a cynical version of the New Class idea 
that emerged in the neoconservative movement three decades later. But most importantly for the 
dissertation’s argument as a whole, I will suggest in conclusion that Trilling’s account of the 
New Class in the forties transmuted the comparatively specific theory of a politically ambitious 
intellectual class into a broader and ultimately much more influential account of the conceptual 
and political dangers of “ideology.” This was a momentous shift. For the newer concept’s 
powerfully idealist, often moralizing indictment of an uncritical, quasi-religious mode of thought 
occluded materialist explanations of the growing social significance of intellectual labor—
including class-based explanations that might have adequately accounted for or even more 
thoroughly influenced postmodernism when it arrived thereafter. In short, this chapter will 
demonstrate that Trilling’s 1940s work paradoxically expanded the labor-leftist theory of a New 
Class to the point of its own negation in mid-century liberalism’s account of “ideology.” Trilling 
helped transform dissident Trotskyism’s relatively precise account of an intellectual class into a 
more popular and sweepingly idealist postwar repudiation of class-based political and cultural 
thought. 
                                                        
5 Trilling recounts his friendship with Slesinger in his afterword to the 1966 edition of Slesinger’s The Unpossessed 
(“A Novel of the Thirties”). He was also acquainted with McCarthy in the late 1940s. Biographers tell of an 
unpleasant dinner Trilling and his wife had at McCarthy’s apartment in 1947 (McCarthy’s version of the encounter 
is the basis for Brightman Writing 426; Diana Trilling’s version is the basis for Kiernan 331, and of course her own 
Beginning of the Journey 124-25). A journal entry from Lionel Trilling also shows that in 1948 McCarthy 
attempted, unsuccessfully, to enlist him in the Europe-America Groups (EAG) (“From” 510). The short-lived EAG, 
spearheaded by McCarthy, sought to unite and support left-leaning anti-Stalinist intellectuals from the two 
continents in the aftermath of World War II. (For good summaries of the EAG and especially of McCarthy’s 
involvement in it, see Kiernan 288-97 and Brightman, Writing 305-11, 319-22.) Last but not least, Geraldine 
Murphy speculates that in his unfinished novel, well under way by the mid-forties, Trilling even based the character 
of Garda Thorne on McCarthy (xviii-xx). 
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2. From Intellectual Class to “Masked Will” 
 Lionel Trilling was famously given to addressing critical arguments to a community of 
his own invention. Judgments of “us” and assertions about what “we” must do are speckled 
across all his writings, early and late. One need look no further than some of the most quotable 
(and quoted) gems from The Liberal Imagination: “with us it is always a little too late for mind, 
yet never too late for honest stupidity” (17), for example, or, “Unless we insist that politics is 
imagination and mind, we will learn that imagination and mind are politics, and of a kind that we 
will not like” (96). In 1965’s Beyond Culture, Trilling takes note of writers who complained that 
his use of “we” was “imprecise and indiscriminate” (vii). One reviewer had objected that 
sometimes “we” meant “just the people of our time as a whole; more often still Americans in 
general; most often of all a very narrow class, consisting of New York intellectuals as judged by 
[Trilling’s] own brighter students in Columbia” (qtd. on vii). Trilling, however, defends his use 
of the word “we,” claiming that there is indeed enough cultural continuity between these groups 
to make it an apt usage. Even when the word refers most to the “narrow class . . . of New York 
intellectuals,” Trilling asserts, the influence of these New York intellectuals on the mass media 
of journalism, television, theater, and cinema is strong enough to justify the term’s use; the 
intellectuals of New York hold such sway over the culture industries that eventually their ideas 
constitute an “us” in actual fact (viii-ix). Furthermore, this supposedly “narrow class” is much 
broader than one might think. It indeed extends beyond the boundaries of America to become a 
kind of global class: “between this small class and an analogous class in, say, Nigeria, there is 
pretty sure to be a natural understanding” (ix). For Trilling in 1965, intellectuals from New York 
and Nigeria alike constitute a coherent and powerful social class.6                                                         
6 The critique of Trilling’s “we” was truly solidified shortly after Beyond Culture’s publication in Graham Hough’s 
1966 New Listener article on “‘We’ and Lionel Trilling.” Other explanations for Trilling’s “we” than I present here 
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No matter whether we agree with Trilling’s sweeping assessment of the class’s influence 
or the idea of its international homogeneity in the mid-sixties, it is nevertheless striking that he 
so easily and confidently asserts both. He was able to do so, I would argue, because the concept 
of an important and influential intellectual class was not at all new to him. While it is commonly 
recognized that some of Trilling’s ideas in the sixties had an influence on the neoconservative 
iteration of a “New Class” in the late sixties and seventies (a lineage we will examine in the next 
section of the chapter), no one to my knowledge has ever demonstrated that Trilling had in fact 
been working with a version of the New Class concept since at least the late 1930s.7 In this 
section of the chapter and the next, then, I will show that beginning in this period Trilling 
borrowed the concept of the New Class from his anti-Stalinist (often Trotskyist) circle, and then 
spent nearly a decade expanding its critique in order to help discredit contemporary “liberalism” 
itself as much as Stalinism. By the time of his mature works of the 1940s—both critical and 
fictional—the existence of what Trilling called an “intellectual class” formed an unspoken 
sociological bedrock for not only his sense of an audience and community of peers (the famed 
and controversial “we” of his later years) but also and perhaps more importantly for many of the 
most important concepts and characteristic themes of his “great decade.” In this section I will 
trace specifically how the concept of an intellectual class led to Trilling’s concept of the “masked 
will.” 
                                                        
exist as well. Elinor Grumet notes that Trilling used this characteristic “we” from his earliest days of publishing for 
the Menorah Journal in the 1920s, and suggests that he was thus adopting a Victorian “language of ethical 
meditation on the state of society” in the context of a well-educated Jewish audience (165). His “we” thus created a 
“‘community-by-incantation’ which shares and validates the culture as he perceives it” (165). But as astute an 
explanation as this is for Trilling’s early usage, it doesn’t fully explain his use of “we” in the forties. In this era, only 
infrequently did Trilling’s community-by-incantation “validate” the culture as Trilling perceived it. Much more 
often, as in my examples above, Trilling was arguing against “us.” 
7 For an example of the critical discussion of Trilling’s influence on neoconservatism in the sixties and seventies, see 
Krupnick 147-50. 
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From the earliest days of his career, Trilling publicly worried over intellectuals’ 
collective identity. Max Nomad’s “White Collars and Horny Hands”—as we recall from Chapter 
One, the first American explication of the most suspicious mode of New Class theory, an exposé 
of the intellectual workers who attempted to sabotage proletarian revolution for their own class 
interests—first appeared in the Autumn 1932 issue of The Modern Quarterly. Reviewing a 
biography of Thomas Carlyle in the same journal, only one issue before Nomad’s article 
appeared, Trilling offers a theme remarkably similar to Nomad’s. He presents Carlyle as an 
erstwhile liberal intellectual whose politics, rooted in the worship of “great men” and “heroes,” 
eventually turned proto-fascist. Then he uses Carlyle’s conversion to reaction in order to draw 
his own skeptical moral for contemporary intellectuals: 
Today, when so many of our middle-class intellectuals are swinging left, it is well 
to remember that the position of the bourgeois intellectual in any proletarian 
movement has always been an anomalous and precarious one. However sincere he 
may be, the mind of the intellectual is so apt to be overlaid with conflicting values 
that it is impossible to be sure of his position; having so many values, he is likely 
to betray one to defend others. In this dilemma the recognition of his own training 
and nature can be his only safeguard against confusion and eventual missteps. 
(109) 
Thus from the start of his remarkable career, Trilling speculated on intellectuals as a discrete 
social group, and his primary concern was with those intellectuals who might be identified as 
“middle-class” and “bourgeois.” He furthermore urged his own class consciousness—the 
middle-class intellectual’s “recognition of his own training and nature”—as a vital principle of 
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intellectuals’ participation in proletarian politics, a self-knowledge required in order to avoid 
supporting fascism.8 
Such concerns were consistent with Trilling’s politics during this period. While never a 
card-carrying Communist, Trilling had nevertheless been “converted” to Communism in 1931 
(D. Trilling, Beginning 179). The 1932 review of Carlyle’s biography had furthermore been 
written while Trilling was, in Alan Wald’s words, “as close as he ever would [be] to 
collaborating with a self-proclaimed Marxist organization” (New York 64): his fiancée Diana had 
worked for a short time (starting in 1931) in a Communist front organization, the National 
Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners. Some contemporaries even remembered the 
couple as “ardent Leninists” at the time (Wald, New York 60). Many of Trilling’s first 
publications had been dedicated to reviewing proletarian novels in the Menorah Journal as well, 
the publication for which his friend Tess Slesinger also wrote. Over the course of the thirties, 
however, Trilling became disaffected from the Communist Party, if not from socialism 
altogether. After Communists roughly broke up a rally of the American Socialist Party at 
Madison Square Garden in 1934, he and others from the Menorah Journal circle openly 
criticized the Party—a move that earned him a rebuke by name from the editors of the Party 
journal New Masses (Wald, New York 63).9 Stung but not yet estranged from leftist politics, for 
the next several years, as he worked on the Columbia University dissertation that would become 
Matthew Arnold, Trilling was an independent anti-Stalinist with socialist inclinations, at least 
intellectually. Like Mary McCarthy, he was sympathetic to Trotsky. Trilling’s wife Diana tells us                                                         
8 Trilling continued to view Carlyle as a proto-fascist throughout the decade, the comparison growing more direct in 
1939’s Matthew Arnold. There he compares Carlyle’s views to Mussolini’s, and notes Carlyle’s popularity in fascist 
Italy (54). 
9 The New Masses editorial of March 27, 1934 sarcastically referred to “the erstwhile Menorah Journal group—
these loop-de-loopers from Zionism to ‘internationalism’: the Brenners, the Cohens, the Bergs, the Novacks, the 
Trillings, the Morrows, the Rubins . . . .” (qtd. in Wald, New York 63). The “Rubin” referred to is Diana Rubin, 
Trilling’s wife since 1929, who still used her maiden name for at least political purposes. 
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that though Lionel did not go to Mexico for the hearings, he nevertheless joined the 1937 Dewey 
Commission, which exonerated Trotsky of Stalin’s accusations. And though neither she nor 
Lionel had ever been a Trotskyist, nor even “much of a Trotskyist fellow traveler,” she claims, 
nevertheless “as between Stalin and Trotsky, we for a long time took the side of the latter” 
(Beginning 213).10 The thirties, in other words, saw Lionel Trilling convert from a modestly 
activist Communist-identified intellectual into a politically inactive but Trotskyist-identified 
intellectual.11 
With that anti-Stalinist, Trotskyist sympathy in mind, it is unsurprising that Trilling’s 
1932 suspicion of Carlylean intellectuals on the left who might sanction authoritarianism only 
grew in his later work. Trilling’s study of Matthew Arnold, for example—the crowning product 
of his graduate work in the nineteen-thirties—admires Arnold for understanding thoughtless 
action to be not only the province of the contemporary “commercial and industrial classes,” but 
“no less the creed of the advanced intellectuals who see the world as the field upon which they 
may religiously exercise their souls” (100-101). For Trilling, Arnold represented a necessary 
counterexample to these uncritical and fervent intellectuals. Unlike them, Arnold believed in “a 
world where will is not everything,” where thought would hold equal place with action (7). In 
contrast to the unthinkingly religious perception of the “advanced” intellectual, “To see the 
object as it really is was the essence of Arnold’s teaching” (8, emphasis in the original). Matthew 
Arnold’s particular mode of intellectualism, Trilling hoped, would serve to correct contemporary 
intellectuals’ tendency to simplify the world according to their activist beliefs.                                                         
10 Trilling’s affection for Trotsky lasted decades, in fact. Reviewing a book about Trotsky’s assassin in 1960, 
Trilling admitted that Trotsky could be “ruthless” (“Assassination” 369), but nevertheless insisted on his 
“charismatic charm,” and called him an “‘intellectual’ in every good sense of that abused word” (370).  
11 In addition to Wald and Diana Trilling, I have relied on Krupnick (35-46) for this account of Trilling’s political 
beliefs in the thirties. Krupnick wisely offers this caveat, however: “It is very difficult to be certain about Trilling’s 
politics in the thirties because he left few traces” (40). This in turn may be because Trilling became markedly less 
political, in any standard sense of the term, over the course of the decade. 
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In the same year as Matthew Arnold’s publication—1939, also the year of the New York-
centered split in the Socialist Workers Party, with its passionate debate over the possible 
existence of a “New Class” creating “bureaucratic collectivism”—Trilling reached a landmark in 
his understanding of intellectuals as a whole. In a contribution to Partisan Review’s symposium 
on “The Situation in American Writing,” he first formulated his mature understanding of the 
group as an “intellectual class.” It was an understanding, or at least a phrase, that would stay 
with him until his death: in 1975, one can still find him unselfconsciously referring to an 
“intellectual class” in his introduction to a republication of The Middle of the Journey (vii, xx, 
and xxi).12 In the 1939 symposium Trilling declares his literary interests to be  
in the tradition of humanistic thought and in the intellectual middle class which 
believes that it continues this tradition. Nowadays this is perhaps not properly 
pious; but however much I may acknowledge the historic role of the working 
class and the validity of Marxism, it would be only piety for me to say that my 
chief literary interest lay in this class and this tradition. . . . it is for this 
intellectual class that I suppose I write (120-21, emphasis in original).  
Trilling hedges on his commitment to Marxism here (“however much [he] may acknowledge” it). 
But he is sure that an intellectual class, distinct from the Marxist working class, exists. 
He goes on to offer a fundamental criticism of that class. “What for me is so interesting in 
the intellectual middle class,” he writes, “is the dramatic contradiction of its living with the 
greatest possibility (call it illusion) of conscious choice, its believing itself the inheritor of the 
great humanist and rationalist tradition, and the badness and stupidity of its action” (120-21). 
While the intellectual class proclaims its belief in the ideals of “the great humanist and rationalist                                                         
12 In an autobiographical lecture given at Purdue University in 1971, Trilling similarly discusses the 1920s as a 
decade that revealed a “growing sense of identity and solidarity [in] the rapidly developing intellectual class” 
(“Some Notes” 230, emphasis in the original). 
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tradition” of the Enlightenment itself—in universal liberty and equality—its supposedly 
“conscious choice” of such ideals is only an “illusion.” In actual practice, we may infer from this 
Trotskyist sympathizer, the intellectual class has deluded itself into championing a Communist 
Party responsible for the “badness and stupidity” of Stalin’s purges and gulags, a system 
diametrically opposed to human liberty. Much like the dissident Trotskyists, in other words, in 
1939 Trilling postulated an intellectual class marked by a fundamental contradiction between its 
consciously lofty ideals and its “bad and stupid” actions. 
Armed with this understanding of the internal contradictions of his intellectual class, 
Trilling soon imagined the class in more detail, offering it a long and ultimately damning history 
in 1943’s E. M. Forster. The intellectual “first came into historical notice” during the French 
Revolution when lawyers and priests in the Assembly spoke out against the aristocracy, Trilling 
remarks there. Thus “The French Revolution was the first great occasion when Mind—
conscious, verbalized mind—became an important element in national politics” (91). But the 
social type of the intellectual did not just originate in the French Revolution, he argues. Once 
again, intellectuals are not simply inheritors of the Enlightenment, despite what they tell 
themselves. For the intellectual also descends from the many religious sects of the eighteenth 
century (91-92), and this has had profound consequences for the subsequent history of the 
intellectual class. The liberal intellectual has retained from this sectarian period the forms of 
argument and invective common to religious dispute. From this alternative genealogy Trilling in 
fact fashions a startling broadside against liberal intellectuals in general, who, he now tells us, 
“have always moved in an aura of self-congratulation. They sustain themselves by flattering 
themselves with intentions and they dismiss as ‘reactionary’ whoever questions them” (92). 
Furthermore, despite his pretensions to social transcendence, the liberal intellectual is in fact “the 
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most class-marked and class-bound of all men” (92). This “class-bound” man bears an uneasy 
relationship to “the business-man” whom he despises, yet depends upon for financial support. He 
is also uneasy with the working class, since he is separated from that class by virtue of his 
articulate speech. Yet he insists on speaking for the working class in a “paternal, pedagogic, even 
priestlike” fashion (92-3), since he regards “the mass of men as objects of his benevolence” (93). 
Thus the liberal intellectual, in Trilling’s ever more critical view, is a smug and self-deceived 
creature descended from the smug and self-deceived religious sectarians of the so-called 
Enlightenment era. Just as importantly, he is part of an intellectual class with its own class 
interests, caught between the capitalist class that feeds him and the working class to which he 
condescends and yet claims to represent.13 
Such a bitingly critical, class-based understanding of intellectual and political self-
deception sets the stage for the emergence of one of Trilling’s most characteristic and important 
phrases of the late forties: “masked will.” The phrase does much to explain Trilling’s politics in 
that decade and those that followed, as we shall see in the remainder of this chapter. It finds its 
best explicit definition in Trilling’s famed essay on Henry James’s The Princess Casamassima, 
originally published in 1948 and then reprinted in 1950’s The Liberal Imagination. A tour de 
force—over a decade later Joseph Frank still hailed it as one of the “finest performances of 
contemporary criticism” (259)14—Trilling’s essay interprets James’s story of revolutionary 
intrigue as a morality tale of “the masked will.” The eponymous Princess, when young, foolishly 
“sold herself for a title and fortune. She regards her doing so as such a terrible piece of frivolity                                                         
13 Following then-standard linguistic usage for “generic” examples, Trilling designates the liberal intellectual a “he.” 
But in practice, when he cared to embody the concept, Trilling most often envisioned his misguided and 
intellectually weak liberal intellectual as a woman. As we shall see, his best exemplars of the liberal intellectual are 
Nancy Croom in The Middle of the Journey, and the Princess Casamassima in Henry James’s novel of the same 
name. 
14 I say “over a decade later” because even though Frank’s essay on Trilling was first published eight years after 
Trilling’s Casamassima essay appeared in 1948—i.e. not quite a decade later—Frank was nevertheless willing to 
reprint his high praise in 1963’s The Widening Gyre, a full fifteen years after Trilling’s first publication. 
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that she can never for the rest of her days be serious enough to make up for it” (qtd. on 87). Thus 
when she meets the proletarian revolutionary Paul Muniment, Trilling argues, she finds a way to 
escape her mistake—to be, in her own estimation, a serious person. She hopes for a more daring 
life, a life opposed to her pale aristocratic existence, via the certainty, the “reality,” of 
revolutionary politics. She is “a perfect drunkard of reality” (87), in Trilling’s evocative phrase. 
Soon embroiled in Muniment’s political machinations, she at last hopes to aid an underground 
revolutionary society by assassinating a duke. In this moment of murderous impulse, justified 
consciously by her proletarian sympathies but founded actually in a desire to change her own life 
and atone for her earlier “frivolity,” Trilling finds her to be 
the very embodiment of the modern will which masks itself in virtue, making 
itself appear harmless, the will that hates itself and finds its manifestations guilty 
and is able to exist only if it operates in the name of virtue, that despises the 
variety and modulations of the human story and longs for an absolute humanity . . 
. . [She is] a striking symbol of that powerful part of modern culture that exists by 
means of its claim to political innocence and by its false seriousness—the political 
awareness that is not aware, the social consciousness which hates full 
consciousness, the moral earnestness which is moral luxury. (87-88) 
Much like the members of Trilling’s intellectual class, the privileged Princess is possessed by a 
will that masks itself with sociopolitical virtue, while in actuality it only attempts to realize its 
selfish desires, possibly by bloody means. In sum, Trilling’s nearly two-decades-long 
meditations on the perils of intellectuals’ political involvement on behalf of proletarian causes—
from 1932’s worry over Carlyle’s conversion to a forerunner of fascism, to 1943’s damning 
history of the smug and self-deceived religiosity of intellectuals since the French Revolution—
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was crystallized in this late-forties critique of the “masked will.” Intellectuals engaged in class 
politics risked mistaking their own class desires for those of others—sometimes with violent 
results. 
But while the “masked will” obtained its best definition in the Princess Casamassima 
essay, it was not the first time Trilling had used the phrase in print. The phrase “masked will” 
was first coined the year before, in Trilling’s 1947 novel The Middle of the Journey (334). And it 
is in Trilling’s novel that we may see his most detailed attempt to work out the phrase’s precise 
political meaning. We will thus turn now to The Middle of the Journey in order to fully 
understand Trilling’s conception of intellectual class politics in the late forties. 
 
3. Masked Will and New Class in The Middle of the Journey (1947) 
As we have seen, the idea that intellectuals might constitute a distinct class originated on 
the left in America. It arose from heterodox Communist and then Trotskyist circles, among left 
intellectuals who were speculating on the role of intellectuals in proletarian revolution, whether 
in abstract theory or in the actual Soviet Union. But historically speaking, the New Class idea did 
not remain forever on the left. In the 1970s, the neoconservative movement—populated at first 
by former Democrats deeply upset by the activism of student and middle-class radicals of the 
previous decade—created its own version of New Class theory in order to explain the existence 
of this “New Left.” They postulated the existence of “a newly dominant class that function[ed] as 
a kind of radical fifth column within the government, media, and academe to mold society 
according to its own ‘anti-American,’ anticapitalist views” (Krupnick 147). In neoconservative 
Irving Kristol’s formulation in the Wall Street Journal in 1975, the New Class’s anticapitalist 
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politics were derived from its attachment to abstract “ideals,” ideals whose realization would—
not coincidentally—necessitate the New Class’s rise to power: 
The “new class”—intelligent, educated, energetic—has little respect for . . . 
(business) civilization. It wishes to see its “ideals” more effectual than the market 
is likely to permit them to be. And so it tries always to supersede economics by 
politics—an activity in which it is most competent, since it has the talents and the 
implicit authority to shape public opinion on all larger issues. (qtd. in Bruce-
Briggs 4, emphasis in original) 
Convincing themselves they were doing good for society, the New Class in reality merely 
created or expanded a slew of political bureaucracies (from classic New Deal programs like 
Social Security to the newer environmental regulation agencies) that would offer them and their 
children employment—and power—for years. So ran the neoconservative narrative of a liberal 
New Class in the seventies.15 
It is widely acknowledged that Trilling had a great influence on this conception of a New 
Class via his 1965 exposition of an “adversary culture”—that is, his account of a powerful 
contemporary cultural movement, descended from both post-Enlightenment modernity and 
twentieth-century modernism, that habitually and unthinkingly valued the rejection of all 
dominant cultural trends.16 Many of the contributors to B. Bruce-Briggs’ chiefly neoconservative 
volume, 1979’s The New Class?, for example, cite Trilling’s “adversary culture” in order to give 
                                                        
15 On the neoconservative idea of the New Class largely in its own words, see Bruce-Briggs. Barbara Ehrenreich, the 
socialist author of another late-1970s iteration of New Class theory—one vastly influential on the left, the 
“Professional-Managerial Class” or PMC (see Walker)—also offers a capsule history of the neoconservative account 
of a New Class in her Fear of Falling, 146-54. 
16 See Beyond Culture, especially the Preface and “On the Teaching of Modern Literature.” The concept of an 
“adversary culture” would be indispensable if one were to trace the trajectory of Trilling’s skepticism of intellectual 
labor and class to the end of his career. 
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an idea of what they mean by a “New Class.”17 But Mark Krupnick denies any true connection 
between Trilling’s “adversary culture” and the neoconservative “New Class.” He asserts that 
neoconservatives were guilty of “politicizing concepts originally intended to be more specifically 
cultural in their reference,” and that there is “nothing in fact in Trilling’s own writing to indicate 
that [Trilling] shared the neoconservative belief” in a New Class (147). And it is true that in his 
critical writings at the time Trilling never portrayed an explicitly political New Class hostile to 
America and capitalism alike. Certainly Trilling never descended to advocating the cartoonish 
version of New Class theory that his former student Norman Podhoretz and others embraced in 
the 1970s.  
But while we may agree with Krupnick’s insistence that Trilling’s mid-sixties idea of an 
“adversary culture” was more cultural than political, it is nevertheless worth bearing in mind that 
this invokes a dichotomy and distinction that Trilling himself had become famous for blurring, in 
essays that “assume[d] the inevitable intimate, if not always obvious, connection between 
literature and politics” (Liberal ix). We can’t separate culture and politics so easily as Krupnick 
suggests, especially not in Trilling’s case. And in fact, as Krupnick writes elsewhere, we would 
do well to note that Trilling often “revealed more in his fiction than in his critical essays on 
fiction about the specific social preferences implied by [his] abstractions” (75). His fiction made 
material what Trilling often conceived in the abstract. In this section, then, I will argue that 
Trilling’s own novel, The Middle of the Journey, demonstrates that Trilling had essentially 
created the neoconservative idea of the New Class by 1947, at least two decades before it 
emerged as a crucial weapon in that movement’s ideological arsenal. This argument should 
                                                        
17 See the essays by Norman Podhoretz (Trilling’s former student), Robert Bartley, Seymour Martin Lipset, and 
Daniel Bell, respectively on pages 22, 58, 85, and 179-80. Nash’s history of American conservative thought also 
discusses Jeffrey Hart’s use of the phrase in a National Review article in 1970 (299-300), though Nash seems 
unaware of its origins in Trilling’s work. 
 125 
contribute vital historical background to debates about Trilling’s relationship to neoconservatism 
in the sixties and seventies—debates that have commonly assumed that Trilling only started 
thinking about intellectual workers in the sixties. But we should be careful to note that it does not 
identify Trilling as a neoconservative avant la lettre.18 As we shall observe in the concluding 
section, Trilling is best seen in this period as an influential representative of what was then 
known as “the new liberalism.” In this proleptic identification of the neoconservative version of 
the New Class idea in Trilling’s novel, then, I propose only to show that the idea of intellectuals 
as a class, first articulated in Communist and Trotskyist circles in the thirties, could be—and 
was—used for surprisingly conservative ends by the latter half of the forties. Trilling’s depiction 
of the “masked will” in The Middle of the Journey shows us that the left concept of a class of 
intellectuals could, like many people on the left in this era, become deradicalized. 
                                                        
18 The literature on Trilling’s relationship to neconservatism is extensive. Aside from Krupnick, Trilling’s widow 
Diana, while admitting that she cannot speak for what her husband would have believed had he lived longer (he died 
in 1975), also denies any affinity between his work and the neoconservative movement. She cites his refusal to 
support Nixon in the 1972 presidential election—despite being asked to do so by neoconservative Gertrude 
Himmelfarb, and despite his unease with McGovern (Beginning 404-05). More recently, Tom Samet argues that 
Trilling’s ideal of the “dense, weighty, fixed, and morally centered self” (469) stands in noble opposition to the 
“already decentered and profoundly deconstructive social actuality” (470, emphasis in original) of an advanced 
capitalism whose exploitation now requires such flexibility of identity. From this point of view, Trilling’s 
celebration of the fixed moral self may be more anticapitalist and liberatory than many of postmodernism’s 
sometimes avowedly leftist ideals. 
But others have found in Trilling an at least partial ally of neoconservativism. Trilling’s one-time Columbia 
student, Norman Podhoretz, for example, claims Trilling as a strong influence on the movement. For him, Trilling 
was at bottom just as opposed to the radicalism of the sixties as he was to that of the thirties—even if his manner 
was disappointingly quiescent (see the excerpt from Podhoretz’s Breaking Ranks in Rodden, Lionel Trilling 367-
71). William Barrett also notes Trilling’s profound influence on neoconservatism via his challenge to the “Marxism 
and modernism” of the Partisan Review circle—but Barrett also holds that Trilling “remained a thoroughgoing 
liberal to the end” (40). (It should be noted that his use of the term “liberal,” however, is in truth apolitical. In the 
same sentence he equates it with a “rational, secular, and non-religious” mind—despite Barrett’s implication, 
something clearly not required for political liberalism.) Other intellectuals have placed Trilling in the 
neoconservative camp with comparatively few reservations: Himmelfarb happily claims him (Rodden, Lionel 
Trilling 372-76), while socialist Cornel West indicts him as the “Godfather of Neoconservatism” (Rodden, Lionel 
Trilling 395-403). 
My own view accords with that of Morris Dickstein, another of Trilling’s students, who believes that 
Trilling was simply and consistently averse to intellectual-political certainty as such. Dickstein remarks that Trilling 
“never buys fully into the neoconservatism already in the air when he died,” and that “[h]ad he lived, the pendulum 
[of his thought] would no doubt have shifted yet again” (qtd. in Rodden, Lionel Trilling 22). Both early and late, 
Trilling valued flexibility of mind over the truths of any political or intellectual trends. Consequently he was loath to 
identify wholly with any political movement, however much he found himself in sympathy with some of its beliefs. 
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The Middle of the Journey takes place in the middle to late 1930s, and its protagonist is 
John Laskell, an expert on public housing who normally lives in New York City. But as we meet 
him he is traveling on a train from New York to rural Connecticut. He is going there in order to 
recuperate from an outbreak of scarlet fever—a red disease, we eventually understand in the 
context of Trilling’s highly symbolic and anti-Communist novel. In this pastoral setting he is 
taken care of by his friends Arthur and Nancy Croom, who are living there for the summer. 
Arthur is a professor of economics whose growing prestige may soon land him a job in the 
Roosevelt administration (60). Both he and his wife are liberal fellow travelers of the Communist 
Party throughout these Popular Front years. Later the Crooms and Laskell are joined by Gifford 
Maxim, a friend of theirs who had gone underground in order to perform “special and secret” 
work (140), possibly involving violence, for the highest levels of the Party. He has now 
dramatically abandoned Stalinist Communism for a dogmatic Christian conservatism, however, 
and seeks a career in literary-political journalism. The novel contains little action beyond this, for 
at its heart it details a shift in political thought, particularly Laskell’s growing estrangement from 
both the fellow-traveling Crooms and the newly conservative Maxim. Narrating this clash within 
a clique of social and political experts (Laskell on public housing, Arthur Croom on economics, 
Maxim on politics), then, The Middle of the Journey offers another miniaturized drama of the 
intellectual class. It is a novel of explicit ideological intra-class conflict in the tradition of 
Slesinger’s The Unpossessed and McCarthy’s The Company She Keeps.  
Trilling’s continuing concern with the class nature of intellectuals in the late forties may 
be seen primarily in the novel’s portrait of Arthur and Nancy Croom. Early on in the novel, John 
Laskell thinks of the Crooms as “a justification of” not only “human existence” in general (81), 
but of middle class Americans in particular. The “middle class, for all its failures,” he considers, 
 127 
could yet produce the models for the human virtue of the future. . . . [H]e could 
want nothing better for the world than what the Crooms suggested. He could want 
nothing better than this much sturdiness and this much grace, this much passion 
and this much reason, this much personal concern and this much involvement in 
large affairs. (82)  
Laskell thus begins the novel with nothing but respect and admiration for the middle-class 
Crooms, and the political idealism they espouse. They represent the hope of illimitable human 
progress and the desire for collective change (93). Most importantly for our purposes here, for 
Laskell and indeed the novel itself the Crooms represent the specific social and political 
potentials of the American middle class.  
But the Crooms do not just represent the middle class in this novel, I would argue; they 
more specifically represent the intellectual class, or New Class. The novel accordingly 
understands the Crooms’ politics as those of the seemingly idealistic masked will. On the level of 
character, for example, the novel’s critique of intellectuals’ masked will can be seen in the 
Crooms’ persistent fawning over their working-class handyman, Duck Caldwell. Caldwell 
demonstrates continual irresponsibility and indeed brutality of mind. He forgets to pick Laskell 
up at the train station when he first arrives (10), and later mockingly relates one of the Crooms’ 
private and intimate moments to a group of his friends at the bar (111-12). Toward the novel’s 
close, he even drunkenly slaps his daughter twice, accidentally killing her (283-84). But despite 
these manifestations of Caldwell’s crudeness and even malignancy, the Crooms habitually make 
excuses for him: they suggest that his failure to pick Laskell up at the station is due to his 
“constitutional weakness” for alcohol, or some vague “unhappiness,” for example (12). And at 
most other times the Crooms simply admire him, talking about him “as if he were not so much a 
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man as a symbol” of the noble working class itself (105). Their view of this working class man is 
in short blinded by their conception of what “the working class” is supposed to be in (Marxist) 
theory. Much like the Princess Casamassima, their political idealism masks a personal will that 
sanctions violence, in this case Duck’s own violent behavior. 
More directly, the Crooms are similarly willing to tolerate Stalin’s purges of the 
Communist Party in the Soviet Union during the Moscow trials. Once again, like the Princess 
Casamassima, they justify their support for such grisly business by a hard-headed appeal to the 
real. The otherwise idealistic Arthur Croom, for example, makes an oblique case for the purges 
as against what he conceives to be a soft liberalism unwilling to confront “reality”:  
You find a good many people these days who think things can be made perfect 
overnight, that a revolution insures a Utopia in an instant, without difficulty and 
trouble, without compromise and without the use of force. . . . The great danger to 
the progressive movement these days, as I see it, is that liberals are going to 
confuse their dreams and ideals with the possible realities. You see that happening 
already—people become disappointed and disaffected because everything isn’t 
the way they would like to have it. They see economic democracy developing 
over there and that doesn’t satisfy them—they begin shouting for immediate 
political democracy, forgetting the realities of the historical situation. (177) 
Thus while Arthur supports the benign cause of economic progress, he simultaneously tolerates 
the bloodiest forms of coercion in its name. Both in relation to Duck Caldwell and to the Soviet 
Union, in other words, the Crooms personify a will that is masked; their idealism masks their 
tolerance of both personal and political violence. 
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Nancy Croom in particular demonstrates the masked will on a more intimate, and 
therefore perhaps more terrifying, level. Many critics have noted that Nancy Croom is often 
figured in the text as a child (e.g. Tanner 67), a revealing symbol of her simplistic—and often 
dangerous—world view. The novel’s first description of Nancy notes that she had “clear eyes 
that could show a child’s wonder but could also show a child’s strong, demanding anger” (9-10). 
This original observation is borne out later as well. Her child’s wonder is shown when Laskell 
searches his wallet for a picture of his deceased lover to show to Nancy, and the narrator remarks 
that “There really was a good deal of the child about her and he had diverted her by making her 
curious about what he had to show” (121). But her child’s anger reveals itself in several of her 
arguments with Laskell, and more subtly when she tells Laskell, who is stepping on some of her 
flowers, to “step out of the cosmos” (81). Edward Shoben overstates the case, but nevertheless 
usefully draws out the ominous overtones of this “lighthearted pun” in the form of a Freudian 
slip when he notes that Nancy is “capable of striking cruelty” and that the accidental pun “only 
emphasizes . . . Nancy’s willingness to move from the larger cosmos virtually anyone who seems 
to stand in the way of her realizing the politicized actualization of her inner longings” (136-37). 
Thus we should not be surprised to find out that Nancy is considering joining the Communist 
Party, as she says in a moment of pique, because she’s “so damn tired” of liberals, “with their 
civil liberties and their Jeffersonian democracies” (206). She may have even directly aided 
political violence, we learn, when she agreed to forward some letters to Maxim, as part of his 
“special and secret”—quite possibly lethal—work for the Party (166-67).19 As a number of 
critics have pointed out, Nancy Croom, with her unconscious will to have John “step out of the 
cosmos” when he disagrees with her one-sided and seemingly virtuous politics, is an ideological                                                         
19 This scenario was modeled on a similar request the real-life Whittaker Chambers made of Diana Trilling. Unlike 
Nancy Croom, Diana Trilling refused the request (D. Trilling, Beginning 216-17).  
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sister to Trilling’s Princess Casamassima. She is The Middle of the Journey’s best representative 
of the intellectual class’s masked will. 
But the novel’s most memorable summary of the dangers of masked will comes in 
symbolic form. It occurs in a startling and almost surreal scene, whose placement at the end of 
the first chapter makes it serve as a keynote for the remainder of the work—a thesis statement, as 
it were, in this academic literary critic’s novel. The Crooms, who live in an unfinished house, 
arrange for Laskell to stay with their neighbors, the Folgers. On Laskell’s first day there, he 
hears a horrendously bizarre, inarticulate, and yet mournful sound coming from the porch below 
his room. He soon discovers that the sound is actually only the old and deaf Alwin Folger talking 
to his three hounds, playfully representing their supposed angst over the tardiness of their 
coming dinner. But Alwin’s imaginative mimicry carries symbolic political weight as he 
repeatedly calls the hungering dogs “poor boys” (emphasis added): “Way-ra dirra, way-ra dirra, 
way-ra dirra forra poo-oo-oo-oo-rrr boys?” he cajoles them; “Where’s the dinner, where’s the 
dinner, where’s the dinner for the poor boys?” the narrator translates (32). Almost immediately, 
if in the main unconsciously, Laskell perceives the political implications of Alwin’s actions: 
“The voice was terrible in its imitation of human reason. . . . It almost seemed to [Laskell] that 
the voice was expressing the grievance of others, was commiserating with others, speaking of 
their sorrow, for the sorrow of other deprived minds. And this power of generalization, this 
appeal, as it were, to justice, was more terrifying than anything else” (30). On some level Laskell 
thus recognizes that Alwin treats the hungry dogs much as Trilling believed that left-liberal 
intellectuals treat the hungry poor: he does not genuinely communicate with them, but 
nevertheless contrives to speak for them in the name of justice. Alwin’s sad, other-worldly 
howling—an “insane exposition of grief and injustice” (31)—is the voice of masked will.  
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Over the course of the novel, Laskell comes to reject such pseudo-benevolent appeals to 
justice, which seem to drive his friends’ politics. He perceives that his friends are less concerned 
about those they are representing than about the satisfaction of their own desires. “It was not [the 
Crooms’ and Maxim’s] wills that wearied him,” he judges in the end, “but the necessity they 
shared to make their wills appear harmless” (324). And when he challenges their political 
dogmatism, they berate him, allowing him to finally name their intellectual and political malady: 
their anger at him is “the anger of the masked will at the appearance of an idea in modulation” 
(334), the inability of the masked will’s dogmatism to countenance complexity. In Trilling’s 
narrative, the intellectual class’s masked will refuses, sometimes angrily, to recognize the 
existence of its own will, its own class interest, in defining its opinions. 
A few years earlier, in 1943’s E. M. Forster, Trilling had implied a liberal justification 
for liberals to beware their masked will. He writes there that liberalism “prefers to make its 
alliances only when it thinks it catches the scent of Utopia in parties and governments, the odor 
of sanctity in men; and if neither is actually present, liberalism makes sure to supply it” (8). 
Trilling here articulates something close to the concept of masked will that he would only name a 
few years later: creating utopian sentiment when they cannot find it in reality, liberals project 
their own utopian desires onto others even when those being spoken for do not share those liberal 
desires. In the liberal imagination, in short, every working-class person is transformed into a 
member of the valiant and revolutionary proletariat. Trilling goes on to explicate the harm 
liberalism does to itself when indulging in such political fantasy. Continually understanding their 
own desires to be those of others, liberals are persistently disappointed, and because of this, he 
maintains, “liberalism is always being surprised” (8). Thus “There is always the liberal work to 
do over again because disillusionment and fatigue follow hard upon surprise, and reaction is 
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always ready for that moment of liberal disillusionment and fatigue—reaction never hopes, 
despairs, or suffers amazement” (8). When those being spoken for do not fulfill the liberal 
fantasy, as inevitably they do not, reactionary politics eagerly fills the vacuum left by dashed 
utopian hopes. In the end, for this dry run of the concept of “masked will,” the liberal’s 
imposition of his or her fantasies onto others only causes setbacks for liberalism’s own noble 
goals. 
But if E. M. Forster thus offered a critique of the masked will that demonstrated an 
essential sympathy with liberalism’s goals, in The Middle of the Journey the critique obtains a 
much more conservative basis. For by exclusively presenting lower-class characters that enjoy or 
even seem to deserve their subservient status, and hence definitively don’t want or need help, 
The Middle of the Journey seems to deny the left-liberal proposition that social inequality is a 
problem at all. The Folgers, for example, live a perfectly content life in a story line that can only 
be described as a paean to feudalism. Tending to the needs of “local squiress” Julia Walker and 
her property (262), Mr. Folger gives her advice as if he were “a great minister of state who gives 
to an aged queen . . . his counsel” (80). He drives Miss Walker around in a car she has bought for 
him, and he and Mrs. Folger cheerfully wait for Miss Walker to build them a house on her 
property—a modest house intended only “to bring Mr. Folger within easier reach, permitting him 
to look after Miss Walker’s little estate” (79), but which the couple treats as if a “duchy . . . was 
to be their reward” (80). Happily meditating on this idyllic scenario toward the end of the novel, 
Laskell contentedly realizes that Mrs. Folger’s “loyalty of commitment to Miss Walker . . . was 
very deep,” and that “Loyalty was a virtue” (311). Contrary to what liberal intellectuals with 
masked wills may think, these loyal serfs are content. The Folgers don’t need to be saved. 
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On a more symbolic level, Alwin Folger’s “poor” hounds, too, do not really have such a 
bad life. When one dog is taken forcibly but kindly into Folger’s hands—or on the level of 
political symbolism, into his control—the dog is “divided between happiness and unhappiness, 
caught and held, yet loving the game that was being played with him” (33). For their part, the 
other two hounds watch “their captive comrade half with pleasure, half with apprehension” (33), 
nervous but not ultimately displeased with his and their dependent position. The choice of 
“comrade” to describe the dogs’ relationships with each other is both purposeful and ironic in the 
novel’s anti-Communist context: anything but the revolutionary proletarians that “comrade” 
would normally imply, in the main these dogs seem to enjoy their servility. In perhaps the most 
outrageous phrase of the book, looked at in this light, by the end of the novel Laskell knows that 
the hounds “were very lazy and on hot days they gasped and looked at the world with suffering 
eyes, but they really had a very easy life and were well fed and much petted” (340). Lovingly 
cared for by their respective masters, both the poor dogs and their serf-like owners the Folgers do 
not want or even need benevolent attention from those better off. In The Middle of the Journey, 
liberal concern for those less well-off is simply misplaced. 
It is also often unmerited. For if the Folgers and the hounds both represent economic 
underclasses as content and well-kept, handyman Duck Caldwell is the worst kind of human 
being and, we are meant to think, the worst kind of proletarian. In The Liberal Imagination, 
Trilling notes that the literature of “our liberal democracy” “pets and dandles its underprivileged 
characters, and, quite as if it had the right to do so, forgives them what faults they may have” 
(83). An irresponsible and finally vicious scoundrel, the character of Duck stands as a (one-
sided) corrective to the entire fictive tradition Trilling identifies as liberal. There is nothing 
inherently wrong with representing a vicious member of the working class, or content and loyal 
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serfs, of course; but it is fair to say that the novel’s portrait of the working class exhibits little of 
Trilling’s supposedly balanced and imaginative political liberalism. If the liberal intellectual with 
masked will risks bad faith when he or she speaks for the working class, when The Middle of the 
Journey speaks for them, they definitively do not want, and in some cases do not deserve, such 
advocacy at all. 
Indeed at times Trilling’s novel accepts the existence of classes with frank appreciation. 
“Laskell had sometimes thought that people in their imposed functions were rather better than 
the same people when they stepped outside their functions,” we are told (210). The “girls in the 
office” who were “notable for the simplicity and directness in their characters,” as well as their 
cheerfully “efficient” demeanor, become “petulant and self-pitying people with no firmness of 
character at all” at the office Christmas party. Likewise the “colleague whose sense of 
performance organized him so well when he was being professional, became, when you had 
cocktails with him . . . as soggy as a soul could be” (210). The “imposed functions” Laskell 
admires, in short, are those of class, the limits of specified professional labor. His ruminations on 
the value of vocational limitations also apply to Emily Caldwell, whose “profession” is that of a 
mother. She does not interest Laskell as “an intellectual or as a rebel,” he realizes. “But in her 
function as Susan’s mother . . . in her function as housekeeper . . . Laskell had found her more 
and more impressive. She had a womanly dignity that did not depend on intellect” (211). 
Trilling’s The Middle of the Journey thus even offers a brief for the positive value of “imposed 
functions” such as class and gender roles. In this, it is ideologically quite close to Russell Kirk’s 
description of the conservative’s “Conviction that civilized society requires orders and classes” 
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(8), articulated only six years after Trilling’s novel in Kirk’s seminal book on The Conservative 
Mind.20 
And recognizing this conservative trend in Trilling’s novel, we may now see that The 
Middle of the Journey, published over two decades before the emergence of neoconservatism, 
portrays a New Class that very much resembles the neoconservative one. If the 
neoconservatives’ New Class did not seek to help the poor, but only to advance its own interests, 
then in The Middle of the Journey the masked wills of both Nancy Croom and Alwin Folger seek 
not so much to help the poor (dogs), as to assert their own will and desires. In the context of this 
novel, where the working class uniformly does not want or deserve the aid of intellectuals, the 
cynical implication that left intellectuals do not genuinely wish to help the poor is a conservative 
one. Gifford Maxim, the novel’s newly-converted Christian conservative, is accordingly its most 
direct exponent: 
And never has there been so much talk of liberty while the chains are being 
forged. Democracy and freedom. And in the most secret heart of every 
intellectual, where he scarcely knows of it himself, there lies hidden the real hope 
that these words hide. It is the hope of power, the desire to bring his ideas to 
reality by imposing them on his fellow man. We are all of us, all of us, the little 
children of the Grand Inquisitor. The more we talk of welfare the crueler we 
become. (243, emphases in the original) 
                                                        
20 While it is not my main subject here, there are indeed many links between Trilling’s work and the traditionalist 
strain of conservatism that came to prominence in the 1950s, then called the “new conservatism,” or what we would 
now call “paleoconservatism.” For a still-excellent mid-fifties evaluation that does much of the work necessary to 
link Trilling to this Burkean conservatism—as Kirk elaborated it, a conservatism that rejected innovation in favor of 
the status quo, tradition, and order—see Joseph Frank’s penetrating essay “Lionel Trilling and the Conservative 
Imagination.” 
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In “Manners, Morals, and the Novel,” an essay published the same year as his novel, Trilling 
echoes the conservative Maxim. “Some paradox of our natures,” he writes, “leads us, when once 
we have made our fellow men the objects of our enlightened interest, to go on to make them the 
objects of our pity, then of our wisdom, ultimately of our coercion” (Liberal 208). In Trilling’s 
mid-forties meditations on intellectual leftism, then, the desire to help subaltern others seems 
always to be an instance of masked will. Like the neoconservative New Class of the seventies, 
the intellectual class in Trilling’s novel demonstrates a selfish will to power that in fact hurts 
those it claims to aid.21 
If Maxim’s speech describes the philosophical will to power characterizing the 
intellectuals of the New Class, the intellectual class’s economic opportunism may be glimpsed in 
the uninspiring narrative of Laskell’s conversion to liberalism. At the party of a liberal friend, 
Laskell finds himself in a heated conversation with a man over the issue of public housing. He 
takes an immediate dislike to the man and searches for any way to contradict him: 
He did not know where he got the ideas he used for his arguments. No doubt they 
came from his opponent’s own laboriously acquired store, needing only to be 
turned upside down. He was pleased when the man became abusive and 
denounced not only Laskell, but what he called Laskell’s “whole school of 
thought.” Suddenly there he was, a member of a school of thought in a profession 
he had never before considered. . . . The ideas that Laskell had produced only to 
be contrary seemed to him suddenly right and important. (36) 
                                                        
21 Many contemporary readers will no doubt also be reminded of Foucault in the Trilling passages cited here. 
Agreed, though this similarity should not be understood to prove that Foucault, either, was somehow a 
neoconservative avant la lettre. See the conclusion of Chapter Four for an explication of Trilling’s relationship to 
poststructuralist and postmodern writers, including Foucault. 
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Having discovered that certain ideas can lead to membership in a profession, Laskell “suddenly” 
and unconvincingly believes in them: the neoconservative New Class, with its masked will of 
seeming benevolence, is born. Both the blunt desire for power and the coarsely economic 
motivations of Trilling’s intellectual class accurately prefigure the neoconservative account of 
the New Class in the seventies. 
Once again, however, I do not seek to claim Trilling for conservatism or 
neoconservatism, in the forties or the seventies or at any other time. Deep and cutting skepticism 
of an intellectual class and its political motivations is not equivalent to neoconservatism itself, a 
movement with multiple beliefs and political agendas, whose effects we are still living out today, 
in America, the Middle East, and elsewhere.22 As we shall see in the next section, Trilling’s 
cultural politics during the forties are more helpfully characterized as part of a contemporary 
movement then known as the “new liberalism.” My point is rather that Trilling’s avowedly 
liberal politics in this era displayed a growing and remarkably strong animus against actual 
                                                        
22 I should take this moment to address the discomfort that sympathizers with one or the other group may feel upon 
seeing an argument connecting Trotskyism to neoconservatism. On the left, Alan Wald seeks to separate the 1930s 
and 1940s radical left, including Trotskyism, from neoconservatism. He instead asserts neoconservatism’s continuity 
with a thoroughly deradicalized Cold War liberalism alone (see New York 352 and “Are Trotskyites”). On the right, 
Bill King offers a thorough refutation of the alleged Trotskyist-neoconservative connection as well (see his online 
article, “Neoconservatives and Trotskyism”). Wald and King both point out that most neoconservatives never 
participated in any kind of Marxist politics, and that the very few who did did so briefly. And thus they are right 
about their main point: when pundits suggest that there is something fundamentally “Trotskyist” about the political 
stands of neoconservatives in either the 1970s or the early 21st century, they are engaged in sloppy thinking at best, 
and shallow name-calling at worst. 
But I am talking here about the history of ideas, which sometimes makes for stranger bedfellows than 
politics itself. For as this dissertation shows via the cases of Lionel Trilling and Mary McCarthy, Cold War 
liberalism learned from Trotskyist thinking, including the debates over a “New Class” of intellectual workers and 
their propensity for supporting “bureaucratic collectivism” in the Soviet Union and U.S. alike. And as Wald points 
out, most neoconservatives began as Cold War liberals. Thus while I agree with Wald that it won’t do to call 
neoconservatives “inside-out Bolsheviks” (New York 352), I would insist as well that we cannot ignore or deny 
significant points of continuity between Trotskyist and/or ex-Trotskyist thinking in the late thirties and early forties 
and neoconservative thought in the late sixties and seventies. There is a continuity of ideas between the two 
movements (including the “New Class” idea), even though those ideas obtain radically different meanings in 
different political contexts. To note a point of intellectual continuity, then, as I am doing, is not to confuse the two 
movements; nor is it to suggest that one inevitably leads to the other. With a genuinely wide ideological and political 
gulf between them, neither Trotskyists nor neoconservatives need fear being tainted by their sometimes shared 
conception of intellectual workers as a class. 
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liberals, so much so that it could resemble and even contribute to the later phenomenon of 
neoconservatism in one crucial respect. And more importantly for the argument of Part I of this 
dissertation, I have shown that Trilling’s imagination of an intellectual class, developed from the 
earliest days of his critical career but expressed most fully in his 1947 novel, revealed one of the 
most damning critiques of left intellectuals yet produced in the influential milieu of New York 
anti-Stalinist intellectuals. In the thirties and early forties, Slesinger’s narcissists had become 
McCarthy’s sometimes well-meaning but easily-deluded proponents of bureaucratic 
collectivism. In both these cases distinctly Freudian psychological motivations, rather than 
coarsely economic ones, played the main role. And the worst outcome directly visible was either 
a tragicomic domestic life, or a tenuously preserved psychological disunity.23 But in 1947’s The 
Middle of the Journey, Laskell’s first political motivations are socioeconomic ones, and Nancy 
Croom’s childish anger and desire to have Laskell “step out of the cosmos” hints at a violence 
reminiscent of Stalin’s purges—or Gifford Maxim’s “special and secret” work.24 Thus the 
intellectual class of The Middle of the Journey was not merely comical or ethically dubious. At 
its best, it was positively dangerous. And the New Class idea was accordingly no longer solely 
the province of the left, but rather a concept available for use by a wide range of political 
perspectives, many of them repugnant to the idea’s original proponents. 
                                                        
23 Despite Slesinger’s more comic treatment of the intellectual class, however, I would argue that Trilling’s 
interpretation of The Unpossessed in 1966 nevertheless effectively read it as another treatise on his conception of the 
“masked will.” Slesinger’s novel, he suggested, depicted a fundamental dialectic between “the desire to make life as 
good as it might be” and “life” itself (23). Such a dialectic resembled what he had described in the 1940s as the 
struggle of intellectual workers to thoughtlessly impose their own political desires (“life as good as it might be”) 
upon the (naturalized) “life” of the working class. In short, Trilling’s 1966 interpretation recruits Slesinger’s novel—
with some justice, as we have seen—as a depiction of the (for him malevolent) politics of an intellectual class. 
24 In this harsh depiction of an intellectual class, we may note, Trilling ironically echoed some features of the most 
skeptical origin of New Class theory in America, though from much farther to the right politically. Recall that Max 
Nomad’s 1932 essay “White Collars and Horny Hands,” opposed to Culture and the Crisis’s romantic vision of 
intellectual-proletarian solidarity, had described the stratum of intellectual workers in terms of a “will-to-power” 
(75), and accused intellectuals of harboring strong economic motivations that would likely undermine the 
proletariat. For more on Nomad’s article and Culture and the Crisis, see Chapter One. 
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4. “Haunted Air”: The End of Interest and the Beginning of Ideology in the New Liberal 
Imagination 
 
Trilling’s profound mistrust of intellectual workers was not the only or even the most 
important result of his early participation in a (post-) Trotskyist milieu of speculation on the 
existence and nature of an intellectual class, however. For the politics of intellectual work and 
intellectual workers lay at the heart of Trilling’s whole literary, intellectual, and political 
influence in the forties. Both at the time and since, Trilling’s politics in that era have been 
identified as a contribution to what contemporaries called “the new liberalism.” R. W. B. Lewis, 
for example, recognized Trilling’s kinship to the movement in his contemporary review of The 
Liberal Imagination (151); more recently Thomas Schaub has offered a longer explication of the 
work’s new liberalism in his American Fiction in the Cold War (20-22). Amongst other things, 
the new liberalism was a politics whose philosophical hallmark was an aversion to what it called 
“ideology.” Accordingly, this last section will suggest that Trilling’s increasingly far-reaching 
meditations on intellectual labor shaped not only his own ideas, but ultimately those of the “end 
of ideology” ethos that in retrospect thoroughly marked the forties and (especially) the fifties. By 
transforming his severe critique of a politically dangerous intellectual class into the broadly anti-
ideological politics of his new liberalism, Trilling simultaneously gave the New Class idea its 
most sweeping social influence and obscured its keenest sociopolitical insights. The occlusion of 
class represented by the concept of “ideology” was in fact to have profound consequences for 
mid-century political thought in general, and, I will argue, for the broader history of 
postmodernism’s emergence in the sixties and seventies. 
A brief review of the new liberalism will allow us to see Trilling’s place within the 
movement. Politically speaking, the new liberalism originated in left-liberal disillusionment with 
the Soviet Union following the Moscow trials in 1936 and the Nazi-Soviet pact in 1939, and 
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more generally with the Soviet Union’s refusal to institute any kind of meaningful workers’ 
democracy, one that would protect civil rights and freedoms. Faced with these failures, many on 
the Soviet-identified left began to question the beliefs that had guided their political lives. The 
political consequences of these doubts varied widely: over the course of the 1940s, erstwhile 
enthusiasts of the Soviet experiment began to embrace positions ranging from a revolutionary 
internationalist Trotskyism that sought to redeem the early promise of the Russian Revolution, to 
an aggressively nationalist archconservatism that sought to achieve American (capitalist) military 
and political dominance over the globe.25 The new liberalism, however, defined itself as part of 
what Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. famously called “the vital center.”26 Often stung by the 
connection between their once-utopian hopes and the reality of Soviet repression, and horrified 
as well by the rise of Nazism, these “new” liberals sought to avoid any radical plan that aimed to 
recreate American society or the world itself from scratch. Consequently they committed 
themselves to the gradual, liberal reform of a democratic welfare state at home, and to a 
relatively cautious policy of containing Soviet influence abroad. They believed in a political 
process that brokered between diverse interests, and that positively welcomed compromise and 
(better yet) consensus. 
But the new liberalism was arguably as much a cultural and philosophical mood as it was 
a political movement, and it was here that Trilling’s influence was decisive. Literary critic 
Richard Chase—Trilling’s younger colleague and protégé in the Columbia English 
                                                        
25 James Burnham, whom we last encountered in the previous chapter breaking away from the (Trotskyist) Socialist 
Workers Party and thence the Workers Party in 1941, represents a particularly dramatic example of this range. Over 
the course of the decade he soon became a respected liberal; then a neo-Machiavellian critic of the illusions of 
popular sovereignty, who argued the need for an elite that lies to the populace for the sake of preserving liberty and 
freedom; and then a hard-edged Cold Warrior of the Right who advocated American world dominance via a 
monopoly of nuclear weapons the country should be willing to use. By 1955, he was an associate editor of William 
F. Buckley’s newly-minted and soon influential National Review. On Burnham’s post-Trotskyist career, see for 
example Diggins 303-37, 370-86, and passim. 
26 See Schlesinger’s book by the same name.  
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Department—provides a useful and succinct summary of its more philosophical beliefs.27 For 
Chase, the new liberalism was “that newly invigorated secular thought at the dark center of the 
twentieth century which . . . now begins to ransom liberalism from the ruinous sellouts, failures, 
and defeats of the thirties” (v). The new liberalism thus had to be understood negatively, through 
a series of distinctions from what must henceforth be known as the “old liberalism,” or what we 
would now call the Old Left. The new liberalism 
must present a vision of life capable, by a continuous act of imaginative criticism, 
of avoiding the old mistakes: the facile ideas of progress and “social realism,” the 
disinclination to examine human motives, the indulgence of wish-fulfilling 
rhetoric, the belief that historical reality is merely a question of economic or 
ethical values, the idea that literature should participate directly in the economic 
liberation of the masses, the equivocal relationship to communist totalitarianism 
and power politics. (v) 
The only point to take issue with in Chase’s account is his belief that the new liberalism was 
“secular thought,” for sometimes the new liberalism was precisely a theology, as in Reinhold 
Niebuhr’s employment of the concept of original sin as justification for a humble and pluralistic 
democracy. This exception aside, Chase’s description of the movement’s philosophical 
skepticism and intellectual open-mindedness is masterful.28 
One way to summarize the new liberalism’s stance—and one that highlights its influence 
and centrality in relation to mid-century American thought as a whole—is to name its politics 
                                                        
27 Chase explicitly acknowledges Trilling’s influence in his Preface to Herman Melville, avowing that his “greatest 
debt” belongs to Trilling, a mentor “from whom I have learned so much during the last ten years” (xi). 
28 I have derived a good portion of these two paragraphs on the new liberalism from Thomas Hill Schaub’s helpful 
overview of the subject in his American Fiction in the Cold War, especially Part I, and Pells’s The Liberal Mind in a 
Conservative Age, especially 130-47. The specific Niebuhr work I have in mind as representative of a new 
liberalism based in theology is 1944’s The Children of the Light and the Children of the Darkness. 
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anti-ideological. Here I do not use “ideology” in the sense that some theoretically-inclined 
literary critics are apt to understand it now, as something that “represents the imaginary 
relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (Althusser 162), something 
impossible to escape and anyway necessary for political practice (170). Rather, the term should 
be understood in an historically specific sense, expressed best by Daniel Bell in his era-defining 
work The End of Ideology. There ideology is described as an “all-inclusive system of 
comprehensive reality . . . a set of beliefs, infused with passion, [that] seeks to transform the 
whole of a way of life” (400). The new liberalism defined itself by a rejection of this kind of 
ideology. It sought to reject any passionate, systemic thought which claimed to explain all of 
reality, and therefore to guide political action absolutely, in the service of an utterly new social 
order. Bell’s thesis—that the fifties had thankfully produced, in the words of his book’s subtitle, 
an “exhaustion of political ideas” in the grand style of ideology—may indeed be regarded as the 
best theorization we have of the new liberal ethos. For Bell had been part of the same New York 
intellectual and new liberal milieu that witnessed hope for, and then profound disillusionment 
with, the Soviet Union, and by extension Marxism itself. Reviewing the political 
disappointments and traumas of the thirties and forties, including the Great Depression, the 
betrayal of the Russian Revolution’s hopes, and the Holocaust, Bell articulates new liberal 
intellectuals’ experience of these events precisely: “For the radical intellectual who had 
articulated the revolutionary impulses of the past century and a half, all this has meant an end to 
chiliastic hopes, to millenarianism, to apocalyptic thinking—and to ideology. For ideology, 
which once was a road to action, has come to be a dead end” (393). Disillusioned with all “final 
solutions” to perceived social problems, the new liberalism often envisioned itself less as a 
positive political program and more as a rejection of ideological thinking per se. 
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And the capstone work of Trilling’s “great decade,” The Liberal Imagination, may rightly 
be understood as a characteristically new liberal attack on ideological thinking in all its 
contemporary forms. While the book offers analyses of many seemingly disparate literary and 
cultural trends of the forties, beneath them all lies a single theme: contemporary liberalism—the 
“sole intellectual tradition” active in the United States, Trilling writes (vii)—precisely lacks 
imagination.29 It is crude and simplistic, devoted to a moralistic conception of life that denies 
ambiguity. In a word, it is ideological. Liberalism instead requires a sense of nuance, 
complication, and complexity. Thus the book’s opening essay on “Reality in America” famously 
attacks the popularity of V. L. Parrington and Theodore Dreiser as symptomatic of an 
impoverished conception of “reality” that moralizes rather than thinks; it instead urges that 
“reality” be understood as complex and conflicting. “Freud and Literature” presses a still-young 
psychoanalytic criticism to reject all-too-straightforward assumptions about how an author’s 
work reflects his or her unconscious mind. Rather, it counsels that art is to be understood as a 
conscious creation whose manifold and indirect means of affecting the world at large are not 
unlike those of the unconscious mind when influencing dreams. “The Kinsey Report” critiques 
the eponymous study of sexuality for understanding sexual behavior as a mere physical fact, and 
instead recommends that sexuality be comprehended in the wider context of its social, 
psychological, and indeed moral dimensions. The book as a whole, then, realizes Trilling’s 
critique of contemporary (“old”) liberalism as simplistic and recklessly moralizing—as 
                                                        
29 In his review of the book, Stephen Spender rightly questioned Trilling’s broad claim that there was no 
conservative intellectual tradition in American life; such a claim had blinded Trilling to the fruitfulness of 
conservatism’s own critique of liberalism, he argued (164-65). And indeed three years after The Liberal 
Imagination’s publication, as we have noted, Russell Kirk’s seminal tome The Conservative Mind would explicitly 
(and quite convincingly) rebut Trilling’s claim (476); Kirk argued that Trilling’s critique of the liberal mind had 
made the need for a revival of conservatism nothing short of self-evident (480). Trilling’s by no means solitary 
ignorance of the existence of conservative intellectual thought was then soon remedied by a tidal wave of 
conservative intellectual publication. For a comprehensive history of the postwar conservative intellectual 
movement, see Nash. 
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ideological, in short—where it instead needs to be complex and genuinely ethical. The book’s 
very title embodies its theme, yoking together in dialectical tension “the liberal” with its 
currently countervailing ideal of “imagination”—an imagination best embodied in literature, “the 
human activity that takes the fullest and most precise account” of the watchwords of new liberal 
politics: “variousness, possibility, complexity, and difficulty” (xiii). 
But if we are to understand one important terminus of New Class discourse in American 
thought and fiction, we must see that it was only through his post-Trotskyist meditations on an 
intellectual class that Trilling eventually created this critique of ideology, the essence of his 
thoroughly influential new liberal politics. To understand this historical connection, we may 
begin by noting more closely Daniel Bell’s explication of the central term in his End of Ideology. 
Bell begins by recalling Karl Mannheim’s distinction between particular and total ideology. The 
first could be defined as a finite set of beliefs derived from the particular “interests” of their 
holders, whether those interests were economic or more broadly political. It is “in this sense that 
we can talk of the ideology of business, or of labor, or the like,” Bell writes (399, emphasis in 
original). Particular ideology is thus a descendant of the historically Marxist understanding of 
ideology as an “attempt . . . to claim universal validity for what was in fact a class interest” 
(396). But Bell declares that total ideology, on the other hand, is the true focus of his thesis; total 
ideology is the ideology he refers to when claiming “The End of Ideology in the West” (393). 
More encompassing and mentally demanding than particular ideology, total ideology is an “all-
inclusive system of comprehensive reality . . . a set of beliefs, infused with passion, [that] seeks 
to transform the whole of a way of life” (400). Where particular ideology is a finite (often class-
based) set of interested social and political positions, and at least potentially knowable by its 
holders, total ideology is instead “a secular religion” that seems to possess its holders entirely, 
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without their conscious knowledge. Unlike particular ideology, total ideology is a kind of 
irrational faith, and therefore “is not necessarily the reflection of interests” (400, emphasis in the 
original).  
Bell’s invocation of Mannheim’s distinction is useful for many reasons, but here 
especially because it allows us to see that Trilling began his critical career in the late 1930s with 
a strong attention to something like the first, more Marxist type of ideology, where thought was a 
product of material (usually class) interest; and that he ended the 1940s concerned with 
something much closer to the second type of ideology, an “all-inclusive system of 
comprehensive reality” that needn’t be related to material interest at all. In a 1938 review of Dos 
Passos’ U.S.A. trilogy, for example, Trilling defends Dos Passos from the criticism of “radical 
admirers” like fellow-traveling critics T. K. Whipple and Malcolm Cowley. Such critics 
complained that for all his social observation, Dos Passos was in the end unconcerned with the 
struggle between classes. But Dos Passos had written about a class struggle, Trilling counters; 
such critics could not see this simply because their conception of “class” was unnecessarily 
limited. A “useful but often undetermined category of political and social thought,” class could 
mean one thing to the “political leader and the political theorist,” and another to “the novelist,” 
Trilling believed (“America” 108). For the (likely Marxist) political leader and theorist, class 
could be seen in “income-extremes or function-extremes” (107), and its importance was to be 
found in the impact of class consciousness on politics—“people’s perception that they are of one 
class or another and their resultant action” (108). But for the novelist, Trilling continues, class 
must also be an index of social “‘interest’—by which we must mean real interest (‘real will’ in 
the Rousseauian sense) and not what people say or think they want” (107-108, emphasis in 
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original).30 For the novelist, class implies not just income-level, but interests—a set of real if 
sometimes unconscious class-related desires. Accordingly, for the novelist “the interesting and 
suggestive things” about class “are likely to be the moral paradoxes that result from the conflict 
between real and apparent interest” (108), between what people say they want and what they 
actually, materially, want. While it was true that Dos Passos ignored the “external class 
struggle,” then, he had nevertheless succeeded in depicting the class struggle “within his 
characters” (108, emphasis added). Dos Passos had depicted the class struggle via characters 
caught between their genuine, largely unconscious class interests, and their openly stated desires. 
Thus Trilling’s relatively early conception of class, while already in flight from unimaginatively 
Marxist accounts, nevertheless balances, to use a Marxist idiom, an objective and a subjective 
component to class. For the young Trilling, class inheres in one’s wallet and in one’s thoughts, 
conscious or not. Class interest helped to create ideology, in short. 
And as we have seen, this fundamental connection between material existence and 
ideological thought persisted for Trilling throughout the late thirties and most of the forties. It 
shaped his understanding of “the intellectual class” he soon evoked in 1939’s “The Situation in 
American Writing.” If a year earlier he had championed Dos Passos’s fascination with characters 
whose stated desires contradict their underlying and active material interests, now Trilling 
explicitly saw the same contradiction in his own class, the intellectual class. Recall the passage 
discussed earlier: “What for me is so interesting in the intellectual middle class is the dramatic 
contradiction of its living with the greatest possibility (call it illusion) of conscious choice, its                                                         
30 Contrary to what Trilling implies here, Rousseau never uses the phrase “real will” himself. Trilling’s reference to 
“‘real will’ in the Rousseauian sense” actually refers to Bernard Bosanquet’s explication of Rousseau in his 
Philosophical Theory of the State, which Trilling takes care to cite and gloss in the more scholarly milieu of his 
Matthew Arnold: “Bosanquet calls the will acting with complete knowledge of the situation the real will; the will 
acting without this knowledge he calls the apparent will” (281, emphases in original). Thus Rousseau (via 
Bosanquet), along with Kant, Freud, and many others, is made an ancestor of Trilling’s obsession with individual 
and collective (class) self-deception. 
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believing itself the inheritor of the great humanist and rationalist tradition, and the badness and 
stupidity of its action” (“Situation” 120-21). In other words, while the intellectual class believes 
it exists beyond class interest, and chooses to act on behalf of a universal, “humanist and 
rational” good, it nevertheless self-servingly embraces a Stalinist ideology that might achieve its 
class and political power over capitalists and the working class alike. Thus, we will recall from 
1943’s E. M. Forster, the intellectual was “the most class-marked and class-bound of all men” 
(94). The intellectual was a social type determined in strong measure by his material position 
between—and consequent political disdain for—both the capitalists who control him and the 
working class to whom he condescends and for whom he speaks. As we have seen, too, 
Trilling’s belief in the effects of economic interest on intellectuals’ thought persisted even into 
his 1947 portrait of John Laskell’s political conversion upon discovery that liberalism could lead 
to a whole professional “school.” Throughout most of the forties, in short, Trilling retained an 
understanding of the intellectual class that offered both an objective and a subjective analysis, 
that understood ideas to be necessarily influenced by material interests. 
It is possible, however, to understand Trilling’s concept of the “masked will,” explicated 
in both 1947’s The Middle of the Journey and 1948’s essay on The Princess Casamassima, as a 
transitional term. For by using that term, Trilling theorized the political interests of his erstwhile 
intellectual class as a much more abstract will. In doing so he enabled that “will” to shed its class 
origins altogether, and eventually to emerge as a critique of an immaterial “ideology.” By the 
time of the later essays printed in The Liberal Imagination—“Art and Fortune” (1948) and “The 
Meaning of a Literary Idea” (1949) particularly—Trilling’s materialism, never strident in the 
first place, indeed visibly fades into a more abstract critique. In these late-forties essays Trilling 
first names the social problem of what he now explicitly calls “ideology,” and though it also 
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involves intellectual self-deception, it is clear that the problem exists above and beyond his 
earlier critique of an intellectual class. Ideas “have acquired a new kind of place in society,” 
Trilling begins.  
The increase of conscious formulation, the increase of a certain kind of 
consciousness by formulation, makes a fact of modern life which is never 
sufficiently estimated. . . . [that] politics, and not only politics but the 
requirements of a whole culture, make verbal and articulate the motive of every 
human act: we eat by reason, copulate by statistics, rear children by rule . . . (258) 
But if intellectuals were once the principal source of ideas, in the modern era the life of such 
“ideas”—“or, to be more accurate, [of] ideology”—is no longer limited “to avowed 
intellectuals.” It extends instead to “the simplest person” (258). Ideological thought is no longer 
the property of an intellectual class, but is in fact something universal.  
What exactly is “ideology,” this thing shared by intellectuals and “the simplest person” 
alike? Ideology is not merely the set of ideas by which ordinary people live their daily lives, by 
which they eat, copulate, and raise children. In fact, it ought not to be confused with ideas at all: 
“Ideology is not ideas; ideology is not acquired by thought but by breathing the haunted air” 
(259), Trilling observes poetically. Ideology is instead simply “the habit or the ritual of showing 
respect for certain formulas to which, for various reasons having to do with emotional safety, we 
have very strong ties of whose meaning and consequences in actuality we have no clear 
understanding” (269). The “consequences” of these passionately held, formulaic pseudo-ideas 
could be vast and malign in Trilling’s view. “To live the life of ideology with its special form of 
consciousness,” after all, “is to expose oneself to the risk of becoming an agent of what Kant 
called ‘the Radical Evil,’ which is ‘man’s inclination to corrupt the imperatives of morality so 
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that they may become a screen for the expression of self-love’” (259). Not simply the ideas of 
“the simplest person” about eating, copulating, and raising children, ideology is in fact a set of 
self-serving mental formulae that may sanction the gravest of moral consequences. 
If we look closely, we can still see the specific dangers of Stalinist purges and gulags 
lurking beneath Trilling’s invocation of “Radical Evil,” a corrupt pseudo-morality rooted in the 
pseudo-ideas of (Marxist) “ideology.”31 But it’s nevertheless clear that in these late essays from 
The Liberal Imagination, “ideology” is to be understood not as the thought of an intellectual 
class influenced by its material interests—as Trilling had earlier conceived of Stalinism, for 
example in his Dos Passos essay—but as ultimately classless thought now derived from “the 
haunted air” itself (259), in Trilling’s pretty but mystifying phrase. It suffers not from economic 
self-interest but from such universal psychological defects as a longing for “emotional safety” 
and “self-love” (269, 259). And if the results of such poor thinking are clearly dire, as a concept 
“Radical Evil” nevertheless lacks, like “ideology” itself, both determinate content and 
determinate cause. In other words, by the time of these late-forties essays the vague but 
universalized conception of “ideology” as secular religion had papered over the more distinct, 
limited, and engaged concern of Trilling’s youth, that of the politics of intellectual work and 
intellectual workers. Over the course of a decade the still at least partly Marxist origins of 
Trilling’s description of thought rooted in intellectual class interest had been negated and then 
synthesized (as it were) into something closer to Bell’s broadest conception of an “ideology” free                                                         
31 We might see a reference to Hitler’s Holocaust as well. But the book contains only one direct reference to the 
Holocaust (249), while Stalin and more generally a debased form of Marxism absolutely permeates the concerns of 
The Liberal Imagination. And even if we interpret the phrase “Radical Evil” as an oblique reference to the 
Holocaust, we should remember that the Holocaust, too, could be seen as one of the sins of the intellectual class: as 
we saw in the previous chapter, the theory of a “bureaucratic collectivism” governed by a New Class was used to 
explain Nazi evils as much as Soviet ones. 
The Liberal Imagination’s one reference to the Holocaust perhaps speaks to the cause of Trilling’s curious 
silence about the issue, relatively speaking: “the great psychological fact of our time which we all observe with 
baffled wonder and shame is that there is no possible way of responding to Belsen and Buchenwald. The activity of 
mind fails before the incommunicability of man’s suffering” (249). 
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of class interests, an abstract but powerful and vast “secular religion” that seeks to transform the 
world. 
This de-materialization and expansion of Trilling’s concepts is of course in keeping with 
his cast of mind more generally, which has often been faulted for its abstraction. Critics of 
Trilling’s novel were among the first to criticize this tendency toward the nebulous in Trilling’s 
work. In the New Yorker, J. M. Lalley felt that the characters of The Middle of the Journey “seem 
to have no objective existence” and would likely “vanish from the universe should Laskell cease 
to think about them” (126); while in the New York Times Orville Prescott called the story 
“entirely bare of warmth and life.” Robert Warshow’s review in Commentary, to my mind the 
most penetratingly observant of the novel’s faults, called Trilling to account for being “removed 
from experience as experience” (543, emphasis in original). The novel’s characters exist in a 
“void of moral abstractions, without a history,” and its plot takes “the form of an intellectual 
discussion [merely] reinforced by events” (545). Rather than discussing politics politically, 
Trilling “makes it appear as if the surrender to Stalinism or its rejection was mainly a matter of 
philosophical decision” (543). Critics of his novel thus recognized Trilling’s tendency toward 
sometimes bloodless generalities. 
In a similar and often more directly political vein, even sympathetic reviewers of The 
Liberal Imagination nevertheless regretted that central terms like “liberal” and  “liberalism” went 
almost wholly undefined in the book. Indeed, in Trilling’s hands, the terms seemed to lack any 
political reference whatsoever. Thus while admiring the book overall, Irving Howe could rightly 
note that Trilling’s work ignored liberalism’s essential connection to capitalism, instead reducing 
liberalism to a mere habit of mind (“Liberalism” 155-56). More recently, Morris Dickstein has 
observed that for Trilling the word “liberalism” has “very little in common with the usual 
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economic, administrative, and electoral meanings” (“Critics” 378). Rather, he speculates that 
“‘liberalism’ is a code word for Stalinism” in the book, one “that relocates the debate on 
higher”—i.e. non-material—“ground and indicts a whole set of assumptions about progress, 
rationality, and political commitment” (378, emphasis in original). As should be clear, I agree 
with Dickstein’s sense that Trilling’s “liberalism” is often a sweeping circumlocution for the 
more specific “Stalinism.” In fact, as we have seen, one of Trilling’s most important abstractions 
(“masked will”) is historically rooted in a specific post-Trotskyist analysis of Stalinism as the 
political thought of an intellectual class. But such a genealogy of the concrete political origins of 
Trilling’s thought should not be made to obscure a larger truth, namely that the central terms of 
Trilling’s maturity—capacious terms like “liberalism” and indeed “ideology” itself—in practice 
lacked the material and political weight they claimed to invoke. 
If Trilling has been noted both then and now for his particularly abstract habits of mind, 
however, it’s important to remember that they were not his alone. Partly due to his influence, 
they were often those of the new liberalism itself. And here we may see in Trilling’s career a 
central irony in twentieth-century American intellectual history. For I would argue that the new 
liberalism’s particularly abstract conception of “ideology” may ironically be recognized as the 
ideology—in a more traditionally Marxist sense—of a significant portion of that intellectual 
class that Trilling attempted to describe early on. This was so in two ways. First, the idealist 
character of the concept of “ideology,” the idea’s removal from concrete social existence, may be 
understood as a characteristic product of specifically intellectual labor—that is to say, of labor 
performed by a growing class of workers paid to create and manipulate abstractions. Producers 
of abstractions are trained to apprehend reality in abstract terms, and the new liberal conception 
of a vast and vague “ideology” (leading to a vast and vague “Radical Evil,” for Trilling) is a 
 152 
prime example of this phenomenon. In The Future of the Intellectuals and the Rise of the New 
Class, a much later entry in the annals of New Class theory, Alvin Gouldner suggests something 
similar about intellectuals’ use of language. The “situation-free character of [the New Class’s] 
language,” he charges, “dulls its sensitivity to the uniqueness of different situations” (86). As a 
result, “Its talents for political tactics . . . are inferior to its capacity for diagnosis and strategy. 
The New Class’s political skills are limited also by its theoreticity, which generally sours it for 
action and impairs its sensitivity to the feelings and reactions of others” (86, emphases in the 
original). The new liberal conception of “ideology” fits Gouldner’s description of the New 
Class’s “situation-free” language to a tee. It was perhaps useful for “diagnosis” of an intellectual 
problem at the heart of bad politics, but certainly not for imagining “tactics” that would combat 
the problem of grandiose abstraction via material means. The product of an ascendant class of 
intellectual workers who dwelt in abstractions, “ideology” was a term distinctly limited by its 
“theoreticity,” its inability to recognize the sociopolitical importance of the intellectual workers 
who produced the concept in the first place. The new liberalism’s influential conception of 
“ideology” whisked intellectuals’ thoughts away from their own social labor and class interests, 
and into Trilling’s “haunted air.” 
This turn away from the concrete also marks the second way in which the fifties’ 
conception of “ideology” might be understood as ideological in a traditionally Marxist sense. For 
the concept’s ethereal nature obscured intellectuals’ power and interests not only from 
themselves, but from the public at large. It allowed intellectuals to speak about ideas as if they 
were neutral brokers, hiding the fact of their specific class interests and alignments from both 
capitalists above and—perhaps more importantly, given “ideology’s” frequent critical use in the 
fifties and sixties as a code-word for any form of socialist belief—proletarians below. To turn 
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Trilling’s concepts on himself and his new liberal peers from a left perspective, we might say 
that the concept of “ideology” was itself a weapon of the intellectual class’s “masked will.” As 
new liberal intellectuals in particular gained financial security and social status, their 
characteristically idealist critique of “ideology” served to obscure their material politics—an 
increasingly anti-liberal, pro-business politics—from fellow intellectuals and all other political 
players. It was a term that could function, in the words of The Middle of the Journey, “to make 
[intellectuals’] wills appear harmless” (324). In sum, the vastly influential new liberal discourse 
of “ideology” in the fifties might be understood as the new liberal intellectuals’ misrecognition, 
and then social mystification, of both the growing importance and the increasingly conservative 
politics of their own intellectual labor and class existence. In this way, the concept of 
“ideology”—so adamant in its rejection of blind political thought—was ironically the largely 
unknowing class ideology of no small portion of intellectuals in the American mid-century. The 
irony is only more rich when we consider that the concept’s origins, in Trilling’s case at least, 
lay in explicit reflections on the politics of an intellectual class. 
Thus the New Class motif in what I have called American “intellectual labor fiction” 
found one of its ends in the “anti-ideological” politics of Trilling’s new liberalism. Mutating 
from its origins in Slesinger’s despairing satire of an intellectual class merely playing with 
Communism, through McCarthy’s darker observation of intellectuals’ potential to embrace the 
bureaucratic collectivism of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, the concept of an intellectual 
class became in Trilling’s hands solely a means of strident abuse. He imagined the intellectual 
class as the mass manifestation of a “masked will” that promoted intellectuals’ economic 
interests while somewhat cynically claiming pious intentions toward the working class. And 
from such a critique Trilling was ultimately able to fashion his influential conception of 
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“ideology,” the new liberal and indeed often antileftist critique of crude political thought per se. 
That powerful new concept came at a high price. By separating “ideology” from his original 
analysis of a growing intellectual class, Trilling, and all who learned this from him, lost the 
ability to intelligently comprehend and then perhaps change a society and culture increasingly 
driven by intellectual labor and intellectual workers. Ironically, Trilling had helped expand the 
New Class theme so broadly that for many—even and especially tragically those on the left—a 
simple allusion to the perils of “ideology” in politics now sufficed to forestall any serious 
discussion of class and class structure in America. Despite Slesinger and McCarthy’s early 
attempts to psychoanalyze intellectuals as a class, we might say, class unconsciousness reigned 
again. For most intellectuals, the latent content of their own class interests was now manifest 
only in a displaced obsession with “ideology.” 
It has been said, not infrequently and with some justice, that this “end of ideology” ethos 
led directly to the distinctly postmodern discomfort with “totalizing” explanations of social 
reality (if not with “reality” itself).32 What the history of Trilling’s contribution to the “end of 
ideology” moment suggests, then, is that one ultimately conservative genealogy of 
postmodernism might run from the Trotskyist critique of bureaucratic collectivism, to mistrust of 
intellectual radicalism tout court, to the “end of ideology,” and thence to an apolitical or at best 
class-unconscious liberal postmodernism. And I would note too that the “ideology” concept’s 
forgetting of its own origins in specific concerns about (intellectual) workers and class—a 
forgetting no doubt also materially shaped by the historical disappointments of the laborist left in 
this period, as well as outright McCarthyist repression—provides one essential explanation of 
how postmodernism’s roots in the radical left’s New Class idea of the thirties and forties, as well                                                         
32 E.g. Fredric Jameson, who writes that “in general, full postmodernism (particularly in the political field) has 
turned out to be the sequel, continuation, and fulfillment of the old fifties ‘end of ideology’ episode” 
(Postmodernism 263).  
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as its (intellectual) class significance more generally, could remain unnoticed for so long. But as 
we shall see in Part II, if the New Class idea was sometimes simply lost to the discourse of 
“ideology,” this was not always the case. For the concept’s materialist reflections on intellectual 
labor did not die—not even in Trilling’s own work. On the contrary, the meditations on 
intellectual workers as a class we have been tracing in Part I were sometimes transformed into 
the more institutional meditations on the bureaucratization of intellectual labor we shall examine 
in Part II. Encapsulated by the rebirth of the campus novel in the fifties, this institutional critique 
of bureaucratic intellectual labor—the more mainstream byproduct of the radical left’s earlier 
fears of a class of intellectual workers tempted by the “bureaucratic collectivism” of the Soviet 
Union—was in fact integral to the emergence of the American “postmodern” novel in the sixties 
and beyond.
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Part II 
 
The Groves of Postmodernism, 1943-1962 
 
 
 
 
“Doctor Leonard. The Black Sheep need a mouthpiece of their own. We want a 
chance to speak. . . . We feel that college students don’t live in glass houses, the 
campus is a miniature fascist state, run by the same lousy factors that the outside 
world is run by.” 
—Tess Slesinger, The Unpossessed (1934) 
 
Even if you have a dialectic instinct—and I do not undertake to judge this—it is 
well-nigh stifled by academic routine . . . 
—Leon Trotsky, “An Open Letter to Comrade Burnham” (January 7, 1940)
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Interlude 
 
A Theory of the Campus Novel 
 
 
Generally thought of as a harmless if perhaps still guilty pleasure, the American campus 
novel is a popular genre that has garnered only modest critical attention or respect. John Lyons’ 
The College Novel in America (1962), the first book-length study, set the tone by opening with 
an annoyed remark about the genre’s “general lack of excellence” (xiii). More recent studies 
have explored the genre with greater respect, but still underestimate both its literary and its social 
importance. Kenneth Womack’s Postwar Academic Fiction (2002) presents the genre as one 
whose primary concerns include “the academy and the hegemony of its institutions, the 
questionable morality of its denizens, and the fractured philosophical underpinnings of its 
mission” (19). Though the book occasionally discusses the social or political aims underlying a 
particular novel, its focus on an “ethical” humanist criticism tends to reduce the campus novel to 
a repository of moral lessons and ignore its sociopolitical meanings as a genre. Elaine 
Showalter’s chatty and informative Faculty Towers (2005) likewise presents itself as a “personal 
take” (13), and understands the genre chiefly as a form of “narcissistic pleasure” for academics 
(1). In her book the campus novel thus serves to document professors’ experiences across the 
decades. In short, criticism on the campus novel has generally depicted it as a genre isolated 
from the mainstream of literary history, and lacking in any social significance much broader than 
that of the academy itself.1 
In Part II of this dissertation I hope to show to the contrary that the campus novel has 
played an important role in postwar American literary history, and one more socially significant 
                                                        
1 Scholarly discussion of academic novels in the British context similarly views academic fiction as representative of 
no more than the academy itself. See Carter and Rossen, for example, both of which use British academic fiction to 
examine the classed and gendered realities of British university life. 
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than has been recognized. In part, the importance of these novels in literary history is due simply 
to their merit. Mary McCarthy’s The Groves of Academe (1952), Randall Jarrell’s Pictures from 
an Institution (1954), Vladimir Nabokov’s Pnin (1957) and Pale Fire (1962), Saul Bellow’s 
Herzog (1964), John Barth’s The End of the Road (1958) and Giles Goat-Boy (1966), E. L. 
Doctorow’s The Book of Daniel (1971), Alison Lurie’s The War Between the Tates (1974), Don 
DeLillo’s White Noise (1985), Jane Smiley’s Moo (1995), and Richard Russo’s Straight Man 
(1997) might all be called campus novels. All are well-crafted, and some are brilliant and already 
canonical. But even if this were not the case, I still would argue that the campus novel should be 
accorded a significant place in any history of postwar American fiction and culture. For the 
campus novel is far from being merely a quaint genre about the behavior of professors. It is, as I 
will suggest in this Interlude, a genre profoundly representative of and inseparable from the 
service economy of predominantly mental labor that has defined postwar American life. Part II 
as a whole will argue moreover that the campus novel of the 1950s and 1960s created an 
important space for the development and emergence of postmodern literature. Looking at the 
wide sweep of academic novels’ history from the early nineteenth century onward, then, this 
Interlude offers a theory of the postwar campus novel’s social causes and meanings, one that will 
provide important literary-historical and sociological context for the analyses of American 
academic fiction that follow in Chapters Four through Six. 
It is standard to discuss the campus novel, much like the mainframe business computer 
and the TV dinner, as an invention of the 1950s. In an article on the topic for The Guardian, 
Aida Edemariam remarks simply that “the campus novel began in America,” and then cites such 
works of the fifties as McCarthy’s The Groves of Academe, Jarrell’s Pictures from an Institution, 
and Nabokov’s Pnin. While Showalter’s book acknowledges that novels about academic life had 
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been written earlier, she nevertheless asserts the conventional wisdom too when she remarks that 
“the genre has arisen and flourished only since about 1950” (1). But scholarship on the campus 
novel would do better to begin by giving full weight to the fact that novels about academic life 
were written well before the fifties. John Kramer’s annotated bibliography of the “American 
college novel” in fact begins with Nathaniel Hawthorne’s first and ultimately disowned novel 
about Bowdoin College, 1828’s Fanshawe. So I will begin by drawing a distinction between the 
“academic novel” more generally—any and all novels about academic life, with an American 
history spanning nearly two centuries—and the campus novel specifically, which is best 
understood, I will argue, as a subset of academic novels that arose in the 1950s. 
The history of the academic novel in America may be roughly divided into four eras. 
According to Kramer’s bibliography, after Hawthorne academic novels appeared throughout the 
nineteenth century only sporadically. Most of the nineteenth century thus constitutes a first, 
sparse era in the production of American academic novels. Yet at some point the output jumped, 
and then grew: Kramer discusses a “first great wave” of novels about undergraduates in the 
1880s and 1890s (xv), and Lyons, writing in the sixties, remarks that “since 1925 there has been 
a spring tide” of college novels more generally (180). The graph below justifies both scholars’ 
observations, and may help us further see phases of the academic novel in America. Using 
Kramer’s attempt at an “exhaustive” (x) bibliography of the “American college novel”—novels 
about American academic life—I have charted the number of such novels published over the 
course of the century starting in 1880. Though counting novels set on campus cannot be an act of 
absolute precision, and this particular illustration relies on Kramer’s judgment of what 
constitutes an “American college novel,” as well as his skill in finding examples, the chart may 
nevertheless accurately suggest trends: 
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Figure 1: Publication of American College Novels in America, 1880-1979 (Five-Year Totals, 
Derived from Kramer 2004)2 
 
Kramer’s “first great wave”—what I would call the start of the second era of the academic 
novel—is represented in the ascent from 1880-1904. Lyons’s “spring tide” of novels since 
1925—the third era—is represented by a high plateau on which the academic novel remained for 
about three decades. Last but not least, the graph also offers considerable evidence for the 
conventional wisdom that the campus novel began in the 1950s, as the latter half of that decade 
                                                        
2 For the numerical information depicted in the charts for this Introduction, I have used Kramer’s updated 
bibliography of 2004, rather than the 1981 edition. In addition to examining novels written since the original, the 
2004 edition adds slightly to the number of novels from the time period covered in 1981. But for all other citations 
to Kramer (those in prose) I have used the 1981 edition, which offers both more fulsome descriptions of the novels 
covered, and some valuable observations on methodology. 
Kramer discusses his method of determining what counts as an “American college novel” on pages x-xiii. 
For the purpose of drawing any conclusions from this data about Americans’ particular experience of American 
higher education, it should be noted that Kramer’s definition of the “American college novel” is based on the 
novel’s content, rather than its author’s citizenship or national experience, or even the novel’s place of publication: 
he is tracking novels about an American college, and not necessarily “American” novels about college. For example, 
he includes David Lodge’s Changing Places, a novel written by a British author, but satirizing American university 
life in part. Non-American authors like Lodge are exceptional to the genre as Kramer defines it, however. The vast 
majority of novels about American higher education—over 400 of the 425 novels listed by Kramer in 1981, 
according to my count—have been written by Americans who lived in the United States all their lives, so Kramer’s 
bibliography may still yield useful information about the trends of Americans’ interest in writing, publishing, and 
even (assuming some rough correlation between production and consumption) reading campus novels. 
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marks a third spurt of publishing growth for such novels. The campus novel is the fourth era of 
the academic novel in America.3 
What accounts for these periods of growth, and the growth of academic novels in general 
since Hawthorne’s first effort? It is common, and reasonable, to tie the growth of academic 
novels to the growth of American higher education itself. Kramer’s “first great wave” in the 
1880s and ’90s certainly coincides, perhaps unsurprisingly, with the first great wave of American 
universities, and the overall growth in American higher education that accompanied them. Lyons 
in turn ascribes the growth of academic novels in the 1920s mostly to “the growth of college 
enrollments after the First World War” (180). And Showalter voices the standard explanation 
when she notes that the mid-century campus novel arose “when American universities were 
growing rapidly, first to absorb the returning veterans, and then to take in a larger and larger 
percentage of the baby-booming population” (1). Novels about academic life, these critics 
collectively argue, have kept pace with the growth of higher education itself, a phenomenon 
measurable in rising enrollment numbers. 
But while such quantitative observations certainly help explain individual periods of the 
academic novel’s growth, they should play only a part—and indeed a comparatively small part—
in understanding the significance of such novels’ proliferation in the “long” twentieth century. A 
fuller and more suggestive explanation for the growth of the American academic novel must also 
be qualitative. More specifically, I would argue that the academic novel’s significance and 
popularity ought to be set against higher education’s role in the rise of professional labor during 
the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. We may now rehearse that history in brief. 
                                                        
3 Focused on the campus novel alone, the chart does not take into account the concomitant growth of published 
fiction as a whole; and some of the increase in published campus novels may reflect growth in the publishing 
industry overall. Nevertheless, the increases shown here are too large to not represent growth in the genre itself 
relative to published fiction as a whole. 
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The Industrial Revolution that swept the country in the 1800s, and especially after the Civil War, 
required educated workers. Engineers were needed to design the machines which replaced craft 
labor, architects to design the factories which housed increasingly “deskilled” workers, 
accountants to keep track of now-complicated books, and managers to keep the ever more 
intricate enterprise running. Doctors and nurses were needed to handle the new-born and sick of 
an exponentially expanding population, journalists and editors to accompany the new printing 
presses, lawyers and more lawyers to handle the increased commerce and wealth. The middle 
classes took advantage of these needs, organizing collectively into professions. The new jobs 
required specialized skills, they argued, and these skills could only be learned and then taught by 
experts, the “professionals” who would keep track of developments in these complicated fields.4 
Their argument prevailed, and the institutional winners were universities, which emerged 
in greater numbers after the Civil War. These American universities, created largely by either 
wealthy philanthropists or state legislatures, and staffed by professors themselves arrayed in 
various professional associations, would serve to create a pool of experts who could train the 
middle class in the specialized skills required by the new economy. These universities were soon 
joined by a tide of “university colleges” that formed in order to feed undergraduates into the 
university’s professional programs. (Colleges of the older, self-contained type often re-formed in 
order to suit the new hierarchy.) Thus, as Burton Bledstein has argued, over the course of the 
nineteenth century “higher education emerged as the seminal institution within the culture of 
professionalism” (121).5 
                                                        
4 On the material bases of the emergent professions, see Larson, especially 1-18, Bledstein 8-39, and Mills 65-70. 
On “deskilling,” see Braverman.  
5 Veysey still remains the standard source for understanding the creation of American universities, though Bledstein 
287-331 sheds some light as well. On the transformation of the old colleges into “university colleges” that 
conformed to university standards, see Jencks and Riesman 20-27, and Bledstein 248-86. 
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This “academic revolution,” as Christopher Jencks and David Riesman famously named 
it, along with the rise in professionalism it facilitated, had profound effects on the American 
class structure. Bledstein emphasizes the “vertical vision” of professionalism as a social form of 
labor. Displacing “horizontal” discourses of solidarity within and even between classes, the 
notion of the profession shaped middle-class ambitions into the form of a “career,” where one 
struggled only upward within the profession itself (105-20). Magali Larson likewise emphasizes 
professionalism’s promotion of “democratic elitism” (243)—an ideology that believes 
democratic society requires the expertise of professional elites in order to benefit society as a 
whole. The ideological work of professionalism, she suggests, is to legitimize social inequality 
by suggesting that expert credentials, gained only via an often expensive education, are the sole 
index of ability per se (237-44). Higher education—with its student competition for grades in 
order to gain better employment, and its familiar hierarchy of professors, seemingly misnamed 
from assistant (to whom?) to associate (of whom?) to “full” (as opposed to quarter or half?)—
thus trains ever more students not only in the specialized skills required for their economic 
advancement, but in the career-oriented values and culture of professionalism itself (200-201). 
Hence the academic revolution meant that institutions of higher education became increasingly 
central to the class structure of America, even as they obscured that structure with a discourse of 
“meritocracy.”6  
This relationship of post-Civil War higher education to class structure, I would argue, 
provides a better and more fundamental explanation of the academic novel’s proliferation from 
the 1880s onward than does the essentially superstructural phenomenon of growing enrollments. 
                                                        
6 The whole of Larson’s masterful last chapter, 208-44, details the ideological work of professionalism; Bledstein 
121-28 also explains the particular importance of higher education to this ideology. More satisfied with the trend of 
“democratic elitism” than Larson, Jencks and Riesman prefer to call it “meritocracy”; see their Academic Revolution 
8-12, as well as the scattered remarks throughout the rest of the text as noted in the book’s index. 
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The American academic novel’s growth, in other words, has been ineluctably tied to the 
professional and class aspirations that have worried and inspired institutions of higher education 
since the end of the nineteenth century. The academic novel flowered in the twentieth century as 
a response not merely to the sheer size of American higher education, but to higher education’s 
central role in American hopes for upward mobility. From the 1880s onward, the academic novel 
in America has served as a significant cultural index of higher education’s growing centrality to 
the “American dream” itself. 
The post-Civil War rise of professionalism may furthermore help explain an important 
thematic trend of the academic novel. Dedicated to the idea that expertise can only be recognized 
and monitored by other experts, a profession is typically understood as a “colleague-oriented” 
occupation: the professional is only answerable to other professionals.7 The impact of such an 
orientation on the academic novel may be measured at least partially by the success of Kramer’s 
synchronic organizing principle, which separates American college novels—most of them 
“easily” (xii), he says—into one of two categories, the “student-centered” or the “staff-centered.” 
The academic novel, in short, typically depicts either undergraduate life or faculty and 
administrative life, and rarely both. No matter how much they are concerned to satirize higher 
education, then, such novels have nevertheless conformed to higher education’s professional, 
colleague-oriented workplace. Generally wedded to the preconceptions of professionalism, the 
academic novel’s representation of higher education dutifully separates professionals (faculty 
and administration) from their clients (students). 
Thus the academic novel in America has registered both the remarkable growth of 
universities and colleges over the past 125 years, and the inextricably related class characteristics 
of the age of professionalism. But if the American academic novel has in actuality existed for                                                         
7 See Jencks and Riesman 201-02, and Larson 226, for example. 
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well over a century, what of the common understanding that the campus novel dates from the 
comparatively recent 1950s? How are we to explain this? We have seen that the sheer quantity of 
academic novels produced in the 1950s, and especially since 1955, explains some part of it (Fig. 
1). But the academic novel had already experienced comparable periods of growth in the 1890s 
and 1920s, as we have seen too. Mere growth, then, is not enough to explain the common 
conception that the campus novel arose in the 1950s. However, if we look at Kramer’s 
bibliography once more, utilizing the distinction between student-centered and staff-centered 
academic novels, we may make a final set of quantitative observations about the academic novel 
that will help answer the question. As Figure 2 shows, starting in the 1920s—the third era—
academic novelists began to pay steadily more attention to the staff of colleges and universities, 
and by the 1950s—the fourth era—they (or at least their publishers) were demonstrably more 
interested in staff than students: 
 
Figure 2: Publication of Student- and Staff-Centered Academic Novels, 1880-1979 (Five-
Year Totals, Derived from Kramer 2004) 
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While the common perception of the campus novel’s origins in the 1950s is undoubtedly 
corroborated by one of the academic novel’s three main surges in publication, then, what chiefly 
distinguishes the fifties from the rest is an epochal shift in the composition of academic novels. 
For as we can see in Figure 3’s depiction of proportional emphasis over time, the 1950s marks 
the academic novel’s transformation from a primarily student-centered to a primarily staff-
centered genre: 
 
Figure 3: Percentage Publication of Student- vs. Staff-Centered Academic Novels, 1880-
1979 (Derived from Figure 2) 
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Professorromane” (2).8 The student-centered novel, so dominant in “early days,” has now faded 
to an aside in our imagination of novels about academic life. When we speak of academic novels 
today, we most often refer to the Professorromane—the campus novels—that came to dominate 
the academic novel in the 1950s, at the start of its fourth era.  
It should be noted that the academic novel’s postwar focus on faculty and administrators 
holds true despite conditions that might have been comparatively unfavorable for it. It holds true 
despite the skyrocketing enrollments of undergraduates in the 1940s and 1950s under the G. I. 
Bill, which provided a free education for nearly eight million veterans (Davis 191), and which 
numerically dwarfed increases in faculty hiring during this same period. It holds true also for the 
1960s and 1970s, when countercultural or otherwise rebellious students may well have offered 
more tempting material than faculty and “establishment” administrators.9  
What then accounts for the academic novel’s in some ways improbable shift in emphasis 
from student to staff? Decisive for the emerging dominance of the postfifties Professorroman, I 
think, is a phenomenon related to but distinct from the broader rise of professionalism that 
underwrote the academic novel as a whole in the twentieth century: the emergence of a society 
increasingly grounded in intellectual labor employed by large bureaucratic organizations. C. 
Wright Mills has described the shift in his 1951 classic White Collar. As “big business and big 
government” grew larger in the twentieth century, coordinating goods and services on a larger 
scale (68), with them grew the number of managers and other “middle-men” (mostly men) who 
coordinated, and the number of office workers (here were the women, increasingly) who 
coordinated the coordination. These personnel were mental workers in the broadest sense; their                                                         
8 Cf. Robert F. Scott’s similar remark in 1994 that “students do not often figure prominently in academic novels” 
(84), a statement that surely would have puzzled prewar observers. Showalter notes that she has borrowed the term 
Professorromane from Richard G. Caram’s 1980 dissertation on campus novels, “The Secular Priests.” 
9 In fact, interest in the counterculture likely explains the brief resurgence of the student-centered novel in the late 
sixties, as seen in Figures 2 and 3. 
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multiplication meant that “as a proportion of the labor force, fewer individuals manipulate 
things, more handle people and symbols” (65, emphases in original).  
Taken as a whole, these white-collar people were different from their middle-class 
predecessors. If the old middle class of the nineteenth century had consisted of mostly small and 
independent regional entrepreneurs, the twentieth century’s new middle class consisted mainly of 
office workers and salaried professionals who were hired by, and dependent on, the large 
organizations that now provided goods and (more and more) services on a national scale. In 
Mills’s pungent metaphors, the new white-collar people constituted a “managerial demiurge” 
that facilitated the increasingly bureaucratic organization of American social and political life. A 
middle-class Leviathan, these workers collectively made up a “great salesroom,” an “enormous 
file,” and even a “Brains, Inc.” where millions of subordinate employees each performed, and 
conformed, to some specialized task necessary to maximize efficiency in the system as a whole. 
William H. Whyte famously depicted this dependent worker of the new middle class as a passive 
and mediocre “organization man,” a figure visible in all sectors of middle-class life: 
The corporation man is the most conspicuous example, but he is only one, for the 
collectivization so visible in the corporation has affected almost every field of work. 
Blood brother to the business trainee off to join Du Pont is the seminary student who 
will end up in the church hierarchy, the doctor headed for the corporate clinic, the 
physics Ph.D. in a government laboratory, the intellectual on the foundation-
sponsored team project, the engineering graduate in the huge drafting room at 
Lockheed, the young apprentice in a Wall Street law factory. (3) 
Embracing a “Social Ethic” opposed to the “Protestant Ethic” of yore, the Organization Man—I 
will capitalize the term to refer specifically to Whyte’s imagining of this social type—believed 
 169 
that the individual must subordinate himself to the group; he lived in suburbia and never openly 
disagreed with his superiors. Thus the middle-class trend had run from the nineteenth century’s 
self-directed entrepreneur to the twentieth century’s bureaucratic and comparatively passive 
Organization Man.10 
 Significantly for the history of the campus novel, these influential theorists felt that 
ominous changes in the character of higher education had contributed to the creation of the 
Organization Man. The colleges were turning into “organization” institutions, Whyte lamented, 
and “at the same time that the colleges have been changing their curriculum to suit the 
corporation, the corporation has responded by setting up its own campuses and classrooms. By 
now the two have been so well molded that it’s difficult to tell where one leaves off and the other 
begins” (63). Curricula, and the students who learned from them, were becoming more 
specialized every year as courses became less intellectual and more technical, and students 
turned away from the humanistic knowledge of the liberal arts (78-100). Academic scientists 
were increasingly under the sway of government money offered for specialized and applied 
rather than basic research (217-219). Mills argued that “in the social studies and the humanities,” 
too, “the attempt to imitate exact science narrows the mind to microscopic fields of inquiry, 
rather than expanding it to embrace man and society as a whole” (131). A narrow kind of 
entrepreneurial instinct had ironically become revived within the bureaucratic universities, Mills 
believed. A certain type of academic was now much like Whyte’s career-oriented Organization 
Man: “This type of man is able to further his career in the university by securing prestige and 
small-scale powers outside of it” in research foundations and the like (135). In many respects, 
these critics warned, the professor was now a prototypical Organization Man, going along to get                                                         
10 For the economic background of this shift, see Mills 63-76; Whyte details the “ideology” of his Organization Man 
in Part I of his book, 3-59. For an excellent work of literary criticism on the role of the Organization Man in mid-
twentieth-century American literature, see Hoberek’s Twilight of the Middle Class, especially the Introduction. 
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along in a large bureaucratic institution that rewarded group-oriented mediocrity rather than 
individual insight.11 
 In any case the professor was certainly a professional engaged in mental labor, employed 
by a large and bureaucratic organization. I would thus argue that campus novelists of the fifties 
could easily make the professor symbolic of broader occupational trends of the professional 
middle class. The academic claim to love pure knowledge alone, independent of worldly interest, 
offered a heightened irony. For, as Larson notes, “the ethics of disinterestedness claimed by 
professionals [at first] appear to acquit them of the capitalist profit motive” (xiii). Thus the 
campus novelist, just as much as the social critic, could use the stereotypes of a scholarly 
“calling” and academic disinterest to put the sometimes coarse actualities of bureaucratic 
professional work in sharp, satiric relief. Janice Rossen accordingly suggests that “All novels 
about academic life and work exploit the tension between [the] two poles of idealism and 
competition, or scholarship as a means to an end and as an end in itself” (140). David Lodge, a 
critic and famed practitioner of the campus novel—the creator of the character Morris Zapp, 
whose foremost ambition in several novels is to be the best-paid professor of English in the 
world—agrees: “The high ideals of the university as an institution—the pursuit of knowledge 
and truth . . . are set against the actual behaviour and motivations of the people who work in 
them, who are only human and subject to the same ignoble desires and selfish ambitions as 
anybody else. The contrast is perhaps more ironic, more marked, than it would be in any other 
                                                        
11 Whyte spends his seventh and eighth chapters, 78-109, discussing the mutually destructive influence of business 
and higher education upon each other, as business demands specialization of higher education, and higher education 
gladly obliges for the sake of research funding. Mills discusses “the bureaucratic context” of academic work in 
several sections, most notably 129-36 and 151-52; he discusses intellectuals and intellectuals’ work more generally 
in his seventh chapter, “Brains, Inc.,” 142-60. 
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professional milieu” (qtd. in Edemariam).12 The campus novel has in short frequently traded on 
the contrast between high professional ideals and low competitive impulses. 
But it is not true, pace Rossen, that all novels about academic life exploit a tension 
between idealism and careerism; and likewise it is not true that the contrast between these two 
ideals had always been socially “marked” in academic fiction, as Lodge’s extemporaneous 
comment might be taken to imply. In fact, Kramer’s annotated bibliography notes that “early-day 
faculty novels”—unlike later campus novels—tended to depict professors as “tragic, romantic 
figures” (164). So it would be more accurate to note that the contrast between academic ideals 
and petty careerism only became marked in the fifties, just as the spectacle of bureaucratized 
professional work became a fixed and widespread trope among social critics.13 Coming of age 
when consciousness of the bureaucratic cast of professional work patterns was acute, the staff-
centered campus novel became synonymous with academic novels more generally. The campus 
novel’s comical deconstruction of professionalism, not to mention its lampoon of the growing 
market in mental labor more generally, resonated with broad social trends and anxieties in the 
fifties and beyond. The new Professorroman exposed the once-noble academic as a mere 
Organization Man, motivated by the same dulled and materialistic aspirations as the rest of a 
middle-class America increasingly dependent on large institutions and corporations. Always 
responsive to the hopes and anxieties of the middle class in America, in other words, the 
academic novel’s fourth and most popular era—that of the campus novel—now served to satirize 
the bureaucratic intellectual labor of that class. 
                                                        
12 For Lodge’s entertaining portrait of Morris Zapp, see Changing Places, Small World, and Nice Work. 
13 Note that I am not claiming that professional work suddenly became bureaucratic in the fifties. As Larson’s 
penultimate chapter points out, professionalism was always intertwined with bureaucracy; professional credentials 
were indeed created in part as a way of securing advancement within a given bureaucratic structure of middle-class 
work (184). I am only claiming that consciousness of white-collar work as bureaucratic work became dominant in 
the fifties, likely for multiple reasons, a critical mass of workers in such positions prominent among them. 
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We now turn to examples of American academic fiction from the early 1940s through the 
early 1960s, in order to trace in more detail the emergence of the campus novel in this period—
and of postmodernism from there. If Part I demonstrated the burgeoning influence of the theory 
of an intellectual class on New York Intellectuals’ intellectual labor fiction, the remainder of Part 
II will suggest how academic fiction in the mid-century learned from this intellectual class theory 
and then gave birth to an essentially “new” genre, the campus novel, that offered a keen and 
comic critique of the bureaucratic labor of that class. Anticipated by Trilling’s short stories in the 
1940s and then coming into its own with Mary McCarthy’s The Groves of Academe (1952), the 
campus novel cleared an essential space for the postmodern to develop, both as an attack on 
bureaucratic mental labor and as a declaration of utopian hopes for the autonomy of intellectual 
work. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Ideology and the Consciousness of the Professoriat: 
The Potential Postmodern in Lionel Trilling’s Academic Imagination1 
 
 
1. “Danger: Intellectuals at Work!” 
 A scene from his novel The Middle of the Journey—as we saw in Chapter Three, Lionel 
Trilling’s fullest imagining of what he called an “American intellectual class”—demonstrates 
Trilling’s sense of the growing influence of that class, as well as its penchant for ideological self-
delusion, or what Trilling called its “masked will.” John Laskell and Arthur Croom are spending 
some leisurely hours outdoors, painting the Crooms’ summer house in Connecticut. They discuss 
the house, and Arthur, who is a professor of economics at a school in New York City, suggests 
that someday he and his wife Nancy might have to move in to it permanently. His left-leaning 
political stances at the university may be endangering his job, he asserts. Laskell, thinking of 
Arthur’s growing public stature and the frequent rumors that he might be hired to work in the 
Roosevelt administration, doesn’t believe him. “Your only danger is that they’ll decide to make 
you a dean or something,” he banters (199). Arthur is hurt by this denial of what the narrative 
itself, sharing Laskell’s skepticism, calls Arthur Croom’s “fantasy of danger” (199). But Arthur 
does not get the chance to offer a rebuttal. For out comes his wife Nancy, who has some teasing 
of her own to do. As the men continue to paint the house, she declares, “Danger: Intellectuals at 
work!” (200). 
 There is something strange going on here, for Nancy has answered Laskell’s bantering 
phrase “your only danger,” and even the narrator’s summation of Arthur’s “fantasy of danger,” 
with her own mocking “Danger: Intellectuals at work!” She has echoed, in other words, the key                                                         
1 Portions of this chapter have appeared previously in Henn, “Trilling’s University.” I thank the Arizona Quarterly 
for permission to reprint them here. 
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word of a conversation—not to mention an authorial voice—that she hasn’t heard. Thematically 
this is no coincidence. For precisely what is at issue in the scene is the untruth of Professor 
Croom’s “fantasy of danger” at work; this only perceived “danger” is explicitly set against the 
actuality of Arthur’s increase in power and prestige, whether now at the university or eventually 
in New Deal Washington, D. C. In this narrative of intellectual labor, Nancy’s uncanny echo of 
the word “danger” thus implies that Arthur’s academic work is about as dangerous as two 
intellectuals painting a house on a lazy summer day. It is nothing like the working-class labor 
playfully alluded to by her phrase, drawn from the familiar “DANGER” signs at construction 
sites. This scene thus presents another facet of Trilling’s conception of an intellectual class. 
Trilling not only condemns the intellectual class’s politics, but he also insists that its moralizing 
is hypocritical. While intellectual workers imagine themselves as beleaguered and marginal, in 
actuality their power and influence grows daily, shaping the highest reaches of American culture 
and government.2 
                                                        
2 In relating this scene of an essentially dismissed fear about the consequences of political belief and action in the 
university, I feel it would be remiss to ignore—especially in our own era, when academic freedom is sometimes 
threatened in the name of national security, or of “ideological diversity”—how much more ominous the scene 
becomes when one remembers the McCarthyist purges of the academy that followed just a few years later. For a 
similar complaint about Trilling’s 1945 short story “The Other Margaret,” which features a “radical teacher [who] 
had ‘corrupted’ her student,” see Wald, New York 238. 
The history of McCarthyism is in fact directly relevant to Trilling’s career, and at the risk of a substantial 
digression, I wish to correct a widespread falsehood about Trilling’s relationship to McCarthyism. In 1953, Trilling 
headed a faculty commission charged with making guidelines for Columbia University’s treatment of Congressional 
witnesses. Over the past twenty years, some important Trilling scholars have mistakenly linked this committee’s 
findings to the subsequent dismissal of a Columbia faculty member. At the end of a paragraph explaining Trilling’s 
stance on Fifth Amendment testifiers, Alexander Bloom mentions that one Columbia faculty member who took the 
Fifth was refused a new contract, and then notes that Columbia denied any connection between her act of pleading 
the Fifth and the university’s subsequent refusal to grant her a new contract (249). If Bloom’s passage thus only 
implies a connection between the Trilling committee and Columbia’s removal of a Fifth Amendment testifier, 
Daniel O’Hara cites Bloom and transforms the insinuation into a full-blown indictment. He writes that Trilling 
headed the committee “with the result that ‘only’ one Columbia anthropologist’s contract was not renewed,” and 
sarcastically calls this an act of “measured, tactful scapegoating and tasteful internal housekeeping” (25, my 
emphasis). Completing this game of scholarly telephone, John Rodden—in an otherwise immensely useful and no 
doubt widely-consulted compilation of Trilling’s interlocutors, Lionel Trilling and the Critics—then cites O’Hara 
and makes the flat statement that “based on the committee’s report, one junior professor [did] not win a contract 
renewal” (xxxiii; he cites O’Hara as his source regarding Trilling’s committee on page 24). 
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But just as importantly, the scene also highlights Trilling’s concern with the growing 
prominence of that particular segment of the intellectual class at work in the classrooms and 
offices of the academy. The governmental influence of this academic fraction of the New Class 
would not have been lost on Trilling: Raymond Moley, Adolf Berle, and Rexford Tugwell 
formed the core of President Roosevelt’s famed “Brains Trust” in 1932, and each had been 
plucked from his post at Columbia University at the end of Trilling’s fifth year of doctoral work 
there.3 But Trilling, who by the time of his novel’s publication was himself only a year away                                                         
Ellen Schrecker’s No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities sets the record straight. Feminist and 
anthropologist Gene Weltfish had taken the Fifth when called before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee 
(a.k.a. the McCarran Committee). Columbia, whose administration was “relatively liberal” and whose commitment 
to academic freedom was in fact “stronger than that of most universities during the McCarthy era” (255), had 
retained two other Fifth Amendment testifiers during that time. But when in June of 1952 it was reported that 
Weltfish had accused the U. S. of using germ warfare in Korea, no less a figure than Columbia President Grayson 
Kirk determined to oust her. She was dismissed from Columbia at the end of the spring semester in 1953. However, 
Kirk accomplished this by the indirect method of creating new university rules that curtailed the rehiring of lecturers 
after a certain number of years on the faculty. Weltfish, in her seventeenth year of non-tenured employment, became 
“automatically” ineligible for rehire (255-57). Since the method of her ouster was unrelated to Columbia’s official 
policy on Fifth Amendment testifiers, then, both O’Hara’s first sarcastic accusation and Rodden’s subsequent 
iteration that she was not rehired “based on the [Trilling] committee’s report” are groundless. 
This does not exonerate Trilling and his committee from charges of complicity with McCarthyism, of 
course. The committee declared federal investigations of universities “unnecessary and harmful,” and thus rebuked 
one aspect of McCarthyism. But the committee also displayed open hostility toward academics enrolled in 
“Communist organizations” of any sort, alleging that such membership “almost certainly implies a submission to an 
intellectual control which is entirely at variance with the principles of academic competence as we understand them” 
(qtd. in Wald, New York 274). In that judgment, Alan Wald rightly observes, Trilling’s committee upheld and indeed 
adopted the very rationale of McCarthyism on campus, which assumed that scholars who were members of the 
Communist Party, or even any “Communist organization,” could not possibly be committed to open inquiry and 
balanced teaching. Perhaps intentionally alluding to one of Trilling’s favorite terms, then, Wald’s scornful 
summation is that Trilling and the other liberals who served on such committees “only wanted to modulate the 
witch-hunt” (274, my emphasis). The assessment is harsh, but not unjustified. 
In the late-thirties narrative of The Middle of the Journey, in other words, Arthur Croom’s fears of 
punishment for political activity on campus are simply a wish-fulfilling fantasy of intellectual heroism and 
martyrdom. But in real life only a few years after the novel was published, Croom’s fears would be justified, and his 
creator’s defense of academic freedom—perhaps influenced by a belief that fellow-traveling professors like Arthur 
Croom were simply self-deceived members of a powerful and ambitious New Class—was timid at best. 
The fullest account of Trilling’s involvement with the Columbia committee is Alexander Bloom’s Prodigal 
Sons, 248-50. While this account is the best existing, however, I have not encountered any truly complete 
explication of Trilling and the committee’s work, or indeed of Trilling’s institutional work in general. Perhaps the 
most thorough account of Trilling’s attitudes toward McCarthyism I have seen, one generally sympathetic toward 
Trilling, is Michael Kimmage’s The Conservative Turn 252-57; the Trilling committee’s work is recounted on pages 
255-56. 
3 Arthur Croom is thus likely modeled, in a general way, on these Brains Trusters. I would argue that Adolf Berle is 
likely the most direct model for him. For while Berle taught law at Columbia, rather than economics (as Tugwell 
did), in 1932 he nevertheless published “a landmark in the economic literature of the twentieth century” (Rosen 
201): The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Berle’s co-author was Gardiner Means, a graduate student at 
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from attaining the rank of full professor at Columbia, had never had a strictly political interest in 
academic labor. For him the fascination and anxiety regarding academic life was always quite 
personal as well. So here we must acknowledge a fact that is no less than central to Trilling’s life 
and work, though it is rarely mentioned in the criticism. Throughout his adult life, Lionel Trilling 
felt a profound ambivalence about his own labor as an academic. 
Starting in the late 1920s, as he entered graduate school and became a college instructor, 
Trilling underwent what Lewis P. Simpson, the only critic to have acknowledged the importance 
of the event, has aptly called a “crisis of vocation” (411). An excerpt from Trilling’s journal in 
December of 1933 begins to tell the story eloquently. In the seventh year of his doctoral program 
at Columbia University, immersed in writing a seemingly interminable dissertation on Matthew 
Arnold, Trilling had just seen a letter Ernest Hemingway had written his friend Clifton (“Kip”) 
Fadiman. It was “a crazy letter, written when [Hemingway] was drunk—self-revealing, arrogant, 
scared, trivial, absurd,” he acknowledged (“From” 498). Yet Trilling went on to record, 
poignantly, that he 
                                                        
Columbia whose time at the university substantially overlapped with Trilling’s own graduate years. Thus Trilling 
may have found inspiration for economics professor Arthur Croom in both Berle and Means. 
Berle’s and Means’s possible “presence” in Trilling’s novelistic depiction of an “intellectual class” 
provides an added fascination in our context here, since The Modern Corporation and Private Property has 
exercised nothing less than a decisive influence on New Class theory in America. The book is primarily known 
today for launching an epochal debate over “ownership” versus “control” in modern capitalist economies, 
highlighting a disparity between the theoretically democratic nature of corporations owned by many stock-holders, 
and the reality of their control by a small and politically unaccountable elite of managers. But its contribution to 
New Class theory stems from its use as an acknowledged (if critiqued) cornerstone of Burnham’s The Managerial 
Revolution in 1941 (see 88-95), which essentially expanded Berle and Means’s thesis so that it might apply to 
property owned by the public itself. Just as stock-holders did not control the corporations they owned under recent 
capitalism, Burnham insisted, the public would not control the property it supposedly “owned” via the state. This 
theoretical ownership without practical control was in fact an essential feature of the political and economic tyranny 
he was calling “managerial society.” Berle’s work has since required attention from every and any treatise of New 
Class theory that claims an empirical basis.  
On Berle’s importance as a foundational figure for American New Class theory, see Bruce-Briggs 10-11, 
and Gouldner 95. On the subject of Roosevelt’s “Brains Trust” more generally, complete with succinct intellectual 
biographies of Moley, Berle, and Tugwell, see Rosen’s Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Brains Trust. Tugwell’s own 
volume, The Brains Trust, offers an eye-witness account of the group’s formation during the spring and summer of 
1932. 
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felt from reading it how right such a man is compared to the “good minds” of my 
university life—how he will produce and mean something to the world . . . . And 
how far-far-far- I am going from being a writer—how less and less I have the 
material and the mind and the will. A few—very few—more years and the last 
chance will be gone. (498) 
His graduate years were virtually defined by this intensely personal conception of creative and 
academic lives as conflicting polarities. The first was a dedication to experience, the second to 
pallid abstraction. Academic employment threatened his literary ambitions, he felt. 
 Yet Trilling was also drawn to academic life, as an incident taking place a little over two 
years after his journal entry makes clear. Not yet done with his dissertation, after nearly nine 
financially-pressed years in graduate school had passed, the English Department at Columbia 
notified him of his dismissal from teaching there—a move that threatened Trilling’s main source 
of income, and thus his only hope to finish his degree. With a cold fury, the usually impassive 
Trilling fought to stay. He systematically confronted individual faculty over the decision to 
terminate his contract. Even his dissertation director Emery Neff was unspared: “made date to 
annihilate him on Thursday,” the journal entry notes (“From” 500). Trilling eventually won, 
retaining his teaching contract and then finishing his dissertation two years later, in 1938. He 
published his dissertation as the highly-acclaimed Matthew Arnold the next year, became an 
Assistant Professor at Columbia in the fall of 1939, and would go on to become the first Jew ever 
to receive tenure in the Columbia English Department.4 Thus even as Trilling despaired over 
what he conceived as the stifling and uncreative nature of academic life, he nevertheless felt 
attracted enough to it—at the least as steady income—to fight to stay in it. As we know, his                                                         
4 The incident is chronicled in Trilling’s febrile notebook entries from April and May of 1936 (“From” 498-503). 
Diana Trilling also chronicles this period in “Lionel Trilling: A Jew at Columbia” (422-24) and The Beginning of the 
Journey (266-81). 
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continued academic employment did not mean that he gave up his hopes of being a fiction 
writer, either. If he devoted the thirties primarily to his dissertation at the expense of his fiction, 
the forties saw him producing a great deal of fiction and criticism alike. As both Simpson and 
Trilling’s widow Diana Trilling note, Trilling’s conflict between a creative and an academic-
critical self defined his development then and thereafter. It was a conflict decisive to his life as a 
whole.5 
Since Simpson’s 1987 article on Trilling’s “crisis of vocation,” however, a cordon 
between Trilling’s private anxiety and public work has largely reasserted itself in the critical 
literature.6 No critic has ever fully addressed the effects of Trilling’s crisis on his critical and 
fictional writing. Furthermore, no critic has suggested any broader implication that such a crisis 
and its effects might have for our understanding of American literary and intellectual history in 
that era and beyond. In this chapter I will attempt to do both. Primarily examining Trilling’s 
1943 short story “Of This Time, Of That Place,” and his most famous work, 1950’s The Liberal 
                                                        
5 See Diana Trilling, Beginning 368-76. One index of the longevity of Trilling’s anxiety may also be found in a 
second despairing notebook entry about Hemingway—this one written nearly three decades after the first, on the 
occasion of Hemingway’s suicide in 1961. Trilling remarks that except for D. H. Lawrence’s, “no writer’s death has 
moved me as much.—who would suppose how much he has haunted me? How much he existed in my mind—as a 
reproach?” (“From . . . Part II,” 10). Though established as a full professor at Columbia for over a decade, and long 
revered as a literary critic in the world at large, Trilling continued to use the figure of Hemingway as a rebuke to his 
life choices. The intensity of this rebuke had indeed grown since the first entry on Hemingway, written when he was 
only twenty-eight. Writing the very day before his own fifty-sixth birthday in 1961, Trilling relates a conversation 
that morning with his wife Diana, in which he had observed that Hemingway’s father had committed suicide at the 
age of fifty-six. He had then speculated, quite ominously, that “Perhaps [his father’s suicide] was the act of courage 
[Hemingway] was facing all his life.” With what one can only admire as a truly remarkable combination of severe 
intelligence and yet compassion for her husband, Diana had immediately replied, “Perhaps the act of courage he was 
facing all his life was to stay alive” (10). 
Another episode of Trilling’s life-long vocational anxiety (from 1948, after the publication of The Middle 
of the Journey and his subsequent promotion to full professor) will be discussed in the final section of this chapter. 
5 I except my own article on Trilling, which is drawn from this chapter. (This chapter, however, offers an argument 
distinguishable from that of the article, and allows for richer context.) For a different reason, I also exclude the 
recent debates sparked by James Trilling’s supposition that his father was afflicted by Attention Deficit Disorder. 
While such conjectures may possibly advance our biographical understanding of the senior Trilling, they have not so 
far fostered genuine criticism of his work: Rodden surveys this dialogue, and wisely dismisses it as an overall 
distraction from understanding Trilling’s ideas (“Case” 63). As this chapter should demonstrate, however, I do not 
believe that biographical speculation must lead away from an understanding of Trilling’s work, or its wider literary 
significance. 
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Imagination, I will make two related claims. The first is that Trilling’s whole conception of “the 
liberal imagination”—his critique of an ideological thought which lacked imagination; the 
critique so definitive of Trilling and indeed of Trilling’s wide influence on American literary and 
intellectual history—originated in and was shaped by Trilling’s anxiety regarding the nature and 
value of academic labor, an anxiety amplified and deepened by his political concerns regarding 
an “intellectual class” defined by bureaucratic labor. My second claim is that Trilling’s largely 
unconscious response to such anxiety, specifically in 1948’s essay on “Art and Fortune,” 
provided one important and largely unknown intellectual basis for postmodernism’s mistrust of 
all-encompassing metanarrative, and its valorization of metafiction. In his realism-oriented 
conception of a novel driven by ideas, Trilling surprisingly laid out a political and crypto-
institutional justification for literary work that would only be fully realized in the self-conscious, 
often metafictional writing of such postmodern authors as Vladimir Nabokov, John Barth, and 
Thomas Pynchon. Despairing journal entries were only the most visible manifestations of 
Trilling’s “crisis” of academic purpose, in other words. It was also a personal crisis that could 
ramify beyond its immediate origins and into the themes of American intellectual and literary 
history more generally. 
 
2. New Class, Bureaucracy, and the Academic Imagination 
 Outside of his journal entries, Trilling’s crisis of vocation left its most legible mark on his 
short fiction. Produced during two separate decades of his young life, in the late 1920s and early 
1940s, the short stories are notable not only for their characteristically graceful style, but for their 
unwavering, perhaps genuinely obsessive, concern with the intellectual quality of academic life. 
These stories are important to Part II of this dissertation because they constitute a body of 
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academic fiction whose themes of triviality, pedantry, and boredom, as we shall see in later 
chapters, went on to dominate the campus novel when it emerged in the 1950s. But in Trilling’s 
own life, writing them arguably served primarily as a way of asserting his creative and artistic 
identity as against the perceived encroachment of his academic milieu. The climax of Trilling’s 
first published story, 1925’s “Impediments,” is an intensely earnest undergraduate’s exclamation 
to his ironic and unflappable friend: “Don’t you ever feel the pressure of the awful boredom that 
hangs over university life—if it is life? That endless, mild, eventless routine. If something would 
only happen, something new!” (9). Next year’s “Chapter for a Fashionable Jewish Novel,” one 
of the few stories in Trilling’s oeuvre not set on campus, nevertheless frequently parodies 
academic discourse and registers its protagonists’ boredom and even disgust with academic 
thought. After catching himself silently denigrating the habit of drinking before dinner as “the 
profanation of the very essence and godhead of drinking in whose compound divinity the 
divinity of purposelessness was implicit, Ding-an-sichkeit contained” (277), for example, the 
protagonist immediately mocks his thought as so much academic pedantry: “Clever, highbrow 
nonsense, that; thus one writes in Sophomore Composition. The next two weeks, gentlemen, will 
be occupied with the study of the purpose and technique of the familiar essay, as it is called; this 
charming form had its genesis . . .” (277, ellipses in the original). The year after that, “Funeral at 
the Club, With Lunch” returned to the university setting, depicting a young professor taking 
lunch at a faculty club before heading off to teach. Later that day at the club there will be a 
funeral for Fitch, a dull and uninspiring “classical professor who was not one of the sort students 
are supposed to call ‘good old’ and seek to have their parents meet at Commencement” (380). 
The protagonist of 1929’s “Notes on a Departure” suffers through a deadening year teaching at a 
midwestern university before going back home to New York City. Psychologically speaking, in 
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short, throughout the second half of the twenties Trilling seems to have written stories largely in 
order to resist his continuing attraction to academic life.7 
 As was the case with most of his characters, Trilling’s struggle was unsuccessful; he 
entered Columbia’s Ph.D. program in 1927. With the difficulties of his doctoral work at 
Columbia and the onset of the Great Depression, he stopped writing stories. Yet when Trilling 
resumed publishing fiction in 1943, “Of This Time, Of That Place” revealed nearly all the same 
anxieties as his 1920s fiction. To my mind his best work of fiction, and certainly among his most 
celebrated, “Of This Time” is also the story that most amply reveals Trilling’s conception of the 
values and dangers of academic employment. If we look at this story in depth, we may see how 
Trilling feared that academic labor could reduce lively and complex thought to a narrow and 
bureaucratized routine; and yet also how Trilling believed the reverse, that higher education 
could nurture a profound and complex understanding of human nature itself. Such ambivalence, 
routed through his reflections on a bureaucratic New Class, left its sizable mark on the document 
now most associated with Trilling, and Trilling’s formidable influence at the time—1950’s The 
Liberal Imagination. Over the course of the 1940s, as he climbed the ranks from Assistant to 
Associate to “full” professor at Columbia University, the academy became both Trilling’s model 
for an ideal of intellectual freedom and his vision of the bureaucratized intellectual labor 
underlying the flaws of contemporary liberalism itself.                                                         
7 Even after he became a professor, all of Trilling’s stories but one refer to academia. “The Lesson and the Secret” 
(1945) somewhat comically depicts the struggle of an instructor attempting to teach wealthy women how to write 
fiction, despite their often more pressing interest in how to sell their fiction. Though Diana Trilling asserts that the 
story is based on an adult education course Lionel taught at the Junior League (Beginning 264, 384), the story 
specifies its setting as a university (63). (The story was to have been part of a novel; the incomplete draft of that 
novel has recently been published as The Journey Abandoned. It features an autobiographical character named 
Vincent Hammell, who is writing a biography of a living author while supporting himself through newspaper work 
and teaching gigs.) “Of This Time, Of That Place” (1943) will be discussed in depth in the main text. 
The sole exception to the rule of academic reference in Trilling’s stories is 1945’s “The Other Margaret.” 
But even that story is rooted in institutions of education. It features “Miss Hoxie,” a radical middle school teacher, 
as well as a protagonist whose first recognition of his own mortality comes upon hearing a sentence from Hazlitt in a 
high school class (14-15). 
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 The protagonist of “Of This Time, Of That Place” is Joseph Howe, a young instructor of 
English at rural Dwight College. Once a bohemian poet in New York City, Howe discovers that 
he doesn’t enjoy the literary life of “genteel poverty” so much as he once did (79), and thus 
pursues an academic career. The story turns around Howe’s relationship to two students at 
Dwight, Ferdinand Tertan and Theodore Blackburn, whom he teaches respectively in the Fall 
and Spring semesters.8 From an East European immigrant family and on scholarship, Tertan is a 
serious and in some respects brilliant student. Ideas excite him, and he is a surprisingly profound 
thinker. He wants desperately to participate in intellectual life; he writes philosophy outside his 
classes. Yet Tertan is also somehow inarticulate—or if articulate, only in a convoluted, nonlinear 
fashion. While both his papers and his speech possess an intuitive sense, their expression is near-
incomprehensible and devoid of rational argument. Howe struggles to help Tertan for most of the 
semester. He reads his extracurricular work, and is impressed enough by his in-class insights to 
give him an A- at the midterm. But eventually he discovers the truth: whatever his gifts and 
talents, Tertan is nevertheless, clinically speaking, “mad” (90). Unsure of his course at first, and 
not wanting to betray his student’s trust and indeed abilities, Howe at last reports Tertan’s 
condition to the Dean, resulting in Tertan’s eventual institutionalization and thus dismissal from 
the college. 
 Theodore Blackburn, on the other hand, is an ambitious young man and intelligent 
enough; he is Vice President of the Student Council, manager of the debating team, and secretary 
of the undergraduate literary society. Yet unlike Tertan, he slights culture, in the Arnoldian sense 
of that word. He views aesthetic experience (“fancy,” he sometimes calls it) as a diversion from 
“reality”; literature is only useful for creating a respectable, “well-rounded” man (86). Worse, his 
ambitions warp any moral sense he might have. He is both cynical and manipulative in his search                                                         
8 Trilling pronounced Tertan’s name “with the accent on the last syllable: Tertan” (Commentary 782). 
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for power and worldly success. For example, when Howe grades one of his exams an F—
characteristically, Blackburn has somehow judged the haunted world of Coleridge’s The Ancient 
Mariner to be “a honey-sweet land of charming dreams [where] we can relax and enjoy 
ourselves” (102)—Blackburn confronts his teacher in conference, and attempts (unsuccessfully) 
to bully him into raising the grade. When later faced with a C- on a quiz, he even tries to threaten 
Howe by implying he would draw the Dean’s attention to a recently-published article that is 
highly critical of Howe’s poetry. When Howe calls his bluff and in fact regrades the quiz as an F 
(what it always deserved), Blackburn breaks down in tears, gets on his knees, and actually begs 
for a better grade (107-109). Though unsuccessful in changing this individual grade, Blackburn 
nevertheless passes the course and graduates. But Howe makes his disdain for him clear. At 
graduation, Howe contemptuously tells Blackburn that he has only given him the passing grade 
in order “to be sure the college would be rid of you” (114). Soon thereafter the Dean arrives and 
announces to Howe that Blackburn is the first in his class to secure a job after graduation. Howe 
remains conspicuously silent, bluntly refusing to congratulate his former student (114-15). Yet 
despite these derisive gestures, Howe has nevertheless passed the intellectually shallow 
Blackburn out of his class, and thus aided his unethical advancement in the world. Howe ends 
the story uncertainly, rushing off to participate in Commencement ceremonies. 
Written only a few years after the schism in the Socialist Workers Party in 1939, and 
published in the same year as Trilling’s E. M. Forster offered up the history of a smug and self-
deceived “intellectual class,” Trilling’s 1943 short story is undoubtedly influenced by the 
political concerns we examined in Chapter Three. The character of Blackburn begins to reveal 
this political aspect of the story. Asking Howe to allow him to take a course in romantic prose, 
Blackburn notes that he began college majoring in English, but then shifted to the social 
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sciences. “Sociology and government,” he elaborates, and then explains his attraction to them: “I 
find them very stimulating and real” (86, emphasis in original). Anyone who has read Trilling on 
the topic of “Reality in America” will recognize Blackburn’s point of view as a concrete 
example of “the liberal imagination” at its worst. Blackburn suffers from “the chronic American 
belief that there exists an opposition between reality and mind and that one must enlist oneself in 
the party of reality” (Liberal 10). In “Of This Time, Of That Place,” such cultural beliefs are 
indeed, as Trilling’s sardonic metaphor (“the party of reality”) implies, associated with a specific 
politics: Blackburn’s condescension toward literature is suspiciously Stalinist, reminiscent of a 
politics that firmly subordinates the aesthetic to considerations of power. Blackburn’s cynical 
attempts to pressure Howe for a higher grade, too, resemble the tactics of Trilling’s unscrupulous 
“intellectual class”: he grasps for material power by all means available to him, from pitiless 
blackmail to pitiful grade-grubbing. Blackburn is in short the youngest of Trilling’s 
representatives from the intellectual class. He is an undergraduate descendent of the French 
Revolution, and an antecedent of Nancy Croom and (Trilling’s interpretation of) the Princess 
Casamassima. 
But Howe is integral to the story’s skeptical considerations of the New Class as well. For 
Howe is not the wholly sympathetic character that he appears to be on a first reading. Nor is he 
for that matter the Trilling stand-in that previous critics have assumed him to be, an earnest 
professor torn only between professional duty and human(ist) sympathy. From its start, Trilling’s 
World War II narrative figures Howe’s pleasure in academic life as a kind of proto-totalitarian, 
New Class hunger for power. As Howe goes to his first day of class, we learn that “the lawful 
seizure of power he was about to make seemed momentous” (73). It is as if he were taking over a 
country rather than a classroom. Howe writes his name on the blackboard for his students, and 
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“The carelessness of the scrawl confirmed his authority” (73). He explains to his students that the 
course will primarily consist of discussion, in which all will be expected to share their opinions. 
“But you will soon recognize,” he dryly remarks, “that my opinion is worth more than anyone 
else’s here” (74). A few of his students understand the witticism and laugh, followed by the rest 
of the classroom. “All Howe’s private ironies protested the vulgarity of the joke,” of course—but 
nevertheless, his students’ “laughter made him feel benign and powerful” (74). The potentially 
political nature of Howe’s attraction to such power is further underscored by the narrative’s 
recurrent allusions to military rank. For example, as Tertan first enters the class, his martial 
bearing is unmistakable: “He advanced into the room and halted before Howe, almost at 
attention. In a loud clear voice he announced, ‘I am Tertan, Ferdinand R., reporting at the 
direction of Head of Department Vincent” (75). Whenever Tertan takes leave of Howe, he bows 
to him (77, 85). Such tropes suggest that Howe’s relationship to Tertan is akin to that of general 
to private. And Howe’s enjoyment of teaching thus may be as much about the pleasure of such 
power, analogous to a dictatorial political power, as it is the joy of knowledge. 
The distinct displeasure he feels toward Blackburn, then, may conversely be about his 
dislike of challenges to his authority. Howe’s first encounter with Blackburn, like that with 
Tertan, also invokes the military, but in an altogether different manner. As Blackburn introduces 
himself to Howe, he brashly declares that “I was once an English major, sir” (85). The self-
satisfied tone of this utterance leads Howe to momentarily (and comically) misinterpret 
Blackburn’s abrupt disclosure of his academic past as a proud declaration of service in the 
British military. Howe quickly perceives his mistake. But he still cannot resist making a lightly 
aggressive joke to undermine Blackburn’s unearned confidence, a joke he acknowledges to be 
“not really in good taste even with so forward a student”: “Indeed? What regiment?,” he asks 
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archly (85). If Tertan imagines himself as a subordinate soldier, with Blackburn, it is Howe who 
must do the imagining. Denied Blackburn’s actual deference, Howe subordinates him 
symbolically. Blackburn does not give in easily, however. Soon thereafter, for example, he 
contrives to escort Howe into his own classroom, his hand on his professor’s elbow. Howe is 
displeased, to say the least: he “felt a surge of temper rise in him and almost violently he 
disengaged his arm and walked to the desk, while Blackburn found a seat in the front row and 
smiled at him” (87). Deriving no small amount of his pleasure in academic life from the status it 
affords him, Howe is galled by Blackburn’s challenge to his power. 
 It would be wrong to proclaim baldly that Howe’s love of Tertan is his love of students’ 
deference, and that his hatred of Blackburn is his hatred of having his authority challenged. 
Howe remains a largely sympathetic character, genuinely dedicated to teaching on some level, 
even if he is not so innocent as critical opinion has thought. But it is accurate to say that Howe’s 
love of his own power is dangerously akin to the unscrupulous ambition shown by Blackburn, 
whom Howe so reviles. In fact, the pitilessness of Howe’s various rejections of Blackburn—a 
refusal to shake his hand (110), the frank admonishment that his last exam was just as much a 
failure as earlier ones (114), the pointed silence when he is expected to congratulate Blackburn 
on his job (114), and the positively melodramatic declaration that “Nothing you have ever done 
has satisfied me and nothing you could ever do would satisfy me, Blackburn” (113)—though 
certainly motivated by Blackburn’s manifest odiousness, may be read equally as products of 
Howe’s unconscious aversion to confronting his likeness to Blackburn. While critics of this story 
have frequently understood Tertan as a repressed part of Howe’s psyche, we must insist that 
Blackburn, just as much as Tertan, is Howe’s double, his “secret sharer.”9                                                         
9 On the subject of the Dostoievskian “double” in “Of This Time,” see Chace 20-21, 26-28; on the notion of 
Conrad’s “secret sharer” in relation to the story, see Krupnick 82-83. 
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 But this counterintuitive comparison of the morally pained Howe to the ruthless 
Blackburn risks suggesting that “Of This Time, Of That Place” is primarily another tale, like The 
Middle of the Journey, about the politics of an ambitious intellectual class. It is not. It is instead, 
I would argue, more centrally a story about academic employment. The story announces its 
institutional themes from the outset when Howe begins his first class of the year by directing his 
students to write an impromptu essay on “Who I am and why I came to Dwight College” (74). 
The question might just as well be asked of Howe; it connects the ontological and the 
institutional, the self’s relationship to the academy. The importance of this question is built into 
the frame of the story as well. The first paragraph offers Howe’s appreciation of a beautiful day 
in the early fall and his eager anticipation of the coming semester, “a moment when he could feel 
good about his profession” (72). The story’s last sentence more symbolically describes how he 
“hurried off to join the procession” of professors at Commencement (116). From start to finish, 
the narrative concerns itself not with politics, but with the implications of academic employment 
for Joseph Howe’s life. 
 If the story is not primarily focused on the New Class, then, it nevertheless uses its New 
Class allusions—rooted in theories of “bureaucratic collectivism” abroad and at home—to 
amplify its critique of academic employment. For academic labor in this story is New Class labor 
par excellence: it is bureaucratic. Here again, the story’s portrait of Howe is not wholly 
sympathetic. For Howe is attached to the mental and emotional comforts of academic 
bureaucracy, to the decorum and orderliness of academic routine. Howe’s enjoyment of 
academia’s bureaucratic rituals forms the simplest and most innocuous demonstration of this 
attachment: the first day of Convocation “was a busy and official day of cards and sheets, 
arrangements and small decisions,” we learn, “and it gave Howe pleasure” (78). Though he 
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complains with the rest of his colleagues about having to assist in the Convocation, “actually he 
got a clear satisfaction from the ritual of prayer and prosy speech and even from wearing his 
academic gown” (78). 
But on a more serious level as well, Howe himself recognizes his deep attachment to the 
bureaucratic order of his profession, its need to classify what is sometimes unclassifiable. His 
resistance to this part of himself in fact creates much of the story’s drama. Weber dubs the 
outlook and habits of bureaucracy as “officialdom,” and Howe conceives his decision to report 
Tertan as a capitulation to such officialdom: his consideration of a response to Tertan’s illness is 
self-consciously filled with the language of bureaucratic efficiency and routine.10 Upon first 
                                                        
10 Weber’s influence on Trilling is both easily observable and intriguing. But note that I am not arguing that Weber’s 
specific sociology of bureaucracy influenced Trilling in this story. It is highly unlikely that Trilling had read 
Weber’s work on bureaucracy by the time he wrote “Of This Time, Of That Place.” Weber’s mammoth tome, 
Economy and Society, though written somewhere between 1910 and 1914, was not published until 1921 (a year after 
his death)—and then of course in German. (For Weber’s work on bureaucracy there, see Volume 2, 956-1005.) The 
first English translations of the sections on bureaucracy and charisma were made by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright 
Mills, and published in a 1946 selection of Weber’s work. Thus any affinity between Trilling’s conception of the 
university and Weber’s conception of bureaucracy in “Of This Time, Of That Place” is, appropriately enough, 
intuitive (charismatic) rather than studied (rational). The Weberian conception of bureaucracy, I contend, 
nevertheless remains a surprisingly precise theoretical analogue for Trilling’s conception of the university in this 
story. 
That being said, another book by Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, most certainly 
influenced Trilling by the late 1930s, and perhaps even in “Of This Time, Of That Place.” Talcott Parsons translated 
Weber’s work into English for a 1930 edition, and Trilling read this edition at some point in the following decade: 
he cites it in the bibliography of 1939’s Matthew Arnold, and spends two pages summarizing Weber’s argument in 
the text (226-28). Weber’s conception of the modern era’s “iron cage” of soulless productivity (Protestant 181) thus 
may well have provided intellectual reinforcement for Trilling’s doubts about his (and Joseph Howe’s) academic 
employment in this era. One can imagine that Weber’s sorrowful summary of those caught in the iron cage—lines 
borrowed from Goethe—may have held special resonance for Trilling when creating a self-conscious Joseph Howe 
joining the procession of professors at commencement: “Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this 
nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved” (182). The notion of a “Protestant 
ethic” is of course Weber’s most well-known analysis of the larger problem of rationalization and specialization, the 
problem also underlying his later analysis of bureaucracy. 
But though Trilling’s reading of Weber had been limited to The Protestant Ethic while writing “Of This 
Time,” by the late 1940s—when he was writing many of the essays later incorporated into The Liberal 
Imagination—Trilling had certainly read Weber's specific work on bureaucracy. He did so quite likely under the 
tutelage of C. Wright Mills, who arrived at Columbia’s sociology department in 1944, published his Weber 
anthology in 1946, and had Trilling read the galley proofs of his 1951 book White Collar (Mills 355). Thus in 
1948’s essay on The Princess Casamassima, for example, Trilling describes the revolutionary Paul Muniment as 
being possessed with “what the sociologists . . . call charisma” (Liberal 86, emphasis in original). Much of The 
Liberal Imagination, in other words, may have been influenced by Trilling’s reading of Weber on bureaucracy—a 
reading that was likely motivated in part by his ongoing concerns about academic and more generally New Class 
labor. 
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realizing Tertan’s illness, Howe wonders if he could “hurry to assign to official and reasonable 
solicitude what had been, until this moment, so various and warm?” (92). Reflecting on Tertan’s 
belief that material existence could not define a self, “Some sure instinct told [Howe] that he 
must not surrender the question [of Tertan’s identity] to a clean official desk in a clear official 
light to be dealt with, settled and closed” by a psychiatrist (94). But the metaphorical desk and 
light of officialdom are precisely what he encounters as he nevertheless goes through with his 
“simple, routine request” to see the Dean: he sends “everything down the official chute,” laying 
the issue “on the Dean’s clean desk” in a room whose glow in the “golden light” of the snow 
made all its “commonplace objects of efficiency” shine (94). Howe reports Tertan without 
knowingly desiring to do so: “it was one of the surprising and startling incidents of his life” (94). 
Yet he follows his unwanted urge; and this bureaucratic action in some sense defines him. 
 At the broadest level, Howe’s desire for the comforts and routines of bureaucratic life 
wins out at the story’s end, too, as he chooses to remain an academic. On graduation day, the 
Dean genially comments to Howe on their shared labor, in terms that underscore its repetitive 
and predictable qualities: “Another year gone, Joe, and we’ve turned out another crop” (114). He 
goes on to say that “After you’ve been here a few years, you’ll find it reasonably upsetting—you 
wonder how there can be so many graduating classes while you stay the same.” “But of course,” 
he immediately corrects himself, “you don’t stay the same” (114). Though the Dean then 
interrupts himself, saying, “‘Well,’ sharply, to dismiss the thought” of how academic workers do 
change (114), it is nevertheless clear that Howe will change after deciding to remain a professor 
at Dwight.  
 The story’s last section suggests that these changes may be ominous, and summarizes the 
story’s almost despairing indictment of the bureaucratic character of academic intellectual labor. 
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Earlier on graduation day, Howe encounters the Dean’s niece, Hilda, who wants to take a picture 
of him. The scene repeats, with a difference, the one that opens the story, where Hilda 
photographs a peach tree in front of the house where Howe is lodging. In the opening scene, she 
employs a rudimentary camera, and her method of art is simply to twist herself around until she 
finds the appropriate angle for the shot. She then snaps the shutter (72). In the last scene, 
however, her method has changed dramatically: she assembles a new, higher-grade camera onto 
a tripod, and then carefully measures the distance and angle of the shot with other photographers’ 
instruments (112). No longer concerned with the natural beauty of a peach tree, she requires 
Howe to pose in a precise manner (112-13), and Howe wears the formal academic robes he 
secretly fancies (111). Thus already we see the stark contrast between the first scene’s depiction 
of a natural aesthetic practice, and the last scene’s formal procedures. 
 Appropriately enough, Blackburn arrives in the midst of this scene of routinized aesthetic 
production. As we saw before, Howe repudiates him, and then the Dean arrives to announce 
Blackburn’s success in obtaining a first job. As the Dean does so, he holds the arm of both Howe 
and Blackburn, “still linking” them (114). Meanwhile Tertan has been hovering in the 
background. Decked out in an eerily (madly) grand outfit—an old and yellowing, too-tight raw 
silk suit on his body, a panama hat on his head, and a whangee cane in hand—and seemingly 
unaware of the scene before him, Tertan comments into the air three times, “Instruments of 
precision” (115). Saddened and moved by this spectacle, Howe is nevertheless unsure of what 
Tertan is referring to, if indeed anything real. But it is clear that Tertan’s characteristically 
evocative phrase may be equally applied to Hilda’s method of photography, Blackburn’s 
mercilessly utilitarian mind, and even now to Howe himself, linked by arm and by profession to 
the story’s best representatives of academic-bureaucratic worldliness. Howe has been promoted 
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from lecturer to official professor (110). The political analogue of such academic achievement 
may be glimpsed as the Dean leaves: Blackburn is walking “stately by his side” (115, my 
emphasis). Having had his picture taken in academic regalia, and thus with his institutional 
identity at last confirmed, a guilty Howe “hurrie[s] off,” in the story’s final phrase, “to join the 
procession” of graduates and professors marching in commencement ceremonies (116). Invoking 
such a compacted image of orderly movement in its concluding words—one that might well have 
recalled the marching fascist soldiers populating newsreels in 1943—the story confirms Tertan’s 
seeming judgment of academic minds as “instruments of precision,” of academic labor as the 
reduction of thought to categorization, the routinization of intellect.11 In large measure, academic 
employment in this story stands for a betrayal of Tertan’s intellectual sincerity, complexity, and 
depth. Howe’s promotion to professor stands for the promotion, whether intentional or not, of the 
shallow and ruthless ambition of Blackburn’s New Class, bureaucratic mind. 
 But it is important to remember that the force of this story’s disappointment is utterly 
contingent on its surprisingly vivid hope and longing for an ideal university. Tertan—with whom 
Howe so strongly identifies, and with whom the story encourages readers to empathize, as 
well—best embodies and articulates that narrative hope for an ideal university. Tertan’s respect 
for academic and intellectual life shows with his first entrance—or rather, refusal to enter. On the 
first day of class, standing “on the very sill of the door” to Howe’s classroom, unwilling to go in 
“until he was perfectly sure of his rights” (75), he asks if he is at the correct class. His devotion 
to education, in other words, is such that he will not tread upon so important a space as a 
                                                        
11 To anticipate this chapter’s concluding remarks about Trilling’s relationship to postmodernism, I would observe 
as well that “Of This Time”’s orderly, routinized commencement procession of intellectuals might be seen looping 
around to the more purely bourgeois convoy of station wagons that famously begins Don DeLillo’s 1985 
postmodern campus novel White Noise: “a long shining line . . . in single file” that “coursed through the west 
campus” (3), an image itself no doubt anticipated in the grainy film of a Leni Riefenstahl epic to be viewed in Jack 
Gladney’s Advanced Nazism class. 
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classroom without good reason. Later, with more than half the semester over, Tertan still cannot 
rid himself of the habit of standing before he speaks in class. “He seemed unable to carry on the 
life of the intellect without this mark of respect for it” (89). Indeed, as Howe asserts in a 
recommendation for him, “Mr. Ferdinand Tertan is marked by his intense devotion to letters and 
by his exceptional love of all things of the mind” (106). Tertan refuses to distinguish between his 
love of the mind and his love of Dwight College and academia itself. 
 This “intense devotion” and “exceptional love” for “all things of the mind” also describes 
Tertan’s feelings toward his professor. Howe’s profession symbolizes true intellectual pursuit for 
Tertan, and thus Tertan consistently expresses a powerfully Platonic affection for Howe and his 
role in the academy. “Some professors,” he notes after their first class together, “are pedants. 
They are Dryasdusts. However, some professors are free souls and creative spirits. Kant, Hegel, 
and Nietzsche were all professors” (76). With that succinct assessment of professorial extremes, 
Tertan tells Howe straightforwardly (and touchingly) that “It is my opinion that you occupy the 
second category” (76). Later, after Howe has discovered Tertan’s illness and discussed it with 
the Dean, the Dean shows Howe a letter Tertan has written to him. The letter contains a long 
passage describing Howe’s importance in his life, and in this passage Tertan offers a vision of 
the professor as one among the “free souls and creative spirits” who are not beholden to “what is 
logical in the strict word” (100)—a charismatic thinker akin to Howe’s formerly bohemian self, 
in other words, unmastered by academic rationality. Tertan imagines the professor as poet rather 
than pedant, and he thus offers a vision of hope for academic labor in a story otherwise 
pessimistic about its bureaucratic characteristics. 
 Indeed, in Tertan’s respect for Howe and the ideals of higher education, we can see one 
of the most poignant aspects of Tertan’s tragedy and thence the story as a whole. Tertan, though 
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lonely and mad and destined to leave his beloved classrooms, nevertheless keeps alive a utopian 
and entirely commendable vision of the academy as a place where visionary thinkers—Kant, 
Hegel, Nietzsche, and in some admittedly deformed sense Tertan himself—are respected and 
nurtured. It is Tertan’s pure desire to know that sparks Howe’s tender identification with him, 
and (in part) his conversely fierce antipathy toward Blackburn. The story as a whole 
consequently mingles its distaste for higher education’s bureaucratic worldliness with a 
lingering, undimmed hope for the academy’s potential to engender thought precisely 
unconcerned with the dull and narrow utility which bureaucracy demands. As much as anything 
else, “Of This Time, Of That Place” gains its full power from the conflict between the story’s 
passionate fear of academic routinization (the proto-Stalinist Blackburn) and its no less 
passionate yearning for an institution of charismatic intellectual labor (the intuitively humanist 
Tertan).12 
                                                        
12 Here I join a distinguished tradition of those speculating on the source of the story’s affect in some binary 
opposition, beginning with Trilling himself and including one of his most gifted interpreters, Mark Krupnick. I 
disagree with both their interpretations of the story in some measure, however.  
In 1967, Trilling speculated that “what power the story may have” lay in the tension between “the judgment 
of morality [and that] of science” (Commentary 784). The moral judgment of Tertan commends his dedication to the 
mind. The scientific judgment recognizes his mind as defective. Trilling goes on to note that many readers have 
wanted to believe that Tertan is not mad, thus ignoring or even negating the scientific judgment. But Trilling insists 
that the scientific judgment must be taken seriously. As he remarks of the real student upon whom Tertan is based, 
“he was on the way to being beyond the reach of ordinary human feelings” (782). (That real student is not Allen 
Ginsberg, as is sometimes assumed: Trilling did not have Ginsberg for a student until after writing the story [D. 
Trilling Beginning 384].) As he remarks of Tertan himself, “Nothing, I fear, can reverse the diagnosis of [his] 
illness” (784). For Trilling in 1967, Tertan is at least as insane as he is noble, and Joseph Howe’s decision to 
institutionalize him and remain in an academic job ought to be respected accordingly. 
But I think that Trilling’s interpretation of the story he had written over two decades earlier is unduly 
influenced by his contemporary concerns. For by the mid-sixties, Trilling’s cultural worries had shifted away from 
the supposedly “scientific” ideologies of any now-aging Stalinists, and toward the almost reverse problem of a 
sometimes antirationalist counterculture given to mixing politics with aesthetic experience—a 1960s cultural politics 
more likely to sympathize with the mad, literature-loving Tertan than with the stodgy and “straight” Howe. Such 
concerns about counterculture politics formed the basis of Trilling’s contention in 1965’s Beyond Culture that “art 
does not always tell the truth or the best kind of truth and does not always point out the right way, and that it can 
even generate falsehood and habituate us to it, and that, on frequent occasions, it might well be the subject, in the 
interests of autonomy, to the scrutiny of the rational intellect” (xiv). Thus while Trilling’s reminders that Tertan is 
truly mad are well-taken, I believe his 1967 interpretation of the story favors his recent concern for “the scrutiny of 
the rational intellect” too much, and downplays the story’s more powerful brief for aesthetic consciousness as 
employed against cold and impersonal (Stalinist, bureaucratic) “instruments of precision.” The later Trilling 
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 I will now argue that Trilling’s anxiety and hope with respect to academic labor, so 
eloquently expressed in “Of This Time, Of That Place,” is in fact key to understanding the 
sources of his intellectual influence as a whole in the forties and beyond. His understanding of 
professors as bureaucratic New Class workers, for example, was ahead of the curve. Two years 
after readers met Joseph Howe in the pages of Partisan Review, the magazine began an 
occasional column entitled “Report from the Academy,” detailing (usually satirically) the habits 
and folkways of the American university. The column’s first installment, Newton Arvin’s “The 
Professor as Manager,” based its satire explicitly on a comparison between James Burnham’s 
controversial post-Trotskyist theory of a rising “managerial class” and academic life. Arvin—yet 
another signatory to Culture and the Crisis, nearly a decade and a half earlier—now viewed a 
significant portion of the once-proletarianizing professional workers as “something like” 
members of an emergent ruling class of managers. “The American academic type that emerged 
in the period between the two wars, and is now everywhere ascendant and authoritative,” he 
maintains, “belongs to an age when, whatever one may feel about the phrase, something like a 
Managerial Revolution has quietly taken place, and he trims his clothes to the cut prescribed by 
that fateful process” (275). As a result, these managerial professors were not intellectuals in any 
true sense. Their character was instead defined by 
                                                        
underestimates, in other words, the broadly antiscientific (and anti-scientific materialist) animus of his 1943 story. In 
a very modest way, his story contributed to the antirationalist sixties zeitgeist he came to deplore. 
Krupnick finds the “key to the power of the story” in its “perilous balance of [the] contradictory impulses” 
of Howe’s desire to be “both bohemian and respectable, poet and professor, adolescent and grown-up” (84). He also 
notes that “It’s hard not to surmise that the ambivalence was Trilling’s own, caught between the claims of his 
generation’s vision of social justice and his powerful craving for success, acceptance, and assimilation into the 
larger society” (84-85). The only substantive difference I have with Krupnick’s reading is that I see the story as 
much more critical of what Krupnick benignly reads as “success, acceptance, and assimilation.” The story considers 
the desire for success and acceptance, I agree. But the particular kinds of success and acceptance examined in the 
story are Stalinist, in a full and distinct anti-Stalinist sense of that word. They are not so much blandly bourgeois as 
they are representative of a shrewd intellectual class willing to use nearly any means that serves its ends. 
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the veneration of quantity, the lust of the tangible, the mental ingenuousness, the 
passion for organizational machinery, the instinct for the immediate and the 
solidly visible, and (to put it negatively) the contempt for ideas, the hatred of 
literature and the arts, the fear of criticism, and (singular as it sounds) the distrust 
of learning itself. (276) 
This describes Blackburn precisely, we may note. The myopic specialization of bureaucracy, 
Arvin goes on to say, was a hallmark of the managerial professor as well:  
True learning in the old sense—in the sense of wide-ranging, curious, 
adventurous, and humane study—has gone into eclipse: you cannot be learned in 
that sense and manage your own office effectively at the same time. You must get 
results; and it is well known that you cannot get results quickly if you dissipate 
your activities in a thousand directions. You must “specialize,” and know more 
than anyone else could hope—or indeed wish—to know about Milton or Melville 
D. Landon. (277)  
For Arvin, the modern professor was in short a bureaucrat of the managerial, New Class type: a 
drone of rote and inflexible habit, a master of increasingly fractional tasks who nevertheless 
steadily advances in power. In overall effect, this managerial professor is a caricatured portrait of 
Howe’s worst, bureaucratic instincts—his love of cap and gown and other academic rituals, most 
superficially, but his unconscious need for power and the betrayal of Tertan’s “true learning” to 
the “specialized” knowledge of clinical psychiatry, most seriously—all in search of order, 
stability, and prestige. He is an amalgamation, in short, of the desires and habits Trilling feared 
most in his own intellectual life. Trilling’s apprehensions and criticisms of academic life 
anticipated and likely influenced the views of the influential Partisan Review crowd, right down 
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to the post-Trotskyist (here Burnhamian) conception of intellectual labor. We shall see in the 
next chapter that they also influenced the genesis of the campus novel, via Mary McCarthy’s 
1952 novel The Groves of Academe. 
 If Trilling’s short stories thus anticipated a whole intellectual-political discourse critical 
of academic labor, I would now note that his fears of academic labor also shaped his most 
substantial contribution to the new liberalism itself. In important respects, 1950’s The Liberal 
Imagination might just as well have been named The Academic Imagination. Having spent two 
decades writing fiction and journal entries about the university, in The Liberal Imagination 
Trilling figures the university as representative of—and sometimes responsible for—the defects 
of the liberal imagination. In his essay on the Kinsey Report, for example, Trilling notes and 
praises the fact that Professor Kinsey’s Report could only be produced in a culture of democratic 
pluralism, one singularly open to the acceptance of all behaviors and peoples, no matter how 
socially unpopular. He identifies this admirable habit of mind with academic thought in general: 
such tolerance “shows itself in those parts of our intellectual life which are more or less official 
and institutionalized,” and is thus “far more established in the universities than most of us with 
our habits of criticism of America, particularly of American universities, will easily admit” 
(227). Furthermore, this characteristically academic “generosity of mind” deserves credit “as a 
sign of something good and enlarging in American life” (227). 
Yet this respect for the pure fact of peoples and behaviors has disadvantages, too, Trilling 
insists. The academic mind is loathe to holistically judge its atomized facts in the service of any 
larger cultural or moral end. The institutional habit of merely accepting social facts such as 
sexual behavior  
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goes with a nearly conscious aversion from making intellectual distinctions, 
almost as if out of the belief that an intellectual distinction must inevitably lead to 
a social discrimination or exclusion. . . . [The proponents of this view] have taken 
it as their assumption that all social facts—with the exception of exclusion and 
economic hardship—must be accepted, not merely in the scientific sense but also 
in the social sense, in the sense, that is, that no judgment must be passed on them, 
that any conclusion drawn from them which perceives values and consequences 
will turn out to be “undemocratic.” (227-28, emphasis in the original) 
In the name of a supposed “democracy,” the Kinsey Report ignores the relationship of facts to a 
cultural and ethical whole. The academic mind considers facts as a technical specialist might 
consider them, ignorant of wider context. And in another essay—originally published in 1942, 
the year before “Of This Time, Of That Place”—we even learn that such atomization and 
simplification is frequently the product of university life:  
The educated classes are learning to blame ideas for our troubles, rather than 
blaming what is a very different thing—our own bad thinking. This is the great 
vice of academicism, that it is concerned with ideas rather than with thinking, and 
nowadays the errors of academicism do not stay in the academy; they make their 
way into the world, and what begins as a failure of perception among intellectual 
specialists finds its fulfillment in policy and action. (182-83) 
In Trilling’s estimation in The Liberal Imagination, in other words, the university’s rational 
character—the bureaucratic mind it produces—tends to apprehend narrow facts, but ignores the 
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wider cultural question of values.13 It promotes the specialist’s technical ideas rather than the 
thought characteristic of a true intellectual. The university of The Liberal Imagination, in short, 
fosters a kind of narrow, ideological thinking that is the counterpart of Theodore Blackburn’s 
callow mind. 
 This academic worship of the isolated fact and simplistic idea, the product of a myopic 
specialization characteristic of bureaucracy—a theme compulsively examined in his fiction, and 
leaving scattered traces in his criticism—was then one great model of the flaws that Trilling 
came to see as characteristic of “liberalism” more generally. In the famous preface to The Liberal 
Imagination, Trilling asserts that liberalism’s characteristically bureaucratic institutions have 
produced its enfeebled imagination. “It is one of the tendencies of liberalism to simplify, and this 
tendency is natural in view of the effort which liberalism makes to organize the elements of life 
in a rational way,” Trilling writes. Furthermore there is both “value and necessity” in this 
“organizational impulse.” But we must also understand that organization “means delegation, and 
agencies, and bureaus, and technicians, and that the ideas that can survive delegation, that can be 
passed on to agencies and bureaus and technicians, incline to be ideas of a certain kind of 
simplicity: they give up something of their largeness and modulation and complexity in order to 
survive” (xii). True ideas cannot survive in bureaucratic institutions, Trilling asserts, without a 
loss of complexity and nuance, without taking the simpler, more dangerous form of ideology. 
Trilling’s immediate reference in this passage—to “agencies, and bureaus, and 
technicians”—is of course to the New Deal programs of the thirties and forties. And this was 
also the preoccupation, as we have seen, of the dissident Trotskyists who created the anti-
Stalinist New Class theories that Trilling adapted. No doubt, some of Trilling’s fear indeed                                                         
13 Daniel O’Hara makes a similar point, arguing that Trilling’s “antiprofessional” stance is “derived from the 
institutionalized separation of moral questions from the professed academic standard of systematic ratiocination that 
functions to rule out of court beforehand any serious or sustained consideration of the ethics of criticism” (6). 
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centered around the idea of having intellectual ideas vetted by state institutions. Yet as my 
narrative of Trilling’s “crisis of vocation” should demonstrate, such political concerns were 
comparatively abstract and recent ones for Trilling. His fear that academic institutions might 
impoverish his flexibility and creativity of mind, on the other hand, was both personal and long-
lived. Indeed, on an emotional level it might not be too much to say that the academic mind’s 
resemblance to bureaucratic Stalinism would have been of less concern to Trilling than 
Stalinism’s resemblance to the bureaucratic mind of academia. If Trilling’s short stories and 
journal entries reflect a deep revulsion to academic life, and his later criticism assumes the 
academic quality of the liberal imagination, then both suggest that his career-long fight against 
ideology was not only a fight against the simplifications endemic to the “masked will” of an 
ambitious, quasi-Stalinist New Class. It was also and more personally a fight against the 
simplifications and specializations of academic-bureaucratic labor itself. 
 We might end the story of Trilling’s relationship to academic labor right there. But to do 
so would be to wrongly place emphasis on Trilling’s perception of the deficiencies of university 
life, and to forget the utopian moment of his academic dialectic, so to speak. In the same year he 
published “Of This Time,” his book E. M. Forster defended the connection between academic 
life and creative endeavors. “According to the American myth, less powerful now than formerly, 
which assumes a mortal antagonism between the creative and the intellectual life, the university 
is a particularly deadly influence upon the creative mind,” Trilling begins (22); and in this he 
accurately summarizes his worst fears. But he debunks this “myth” in the remainder of the 
paragraph, noting that at least “in England forty-odd years ago, a student at Cambridge [such as 
Forster] was not likely to suppose that the university of Marlowe, Milton, Dryden and Coleridge 
was going to dessicate him by scholarship or make him into a don when he wanted to be a poet” 
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(22). The passage as a whole thus stands as a testament of Trilling’s belief that the university 
could provide a platform for the charismatic work of creative mental labor. And we have already 
seen that while “Of This Time” revealed Trilling’s great skepticism of the bureaucratic reduction 
of mind in institutions of higher education, it also recalls the past achievements of the university 
in producing such giants as Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche. Trilling’s critique of the university was 
thorough and deep, no doubt. But it was inspired by an equally high hope for that institution. 
 The oft-quoted final words of Trilling’s Preface to The Liberal Imagination recommend 
the study of literature to liberal readers because it is “the human activity which takes the fullest 
and most precise account of variousness, possibility, complexity, and difficulty” (xiii). If 
literature was the human activity wherein such qualities were to be found, Trilling still hoped that 
the university would provide a human institution equally suited to those ideals. His 1940s 
portrait of an institution mired in bureaucratic routine and reductionist ideology, of an academy 
that served an intellectual class’s social and political ambitions, gained its bitter animus precisely 
from his underlying and persistent hope for an institution devoted to the charismatic work of 
thought. Trilling’s ambivalence about the bureaucratic dangers and charismatic possibilities of 
academic-intellectual labor—the product of long agony, registered first in his short stories and 
journal entries, and ultimately manifested in the fiction and essays of his maturity—was central 
to his experience of the 1940s. In the abstracted form of his hope that liberals might possess 
imagination, that ambivalence toward bureaucratic higher education constituted perhaps his most 
significant contribution to American literary-political culture in the mid-twentieth century. 
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3. Ending Ideology: Towards the Postmodern in Trilling’s Novel of Ideas 
 
 As we saw in Chapter Three, both at the time and since critics have commonly and 
correctly identified Trilling with the new liberalism of the 1940s and 1950s. But to my 
knowledge there has not been a word in recent criticism on Trilling’s relationship to—and 
influence upon—a phenomenon we are much more familiar with today: postmodernism.14 In this 
final section of the chapter, then, I wish to show that Trilling’s anxiety regarding academic and 
bureaucratic labor influenced more than his conception of liberalism in The Liberal Imagination. 
His academic anxiety even may have informed key postmodernist intellectual and cultural trends 
that emerged a generation later. For if The Liberal Imagination as a whole imagined American 
intellectual life as a macrocosm of the bureaucratic university’s narrow habits of mind, Trilling’s 
1948 essay “Art and Fortune”—collected in The Liberal Imagination—nevertheless persists in 
advocating a specifically realist aesthetic practice whose value derives precisely from Trilling’s 
hope for a university capable of producing charismatic and holistic thought. And in that essay’s 
theorization of a self-conscious novel of ideas dedicated to antibureaucratic complexity, Trilling 
offers an early theoretical basis—rooted in realism—for the antirealist body of fiction later 
writers would call “postmodernism.” 
Trilling first read “Art and Fortune” at a gathering of the English Institute in New York 
City in September of 1948. It was only a year after he had published his first and (as it turned 
out) only novel to mixed though respectable reviews. In order to understand Trilling’s motives 
for writing “Art and Fortune”—motivations central to my claims about Trilling’s contribution to 
the foundations of early postmodernism—we have to understand both the reviews of The Middle 
of the Journey and their profound effect on Trilling. The negative assessments reanimated                                                         
14 I again except my own article on Trilling. I would also note that in his 2004 article “‘I’m Not His Father’” Robert 
Genter discusses Trilling’s direct relationship to literary modernism in the person of his pupil Allen Ginsberg. 
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Trilling’s old anxiety about his career, for they almost uniformly ascribed the novel’s aesthetic 
flaws to its author’s academic employment as a critic. This was the case indirectly when J. M. 
Lalley jibed in the New Yorker that “much of the dialogue reads as if it were a pasting together of 
excerpts from the New Masses and the Partisan Review” (126). More directly, Orville Prescott 
opined in the New York Times that “When the critical sense is strenuously exercised creative 
power seems to atrophy” (23). Robert Warshow’s long review in Commentary was particularly 
cutting. Trilling’s characters, he said, exist in an “academic void of moral abstractions” (543), 
and because Trilling seemed unable to record experience without reference to a master idea, “Mr. 
Trilling has not yet solved the problem of being a novelist at all” (545). One consensus of these 
negative reviews, then, was that Trilling’s dedication to criticism and intellectualism had stunted 
his capacity to write fiction. 
 Once again, as when he encountered Hemingway’s letter in graduate school, Trilling 
turned to his journal. “The attack on my novel is that it is gray, bloodless, intellectual, without 
passion,” he wrote in December of 1947, referencing Lalley, Prescott, and Warshow by name.15 
Trilling believed that such accusations gained their peculiar animus from a more general 
resentment against academics and critics who attempted to write fiction. Each attack, he wrote, 
was “always made with great personal feeling, with anger.—How dared I presume?” (“From” 
509). In another entry, written only months later, he continued to meditate on the potential 
conflict between his academic life and his aspirations as a novelist, this time taking the conflict 
more to heart. Receiving official word of his promotion to full professor at Columbia, Trilling 
feared that “I pay for the position [as professor] . . . with my talent—that I draw off from my                                                         
15 The editor labels the entry only “1947,” but Trilling’s reference to Warshow and Prescott—whose comparatively 
late and hostile reviews were both published in December—demonstrates that the entry was written sometime that 
month. In fact, it is likely that Warshow’s review directly prompted the entry; years later Trilling remarked that he 
took the review “quite personally” and that his “resentment” of the review “apparently went quite deep” (qtd. in 
Shoben 46). 
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own work [as a novelist] what should remain with it” (511). But this repetition of his vocational 
crisis now came with a difference. For instead of remaining mired in such fears about academic 
employment, Trilling rallied against them. They ultimately emanated less from himself, he 
wrote, than from his “downtown friends,” the ones who congregated so many blocks south and a 
world away from his own Morningside Heights.16 “Suppose I were to dare to believe that one 
could be a professor and a man! and a writer!—what arrogance and defiance of convention,” 
Trilling shouts. “Yet deeply I dare to believe that, and must learn to believe it on the surface” 
(511), he concludes more quietly: he intends to reconcile his academic and literary identities. 
This time, Trilling self-consciously determined to overcome his fears and to live the life of both 
professor and novelist. 
 His first public assertion of the ability to be both—to “believe it on the surface”—came 
in September of that same year, with his reading of “Art and Fortune” aloud to the English 
Institute, a gathering of literary (and often academic) intellectuals. The essay was published in 
Partisan Review three months after its delivery, and in The Liberal Imagination two years later. 
Deeply rooted in Trilling’s renewed crisis of vocation, the essay outlines both a theory of the 
novel and a political rationale for the intellectual labor of authorship itself in the Cold War. 
 “Art and Fortune” begins by declaring its intent to contemplate the specter of the novel’s 
death as a genre, much-discussed after the age of Joyce and Proust (Liberal 240-42). Seeking to 
defend the novel’s viability, Trilling’s essay imagines how it might respond to conditions that 
now threaten its existence. The soul of the novel whose crisis concerns him, we may begin by 
noting, is that of nineteenth-century realism. What Trilling persistently and sweepingly calls “the 
                                                        
16 On the conflict between Trilling’s “uptown” and “downtown” lives, see the perceptive third chapter of Krupnick’s 
Lionel Trilling. In a sense, one might characterize my own two analyses of Trilling’s work similarly: the previous 
chapter primarily details the downtown, post-Trotskyist influences on Trilling’s career, while the present chapter 
primarily examines the uptown, academic influences. 
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novel” is in fact indissolubly bound up with the realist novel’s specific hopes to represent social 
life in clear and simple prose: his chief examples of “the great novels” at the center of the 
tradition he is examining are, tellingly, “Lost Illusions, The Sentimental Education, War and 
Peace, Jude the Obscure, and The Brothers Karamazov” (244). Though it speaks uniformly of 
“the novel,” then, “Art and Fortune” seeks to understand the specific dilemma of realism in the 
current era.17 
Classically, Trilling asserts, the novel was motivated by two concerns: anxieties 
regarding money and class, and the desire to shape ideas (242-44). The novel’s contemporary 
difficulties, he goes on to say, stem from the fact that these two provocations have faded in the 
contemporary era. Class—never as important to America as to Europe—no longer plays a 
decisive role in social life; in the new welfare state as well as under Communism, its influence 
has been substantially replaced by the more direct exercise of state power (244-247). Ideas are in 
retreat as well, perhaps pushed back by the straightforward action of such a blunt, state-centered 
politics: “all over the world the political mind lies passive before action and the event” (247). If 
the nineteenth century had occasioned rich and galvanizing traditions of both conservative and 
radical thought, in the twentieth century “we are in the hands of the commentator” (247), who is 
unable to grasp reality by means of true ideas.                                                         
17 One might object that since elsewhere in the essay Trilling defends Joyce’s (modernist) Ulysses as an example of 
the novel he thinks to be still living (255), he isn’t concerned with realism exclusively. But Trilling justifies his 
inclusion of Ulysses as part of “the novel”’s tradition in a strange and ultimately revealing manner. The discussion 
takes place in the context of Trilling’s objection to novelistic prose that veers too far in the direction of poetry, and 
his preference instead for “a straightforward prose, rapid, masculine, and committed to events, making its effects not 
by the single word or by the phrase but by words properly and naturally massed”—his preference for the prose of 
classic realism, in short. Knowing that his defense of Ulysses—but explicitly not of Djuna Barnes’ Nightwood—will 
raise eyebrows in this context, he then argues in a footnote that Ulysses’ “basic prose, which is variously 
manipulated, is not without its affinities with the prose I ask for” (255). To laud the prose of Ulysses’ later chapters 
(say) as mere “manipulations” of “basic prose” strikes me as pushing the stated and fundamental hope for “a 
straightforward prose” to the breaking point. But the salient point here is that with this description Trilling 
essentially claims Joyce for realism, severely downplaying Ulysses’ shocking formal innovation. His strange 
characterization of Ulysses only further proves that his standards and hopes in this essay are those of the realist 
novel. 
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 This decline of ideas does not reflect any decrease in thought per se. On the contrary, 
thought of a certain kind now multiplies throughout the culture. Such thought has become 
powerful and indeed permeates daily existence: “we eat by reason, copulate by statistics, rear 
children by rule, and the one impulse we do not regard with critical caution is that toward 
ideation, which increasingly becomes a basis of prestige” (258). In short, we now have a society 
of ideology rather than true ideas, a “strange submerged life of habit and semihabit in which to 
ideas we attach strong passions but no very clear awareness of the concrete reality of their 
consequences” (259). With the rise of this abstract and politically unconscious society, then, 
“ideological organization has cut across class organization” (258). The ancien régime of money 
and ideas has been succeeded by the nouveau régime of state authority and an uncritical 
“ideation” leading to prestige. “Art and Fortune” argues that in this era when state power and 
ideology have replaced class and ideas, the novel has lost its traditional (realist) roots and 
rationale, and this loss primarily accounts for its present crisis. 
 But the novel has not yet expired, Trilling asserts. Indeed, these otherwise damning 
circumstances may actually present an opportunity for it. If economic class can no longer 
motivate the novel, then ideological class might. The new novel might dramatize the ideologies 
that presently constitute the world of social and political action. Furthermore, the novel may have 
a political duty in the age of ideology, for a novel that deals “in a very explicit way with ideas” 
may help revive the cause of ideas as against ideology, in part by simply and directly discussing 
them (256, emphasis added). In revitalizing ideas, this new novel may “remind us forcibly of the 
ideological nature of institutions and classes” in the present era (257). All this is not to put the 
novel to exclusively political uses, Trilling is quick to point out. For the essay’s title refers to his 
ultimate belief (along with Aristotle and Agathon) that “Art fosters Fortune, Fortune fosters Art” 
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(qtd. on 260). The novel (Art) must foster Fortune by disrupting the certainties of political 
ideology, yes, but the haphazard nature of Fortune must also foster a novelistic Art that continues 
to be grounded in an only “relaxed,” rather than directly political, will.18 The new novel would 
encourage the play of ideas, which then only might disrupt the dominance of ideological thought. 
This new novel would essentially revitalize the nineteenth-century realist novel’s concern with 
ideas, for an age in which class had been replaced by ideology. 
We should note once again the post-Trotskyist underpinnings of Trilling’s thought in this 
essay. His portrait of a world dominated by a direct form of state politics unconcerned with 
serious ideas, for example, is deeply influenced by New Class theory, however much (as we saw 
in Chapter Three) that critique has begun to be obscured by the abstraction of “ideology.” The 
New Class’s power, we recall, was derived not from the ownership of capital—money—but 
from direct, managerial control of the state itself, a power gained partially via its ability to 
transmute once-rich ideas (Marx) into a merely self-serving ideology (Stalin and even Lenin 
himself, for Trilling). Furthermore, in its recommendation of a novel of ideas opposed to 
ideology, the essay essentially revives Friedrich Schiller’s early-nineteenth-century concept of 
“aesthetic education” and updates it for the era of the New Class. After the Russian Revolution 
(rather than the French), “Art and Fortune” advocates the “relaxed will” of a novel of ideas (a 
kind of Spieltrieb) as the appropriate counterweight to the ideological will characteristic of New 
Class politics. Trilling’s essay responds to New Class theory by imagining a novel that would 
encourage the play of ideas and thus disrupt the dominance of the New Class’s ideological 
thought.                                                         
18 The “relaxed will” is E. M. Forster’s phrase, much admired by Trilling; see E. M. Forster 5. The first chapter of E. 
M. Forster, where Trilling coins the phrase “liberal imagination” and introduces Forster as a corrective to 
liberalism’s failings, may be read as essentially a rehearsal for The Liberal Imagination as a whole, and “Art and 
Fortune” in particular. Indeed, compared to the later works, Forster may be recommended for its often refreshingly 
concrete explication of Trilling’s argument. 
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 But in the context of some poor reviews for The Middle of the Journey, and Trilling’s 
renewed determination to be both an academic and a novelist, it is hard not to read the essay also 
as a defense of Trilling’s own practices and profession. Here I would build upon Lewis 
Simpson’s sharp intuition that around 1946, “when he was working with equal assiduity both as 
critic and novelist,” Trilling “envision[ed] the possibility of resolving his divided career as 
writer” (412). Simpson argues that 1947’s The Middle of the Journey was accordingly “an 
attempt to unify criticism and poetry in the form of a novel” (412). “Art and Fortune,” I would 
argue in turn, is Trilling’s 1948 attempt to theorize this unification. It is Trilling’s attempt to 
unify fiction and criticism—to justify his dual career as novelist and academic—via the concept 
of that revitalized realism he commends for the future novel, a new novel that “No less than in its 
infancy, and now perhaps with a greater urgency and relevance, . . . passionately concerns itself 
with reality” (259). If critics had complained that The Middle of the Journey was too cerebral, 
too given to letting its ideas override the novelist’s higher calling to represent “reality” and 
“experience” (Fiedler 128, Warshow 543), Trilling retorts that the novelistic attention to ideas is 
not a retreat from reality and experience, but rather a means to approach them. Ideas have 
always been central to the realist novel, he points out; and in an era when the power of 
intellectual labor and expertise grows daily, and ideology threatens to overtake somatic reality 
and experience itself (“we eat by reason, copulate by statistics”), genuine ideas may disrupt such 
ideology and hence help to restore experience. And if this conception of the novel can save the 
near-moribund genre itself, we might add, who better to champion a novel of ideas than a man 
daily engaged with them? Who better than a professor? “Art and Fortune” is thus at once a 
meditation on the novel’s problems and potentials in the age of the New Class, and an 
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affirmation of the literary and political importance of ideas—of Trilling’s academic and 
novelistic labor, potentially—in that same era.19 
 Trilling himself, however, remained displeased with his account of the novel’s new 
possibilities. Shortly after reading it to the English Institute (likely that same evening), he wrote 
that he was “very unhappy about my essay which I consider academic, simple-minded, philistine, 
regressive” (“From” 512). Why was Trilling so critical of his essay? I suspect that he ultimately 
believed the novel should never require justification, even partially, by an appeal to politics or 
utility. And thus “Art and Fortune”’s vision of the novel as against ideology ironically made the 
essay a perfect specimen of ideological thought itself—a “philistine” and “academic,” rather than 
purely aesthetic, defense of the novel. So when the largely academic audience at the English 
Institute praised this philistine defense of the novel, it only confirmed Trilling’s disappointed 
sense that he was in fact not a true novelist, but just another cog in the bureaucratic academy. 
Consequently he imagined the more charismatic figures in the English Institute’s audience as a 
kind of silent tribunal: “wanted desperately to be praised by [Mark] Schorer and [Leslie] Fiedler, 
who said nothing—Schorer having vanished. . . . great sense of the superiority of the ‘others’—
Warshow, Fiedler . . .” (512). As for the rest in attendance, their praise actually condemned him; 
                                                        
19 Trilling’s explication of the novel of ideas may have taken inspiration from a review of The Middle of the Journey 
by Morton Zabel in The Nation. In that glowing—and for our purposes still quite interesting—piece, Zabel argues 
that Trilling’s novel is part of “a new genre among novelists,” set in “the milieu of the contemporary literary and 
political intelligentsia” (414). Other exemplars of this new genre include Edmund Wilson’s Memoirs of Hecate 
County and Eleanor Clark’s The Bitter Box. But for Zabel, Trilling’s novel of the intelligentsia in particular is 
perhaps a “classic,” and at the least a “brilliant example of [the] new mode of fiction,” a mode that “brings the best 
critical intelligence now discernible in America into play with an absolutely honest creative talent” (416). Zabel thus 
may have given Trilling the courage to believe not only that intellectual and creative capacity could coexist in the 
same work and man, but also (in “Art and Fortune” especially) that novels like his own might be seminal to the 
future of the novel itself. 
Zabel’s speculation about a new genre of the American intelligentsia should interest us as more than a 
source of psychological inspiration for Trilling, however. It should indeed be accorded some small bit of attention in 
American literary history itself. For it marks an early identification of what I have called (in Part I) “intellectual 
labor fiction.” And as Part II of this dissertation makes clear, the serious genre of intelligentsia fiction that Zabel 
identifies was something like a less popular cousin of the satirical campus novel that took off in the 1950s—and thus 
may also be considered an ancestor of the postmodern novel in America. 
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it “profoundly depressed me—utterly—sickened me with my profession” (512). Thus Trilling’s 
triple discontent—with his essay’s argument, with its unthinkingly positive reception by a 
predominantly academic audience, and with what he believed all this said about himself as a 
novelist—caused him once again to doubt his career choices. His simultaneous attempt to 
advocate the novel of ideas and to synthesize his academic and literary vocations, he believed, 
was misguided and a failure.20 
 But despite Trilling’s disappointment, the essay nevertheless merits serious attention in 
the history of literary ideas. For “Art and Fortune”’s detailed suggestions regarding the formal 
characteristics of this realism-inspired novel of ideas—the formal characteristics that on a 
personal level might justify Trilling’s academic labor, and that on a broader plane might aid the 
novel in disrupting the sway of New Class ideology—in retrospect constitute a bellwether for 
what would come to be called the postmodern novel. The essay’s fifth section begins by 
critiquing one proposed answer to the novel’s problems, Sartre’s theory of “dogmatic realism.” 
According to Trilling, Sartre’s aesthetic intends that “the novel is to be written as if without an 
author and without a personal voice and ‘without the foolish business of storytelling’” (253). 
This novel of dogmatic realism would keep the reader immersed in its fictional world; its reader 
                                                        
20 In September of 1948, Trilling had especial cause to be jealous of Fiedler and to desire his praise. Only three 
months earlier, in June’s Partisan Review, Fiedler had published his (still) famous, (still) infamous essay on 
homosociality and race in American literature, “Come Back to the Raft Ag’in, Huck Honey!” Like Trilling, Fiedler 
was a professor: in 1948 he was teaching at Montana State University. But in this essay Fiedler had proven himself 
capable of a distinctly unbuttoned critical effort, one that no one would have thought to label “academic.” The lively 
and wild essay had shaken up the intellectual establishment at Rahv’s Partisan Review and beyond. On the other 
hand, Trilling’s work, while greatly admired, had never occasioned any such reaction. It was clear that “Art and 
Fortune” wouldn’t either. This may explain a great part of Trilling’s despairing tone as he goes on to relate the 
praise his essay had garnered from Jacques Barzun and Philip Rahv. They each “called me & said the piece was a 
great cultural statement, both using the same phrase. I had sent it to Ph. R. to tell me whether it was suitable for 
P[artisan ]R[eview] & now he is wild for it.—What am I after?” (512). Where Fiedler’s essay had provoked outrage, 
his own more measured effort elicited only dull piety, perfectly symbolized by the uncanny repetition of the all-too-
respectful and contentless phrase, “a great cultural statement.” To continue the Weberian motif, where Fiedler had 
been charismatic, Trilling had only occasioned the routine and mechanical repetition of banal critical acclaim. 
For an account of Fiedler as “Enfant Terrible, American Jewish Critic, and the Other Side of Lionel 
Trilling”—Trilling’s critical alter ego or “double,” as it were—see Walden. 
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“is to be prevented from falling out of the book,” is in fact “made to forget that he is reading a 
book” written by an author at all (253). No prose is permitted that might remind the reader of 
anything outside the book. 
 Trilling’s description already begins to highlight his objections to such an aesthetic. 
Using politically-charged vocabulary, he argues that Sartre’s theory of dogmatic realism aims to 
keep the reader “as strictly as possible within [the novel’s] confines and power by every possible 
means.” His objections then become explicit: “The banishment of the author from his books, the 
stilling of his voice, have but reinforced the faceless hostility of the world and have tended to 
teach us that we ourselves are not creative agents and that we have no voice, no tone, no style, no 
significant existence” (253). The reader of “dogmatic realism” is engulfed by the aesthetic field, 
and shepherded away from actuality. Her or his consciousness is submerged into the hidden 
author’s Weltanschauung. Politically speaking, Trilling spies a brace for fascism and 
authoritarianism in Sartre’s aesthetic theory. Dogmatic realism’s complete capture of readerly 
consciousness, we might say, finds its best political analogy in the “big lie” of modern (New 
Class) political propaganda. It is the aesthetic of ideology. Readers caught in such an aesthetic, 
an aesthetic dedicated to the occlusion of what the young Marx called “sensuous reality,” are 
robbed of their role as what Trilling calls “creative agents.” If we were to phrase Trilling’s 
objections in Lukácsian terms, we would say that dogmatic realism propagates the reader’s 
reified consciousness, held in thrall to a fetishized novel that slyly represents the master 
consciousness of an author whose labor is purposefully hidden from sight.21                                                         
21 Here is perhaps the best place to address the intent of my chapter’s title, “Ideology and the Consciousness of the 
Professoriat.” Students of Marxist theory with an eye for allusion may have noticed that it alludes to the title of 
Georg Lukács’s celebrated chapter in History and Class Consciousness, “Reification and the Consciousness of the 
Proletariat.” Lukács had been amongst Weber’s circle in Heidelberg from 1912 to 1916, as Weber was writing 
Economy and Society; and so Weber’s critique of bureaucratic discipline and the rationalization of thought strongly 
affected Lukács’s concept of reification: “The specialisation of skills leads to the destruction of every image of the 
whole,” Lukács opines in one particularly Weberian passage (103). (The Marxist Lukács, of course, ultimately turns 
 211 
 Trilling’s remedy for such political-aesthetic ills follows immediately: “Surely what we 
need is the opposite of this, the opportunity to identify ourselves with a mind that willingly 
admits that it is a mind and does not pretend that it is History or Events or the World but only a 
mind thinking and planning—possibly planning our escape” (253-54). This more or less repeats 
                                                        
to the commodity fetish, more than institutional authority, to explain reification’s source. Lukács’s early 
development in Weber’s circle is explored in Löwy 37-40, Congdon 82-89, and Gluck passim.) Given Weber’s 
eventual influence on Trilling as well, observed in a footnote above, it should not be surprising that there is a family 
resemblance between Lukács’s critique of reified thought as an instance of the commodity fetish and Trilling’s 
rejection of ideology: “pellets of intellection” was one of Trilling’s most evocative, and notably material, metaphors 
for ideological thoughts, for example (Liberal 284). Hence my chapter title’s substitution of Trilling’s “Ideology” 
for Lukács’s “Reification” is only partially tongue-in-cheek. Trilling’s conception of a would-be hegemonic New 
Class in the academy, of course, accounts for the substitution of “Professoriat” for Lukács’s “Proletariat.” 
But in addition to this indirect family resemblance between Trilling’s “ideology” and Lukács’s 
“reification,” via the ur-source of Weber, Lukács had a surprisingly direct influence on Trilling, in a manner thus far 
unremarked in the critical commentary. As Mark Krupnick has noted, Trilling persistently appropriated the term 
“dialectic” in the thirties and beyond as an honorific means of describing complex thought (51-55). It is in this 
ongoing attraction to the “dialectical” that we may see the Lukácsian heritage in Trilling’s work. Trilling did not 
learn the importance of the dialectic from Lukács directly, but from a contemporary Marxist student of John 
Dewey’s—the famously formidable philosopher Sidney Hook. It is in fact nearly impossible to overestimate Hook’s 
influence on Trilling’s forty-year dedication to “dialectical” thought itself, however much Trilling eventually 
molded the concept to his own purposes. Diana Trilling relates that Hook was responsible for converting both her 
and Lionel to Communism while they all stayed at the Yaddo artists’ colony in the summer of 1931 (179-83). Hook 
then became a mentor to Trilling’s dissertation work for much of the thirties (Krupnick 44-45, 51). And in Hook’s 
celebrated 1933 book on Marx, Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx, Hook rightly acknowledged his 
“indebtedness” to the work of Lukács in History and Class Consciousness (xii). For Hook had followed Lukács in 
heretically considering dialectical thought, more than any specific social or political belief, to be Marx’s essence. 
Thus it is quite plausible to say that the mature Trilling’s great theme of the need for complex, anti-ideological 
thought—the flexible and imaginative thinking we most associate with him today, that he frequently called 
“dialectical”—found its original inspiration, via Hook, in Lukács’s 1923 “Studies in Marxist Dialectics” (as the 
subtitle of History and Class Consciousness has it). Even if the intent was to be ironic, then, the title of Martin Jay’s 
classic study of the Frankfurt School, The Dialectical Imagination, echoes Trilling’s The Liberal Imagination quite 
appropriately: Trilling’s most famous and representative book indeed has important roots in Western Marxism’s 
attempts to emphasize the specifically dialectical heritage of Marx. 
None of this intellectual genealogy suggests that the mature Trilling was a closeted Marxist, of course; not 
even so eccentric a Marxist as the Lukács of History and Class Consciousness, or for that matter the Sidney Hook of 
Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx. But it does serve as clear evidence that the concept of “dialectical” 
thought, emphasized by Lukács and then Hook, profoundly influenced a young Trilling who sought to assert the 
value of intellectual autonomy while still evincing his commitment to Marxist politics. An irony of American 
intellectual history, then, is that through Trilling—and no doubt others of his generation who followed a similar 
trajectory—the “dialectic” of Lukács and Western Marxism more generally helped form the “end of ideology” ethos 
in mid-century American thought. The most iconic anti-Marxist idea of the 1950s, in short, came to being only with 
the help of an equally iconic Marxist concept. From there, as this section of the chapter will go on to show, the 
notion of the dialectic also helped create the anti-ideological literary and intellectual phenomenon we have come to 
call postmodernism. 
For an account of how the Lukács-inspired Frankfurt School influenced American intellectual life, 
including the work of the New York Intellectuals, much more than is typically thought, see Wheatland. The 
Frankfurt School, of course, was housed along with Trilling at Columbia University from 1934 to 1950, in the form 
of the Institute of Social Research; see Jay 39 and 286 regarding the beginning and the end of the Institute’s time at 
Columbia. 
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in brief, with greater political emphasis, what Trilling had once admired about E. M. Forster’s 
fictional habits: 
He teases his medium and plays with his genre. He scorns the fetish of “adequate 
motivation,” delights in surprise and melodrama and has a kind of addiction to 
sudden death. Guiding his stories according to his serious whim . . . Forster takes 
full and conscious responsibility for his novels . . . . Like Fielding, he shapes his 
prose for comment and explanation, and like Fielding he is not above an 
explanatory footnote. . . . 
 In all this Forster is not bizarre. He simply has the certainty of the great 
novelists that any novel is a made-up thing and that a story, in order to stand 
firmly on reality, needs to keep no more than one foot on probability. (E. M. 
Forster 5) 
An epiphanic scene from his 1945 story “The Other Margaret” likewise documents Trilling’s 
fascination with the contrast between the pleasure of aesthetic absorption (à la Sartre’s dogmatic 
realism) and the greater pleasure of a knowingly aesthetic creation:  
When Elwin . . . had listened to his daughter playing her first full piece on the 
recorder, he had thought that nothing could be more wonderful than the 
impervious gravity of her face as her eyes focussed on the bell of the instrument 
and on the music-book while she blew her tune in a daze of concentration; yet 
only a few months later, when she had progressed so far as to be up to airs from 
Mozart, she had been able, in the very midst of a roulade, with her fingers moving 
fast, to glance up at him with a twinkling, sidelong look, her mouth puckering in a 
smile as she kept her lips pursed, amused by the music, amused by the frank 
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excess of its ornamentation and by her own virtuosity. For Elwin the smile was 
the expression of gay and conscious life, of life innocently aware of itself and 
fond of itself, and, although there was something painful in having to make the 
admission, it was even more endearing than Margaret’s earlier gravity. Life aware 
of itself seemed so much more life. (28-29) 
By the time of “Art and Fortune,” this aesthetic of deliberately teased mediums and genres, of 
amused sidelong looks and “frankly” excessive ornamentation—this “life aware of itself”—
constitutes not merely a set of pleasures, but in fact an unsurpassed aesthetic education. For 
Trilling asserts that “To know a story when we see one, to know it for a story, to know that it is 
not reality itself but that it has clear and effective relations with reality—this is one of the great 
disciplines of the mind” (254, emphasis in original). Such awareness has political as well as 
purely mental value, Trilling believes, since the mind that can exist between fiction and reality in 
this manner, maintaining a firm distinction between the two, is a mind resistant to New Class 
society’s urge to drown the varieties of individual and political experience in the shallow pool of 
ideology. Hence “liberating effects . . . may be achieved when literature understands itself to be 
literature and does not identify itself with what it surveys” (254). A reflexive aesthetic was thus 
one cornerstone of Trilling’s response to the dangers of narrowly bureaucratic, ideological 
thought. 
 Both Trilling’s critique of rigid, bureaucratized ideas, and his consequent promotion of a 
conscious fictionality, we may now note, bear more than a passing resemblance to central tenets 
of what was later called “the postmodern.” In his imagination of a society (and aesthetic) where 
bureaucratically-produced ideology has permeated the core of daily existence, in other words, we 
have a forerunner of the postmodern emphasis on reality as a kind of fiction (ideology) in itself. 
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And in his hope for a novel of ideas that would disrupt such ideology, we have a forerunner of 
the postmodern belief that a playful incredulity toward metanarratives—perhaps in the form of 
meta-fiction, wherein “literature understands itself to be literature”—might be an appropriate 
response to a world dominated by abstractions.22 By inventing the concept of a reflexive novel of 
ideas that would justify the academy’s potential for thought as against the bureaucratized and 
ideological world at large—an ideal of the novel rooted in realism’s hopes to represent social 
reality—Trilling had taken steps toward the creation of some of postmodern fiction’s most 
frequent legitimating theories and self-understandings. Trilling’s attack on ideology might lay 
foundations for the postmodern mistrust of “reality” itself; and his promotion of a self-conscious 
novel purveying contestable ideas, rather than an uncontestable and all-encompassing ideology, 
might conduce to a postmodern metafiction that emphasized its existence as nothing more than 
fiction. 
 To say all this is not to call Trilling a postmodern, of course. Stephen Tanner notes that 
Trilling’s “was essentially a nineteenth-century conception of the novel”—that is to say a still 
realist one—and thus argues that Trilling’s prediction that the coming novel would deal directly 
with contemporary ideas “simply revealed his conservative hopes” for a novel that would partake 
as much of social and intellectual life as his Victorian idols’ creations did. In the end, he 
observes, Trilling’s predictions “proved embarrassingly wide of the mark” (101). And indeed, 
while Trilling admired E. M. Forster’s reflexive penchant for the open play of ideas, one can 
only guess how he might have reacted if Ishmael Reed’s Mumbo Jumbo, say, had descended 
from the heavens onto his desk while he was writing the essay. (It is hard to imagine he would 
have come down with his own case of Jes Grew.) This holds equally true for Trilling’s own                                                         
22 “Incredulity toward metanarratives” is, of course, Jean-François Lyotard’s famous short definition of the 
postmodern; see Lyotard xxiv. 
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practice of fiction. For example, 1947’s The Middle of the Journey—with its intense and open 
discussion of ideas, and only a straightforward if sparse plot to sustain it—is much closer to the 
“realistic” political fiction of Trilling’s beloved Henry James novel, 1886’s The Princess 
Casamassima, than to such postmodern political fiction as Robert Coover’s 1977 novel The 
Public Burning. Thus we should not call Trilling, and I am not calling Trilling, a postmodernist 
avant la lettre. 
 I am saying, however, that Trilling’s literary-formal response to both Stalinism and 
academic labor was an aesthetic theory and indeed a body of ideas, rooted in realism, 
recognizably capable of developing into postmodernism. For with Trilling’s skepticism of New 
Class power, of a masked will that dominates most at the moment it seeks to speak for others’ 
good, we are potentially on the way to Foucault’s skeptical account of disciplinary power, a 
power so often advanced under the academically-trained and bureaucratic auspices of experts in 
mental health, prison reform, and psychoanalysis. Likewise, Pynchon’s vast conspiracies may 
appear in this light simply as delirious amplifications of the bureaucratic “organizational 
impulse” that Trilling imagined as central to higher education and contemporary liberalism 
(Liberal xii). But simultaneously, with Trilling’s flexible new liberalism opposed to any simple 
understanding of “reality,” and his conception of a self-consciously fictional novel of ideas, we 
are potentially on the way to Nabokov’s impish, joyous proliferation of narratives and 
interpretations, and to Barthesian jouissance. We are even potentially on the way to Derrida’s 
poststructuralist celebration of a “play” that evades all logocentric claims to absolute truth.23                                                         
23 Regarding the topic of Trilling’s possible relationship to poststructuralism, it’s intriguing to note that during a 
public lecture delivered near the end of his life in 1975, Trilling groused that structuralism was “another system” 
akin to the Stalinism of his youth, a system that was “antithetical to will and individual freedom” (Langbaum 65). 
Thus he would certainly have been sympathetic to ideas challenging structuralism. Nevertheless, it’s simultaneously 
true that had he lived longer Trilling might have mistrusted the eventually profound influence of poststructuralism as 
well, particularly if he believed that influence to be essentially antirationalist and determinist (as in the common 
caricatures of Derrida and Foucault, respectively). My only argument here, in any case, is that in the 1940s and 
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Trilling’s mid-century new liberalism and his realist novel of ideas, predicated upon his 
simultaneous skepticism of and hope for the possibilities of intellectual and academic labor, 
provided openings for two central strains of postmodern thought and aesthetics. Both the quasi-
paranoid and the giddily liberatory were possibilities to be extrapolated from this famously 
moderate author’s mind. 
 Trilling’s duality and ambivalence was integral to his career, and it is part of what 
continues to make him fascinating. I have argued in Chapter Three and here alike that his 
ambivalence was rooted in a deep skepticism regarding intellectuals generally, and academic 
labor more specifically, a skepticism that in turn shaped the anti-ideological stance characteristic 
of his new liberalism and his novel of ideas. But more surprisingly, I have also argued—and I 
think the point bears repeating—that the chastened politics of his new liberalism and the 
oftentimes brooding quality of his fiction were not built solely on skepticism. For what lay 
behind his critiques and concerns, back of Trilling’s characteristic reticence and nuance, was a 
profound hope for intellectual autonomy and intellectual freedom. Understood in the concrete 
social terms that Trilling usually submerged beneath his abstractions, it was a hope for the 
autonomy and freedom of intellectuals themselves. His outlook on intellectual labor in the 
forties, especially, thus consisted of equal parts fear and desire. It feared the increasingly 
ideological nature of New Class society; it desired a political existence for intellectuals as free as 
that of a physically healthy and philosophically firm John Laskell, unfettered by the ideological 
thinking of both Maxims and Crooms. It feared the bureaucratization of intellectual life in the 
academy; it desired academics’ labor to be as free as Tertan’s mind, existing beyond the 
immediate concerns of this time and that place. It feared the debasement of fiction held to the                                                         
1950s he had contributed to an antibureaucratic, antisystemic intellectual milieu where poststructuralism and indeed 
“postmodernism” itself might later thrive. 
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narrow and Stalinist standards of “socialist realism”; it desired artists’ freedom to delight in pure 
creation, much as a Forster or a Mozart would—it desired, in other words, an aesthetic practice 
in which intellectual workers could openly traffic in ideas, without thinking to apologize for the 
inevitable discontinuity between their roaming imaginations and the actual, material world. 
Trilling’s pervasive anxieties about academic life and his utopian hopes for a life of autonomous 
thought and intellectual labor thus molded his career from beginning to end. In equal measure, 
we shall see, such institutional fears and political hopes offered a rich basis for both the campus 
novel’s characteristic themes, and the anti-ideological and intellectually utopian culture of 
postmodernism itself. 
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Chapter Five 
 
On the Campus Novel and the Possibility of Postmodernism: 
Antibureaucratic Politics in Mary McCarthy’s Academe1 
 
 
1. Mary McCarthy and the Invention of the Campus Novel 
Shortly after the publication of Trilling’s “Of This Time, Of That Place,” and in the same 
year that Partisan Review began a series of columns offering a “Report from the Academy,” 
Mary McCarthy herself went back to college—as a professor, teaching at Bard College for the 
1945-1946 academic year. She tried her hand at teaching again in the spring semester at Sarah 
Lawrence in 1948, but in the end gave up on academia permanently in order to continue her 
career as a freelance essayist and novelist. Why? Though she enjoyed what she later called “this 
business of studying” (“Art” 10)—the focused and detail-oriented reading necessary for 
preparing her classes—she nevertheless found the work as a whole simply too grueling to want 
to do again. “It was all quite mad, crazy. I had never taught before, and I was staying up till two 
in the morning every night trying to keep a little bit behind my class,” she joked ruefully (9). 
Though she did not have as much experience with academic life as Trilling, nor did she agonize 
over it as much, then, Mary McCarthy’s time as a professor nevertheless made a firm impression 
on her.2 
 And like Trilling as well, she determined to make fiction out of her experience. But 
McCarthy’s uproarious satire of academic life, 1952’s The Groves of Academe, was quite 
different from any of Trilling’s earnest stories, and thereby holds a special place in American 
literary history. In writing The Groves of Academe, Mary McCarthy sparked something new. She 
                                                        
1 A portion of the last section of this chapter has appeared previously in Henn, “Realism By Other Means?” I thank 
The Journal of the Midwest Modern Language Association for permission to reprint it here. 
2 Kiernan’s biography offers the most material regarding McCarthy’s time teaching; the year at Bard is recounted on 
pages 235-60, while McCarthy’s stint at Sarah Lawrence is discussed on pages 282-84. 
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created what we now call “the campus novel,” a postwar genre satirizing higher education, 
especially faculty and administrators. As we saw in the Interlude, novels about academic life in 
America may of course be traced back to Bowdoin graduate Nathaniel Hawthorne’s first novel, 
Fanshawe, published in 1828. More such academic novels—the term I use here to label all 
novels about academic life, from which the specifically satirical genre of the campus novel 
emerged—were then published sporadically in the nineteenth century, and by the 1890s there 
was a dependable yearly stream of them. The latter half of the 1920s in particular witnessed a 
remarkable increase in their production.3 But if before the 1950s academic novels had primarily 
concentrated on undergraduate hijinks, or the occasional tragedy befalling sensitive professors, 
with McCarthy’s Groves the tide seemed to turn. Comparatively bare-knuckled satire of the now 
ignoble faculty became more common, and indeed dominant. In America alone, the genre has 
since flourished with such comic novels as Randall Jarrell’s Pictures from an Institution (1954) 
(often thought of as an answer to McCarthy’s Groves), Vladimir Nabokov’s Pnin (1957) and 
Pale Fire (1962), Saul Bellow’s Herzog (1964), John Barth’s Giles Goat-Boy (1966), Alison 
Lurie’s The War Between the Tates (1974), Don DeLillo’s White Noise (1985), Jane Smiley’s 
Moo (1995), and Richard Russo’s Straight Man (1997). Critical reflections on this postwar genre 
thus rightly (and routinely) cite McCarthy as its progenitor.4 Though novels about academic life 
                                                        
3 In this context, and with Trilling’s academic short stories now under our belt, it is time to note that this 1920s 
generation of academic novels may have influenced Trilling’s fiction. Trilling knew two academic novelists from 
his work at Columbia. Early in his Ph.D. program, Wanda Fraiken Neff—the wife of his future dissertation advisor 
Emery Neff—published a novel called Lone Voyagers (1929), set in a fictionalized University of Minnesota. Four 
years later, in 1933, John Erskine, creator of Columbia’s “Great Books” concept (Krupnick 47) and Trilling’s 
cherished undergraduate mentor, published Bachelor—of Arts while still teaching English at the university. On 
Neff’s book, see Kramer 94; on Erskine’s, see Kramer 75. I refer to the older edition of Kramer’s bibliography, 
which generally offers fuller plot descriptions of its novels; in the 2004 edition, Neff’s novel is described on 187, 
while Erskine’s is recounted on 37. 
4 Guardian critic Aida Edemariam, for example, states unequivocally that “The campus novel began in America, 
with Mary McCarthy’s The Groves of Academe.” In the more careful statements of scholars, McCarthy also retains 
pride of place in the genre’s history. In his introduction to Nabokov’s 1957 campus novel Pnin (“Exiles”), critic and 
celebrated campus novelist David Lodge writes that McCarthy’s novel “has some claim” to being the first campus 
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existed for over a century by the time she wrote The Groves of Academe, in other words, 
McCarthy was largely responsible for the campus novel’s mid-twentieth-century birth as a comic 
genre.5 
But outside of a few brief sections in monographs dedicated to McCarthy, The Groves of 
Academe has been the subject of little analysis, and even fewer close readings. What has caused 
this novel’s comparative critical neglect? Many factors, doubtlessly. But the novel’s uneven 
quality itself likely bears a large share of the responsibility. McCarthy’s friend Nicola 
Chiaromonte may have hit on the novel’s central flaw when he wrote a letter to Dwight 
Macdonald about the one chapter he had read. It was “very clever and confused,” he told Dwight 
Macdonald (qtd. in Kiernan 336). “If Mary only learnt to stick to some line of consistent 
development, instead of showing off in all directions” (336).6 What Chiaromonte found true of 
one chapter, I would argue, is a telling critique of the work as a whole: The Groves of Academe 
is a novel that never confidently decides upon its primary ideas, or how they all relate to each 
other.  
This roughness of form will be important to my analysis of the novel’s role in American 
literary history in this chapter, and so it bears a bit more examination at the outset. Much of the 
problem almost certainly lay in the process of composition. McCarthy complained at the time 
that she didn’t know how to present the ideas in her novel, and her efforts on this front may well                                                         
novel; while in the online Literary Encyclopedia, Charles Knight observes most precisely that the “satiric campus 
novel, in its contemporary form” begins with McCarthy’s work. 
5 Making allowances for the exaggerations typical of grant proposals, it’s interesting to note that McCarthy herself 
thought she was engaged in a pioneer effort when writing her campus novel: “the [academic] milieu is relatively 
unexplored by fiction,” she told the Guggenheim Foundation in the late forties (qtd. in Gelderman Mary McCarthy 
167). For sociological speculation on the causes of the campus novel’s emergence in the fifties, see the Interlude. 
6 Chiaromonte had read the chapter “on the College setup,” “on advise [sic] from Hannah Arendt” (qtd. in Kiernan 
336). Kiernan assumes that by this he means he read the first chapter (336), wherein Henry Mulcahy first learns of 
his termination and determines to fight it. But that chapter sets up the novel as a whole, rather than presenting “the 
College setup” specifically. Thus it is more plausible that Chiaromonte is referring to the fourth chapter, “Ancient 
History,” where McCarthy presents the history of Jocelyn College, satirizing several of its perennial disputes about 
matters of pedagogy—a chapter that is admittedly especially multidirectional, even within the context of Groves. 
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have interfered with her ability to arrange and unify the ideas themselves. As she was in the 
midst of making a last push to finish Groves in June of 1951, she confessed to her friend Hannah 
Arendt that she found it “harder and harder to blend the action with the opinion of the action” 
(Letter of 27 June 1951, 4). How to convey the (many) ideas animating it? She did not want to 
write a “talk-novel where the characters discuss the ideas—while they are being enacted. This 
seems a bit too packaged, like the spaghetti and the sauce and the cheese all in one box for your 
convenience” (4, emphases in the original). She had determined to write from the point of view 
of her largely unsympathetic protagonist Henry Mulcahy (“Characters” 286), but never found the 
method satisfactory. “There are moments when one would like to drop the pretense of being 
Mulcahy and go on with the business of the novel,” she confessed years later (287). The novel 
bears the marks of her struggle over perspective too, I would argue, for she does indeed 
increasingly “drop the pretense of being Mulcahy” in the novel’s last hundred pages. Mulcahy’s 
relative absence there allows for the more frequent presence of John Bentkoop, a professor of 
religion whose wise and conspicuously analytical speeches make him akin to a Greek chorus for 
the novel. With Bentkoop, in short, an element of McCarthy’s feared “talk-novel” infiltrates her 
otherwise Mulcahy-centered satire. (This is not an altogether bad thing, since Bentkoop’s 
speeches often tie together previously disparate ideas in what is, after all, a novel of ideas—a 
novel that lives or dies by its ability to encourage thought.) In any case, one surmises that it was 
difficult and frustrating for McCarthy to convey her many ideas while stuck inside Mulcahy’s 
necessarily limited consciousness; and yet that she did not want to write omniscient narrative 
either. Thus thinking through and arranging her ideas may have taken a back seat to the more 
basic problem of exposition. As a result, this insistently satiric and intellectually extravagant 
novel never entirely gels. 
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But despite the novel’s limitations—which should not detract from its many pleasures, 
both local and global—I will argue in this chapter that McCarthy’s foundational campus novel 
does have something like a coherent political philosophy. On its surface level, the novel is a 
send-up of McCarthyist academic politics in the 1950s: it features a visiting professor at a liberal 
arts college (Mulcahy) who actually claims past membership in the Communist Party in order to 
generate sympathy from the novel’s ostentatiously progressive faculty, and thereby secure 
reappointment for another year. Understandably, then, critical discussion has often dealt with the 
novel’s politics in relation to McCarthyism. In this chapter, however, I want to establish a 
broader sociological and philosophical basis for the novel’s politics.7 I will begin by arguing that 
                                                        
7 Though it is thus not my concern in this chapter, the debate over McCarthyism is too central to the novel to ignore 
entirely. For those interested, then, I comment here on this elephant in the unusually small room of criticism on the 
novel. For critics on the left, the novel’s send-up of liberal (Senator Joseph) McCarthy-era politics has never been a 
comfortable one: The Groves of Academe mocks its professors’ blinkered eagerness to embrace the anti-McCarthyist 
cause on campus much more than it does McCarthyism itself. (This fact doubtless also helps explain the novel’s 
failure to attract attention from many academic critics.) Nevertheless, over the years two main lines of liberal-left 
defense for the novel have been established. The first and most subtle is that the novel offers a philosophical attack 
on McCarthyism; the second is that the novel’s satire is simply narrowly-aimed, attacking the hypocrisy of anti-
McCarthyists without denying the evils of McCarthyism per se. Both these interpretations are unconvincing, I think. 
The novel’s relationship to McCarthyism should remain disconcerting at best for left-leaning critics. 
Sabrina Fuchs Abrams argues for the novel’s underlying philosophical opposition to McCarthyism. She 
admits that the novel is, in part, “a comment on the tendency of fellow-traveling liberal intellectuals in the Cold War 
atmosphere of persecution and paranoia unquestioningly to defend the academic freedom of accused Communists” 
(72). But she also insists that it stands as “a warning against the all-consuming power of ideology,” and thus “can 
also be seen as an indictment of the anti-Communist hysteria consuming America in the 1950s” (73). I agree that the 
novel attacks ideology. But I’m not persuaded that the novel’s attack on ideology in general can then be so easily 
translated into an attack on McCarthyism in particular. As I will make more clear below, actual McCarthyism never 
makes a direct or emotionally serious appearance in the novel; the only ideology consistently on (satirical) display in 
the novel is anti-McCarthyist liberalism itself. Any reading of the novel as an attack on McCarthyism thus strikes 
me as overly generous. 
Mary McCarthy herself defended the novel as a satire aimed narrowly, a send-up of only hypocritical anti-
McCarthyists. When interviewed by William F. Buckley on his PBS program Firing Line in June of 1971, 
McCarthy defended the moral and political legitimacy of her satire in The Groves of Academe thus: “there was a lot 
of hypocritical breast-beating going on among people who talked about the loss of their cultural freedom” during the 
McCarthy era. “They had not lost it,” she averred bluntly (“Is America” 147). Before further analysis, it is 
enormously important—historically, politically, and even ethically—to note that McCarthy’s statement has a 
definite basis in fact. Ellen Schrecker, our preeminent historian of McCarthyism on campus, essentially agrees with 
McCarthy when she somewhat bitterly points out that “support for the anti-Communist crusade [in higher education] 
was superficial and . . . resistance to it entailed far fewer risks than people imagined” (337). There was hypocritical 
breast-beating among intellectuals and academics in the McCarthy era, in short. Liberal intellectuals’ laments that 
they had “lost” their cultural freedom were frequently only expressions of cowardice—all too common excuses for a 
personal refusal to speak and otherwise act against McCarthyism, excuses that prolonged and effectively aided the 
purges. Thus the real criticism to be made of Mary McCarthy’s denial that McCarthyism had succeeded in robbing 
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with however light a satiric touch and subtle a political current, Mary McCarthy’s invention of 
the campus novel in 1952—much like The Company She Keeps in 1942—rests on a conception 
of middle-class brain workers as the metaphorical foundation of a potentially totalitarian society. 
But where the earlier novel imagined a class basis for its mental workers’ politics (the politics of 
“bureaucratic collectivism”), this novel instead offers a primarily institutional portrait of 
bureaucratic intellectual workers (faculty) who at their worst share only a reified consciousness, 
and are thus akin to totalitarian masses incapable of seeing anything that contradicts their 
prefabricated conceptions of the world. And if The Groves of Academe evokes such immense                                                         
intellectuals and academics of their “cultural freedom” is not that it was untrue. It is rather that she used the truth of 
McCarthyism’s limits to downplay the danger of McCarthyism itself, rather than to attack liberal cowardice in the 
face of an otherwise real threat. 
And her novel, I would argue, unfortunately reflects this belittling of McCarthyism as a serious threat. 
There is one meaningful mention of McCarthyism’s effect on Jocelyn early on, no doubt. At Jocelyn, Mulcahy 
reflects, there had been “a suicide among the former Students for Wallace, an attack from the Catholic pulpit, the 
withdrawal of a promised gift, [and] a deepening of the budgetary crisis” (12). But the gravity of this declaration is 
almost immediately undermined by its satiric use: Mulcahy notes that these somber events mean (to him) only that 
“the dismissal of an outspoken teacher, at this turning point in the college’s affairs, might seem a leetle too 
opportune, especially if it could be shown that the teacher in question had engaged in political activities of the type 
now considered suspect” (12). The real facts of McCarthyist repression serve primarily as an opportunity to reveal 
Mulcahy’s self-serving cynicism as a publicly liberal academic. Of Mulcahy’s own genuine harassment at a 
previous college all we are told (a page earlier) is that the legislature had accused him of “‘Communistic, atheistic 
tendencies,’ as evidenced by a few book reviews in the Nation, of all places, a single article in the old Marxist 
Quarterly (‘James Joyce, Dialectical Materialist’), and a two-dollar contribution to the Wallace campaign” (11). 
This ultimately only amused account of McCarthyism on campus pokes as much fun at the victim (the embarrassing 
reductiveness of his article’s title, the cheap shallowness of his commitment to the Wallace campaign) as it does the 
McCarthyists themselves. And in any case these two solitary, early, and jokey references to McCarthyism are soon 
forgotten as the novel moves on to its nearly three hundred pages documenting a foolish anti-McCarthyist crusade at 
Jocelyn. The novel thus lacks any sustained and serious treatment of the McCarthyist threat, and principally attempts 
to satirize anti-McCarthyists only. 
As such, Mary McCarthy’s novel could easily give aid and comfort to the enemy, as it were. In the 1971 
interview, for example, the arch-conservative Buckley reads The Groves of Academe as proof that “to have been an 
anti-McCarthyite made it much, much safer for you in academic circles and even in government circles” (McCarthy, 
“Is America” 147). It would be surprising if Buckley’s essentially pro-McCarthyist interpretation were his alone. For 
this reason the novel’s politics in relation to academic McCarthyism, as well as its author’s, should remain difficult 
to celebrate for left-leaning literary critics. 
A brief coda, however: all this should not distract us from the fact that Mary McCarthy herself was by and 
large an open opponent of the Senator who bore her last name. She published a number of essays critical of 
McCarthyism (most of them collected in On the Contrary: “No News,” “The Contagion of Ideas,” and “My 
Confession”), for example, and at one point she even seriously considered dropping her literary career in order to 
pursue law school and then argue civil rights cases arising around McCarthyism. Though her single-minded satire of 
McCarthyism’s liberal opponents was often misguided, her opposition to McCarthyism as a whole should not be 
doubted. To my mind Carol Brightman’s excellent chapter on “That Other McCarthy” offers the best synoptic 
analysis of Mary McCarthy’s sometimes lethargic but no doubt sincere opposition to McCarthyism (Writing 351-
61). 
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and fundamental political problems, its implicit solution is no less sweeping: the novel advocates 
a universalist vision of liberalism opposed to the reifying and isolating habits of bureaucratic 
society. Finally, however, this chapter will move beyond a close reading of the novel’s social and 
political philosophy to a discussion of its role in American literary history—as both the first 
campus novel and, I will contend, a precursor of postmodernism in both literature and thought. 
By examining the antibureaucratic cast of McCarthy’s later literary criticism, we may see that 
The Groves of Academe marks a point where for many socially conscious authors the basic 
assumptions of realist fiction were no longer tenable, and consequently where postmodern 
themes of epistemological undecidability and decentralized power became viable. As both the 
product of a crisis in realism and an attempt to create an antibureaucratic liberalism that 
addressed the concerns of intellectual workers, the first campus novel anticipated many of the 
central sociopolitical and aesthetic hallmarks of postmodern literature and theory. 
 
2. Bureaucratic Reification and the Totalitarian Campus 
 
Most of the fun and sparkle of The Groves of Academe lies in its gleeful parody of 
academic life as a typical bureaucracy. One cannot read the work without laughing at the petty 
struggles for power, the inefficiency, and the ultimate inability to accomplish anything that often 
defines Jocelyn College. The comic reversal of the novel’s conclusion is enough to substantiate 
this: a college President is forced to resign in the hope that his successor might be able to 
exercise enough authority to refuse to reappoint Henry Mulcahy, an often incompetent professor. 
Along the way to that conclusion, we see a multitude of comic squabbles that seem to constitute 
Jocelyn. Mulcahy rails not only against the termination of his job, but against an imagined plot to 
reroute eggs meant for the dining hall to an outside buyer. (He archly calls on the dietitian “to 
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unscramble, if she would be so good, for her colleagues, the history of the twenty thousand 
eggs” [4, emphasis in the original].) Almost the whole of the fourth chapter is set aside to 
establish the pettiness of Jocelyn’s governance debates. There, in often great detail, we are 
treated to the history and controversy surrounding such burning and regularly-discussed issues as 
the long-standing January “field-period” (71-75), the concept of “individual instruction” (75-82), 
and whether the college should “drop the term progressive and substitute experimental on page 
three of the catalogue”—not to mention the appropriate spelling of “catalogue (catalog?)” (70). 
“From its inception, the college had been rent by fierce doctrinal disputes of a quasi-liturgical 
character” (69), we are told, but “nobody cared, beyond the immediate disputants, how the issues 
were resolved” (70). The surface level of plot, in short, confirms professor Domna Rejnev’s 
judgment that Tolstoy would have wisely pronounced the faculty and administrators “fools” 
(251) for being “so concerned with trivialities” (252). In the most immediate sense, The Groves 
of Academe is a brilliant parody of bureaucratic triviality.8 
                                                        
8 Two essays from the early fifties also confirm that McCarthy understood and worried about higher education as an 
increasingly bureaucratic institution. The more widely-known of the two, “The Vassar Girl,” was first published in 
Holiday magazine in May of 1951; it was republished in her essay collection On the Contrary in 1961. Going back 
to her alma mater nearly two decades after graduation, McCarthy finds that Vassar students aren’t living up to 
Vassar’s reputation for bohemian independence and intellectuality. In her time away, proudly contrarian Vassar had 
become “a miniature welfare state” (208); the once independent Vassar student now depended “on the college and 
its auxiliary agencies to furnish not only education but pleasure, emotional guidance, and social direction” (207). 
There was thus an “administrative cast” to “the present Vassar mold”; a “uniform, pliant, [and] docile 
undergraduate” was the result of a contemporary Vassar education (210). In the course of a generation, the “Vassar 
girl” had gone from adventurous bluestocking to sheep-like bureaucrat. 
A largely unknown talk for BBC radio listeners in 1952 offers McCarthy’s other contemplation of higher 
education in this era. If “The Vassar Girl” had concentrated her fire on her alma mater alone, “New Trends in 
American Education” attempted a general analysis, decrying a change taking place across every one of the 1,301 
American colleges in existence (136). The college of old, “a sheltered refuge from the world of action” dedicated to 
intellect alone, was now threatened by “the strengthening of its ties to commercialism and to the so-called realities 
of world politics.” The “professor who used to be napping in his study is today on an aeroplane or a sleeper with his 
briefcase, indistinguishable often from the sales executive who occupies the next seat” (137). Those who were not 
aiding business were advising politicians: “Nowhere today, except in Washington itself, does one hear so much 
political lowdown as in the university faculty rooms” (137). Much as at Vassar, the Arcadian college of old was now 
caught up in the bustling and conformist bureaucracies of corporate and governmental life. By the early fifties, in 
short, McCarthy understood the academy as a bureaucratic institution representative of the wider bureaucratized 
world itself. 
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But a key essay written by McCarthy shortly after Groves suggests that she took 
bureaucracy—whether in academia or at large—as more than just a subject of lively fun. In an 
ostensible review of Edgar Johnson’s biography of Dickens, McCarthy draws a connection 
between capitalism, bureaucracy, and “the whole of modern ‘humanistic’ culture” itself 
(“Recalled” 224). She suggests that Dickens’s contemporary critics suffer from the same 
problem as his characters: the “thingification of man, to use Kant’s term.” What is the 
thingification of man? In the wake of the Industrial Revolution, she writes, all of Dickens’s 
characters “have lost their humanity” and instead “obdurately become things” (222). Those that 
do not become cold and vicious react to the Industrial Revolution’s “mechanization” and 
“alienation” (221) of humanity by living as if they were integral parts of the “shatterproof 
hierarchical structures” that have formed in response to the need for efficient production (222). 
They have “officialized” themselves, “like Mr. Dorrit, the Father of the Marshalsea, receiving his 
testimonials; or Mr. Bounderby, who has invented his own authorized biography; or Mrs. Gamp, 
who has invented her own reference, the imaginary Mrs. Harris” (222). When they are not 
villainous, in short, Dickens’s characters nevertheless betray an inhuman distance and lack of 
warmth all too characteristic of the Industrial Revolution’s drive for efficiency. 
Dickens’s critics betray the same sins, McCarthy suggests. Each of them “clears his 
throat with a vast administrative harumph” (218) before writing something that resembles “the 
report of some officially constituted commission” (217). Such reports shoddily rely on “the 
metonymic principle”: a “part” of Dickens “is substituted for the whole, and a single 
‘incriminating’ utterance is produced in court to lay bare the man in his totality” (218). 
Associating Dickens’s critics with bureaucracy, then (“officials,” “commission,” 
“administrative”), McCarthy notes a tendency of all of them, friendly and not, to offer an only 
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partial view of the man and his work. These “administrative” critics see aspects of Dickens, 
taken out of context, but never observe the whole of him. In McCarthy’s sweeping conclusion, 
she suggests that the bureaucratic alienation and resultant inability to think about the whole that 
she spies in Dickens’s characters and critics alike “perhaps underlie[s] the whole of modern 
‘humanistic’ culture” (224). What we might call the Industrial-Bureaucratic Revolution has led 
modern intellectuals to view culture as a series of partial objects, rather than a whole. 
Strange as it is to say, in this essay McCarthy’s perhaps unconscious blend of a young 
Marx (“alienation”) and a mature Weber (“mechanization,” “administrative,” “officialized”), as 
well as her insistence on the importance of seeing things in their totality, recalls the Lukács of 
History and Class Consciousness. Like him, at least, she is a critic of abstracted thought who 
traces its roots to a bureaucratically-inflected capitalism. So without suggesting an equation 
between the two figures or their political beliefs—McCarthy was never a revolutionary Marxist-
Leninist, nor at this point was she even much of a socialist—I want to suggest that we might 
profitably replace her citation of “Kant’s term,” the “thingification of man,” with Lukács’s term: 
reification. Not only is the word more felicitous than “thingification,” but it also more readily 
calls to mind what I will argue is the antibureaucratic social critique of contemporary capitalism 
informing much of McCarthy’s thinking (not to mention that of many a liberal New York 
Intellectual) in the early fifties. No matter how much McCarthy’s satire depicts bureaucratic 
culture in higher education as a source of comic triviality, The Groves of Academe nevertheless 
also attacks bureaucratic thought as the source of grave ethical and political consequences. More 
specifically, the novel depicts its faculty as bureaucrats whose reified conceptions of the world 
block their access to reality itself—thus allowing them to lie to themselves and others. This 
theme of bureaucratic, reified thought indeed offers the novel not only a greater degree of 
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intellectual coherence than has been recognized, but also political heft. If taken beyond the 
campus, the novel ultimately suggests, such bureaucratically-induced dishonesty may even lead 
to a proto-totalitarian political culture. 
A brief summary of this relatively unread novel at the outset will prove helpful. The 
Groves of Academe opens with literature professor Henry Mulcahy’s discovery that his job at 
Jocelyn, a liberal arts college, is not being renewed. He is outraged, and immediately begins 
scheming to keep his job. Enlisting the help of sympathetic students and faculty, he tells his 
allies both that his wife Cathy is gravely ill, and that he is being fired because Jocelyn President 
Maynard Hoar fears what would happen if his brief membership in the Communist Party is 
revealed to the public. At comically hyper-progressive Jocelyn, the mere accusation of red-
baiting is enough to secure many allies, and Mulcahy—despite what we learn is his decidedly 
mixed record as an educator—becomes a cause célèbre. But we eventually discover that his two 
claims are false: his wife Cathy is not seriously ill, and he was never a member of the 
Communist Party. He is being let go from the faculty only because the cash-strapped college 
can’t afford to keep him; and he was warned of this probability from the start of his year-long 
appointment. President Hoar had only hired him in the first place as an earnest attempt to give 
temporary shelter to a professor who indeed had been unjustly harassed over falsely alleged past 
Communist activity at his previous job. Despite Mulcahy’s dubious standing, however, faculty 
pleading wins him a one-year reappointment. Some time later in the spring semester, Mulcahy 
then manages to catch the President in the act of investigating (for the first time) whether 
Mulcahy is now, or ever has been, a member of the Communist Party. The President’s actions 
are not motivated by any McCarthyist animus, of course. Hoar only wants to discover if Mulcahy 
has lied about his Party membership, including before a state legislature previously: for if he has, 
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then the President and Jocelyn College itself have protected a perjurer—a fact that could damage 
both President Hoar himself and the institution he represents. But Hoar’s inquiries into 
Mulcahy’s political past nevertheless look enough like McCarthyism to allow Mulcahy to 
blackmail him. The novel ends as Hoar decides to resign: as long as Mulcahy has the ability to 
blackmail the President for his apparent “investigation,” the college will never be able to rid 
itself of the errant professor. Thus the dishonest and self-centered Mulcahy keeps his job for at 
least another year, while the comparatively noble President quits—with a considerable sense of 
relief. 
Early on in the novel, Mulcahy draws our attention to a critique of bureaucratic thinking 
we are already familiar with: the new liberal discourses initiated by Lionel Trilling in the 1940s, 
best summarized in his 1950 essay collection The Liberal Imagination. Trilling’s influence on 
the novel may be spied in the novel’s first pages, as Mulcahy declares that President Hoar 
possesses “a simple intelligence,” “an administrative mentality that feels operationally, through 
acts” (5). Hoar’s is a bureaucratic mind, in other words, opposed to Mulcahy’s own supposed 
(and Trillingesque) “imagination that is capable of seeing and feeling on many levels at once” 
(5). Sounding more and more like Trilling, Mulcahy guesses that Language and Literature 
professor Domna Rejnev, too—his principal ally on the faculty—suffers from a liberal lack of 
imagination: “she was a true liberal . . . who could not tolerate in her well-modulated heart that 
others should be wickeder than she, any more than she could bear that she should be richer, 
better born, better looking than some statistical median” (52). She was “a perfect example of 
these mental processes, even when one would have thought that her eyes would have been 
opened to a darker truth about human nature than her philosophy admitted” (52-53). Trilling’s 
Liberal Imagination in fact finally figures by name into Mulcahy’s scheme to keep his job at 
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ultra-“progressive” Jocelyn. “The idea that a man in his right mind would run the risk of 
proclaiming himself a Communist when the facts were the other way would simply occur to no 
one,” Mulcahy realizes, for “the ordinary liberal imagination . . . could not encompass such a 
possibility” (99). Mulcahy’s whole dishonest plot, which in fact sets in motion the otherwise 
comic plot of the novel itself, is thus founded on a Trilling-like belief that the liberal 
imagination, rigidly limited to the bureaucratic norms of “statistical medians,” is unable to 
comprehend evil and deception. 
But a central irony of the novel is that Mulcahy possesses a “liberal imagination” himself, 
a mind warped by reification. John Bentkoop, the wise professor of religion, offers the most 
incisive summary of this point. “Hen has a remarkable gift, a gift for being his own 
sympathizer,” Bentkoop opines to Domna. However, he continues, this “gift” is actually “a 
species of self-alienation” (205). The result of such self-alienation is that Mulcahy is “loyal to 
himself, objectively, as if he were another person” (205). He has in fact “foregone his 
subjectivity and hypostasized himself as an object” (205). In short, Mulcahy’s self-alienation has 
led to the reification of his very being. And as Bentkoop further suggests, Mulcahy’s reified 
consciousness has also led to the creation of a self utterly unmoored from empirical reality: 
The criteria of truth and falsity, as we know them, don’t exist for Hen. He doesn’t 
examine his statements from the point of view of the speaker, but from the point 
of view of the listener. He listens to himself as you or I might listen to him and 
asks himself, “Is it credible?” Even in private soliloquy, credibility is the standard 
he applies; that is, he looks at truth with the eyes of a literary critic and measures 
a statement by its persuasiveness. If he himself can be persuaded he accepts the 
moot statement as established. This is real alienation. (206) 
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Mulcahy’s self-alienation is so complete that his sense of “the truth” has become detached from 
reality. He reifies his self and “the truth” alike, turning them into things capable of being 
fashioned independently of external evidence, and thence examined only for their ability to 
sound “credible.” Reification causes Mulcahy to lie to himself and to others. 
Bentkoop’s acute observations are substantiated by the novel’s opening pages, which 
detail what is perhaps the most important and telling example of Mulcahy’s reified thought 
process. Upon reading the letter notifying him that he will not be reappointed, Mulcahy 
meditates that “To be fired at this juncture, when he was halfway to tenure, was unthinkable. 
Consequently, he refused to be fired” (9-10). We may make at least three observations about 
these conjunctive statements. For one, despite Mulcahy’s framing of his discontinuance, no one 
has contemplated “firing” him. He is simply not being reappointed. Second, Mulcahy’s inability 
to imagine the loss of his job comes, as we eventually discover, well after Jocelyn’s President 
has offered him clear and written warnings that this might happen. Delusionally dedicated to a 
reified conception of his own permanence at Jocelyn, in other words, Mulcahy forgets and 
ignores all evidence that contradicts it. But most importantly, Mulcahy’s whole inability to 
imagine a world in which he could be “fired” is presented here as the actual source of his 
determination to stay in his job. It is “unthinkable” that he should not have the job, and so 
“consequently” he refuses to be “fired.” He simply and literally cannot imagine losing his job; 
ergo it shall not be. His reified conception of himself (“I am a professor at Jocelyn College”) 
causes him to lie to himself and thence the rest of the campus. The plot of the novel is thus 
predicated not just on Mulcahy’s estimation of others’ liberal imagination, of the bureaucratic 
and reified conception of reality that makes them incapable of comprehending evil, but on 
Mulcahy’s own reified conception of his permanence at Jocelyn. 
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Lest we think the problem of reification is Mulcahy’s alone, however, we should note 
that more sympathetic faculty in the novel share it. Critic Timothy Waples has made a case for 
regarding professor Alma Fortune as the sadly unelaborated feminist heroine of The Groves of 
Academe, and views with admiration Alma’s bold decision to resign in protest over Mulcahy’s 
termination (82-84). But though Alma is clearly to be admired for her independence and courage, 
she is drawn with more irony than Waples recognizes. For Alma’s resignation is based on a 
reified conception of Henry’s righteousness, one that refuses to examine its preconceptions. 
McCarthy is still somewhat the Freudian in this novel: Alma’s quick resignation may easily be 
read as the repetition of a childhood gesture, that of leaving her abusive father when she was 
fifteen (150). But while her father was unjust, President Hoar has not been; and so in the case of 
Henry Mulcahy, like most faculty in the novel, she has been readily duped. She accepts 
Mulcahy’s “truth” without serious investigation and defends him because it seems a righteous 
thing to do—that is, it fits her reified conception of a world in which father figures like President 
Hoar unjustly punish their faculty children. Just as importantly, she defends Mulcahy because it 
allows her to re-fashion, as in her childhood, a brave and daring self in rebellion against unjust 
authority. Too caught up in this reified image of herself and then Mulcahy, both derived from her 
own history of a decisive break from abuse, Alma does not seek the truth. Something less than a 
feminist heroine pure and simple, she resigns hastily and without true cause. By this action she in 
fact becomes akin to Mulcahy. She creates a “truth”—Mulcahy’s supposed persecution by 
Hoar—based not in reality, but on a reified image of her heroic self. 
Domna Rejnev is perhaps the novel’s most sympathetic character, whom in later years 
McCarthy lamented too closely resembled herself (Intellectual Memoirs 99). But she is likewise 
revealed as an ideologue willing to bend the truth to fit political purposes. She is first introduced 
 233 
to us as “a smoldering anachronism, a throwback to one of those ardent young women of the 
Sixties, Turgenev’s heroines, who cut their curls short, studied Hegel, crossed their mammas and 
papas, reproved their suitors, and dreamed resolutely of ‘a new day’ for peasants, workers, and 
technicians” (37). Her personality itself is thus an instance of reification, a model derived from 
previous examples rather than created in response to the empirical world it inhabits. Her body, 
full of sharp angles and firm divisions, serves to confirm her mental inflexibility: her nostrils are 
“finely cut,” her hair “dark, straight,” her profile “severe” and “clear-cut,” her lips “fine-drawn” 
(37), and her voice “low, concise, even” (38). Taken as a whole, “Her very beauty had the 
quality, not of radiance or softness, but of incorruptibility; it was the beauty of an absolute or a 
political theorem” (37). Dedicated to a self out of Turgenev and possessing more than a whiff of 
political rigidity, Domna’s reifying mind then fails to exercise appropriate skepticism toward 
Mulcahy’s explanations. When she first tells another faculty member Mulcahy’s story of 
political persecution, she in fact reflects that the story “was incredible”: literally, something one 
can’t or at least shouldn’t believe. But then “her training”—as a scholar, as a (bureaucratic) 
academic—assures her that this “did not make it any the less true” (87). As she later realizes, “I 
think really, in my heart, I knew all along” about Henry’s mendacity. “I think I hid from myself 
what I did not want to see” (214). But her reified conception of her own righteousness, and of 
Henry as a “cause,” prevents her from even looking for the truth. 
Moreover, much like Alma and Mulcahy himself, Domna’s rigid dedication to Mulcahy’s 
supposed cause induces her to lie. Her first reaction upon hearing his story is to dress it up; she 
treats it as an object to be molded to the cause. A few years earlier Mulcahy had testified to a 
state legislature (in reality, truthfully) that he was not a member of the Communist Party. Domna 
realizes that this fact will make him look bad to other faculty once he now “confesses” his 
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present membership, so she asks him: “You don’t mind, do you, if I date your last active 
membership back a few years, say, before you were investigated by the legislature?” (59, 
emphasis in the original). (Mulcahy indeed does not mind if she lies for him.) And when she tells 
Mulcahy’s “incredible” tale to another faculty member, she similarly makes “certain little 
modifications and additions that [as she rationalizes it] would make the President’s guilt more 
evident to an a-political audience” (87). Later she lies to the President himself in order to defend 
Henry, telling Hoar that students admire Mulcahy, when in fact she has no evidence for this 
(185). Much like Mulcahy and Alma, in short, Domna’s reifying mind—a mind which allows her 
to fashion empirical reality according to an abstract sense of “justice”—impels her to lie, to 
herself and to others. 
Themes of reification and dishonesty do more than inform the portrayal of character in 
The Groves of Academe, we may now see. They also run prominently through the novel’s 
varied—and otherwise seemingly unrelated—philosophical dialogues, revealing the concept of 
reification to be central to the novel as a whole. For example, the theme of reification underlies 
the conversation about love that follows Domna’s discovery that Mulcahy has been lying all 
along, and that his wife Cathy has been complicit in the ruse. Realizing Domna’s disappointment 
in Henry, Cathy obliquely explains that “What you love in a person is his essence, not the dross 
of appearance” (199). “Love is the discovery of essence,” she posits (199): there is no necessary 
connection between the self you love and the outward actions of that self, between Henry’s 
“essence” and his dishonest scheming; they are separate. A sadder and wiser Domna now 
disagrees with this rationalization. One’s outward actions and one’s inward being must coincide. 
“Appearances intimate to us; they do not flatly deceive,” she declares (199). “One must love in 
depth,” she insists; “Fair without and foul within has no charm for me” (200). The self cannot be 
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understood as a disconnected essence that one can love, a reified object apart from the world it 
acts in. 
This credo against the reification of “appearances” as opposed to essence also has an 
aesthetic dimension in the novel, where it is posed as the problem of content and form. “Your 
department’s monstrously one-sided,” John Bentkoop tells Domna; “you’re concerned with 
formal questions exclusively: Tolstoy’s method, the method of Virginia Woolf, the elucidation of 
Mann’s symbols, the patterns of Katherine Anne Porter” (209-10). The educational effects of 
such a “monstrously one-sided” formalist pedagogy, he goes on, are to create a generation of 
“sophisticated literary hollow men, without general ideas, without the philosophy or theology 
that’s formed in adolescence, without the habit or the discipline of systematic thought. Our 
students have literally no idea what they think or believe except in questions of taste . . .” (210). 
Trained only to look at the formal patterns of literary works, these students never learn to truly 
think. The faculty’s obsession with form is another kind of reification, in other words. Much as 
Cathy’s love for Mulcahy depends on the reification of his actions as something separate from 
his being, the Literature department’s formalism isolates and reifies art, turning it into a formal 
object separate from its roots in thought.  
If the entire Literature department thus reifies form over content, one Literature professor 
in particular takes formalism to its extreme in the novel. Poet Herbert Ellison’s formalism 
permeates every part of his life, both his likes and his dislikes. Frankly bored by “most general 
ideas”—by content, in short—he is naturally also not interested in the work of James Joyce, for it 
was “too naturalistic,” too focused on material existence (223). Nevertheless, Ellison likes to 
hear Mulcahy read Joyce out loud, “for the rhythms and vocabulary” alone (223). He loves the 
game of charades too (223); it is a game where one subjugates content (what one is in actuality) 
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to form (what one shows to the other players). The comic apogee of Ellison’s formalism, 
however, comes when we discover that “the legend put about by the students, that he wore 
nothing under his outer clothing, was correct” (223). Concerned with all things exterior, and 
dismissive of all things interior—whether ideas in art or underwear on his person—Ellison 
reifies form as something utterly separate from content. 
But just as importantly for my analysis, Ellison also demonstrates that in this novel 
reified consciousness has not just philosophical and moral consequences, but political ones as 
well. To understand this, we must pause to note the profound effect that reading her friend 
Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) had on McCarthy while writing her 
novel. In an effusive note to Arendt in April of 1951, McCarthy exalted her path-breaking 
treatise as “a truly extraordinary piece of work, an advance in human thought of, at the very 
least, a decade” (Letter of 26 April 1951, 1). It was at this time, after reading The Origins of 
Totalitarianism in its entirety and sending her letter of praise, that McCarthy entered into a 
period of intense work on Groves. By her own account, she “worked terrifically all summer to 
finish it, eight or nine hours a day” (qtd. in Gelderman, Mary McCarthy 165). Frances Kiernan 
tells us that the “last third of the manuscript” in particular “had been completed in one great 
spurt, by dint of her writing as many as eighteen hours a day” (333). Thus a great part of her 
novel about Jocelyn College was written with Arendt’s treatise on totalitarianism fresh in the 
author’s famously exact memory.9 
                                                        
9 I should take this moment to clarify my purpose in using the words “totalitarianism” and “totalitarian” in this 
chapter. I am employing such words only to describe a central concept of McCarthy’s (and of course Arendt’s) 
political thought. One should not take the appearance of such terms, then, as tacit acceptance of Arendt’s specific 
thesis in The Origins of Totalitarianism. In fact I think that Arendt’s work—while I admire it immensely for its 
irreplaceable insights into modern political life, both then and perhaps even more so now—offers only a thin 
discussion of Stalinist Russia, and thus remains unconvincing in its claim that the Nazi and Soviet states were 
essentially identical. 
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The exhilarating experience of reading the Origins seems to have focused McCarthy’s 
attention on the more saturnine possibilities of Ellison as a character, at the least. Ellison 
emerges from the background in the last third of the novel—the third McCarthy wrote primarily 
after reading her friend’s tome on totalitarianism—to become Mulcahy’s coldly political 
lieutenant: 
The fact that [Ellison] was not liked in the department neither grieved nor 
interested him; he saw that the voting strength was divided three to two against 
himself and Mulcahy, with [Literature Department head Howard] Furness as the 
pivotal figure, and he treated Furness frankly for what he was—a pivot—making 
no attempt at friendship and merely assuming, at critical junctures, that Furness 
would want to be told how to vote. . . . He did not forget, either, that Domna had 
only half a vote, which seemed to him, in fact, her primary characteristic; he did 
not, like Mulcahy, worry over what she might think or do if she “caught on” to 
what was being planned against her. “She has only half a vote,” he replied 
tranquilly, whenever such conjectures were broached. (222) 
Here we may see a crucial link between the novel’s concerns with reification and its political 
meditations. For Ellison’s reifying habits—Furness becomes a “pivot,” Domna “half a vote”—let 
him treat others strictly as objects to be used for a given end. Such ruthlessness in politics, albeit 
faculty politics, is reminiscent of the “cynicism” Arendt felt characterized totalitarian 
movements, especially at the elite levels (Origins 382).10  Looking ahead in Arendt’s work, we 
might also say that in comical fashion, the methodical and ruthlessly reifying Ellison plays                                                         
10 All citations of The Origins of Totalitarianism refer to the “New Edition” of Arendt’s 1951 work, which 
incorporates revisions made in 1958 and 1966. I have used this edition because it is the most widely available. But 
all passages cited in this chapter were also included in the original edition, the edition McCarthy read while writing 
Groves. (For Arendt’s account of the changes made between 1951 and 1966, many of which involved simply finding 
a new home for passages from the deleted “Concluding Remarks” of the original edition, see xxiv-xxv). 
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Eichmann to Mulcahy’s Hitler. He is the professor’s cynical aide de camp, responsible for the 
execution of tasks without regard for any larger truth.11 Only an extreme example of the other 
faculty whose reification of Henry’s “cause” blinds them to any facts contradicting his story, the 
totalitarian Ellison carries out his Leader’s plan with an astonishing lack of curiosity regarding 
any person or thing that might contradict the Leader. 
 In describing the techniques used to plan a conference on contemporary poetry, the novel 
in fact directly compares Ellison’s methods to those of totalitarian movements. When his 
invitation list for the conference is revealed—a few older and established poets will be 
surrounded by an overwhelming number of newer poets who are Ellison’s personal friends—
Domna calls his plan an attempted “putsch” in the world of poetry. “Is she accusing me of being 
a fascist?” Ellison incredulously asks the rest of the faculty at the meeting (239). Though only a 
short silence, punctuated by a lone cough, comes in reply, the answer seems clear. So does the 
justice of Domna’s characterization.  
Furthermore, the formalist Ellison’s attempts to drum up attendance for the conference-
cum-putsch are modeled on Nazi propaganda techniques, one main subject of Arendt’s analysis 
of totalitarian movements (341-64). “WHERE ARE THE POETS OF THE MASSES?” reads the 
at first mysterious sign blazoned across campus in “crude red ink” (231). We soon discover that 
Ellison, rather than some radical student, is behind this. Ellison justifies his dishonest gambit as  
an appropriate device . . . for stirring up interest in the conference. There can be 
no proper debate if the passions are not roused. You mistake what Hen and I have 
been doing, sowing fear and anticipation among the students. They’re being 
taught to take poetry seriously, like a baseball game. . . . Choosing up sides. It’s 
                                                        
11 See Arendt’s 1963 “Report on the Banality of Evil,” Eichmann in Jerusalem. 
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the only way to run these things, to give them the quality of a mythic contest. 
(234-35)  
If Ellison seems reminiscent of Eichmann in his unquestioning loyalty to Mulcahy and his 
thoughtless efficiency, here he is nothing less than Goebbelsian in his mastery of propaganda. 
Determined to arouse student “passions,” sow “fear and anticipation,” and create “the quality of 
a mythic contest”—without regard to any truth that might interfere with his reified political 
goals—Ellison’s propaganda for his poetry conference resembles the epic (and on some level 
ridiculous) propaganda of Nazism. 
Last but certainly not least, the structure of the novel recalls Arendt’s account of the 
structure of totalitarian movements, a part of The Origins of Totalitarianism that McCarthy 
singled out for praise in her admiring letter to Arendt.12 For Arendt, totalitarian movements were 
arranged in multiple levels of ascending commitment to the movement, each primarily in contact 
with only the level immediately above or below it. Thus fellow-travelers form the lowest level, 
and they only meet the ordinary members of the totalitarian party; these members in turn 
fraternize with party elites, who are themselves in touch with the Leader’s intimates; while 
finally the intimates are of course gathered around the Leader himself. This linked structure had 
two primary functions. First, it served to shield adherents at every level from any belief that 
might deviate too far from their own. Second, as a consequence it “normalized” and confirmed 
each adherent’s belief. The beliefs of those followers “below” seemed less fervent but 
nevertheless authenticated their own more “firm” beliefs, while the beliefs of those “above” 
seemed perhaps “overstated” but nevertheless essentially right. As an attempt to understand why 
McCarthy so admired her friend’s analysis, we may say that in Arendt’s account, the totalitarian                                                         
12 She “liked particularly,” she told Arendt, the section “on the structure of the totalitarian movement, with the 
fellow-travelers representing ‘reality’ to the members, the members to the cadres, and so on” (Letter of 26 April 
1951, 2). 
 240 
movement’s structure of largely self-contained levels serves to reify its followers’ beliefs. 
Fundamentally unchallenged at all levels, the adherents of a totalitarian movement live “in a 
fools’ paradise of normalcy; the party members are surrounded by the normal world of 
sympathizers and the elite formations by the normal world of ordinary members” (368). Along 
with propaganda techniques, this structure made totalitarianism—in the words of McCarthy’s 
letter to Arendt—“a scheme in the minds of certain displaced men to rob other men of their sense 
of reality” (26 April 1951, 2). In the Origins itself, Arendt concludes her discussion of the danger 
of totalitarian movements with a memorably chilling summary. “In a totally fictitious world,” 
she writes, “failures need not be recorded, admitted, and remembered. Factuality itself depends 
for its continued existence upon the existence of the nontotalitarian world” (388). If 
universalized, the totalitarian organization of isolated levels could serve to destroy fact itself, 
transforming the world into a tissue of falsehoods. 
The structure of McCarthy’s novel similarly emphasizes the hierarchical dissemination of 
lies throughout an organization. Patiently mimicking the structure of Jocelyn College, the novel 
depicts false information—Cathy Mulcahy’s supposedly critical illness, Henry Mulcahy’s 
supposed membership in the Party—percolating upward through the campus bureaucracy 
without serious dispute. Each of the first four chapters, for example, ends with a gesture toward 
this progression of misinformation. At the end of the first, Henry tells his student that he was 
fired. A smart propagandist, he knows that his misinformation about the event will spread across 
the campus, to his benefit. “He had consolatory visions of student petitions, torchlight parades, 
sit-down strikes in the classroom,” and so “like a conductor, he thought, with raised baton over 
the woodwinds of [his student’s] feelings,” he sets his orchestrated plot in motion (19). At the 
close of the second chapter, he leaves to tell Domna (35). Domna closes the third chapter by 
 241 
making a list of Mulcahy’s faculty supporters (60), and ends the fourth by reporting Mulcahy’s 
firing to the head of the Languages Department, Aristide Poncy (89). The rest of the novel 
continues to limn the circulation of misinformation, as the next two chapters depict faculty 
debate and resolutions on the matter. The seventh chapter, appropriately titled “Oh What a 
Tangled Web We Weave,” ends with Mulcahy reluctantly deciding to stop the student petition he 
himself had encouraged in the first chapter (165-66). The eighth chapter at last reaches the level 
of the President’s office, where, amazingly, the facts of Mulcahy’s story are challenged for the 
first time. Domna finally discovers the truth—or at least most of it—in the ninth chapter. In this 
way, carefully hiding facts until well over half the text is over and a multitude of characters at 
various levels of the campus bureaucracy have credulously accepted Mulcahy’s fabrications, the 
novel imposes on the reader some semblance of the experience of the totalitarian circulation of 
reified lies. The novel is thus not content to indict its characters alone as dupes of reification; as 
its readers, we too are surprised by the sin of our participation in mass gullibility via a kind of 
reification.13 Like the faculty, we are participants in a campus structure resembling the structure 
of a totalitarian movement. 
The remaining four chapters depict the consequences of Jocelyn’s swarm of information 
and misinformation, as Henry is reappointed and begins planning and hosting a poetry 
conference for the Spring semester. The conference itself, which occupies the last three chapters, 
provides some perspective at last: though it does not make them any more immune to petty 
rivalries than the faculty, the poets’ existence outside of the college nevertheless provides a 
balance to the hothouse of Jocelyn campus politics in which the rest of the novel has immersed 
us. Accordingly, visiting poet Vincent Keogh offers the last and best word on the bureaucratic                                                         
13 I borrow the term “gullibility” from Arendt’s Origins as well; she argues that “a mixture of gullibility and 
cynicism . . . became an everyday phenomenon of [the] masses,” who would thus credulously accept the tenets of 
totalitarian propaganda (382). 
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campus’s relationship to the circulation of reified information, and its consequences for ethics 
and politics. After participating for a bit in Jocelyn’s internal politics—telling President Hoar and 
some faculty that Mulcahy wasn’t a member of the Communist Party, and then telling Mulcahy 
that they were asking about his politics—he debates telling Domna that he has told Mulcahy. But 
soon he rejects the idea, and in the process he rejects the whole complex of information and 
misinformation that is Jocelyn College:  
No, he inwardly shouted to himself; Keogh, keep out of this, or they will get you. . 
. . Within twenty hours, he perceived, they had succeeded in leading him up the 
garden path into one of their academic mazes, where a man could wander for 
eternity, meeting himself in mirrors. No, he repeated. Possibly they were all very 
nice, high-minded, scrupulous people with only an occupational tendency toward 
backbiting and a nervous habit of self-correction, always emending, penciling, 
erasing; but he did not care to catch the bug, which seemed to be endemic in these 
ivied haunts. (295, emphases in the original) 
He refuses to become a part of this bureaucratic system, a system that in his metaphorical 
estimation both perpetually circulates new information, as in the revision of a scholarly essay 
(“always emending, penciling, erasing”), and perpetually distorts that information, much as a 
hall of mirrors distorts images. He refuses to be claimed by Jocelyn’s mix of reified gossip and 
information, so dangerously akin to totalitarianism’s unquestioned ideologies. 
The novel’s epigraph, from Horace, reminds readers that truth is to be sought in the 
groves of academe: “Atque inter silvas academi quarere verum,” it reads; in English, “and into 
the groves of academe to seek the truth.” But for Keogh, and one senses for the novel itself, the 
academy is the last place one should hope to find the truth. Its “groves” are rather a “tangled 
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web” of bureaucracy where reified information circulates largely without reference to any 
empirical truth that might challenge its preconceptions. In this web of reified, propagandistic 
misinformation and organizationally-reinforced lies, Mary McCarthy’s bureaucratic campus 
resembles, in comic form, nothing so much as Arendt’s “totally fictitious world” necessary for 
the victory of totalitarianism. The postwar campus novel thus begins its tenure (forgive the term) 
with a distinctly philosophical and political set of reflections on what happens to truth in a 
bureaucratic society where reified information circulates without vigorous debate.  
 
3. Truth, Freedom, Responsibility, and Justice; or, Universalist Liberalism against 
Bureaucracy 
 
McCarthy’s novel thus depicts bureaucratic intellectual labor and reified thought as 
conducive to both personal dishonesty and a proto-totalitarian political culture. But it also 
advocates a more constructive set of values. Groves implies solutions to the problems it defines. 
For example, a real and vigorous search for truth—as opposed to the pseudo-truths or even 
falsehoods found ready-made via bureaucratic reification—is one of the novel’s most cherished 
political goals. The importance of the search for truth is indeed the affirmative creed that forms 
the primary basis for the novel’s satire: the epigraph’s assumption that one seeks truth in the 
groves of academe offers an earnest keynote against which readers can measure all the failures of 
that ideal that follow. But the antibureaucratic politics evinced in The Groves of Academe are 
more thorough-going than this belief in the importance of seeking truth. I will now suggest 
specifically that by borrowing from certain Sartrean themes and again from contemporary 
theories of totalitarianism, Groves also champions a distinctly universalist conception of such 
values as freedom, responsibility, and justice. Taken as a whole, these values add up to an 
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affirmation of cosmopolitan liberalism against an age of middle-class bureaucracy that McCarthy 
saw emerging both on and off campus. 
McCarthy was not always enthusiastic about Jean-Paul Sartre (nor especially about the 
woman whom French tabloids called “Notre-Dame-de-Sartre”—Simone de Beauvoir 
[Brightman, Writing 328]), but there is no use denying the influence of Sartrean existentialism on 
her novel.14 She seems to have been particularly fascinated by the Sartrean charge that every 
individual bears a moral responsibility for all of humanity. Sartre’s existentialism, recall, asserts 
first that humanity is defined by its absolute and terrifying freedom in a world without any 
transcendent meaning or purpose. The corollary of this absolute freedom is that each individual 
of necessity bears an absolute and universal responsibility for all others: for Sartre, every action 
taken in a world without transcendent purpose necessarily implies one’s personal moral 
judgment of what is right for all. This ever-present and vast ethical charge means that “anguish” 
(“Existentialism” 292), rather than exhilaration, is the natural state of human beings “condemned 
to be free” (295), forced to make choices in a world of absolute freedom and therefore universal 
responsibility.15 
In The Groves of Academe, it is Domna Rejnev who thinks most about existential themes 
in general. Like her creator, she is prone to making domestic metaphors out of serious ideas: she 
“had to force herself to do the dishes,” we are told, “by deciding every night not to do them, 
which, as she pointed out to one of her tutees, was a homely illustration of Kierkegaardian 
freedom; by deciding not to do the dishes, she recovered her freedom to choose to do them” 
(251). And in a more specifically Sartrean fashion, Domna furthermore connects an idea of                                                         
14 For a sense of McCarthy’s skepticism regarding Sartre, see for example her cutting review of his play Les Main 
Sales in 1949 (“Sartre and the McCoy”). On McCarthy’s experience of existentialism and existentialists more 
generally, and her acidulous feelings about de Beauvoir in particular, see Brightman’s biography, 327-50. 
15 This very basic summary of Sartre’s position is taken from his popular essay of 1946, “Existentialism is a 
Humanism.” 
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existential freedom to the idea of personal responsibility, refusing (for example) to forgive 
Henry’s lies simply because of his upbringing and environment: “No doubt this cringing soul 
reflects social conditions; one has only to look at Henry to imagine the matrix that formed him . . 
. . But there is also in each individual the faculty of transcendence; there is in each of us a limited 
freedom” (213). In Domna’s more tempered version of Sartrean freedom, Henry is at least 
partially free, and thus responsible for his own actions despite whatever has shaped them. 
But even if she dilutes the absolute nature of Sartrean freedom when discussing Henry, in 
one of the novel’s more touching scenes we may see that she does no such thing when examining 
herself: a distinctly Sartrean anguish in the face of her infinite responsibility weighs heavily upon 
Domna. Near dawn, at the end of a late-night talk with John Bentkoop wherein Domna debates 
her complicity with what she now knows to be Henry’s lies, Bentkoop tries to reassure her. 
Discussing their advocacy of Henry when speaking to President Hoar, Bentkoop has suggested 
that the President was relieved by their strong support; it allowed him to keep Henry, which was 
what he had wanted to do anyway. They had “accepted responsibility” for Henry, thereby 
absolving Hoar of that responsibility (215). But instead of comforting her, “The word, 
responsibility, seemed to lie on her shoulders like a burden,” and “sunk her into new 
perplexities” (216). “‘Responsibility,’ she whispered, ‘what does it mean, we accept 
responsibility for Henry? Does it mean we underwrite him for one year, or are we stuck for 
life?’” She then laughs, but “rather nervously” (216). Her laughter attempts to mask how serious 
the question is for her: does responsibility ever end, or is it, as Sartre said, an infinite 
responsibility that is the ineluctable condition of human existence? Bentkoop, practical and 
comforting, tells Domna that responsibility has limits—their responsibility for Mulcahy lasts a 
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year only, he answers—but Domna isn’t as sure (216). She and the novel itself are influenced by 
the strenuous ethical charge of existentialist concepts of responsibility. 
This theme of “responsibility” is not merely an ethical concern in the novel, however; it 
is political as well. A politicized conception of “responsibility” standing opposed to bureaucracy 
was in fact the keynote of at least two articles regarding totalitarianism prominent in McCarthy’s 
circle during the forties, and these articles will help us see the novel’s own antibureaucratic 
liberalism more clearly.16 Hannah Arendt’s “Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility” 
(1945), for example, takes as its occasion the then-growing discovery of the full extent of the 
Holocaust. The title’s first half, “Organized Guilt,” refers to the article’s claim that Nazi 
Germany has organized the guilt of its citizens, their culpability in mass murder, so as to 
eliminate the distinction between (ordinary, innocent) German and (extraordinary, guilty) Nazi. 
The Nazis have been able to do so, Arendt argues, because “the family man” has been 
transformed—not just in Germany, but everywhere—“from a responsible member of society, 
interested in public affairs, to a ‘bourgeois’ concerned only with his private existence and 
knowing no civic virtue” (22). Attuned only to this private existence, “When his occupation 
forces him to murder he does not regard himself as a murderer because he has not done it out of 
inclination but in his professional capacity” (23). He has succumbed, in short, to “the 
bureaucratic organization” of what amounts to an “administrative mass murder” (22, 21). The                                                         
16 Though I cease to discuss existentialism after making this transition to a discussion of the political ramifications 
of the word “responsibility” in McCarthy’s circles, I am not suggesting thereby that existentialism was apolitical. 
Sartre’s existentialism was political in the forties already, as a reading of his postwar article “Portrait of the 
Antisemite” (published in Partisan Review) should make clear. (There, Sartre presented the antisemite as a man 
terrified by his absolute freedom, haunted by and in flight from a world that offered no metaphysical guidance; the 
antisemite shores up his sense of self by indicting “the Jew.”) Arendt herself, whose political thinking in the mid-
forties is discussed below, had deep personal and philosophical connections to German existentialism: having had an 
intense youthful affair with her mentor Martin Heidegger, and close friends with her former teacher Karl Jaspers, 
Arendt could not help but be influenced by Existenzphilosophie. (See her 1946 article “What is Existenz 
Philosophy?” in Partisan Review for an example. One can observe as well that Arendt’s later political philosophy—
for example in such terms as “natality,” the ability of human beings to create what is new—sometimes sounds like 
an existentialist paean to the radical freedom of human beings in a world without moral absolutes. See The Human 
Condition, 8-9 and 176-78.) 
 247 
second half of Arendt’s title, “Universal Responsibility,” refers to the article’s hope and ideal: 
our only response to bureaucratically organized guilt can be the revival of a sense of universal 
responsibility, a newly politicized humanism that transcends national, racial, or any other 
parochial feeling of solidarity between human beings. For the “idea of humanity, when purged of 
all sentimentality, has the very serious consequence that in one form or another men must 
assume responsibility for all crimes committed by men and that all nations share the onus of evil 
committed by all others” (23). (A slightly altered version of this sentence was incorporated into 
The Origins of Totalitarianism as well [Origins 235-36].) For Arendt, then, universal 
responsibility was not just the corollary of existential freedom; it was also the only legitimate 
moral and political response to an historical circumstance in which human beings were isolated 
from one another by the bureaucratic structures of professional life. 
 McCarthy’s close friend Dwight Macdonald also published a celebrated and controversial 
article two months later in his Politics magazine, titled “The Responsibility of Peoples.” As the 
war was nearing an end, Macdonald followed Arendt’s lead (citing her article in fact) and raised 
similar questions. Meditating on how to treat the German people as a whole in relation to Nazi 
crimes, Macdonald believed that a central problem of contemporary politics was bureaucratic 
labor’s effects on social and civic life:  
The principles on which our mass-industry economy is built—centralization of 
authority, division of labor (or specialization of function), rigid organization from 
the top down into which each worker fits at his appointed hierarchical level—
these have been carried over into the political sphere. The result is that . . . the 
individual has little choice about his behavior, and can be made to function, by the 
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pressure and terror wielded by the masters of the Organic State, in ways quite 
opposed to any he would voluntarily choose. (91) 
And again: “Modern society has become so tightly organized, so rationalized and routinized that 
it has the character of a mechanism which grinds on without human consciousness or control. 
The individual . . . is reduced to powerlessness vis-a-vis the mechanism. More and more, things 
happen TO people” (87, emphasis in the original). Bureaucratic workers and societies under the 
control of vastly powerful states thus posed “the dilemma of increasing political impotence 
accompanied by increasing political responsibility,” Macdonald asserted (93). His solution to the 
bureaucratization of politics was similar to Arendt’s politicized humanism: if we are to solve the 
problem of bureaucratic nation-states, we must look to “our essential humanity and to a more 
sensitive and passionate respect for our own and other people’s humanity” (93). Where we are 
increasingly held responsible for the actions of “our” states, we must disavow all parochial and 
“specialized”—in short, all bureaucratic—forms of responsibility in favor of that universal 
responsibility called humanity. The “responsibility of peoples” is to all people. 
Such antitotalitarian political meditations on universal responsibility are explored most 
fully in what is quite tellingly the novel’s only depiction of a sustained and open democratic 
debate. In the chapter titled “Lucubrations,” Jocelyn’s literature faculty meet to determine the 
department’s response to Mulcahy’s discontinuance. Still believing Mulcahy’s lies, they discuss 
many issues beyond the immediate one of whether to support him: during the course of this long 
chapter, the faculty debate in scholarly detail whether members of the Communist Party retain 
the intellectual freedom that would make them fit to teach (118-19); how to judge such nebulous 
goods as pedagogical worth (120-23), intellectual talent (125-26), and even (by way of analogy) 
aesthetic beauty (123-24); whether institutions have an obligation to keep dissenters on staff 
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(127-32); and whether isolated protections for minorities and disadvantaged groups ultimately 
only reinforce the wider discriminatory practices that make the protections attractive in the first 
place (135-39). The debate’s many twists and turns, with all their niggling detail, are of course 
comic. Yet as so often in this novel, beneath the satire of bureaucratic triviality lies a deeply 
serious concern. When all is said and done, the faculty debate revolves around the nature and 
extent of the department’s responsibility—to Henry Mulcahy, to Jocelyn College, and to the 
American republic.  
Much as in her late-night scene with Bentkoop, Domna argues for an extended sense of 
responsibility. When deciding whether to let an employee go, she argues, one must take into 
account at least three concerns. “Professional competence” is the primary one; but one must also 
consider “the employee’s need and future prospects,” and “what one might name the exemplary 
effects of such a decision. If Maynard lets Henry go, how many other college presidents, seeing 
what Maynard as a professional progressive has done, will cease to feel any qualms about 
proceeding against their own Communists, ex-Communists, quasi-Communists?” (136). “Other 
things being equal”—i.e., if it is granted that Mulcahy is as competent as the rest of them—they 
should take into account more than just the professional concerns of his teaching ability and 
scholarly merit, she argues (136; emphasis in the original). 
Identifying the word whose definition separates them, department head Howard Furness 
disagrees: “Maynard’s responsibility, I should say, began and ended here at Jocelyn. To cultivate 
his own garden here and maintain the teaching standard is to set a sufficient example. To debase 
the teaching standard—however low you may think it already—on behalf of some vague social 
need would be an act of malfeasance, like the watering of stock or the currency” (137, my 
emphasis). For Furness, Domna’s extension of responsibility beyond the directly professional 
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can only mean the devaluation of professional concerns. If they value Mulcahy simply because 
he is politically endangered, they perforce devalue the importance of his teaching—the latter 
being their central professional and indeed ethical responsibility, he asserts.  
And yet it is important to note that Howard’s arguments do not deny the existence of the 
wider responsibilities Domna values. In fact, his consideration of responsibility is ultimately 
more capacious than Domna’s. For his two-pronged argument is not only that undue focus on 
Mulcahy’s home life and the college’s political responsibilities will ultimately debase their 
immediate responsibility to Jocelyn’s students, but that such inattention to their students will 
furthermore make them less effective in forcing both Henry Mulcahy and American society to 
take responsibility for their personal and political freedoms. For example, when Domna argues 
the need to protect specific groups that have been discriminated against—and by extension 
argues that Jocelyn should serve as a haven for unpopular political dissidents like (supposedly) 
Mulcahy—Howard counters that such a policy of protecting specifically named populations will 
lead only to “vying groups of separatist minorities organized for self-protection,” rather than to 
Domna’s ideal of the substantial equality of all (135). When she similarly argues that women’s 
colleges are right to grant preference to women, and historically black colleges to blacks, 
Howard asserts that such policies only provoke more discrimination in the long run. With these 
policies in place, “Harvard feels no moral pressure to hire women, since they have their own 
colleges, and the same is true of the Negroes and the Jews” (137). Without commenting on the 
merits of either Domna’s or Howard’s views—and their debate of course cleverly opens up 
central questions of the identity politics that would occupy postwar American culture, including 
debates over affirmative action—we may note that Howard’s contention is not that the faculty 
have no wider responsibilities, but that those indeed wide responsibilities are sometimes best 
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served by insisting on a more rigid definition of professional responsibilities. Despite their 
serious disagreements, Howard and Domna fundamentally agree that responsibility is universal.  
Her realization that this is the case eventually causes Domna to back down. She 
recognizes that she hasn’t considered the wider implications that Howard has: “she had been 
secretly struck by the perspicuity of Howard’s analysis” (141), and thus despite her previously 
fervent advocacy of Mulcahy, she abstains when the time for a vote comes (144). Despite her 
embrace of universal responsibility as an ideal, Domna realizes that here she has seen Henry’s 
plight myopically, wishing to address his suffering immediately and only via local means. 
Though Howard has been admittedly motivated in part by his dislike of Mulcahy, he has 
nevertheless been more the universalist here, looking at the problem from a holistic point of view 
and attempting to imagine what effects a vote in favor of Mulcahy would have on larger systems 
of professionalism and social discrimination. Ironically, we may note, it is Domna who has 
thought as a well-meaning bureaucrat would, with a limited and narrow perspective focussed on 
Mulcahy’s good alone. By contrast, Howard—the department chair who begins the debate by 
complaining vociferously that Mulcahy doesn’t fill out his “achievement sheets” on time (113)—
ultimately offers a less bureaucratic and parochial notion of political responsibility. In so doing, 
he argues for a universal political responsibility philosophically akin to that which McCarthy’s 
friends Macdonald and Arendt were calling for. 
 Thus universalist conceptions of the search for truth, as well as freedom and 
responsibility, are central to the novel’s politics. But we must note one last value that Howard 
defends in the same chapter: justice, which for him is ineluctably tied to the rule of law. Here we 
should remember that the importance of law was a recurrent theme of Arendt’s Origins of 
Totalitarianism as well. It was so especially in the section “on the elite and vice and crime”—
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along with the section on the structure of totalitarian movements, one that McCarthy told Arendt 
she “liked particularly” (Letter of 26 April 1951, 2). Arendt argues that once European elites 
considered Judaism to be a fashionable vice, rather than the crime it used to be, the machinery of 
the Holocaust became possible (79-88). For the notion of crime merely prohibits defined 
practices, while the notion of vice rebukes being itself. A crime could be “met with punishment,” 
while a vice could “only be exterminated” (87). The only way to eliminate the supposed vice of 
Jewishness, in other words, was to eliminate “the Jew” itself. And “the first essential step on the 
road to total domination,” Arendt similarly declares in a discussion of totalitarian states, “is to 
kill the juridical person in man” (447), to isolate people, both mentally and practically, from all 
legal systems. Once Jews had been understood as a social problem, rather than a political or legal 
one, it was comparatively easy to deny them national citizenship, which would guarantee the 
protection of a state with laws. From there it was but a small step to throw the Jews into 
concentration camps—camps purposefully designed to hold them outside any system of law and 
thus break down their resistance to Nazi power. Totalitarianism was therefore partly defined by, 
and certainly thrived on, its ability to dispense with justice and law, and to “kill the juridical 
person in man.” 
Thus when Domna claims that the faculty owe Henry a vote of confidence based on the 
principle of aidôs—an ancient Greek term signifying the compassion one should show toward 
someone who arouses horror and pity—we should understand that metaphorically, though filled 
with good intentions, she proposes a non-juridical basis for the department’s action. Since Henry 
has suffered so much, she believes, the department ought to show aidôs for him, ought to keep 
him on out of respect for his suffering, rather than because he has adhered to the department’s 
agreed-upon standards of conduct (133). Furness disagrees based on juridical principle: “In strict 
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justice, there is no aidôs, and I for one propose to deal justly” (134). While the rest of the faculty 
bring in the supposed political and health issues surrounding Mulcahy’s ouster, Furness stoutly 
refuses to consider them at all. For him, the standard for keeping a teacher ought to be as 
consistent as a law. Mulcahy’s professional competence alone should be considered. And 
Furness argues that Mulcahy consistently falls short of that standard: Mulcahy is irresponsible 
about his work for the department (113-15), and doesn’t even subscribe to Jocelyn’s progressive 
educational beliefs, refusing to do the very things he was hired to do (127-28). While Domna and 
Alma are free to plead for Mulcahy personally, then, “We can’t let clemency become the official 
business of the department” (134). The department must follow a kind of law in judging all 
faculty members’ competence. 
And with Arendtian rigor, the novel itself sides with Howard Furness’s brief for justice 
before aidôs, clemency, or any other subjective criterion of action. Domna’s inability to act in 
“strict justice” is the same inability that leads to President Maynard Hoar’s downfall in the 
novel’s last pages. If Domna wishes to treat some populations (viz. Mulcahy) differently than 
others, based on what Howard calls a “vague social need” (137), in the end Maynard Hoar 
similarly makes the mistake of treating Mulcahy differently from other professors. He takes into 
account something other than Mulcahy’s professional competence. Worried that public 
knowledge of Mulcahy’s supposed membership in the Communist Party will now make it appear 
as if Jocelyn has sheltered a known Communist (not to mention one who has perjured himself in 
front of a state legislature on the matter), and thereby damage his presidency and Jocelyn as a 
whole, Maynard seeks to discover whether the rumors of Mulcahy’s Party membership have any 
basis in fact. But by this act Maynard betrays the idea of the rule of law, of universal standards. 
For Mulcahy’s political affiliations, imagined or real, are—just as Howard Furness insists—not 
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germane to any judgment that a college president needs to make about keeping on a member of 
the faculty. And it is this mistake—this disregard for the strict standards of universal, equally-
applied law, as it were—that allows Mulcahy to triumph over Hoar at the novel’s end, essentially 
blackmailing a President who by even inquiring about Mulcahy’s politics appears to have 
participated in the McCarthyist witch-hunt he claims to abhor. 
Demonstrating the centrality of such concerns to Groves, the novel ends with explicit 
reflections on the nature of justice and the rule of law. “I’m concerned with justice,” Mulcahy 
tells Hoar when the President exasperatedly asks him why he has lied and manipulated so many 
people (301). “Justice for myself as a superior man and for my family,” Mulcahy elaborates 
(301). But in saying this, Mulcahy reveals his flawed understanding of the central term—and not 
only because he has lied in order to obtain his so-called “justice.” For in strict justice, there is no 
reference to the particularities of supposedly “superior men” or their families. Justice operates, as 
Rawls would put it a few decades thereafter, from behind a veil of ignorance about such 
particularities. There is no justice “for”; there is only justice—it is universal or nothing. Once 
again, Furness’s insistence on the impersonal and universal quality of justice is vindicated.17 
Once Maynard admits his mistake to himself, that he has erred in asking about Mulcahy’s 
politics, he is in a position to identify with the rule of law again, as against the breaking of law                                                         
17 This interpretation answers two questions that McCarthy herself, in an unpublished lecture on her novel, thought 
lay at its heart: “Is there such a thing as justice on earth[,] and can you have justice without equity or equality, which 
Nature refuses to dispense?” (qtd. in Abrams 67). My argument here is that while McCarthy’s novel certainly 
unsettles the idea that justice can exist on earth in any pure form, it nevertheless persists in believing that a human 
form of justice can exist without reference to any supposed equality, whether of income or ability. Through 
impersonal and universally-applied laws, justice may indeed exist on an earth without substantial equity or equality. 
My belief that McCarthy’s conception of justice is an impersonal one also accords with Deborah Nelson’s 
perceptive argument that Arendt and McCarthy, unusually for women or even men of their time, “heartlessly” 
insisted on the political importance of solitude and a clear-eyed view of facts, over and against the usually empathic 
appeals to solidarity that have characterized progressive politics since World War II. This is not the place to 
comment on Nelson’s implicit valorization of such “heartlessness” as the basis for a superior (anti-therapeutic) 
politics. But I would note that McCarthy’s “heartlessness” was more than an insistence on the value of dispassionate 
political thinking. It was just as importantly a means to the universalism I have been describing here. An impersonal 
“heartlessness” was a way of extending moral and political consideration beyond those whom it was easiest to 
consider, of expanding moral and political regard beyond one’s bureaucratic department or even nation. 
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due to supposedly higher “social needs,” whether those of his personal career or those of Jocelyn 
College itself. Thus the final image of the novel is that of President Hoar reciting Cicero’s first 
Catiline oration: “‘Quo usque tandem, Catilina, abutere patienta nostra?’ ‘How far at length, O 
Catiline, will you abuse our patience?’” (302). The allusion here is to the famed conflict between 
Catiline, the rebel who threatened to overtake the Roman consulate by force, and Cicero, the 
consul who discovered and destroyed his plot. Recounting her participation in a childhood play 
based on the Catiline Conspiracy in Memories of a Catholic Girlhood (1957), McCarthy 
provides a helpful gloss. Though she plays the part of Catiline and is determined to use the 
opportunity to glorify the rebel for the rest of her schoolmates, to her distress she finds herself 
eventually doubting Catiline. What if he was “merely a vulgar arsonist, as Cicero and his 
devotees contended?” (145). Eventually these “first stirrings of maturity” (145) come to fruition 
with the conviction that Catiline indeed was “a gangster and a ruffian, just as that old bore, 
Cicero, said” (159). In the italicized postscript to this lightly fictionalized story of her youth, 
McCarthy sets out its moral: despite her belief in the importance of questioning and rebellion, in 
the end and “To my surprise, I chose Caesar and the rule of law” (166). And so too when that 
old bore Maynard Hoar quotes Cicero at the novel’s end, he rejects Mulcahy’s Catilinian tactics 
and chooses the rule of law. 
“I suppose, in a certain sense, I must be saying farewell to progressivism,” Hoar remarks 
of his condemnation of Mulcahy’s dishonest demagoguery (302). And indeed, both Hoar and the 
novel itself say goodbye to what they consider to be a myopically rebellious “progressivism,” 
embracing instead a universalist liberalism that values the formal equality of law above any 
valorization of substantial equality that disregards the means by which it is achieved. The 
constellation of liberal values championed in Groves—the dedication to a search for truth via 
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debate and contestation, the recognition of human freedom and its attendant universal 
responsibility, and an impartial and universal justice under equally-applied laws—may seem to 
have gone rather far from the antibureaucratic animus we have been tracing previously. But in 
fact they all take their cue from that quintessentially 1950s animus. The search for truth via 
debate, as we have seen, is counterposed to the bureaucratic structures of totalitarianism, in 
which information is segmented and separated, reified and incapable of being contradicted 
seriously. So too absolute freedom and universal responsibility stand opposed to the bureaucratic 
habit of moral segmentation, the dubious ability to separate one’s responsibility to the 
department or the nation from one’s responsibility to all of humanity. And finally the ideal of 
universal justice under law stands against any bureaucratic division of humanity that might 
threaten to treat one human being differently from another. In the postwar groves of McCarthy’s 
academe, in short, the only cure for a bureaucratic, proto-totalitarian narrowing of mind was a 
liberalism based in universalist, cosmopolitan ideals. 
 
4. Antibureaucratism, Literary Realism, and the Possibility of Postmodernism 
The Groves of Academe thus solidified McCarthy’s universalist critique of the 
bureaucratic tendency toward reification and fragmentation. But by no means did McCarthy drop 
such a critique thereafter. Though manifested at first in her skeptical examinations of higher 
education, offered in both her novel and contemporary essays, antibureaucratic themes became a 
mainstay of her work in the fifties and sixties. In McCarthy’s hands, I will now argue, this 
universalist critique of bureaucratic intellectual labor and society helped open the way for many 
postmodern theories and literary practices—a surprising irony of American intellectual history, 
given postmodernism’s later hostility toward universalism. By examining two remarkable essays 
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from the early sixties, “The Fact In Fiction” (1960) and “Characters in Fiction” (1961), we may 
see that McCarthy’s antibureaucratism animated her analysis of the state of realist fiction in the 
early sixties. That analysis of realism’s troubles suggests, however unwillingly, the lineaments of 
postmodern thinking about both literature and society. Such proto-postmodern essays thus 
ultimately reveal that The Groves of Academe—and by extension a whole antibureaucratic 
tradition of depicting mental labor, crystallized by the postwar campus novel—could create a 
space for the development of postmodernism. 
“The Fact in Fiction” and “Characters in Fiction” together form a summa of McCarthy’s 
thinking about contemporary fiction in the early sixties. Their nearly identical titles, original 
publication in the same journal (Partisan Review) less than a year apart, and subsequent 
publication next to each other in her essay collection On the Contrary suggest they were meant 
to be read together at the least.18 And much as Trilling’s “Art and Fortune” did in 1948, both 
these essays begin by contemplating the possible death of the realist novel. “Fact” contends that 
with the exception of Faulkner’s work, no great novel has been written since the death of 
Thomas Mann; it even suggests that it may not be possible to write novels at all anymore (250). 
Likewise, “Characters” opens with the assertion that since Joyce and Proust, there have been no 
great characters in the novel (274). In the early sixties, McCarthy believed that the novel was in 
crisis, perhaps terminally so. 
McCarthy finds two main social culprits for the novel’s impasse. They are most clearly 
articulated in “The Fact in Fiction,” but despite McCarthy’s more formalist bent in “Characters,” 
they have ramifications there as well. The first culprit is what McCarthy calls the “irreality” of                                                         
18 A third essay, on “The American Realist Playwrights,” is grouped together in the last section of On the Contrary 
as well. First published only months after “Characters in Fiction,” it takes realism as its subject and offers themes 
similar to “Fact” and “Characters.” But it was originally published in Harper’s Magazine, not Partisan Review, and 
treats the theater specifically—an art form that, it contends, consistently lags behind the novel anyway (293-94). For 
reasons of space and focus, then, I am restricting my discussion to McCarthy’s criticism regarding the realist novel. 
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the twentieth century (267). The novel, she asserts in “Fact,” has always been invested in the 
real: “The distinctive mark of the novel is its concern with the actual world, the world of fact, of 
the verifiable, of figures, even, and statistics” (250). The novel was the genre most capable of 
depicting, and the most reliant upon, the minutiae of reality. But in the era of Auschwitz and 
Buchenwald, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, she believed, it was difficult to feel that reality was itself 
real. The novelist could not write about quotidian happenings without feeling their 
“inverisimilitude,” their essential triviality and insignificance when placed alongside the world of 
the Holocaust and the atom bomb. Yet if a novelist “tries, on the other hand, to write about 
people who make lampshades of human skin”—about the horrors of contemporary reality—“he 
feels still more the inverisimilitude of what he is asserting” (267). In the twentieth century, the 
real had become alternately trifling or obscene. Both conditions seemed to make the novel’s 
traditional rationale, that of depicting everyday reality, ring hollow. 
Twentieth-century horrors appear to underlie the central complaint of “Characters in 
Fiction” as well: writers can no longer assume the “common humanity” that had once made fully 
developed and sympathetic characters a worthy goal of novelistic portraiture (285). “The world 
of twentieth-century sensibility, in contrast to that of Tolstoy,” McCarthy writes, is “a world of 
paralyzed grief, in which little irrelevant things, things that do not belong, are noticed or 
registered on the film of consciousness, exactly as they are at a funeral service or by a bored 
child in church” (279). This atmosphere of “grief,” no doubt inspired by Auschwitz and 
Hiroshima, then seems to provoke in part her subsequent assertion that contemporary writers 
could no longer depict characters who shared a “common humanity.” The “grief” of a funereal 
twentieth century could lead to a trauma that repressed or “paralyzed” the desire to comprehend 
such humanity. Rather than trying to descry a common humanity, then, novelists had turned to 
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depicting extremes—to depicting “soul[s] so foreign or so foetal as to seem beyond grasp” (284). 
This extremist trend is rooted in “a desire to comprehend, which seems to be growing stronger as 
the world itself becomes more incomprehensible and dubious” (285). Thus, as in “The Fact in 
Fiction,” “Characters” ascribes the troubles of contemporary novelists to the “irreality” and 
inhumanity of the twentieth century. 
But for McCarthy the second main cause of the novel’s dilemma, more central to my 
analysis here, was the newly bureaucratic working conditions of writers themselves. “Today the 
writer has become specialized, like the worker on an assembly line whose task is to perform a 
single action several hundred times a day or the doctor whose task is to service a single organ of 
the human body,” McCarthy declares in “Fact” (268). Crucially, such specialization defines not 
only the writer’s labor, but also his or her very “social existence” (268). With many a writer 
teaching at universities (a telling example), the writer’s “colleagues are writers [themselves] or at 
any rate they ‘publish,’ and his students, like his girl friends, are hoping to write” as well (268). 
Thus the contemporary writer “sees only other writers; he does not know anyone else” (268). 
McCarthy is quick to stress that this is more than a moral problem of cliqueishness: 
The isolation of the modern writer is a social fact, and not just the writer’s own 
fault. He cannot help being “bookish,” which cuts him off from society, since 
practically the only people left who read are writers, their wives and girl friends, 
teachers of literature, and students hoping to become writers. The writer has 
“nothing in common” with the businessman or the worker, and this is almost 
literally true; there is no common world left in which they share. The businessman 
who does not read is just as specialized as the writer who writes. (269) 
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Readers and writers, in other words, compose a kind of bureaucratically specialized—and hence 
socially isolated—group in society. Accordingly, “common sense in terms of broad experience” 
has “become inaccessible to the writer” (268).19 In the act of becoming a “writer,” the novelist 
loses contact with broader and shared reality itself, the very stuff of novels. Thus, “The worst 
thing, I would say, that can happen to a writer today is to become a writer” (268-69). 
Bureaucratic isolation, as much as “irreality,” was responsible for the impasse of the realist novel 
in McCarthy’s estimate. Separated from all those who did not write themselves, the novelist 
could no longer grasp life outside a literature department, as it were. 
In “Characters,” I would argue, McCarthy observes along similar lines that bureaucratic 
isolation has destroyed the perception of a common humanity grounding realist character 
development. McCarthy refers to bureaucracy early on with the observation that, despite the 
stereotypes of conformity that the term “bureaucracy” evokes, bureaucratic life has created many 
types of characters that an author might wish to catalogue: “the very forces and institutions that 
are the agents and promoters of conformity in America—bureaucracies public and private and 
the regimented ‘schools’ and [psychoanalytic] systems of healing and artistic creation—are 
themselves, through splits and cellular irritation, propagating an array of social types conforming 
to no previous standard” (273). This bewildering “array of social types” arguably underlies the                                                         
19“Common sense” was again an Arendtian theme; see Deborah Nelson’s helpful explication of Arendt’s usage, 89-
92. Nelson’s article also offers an interesting and I think related reading of the term “fact” in McCarthy, contending 
that “What makes something a fact seems to be less its informational content than its capacity to alter the observer” 
(94), its ability to be other than the observer. Nelson closes this part of her argument by suggesting that McCarthy’s 
career was dedicated to promoting such a conception of fact—that is to say, to promoting “a discipline of 
perception” that always contains this “capacity to alter the observer” (95)—and to demanding that intellectuals 
thereby “enter a process of self-alienation that is never ending” (95). This is true and perceptive as far as it goes, and 
it dovetails with my own earlier analysis of McCarthy’s attack on reification as a kind of thought impervious to 
contradiction. But its ethical cast risks neglecting the importance of McCarthy’s social and material analysis. In 
these early-sixties essays especially, it is bureaucratic specialization and its consequent social isolation that has 
separated intellectuals from facts that might alter their perception of the world. Bureaucracy, and not just cowardice 
and/or laziness, militates against intellectuals’ acquisition of an Arendtian “common sense,” the experience of facts 
that would open up multiple points of view. In McCarthy’s work, both fiction and essays, in other words, the 
material and indeed specifically institutional conditions under which intellectuals think are as important as their 
moral dedication to perceiving self-altering facts. 
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essay’s central contention that the sense of a “common humanity” that used to ground literary 
realism no longer exists, making novelists less inclined to depict recognizable and sympathetic 
characters. If “The Fact in Fiction” argued that the realist novel of “common sense” and common 
facts was no longer possible because writers and businessmen (like everyone else) now had “no 
common world left in which they share” (269), “Characters in Fiction” notes something similar 
when arguing that a “common humanity” was no longer assumed in fiction. The world was 
becoming “more incomprehensible” to the writer, and not only because of Auschwitz and 
Hiroshima (285). The multiplication of reified social types inherent in bureaucratically organized 
societies was also destroying the commonality of experience that realist authors had relied upon 
in creating characters. 
A theory of bureaucratic social ills also underlies McCarthy’s assertion in “Characters” 
that contemporary novelists could no longer identify “with the hero or the heroine, a sympathetic 
figure whose dreams and desires resembled the author’s own” (284). McCarthy is at least open to 
social and even political explanations for this literary development when she calls the absent 
hero of realism an incarnation of “our subjective conviction of human freedom” (289) and “a 
bearer of human freedom” (292). Here again, I would argue, the notion of a specifically 
bureaucratic social structure is at work: bureaucracy, with its specialization of thought and 
promotion of an atomized social existence, so prevents consciousness of the world at large 
(outside the department) that the contemporary writer’s ability to imagine any active subject, any 
“bearer of human freedom” who could be aware of and then act upon the social realm, is 
fettered. Unlike the realist authors of an earlier era, the novelist in the age of bureaucracy could 
imagine neither a common humanity that would form a basis for creating sympathetic characters, 
nor an active subject who could become the “hero” of a novel. In both “The Fact in Fiction” and 
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“Characters in Fiction,” we discover at work a theory of the relationship between contemporary 
bureaucratic labor and the difficulties of literary realism. With no shared reality (“fact”) in a 
departmentalized society and no ability to imagine a common and socially active humanity 
(“characters”) in a bureaucratic culture, the realist mode of representation faced severe 
difficulties. 
We may now note that the arguments of these two essays, and especially their 
antibureaucratic strain, also make for suggestive explanations of postmodern literary and cultural 
trends.  Indeed, taken collectively, the essays may be read as an early attempt to understand 
postmodern conditions of literary production. Certainly McCarthy’s account of the “irreality” of 
the twentieth century may provide (and often has provided) some explanation for a postwar 
eschewal of literary realism. Writers faced with an unrealistic world might well have desired to 
spearhead a postmodern tendency to create fictions openly, to disavow any responsibility for 
transcribing “reality” per se. But McCarthy’s discussion of realism’s bureaucratic troubles is 
even more suggestive in explaining certain postmodern literary habits. If, for example, writers 
were increasingly specialized, writing only for each other, the 1960s and 1970s trend of fiction 
about fiction—postmodern metafiction, in short—might be understood as a natural result of the 
bureaucratic narrowing of readership to other writers.20 Furthermore, if a bureaucratized culture 
was removing the last vestiges of a common humanity from the writer’s sight, and even from 
existence, it would be surprising indeed if writers were able to create fiction that movingly 
                                                        
20 A narrowing of audience is at the heart of at least two arguments about postmodernist reflexivity that I am aware 
of. In a deeply critical tone, Charles Newman ascribes postmodernist self-consciousness (“The Threnody of 
Solipsism” [40]) to “a heightened sense of the unreality of the audience, which is more than a philosophical 
problem” (41). Less judgmentally (and even optimistically in the larger context of his work), Mark McGurl 
essentially echoes McCarthy’s sense that writers are bureaucratically isolated from non-writers when he suggests 
that we might “see the metafictional reflexivity of so much postwar fiction as being related to its production in and 
around a programmatically analytical and pedagogical environment” (47-8), in and around the ubiquitous creative 
writing programs of what he calls The Program Era. (See 37-56; and especially 46-56, which discusses the campus 
novel). 
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depicted the travails of ordinary and sympathetic characters. Hence the postmodern’s frequent 
indifference to realistic, “round” characters—in Jameson’s famed terms, its “depthlessness,” 
“superficiality,” and “waning of affect”—could be understood as the predictable result of a 
bureaucratic labor and social organization that separates people from each other and makes them 
less interested in others per se.21 (If we wished to be Weberian about it, we might label 
Jameson’s “waning of affect” a rationalistic “waning of charisma” instead.) Without necessarily 
assenting to these arguments, we can in any case see that McCarthy’s attempts to describe the 
bureaucratic difficulties of realism look very much like prototypical attempts to explain what we 
have since come to call the postmodern. 
And if in this way McCarthy’s antibureaucratic essays seem to prefigure the postmodern, 
I would suggest that in a number of crucial respects The Groves of Academe —McCarthy’s 
earlier, novelistic account of the dangers of bureaucratic labor and culture—also prefigures the 
postmodern impossibility of realism limned in the later essays. We may begin to see this by 
examining this foundational campus novel in light of the genre’s subsequent history. Discussing 
the campus novel as a postwar form, Steven Connor notes that the campus setting offered 
                                                        
21 On the terms cited, see Jameson, Postmodernism 6-16. More generally, one might note that just as McCarthy 
locates the troubles of realism in bureaucracy, Jameson similarly explains much of postmodernism as a result of 
bureaucratic existence and thought. See for example his early (1982) explanation of why, in the postmodern era, a 
norm-less pastiche has nearly replaced the satirical aims of parody. The postmodern, Jameson suggests, may be 
understood as “the age of corporate capitalism, of the so-called organization man, of bureaucracies in business as 
well as the state”; it is a bureaucratic era where the “older bourgeois individual subject no longer exists” (115). And 
thus he wonders if 
in the decades since the emergence of the great modern styles society has itself begun to fragment . . . each 
group coming to speak a curious private language of its own, each profession developing its private code or 
idiolect, and finally each individual coming to be a kind of linguistic island, separated from everyone else? 
But then in that case, the very possibility of any linguistic norm in terms of which one could ridicule 
private languages and idiosyncratic energies would vanish, and we would have nothing but stylistic 
diversity and heterogeneity.  
That is the [postmodern] moment at which pastiche appears and parody has become impossible. 
(“Postmodernism and Consumer Society” 114) 
In sum, then: for McCarthy, bureaucracy makes realism impossible; and for Jameson, bureaucracy makes 
postmodernism nearly inevitable. 
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novelists a relatively closed, yet still permeable world to write about. He goes on to suggest that 
the campus novel may accordingly partake of two paradigmatic genres:  
the one concerns the disruption of a closed world, and the gradual return of order 
and regularity to it, while the other concerns the passage through this closed world 
of a character who must in the end be allowed to escape its gravitational pull. The 
one is institutional . . . the other is individual . . . . Typical of one is the detective 
story, in which the aim is to neutralise the menace of an enigma; typical of the 
other is the Bildungsroman, or novel of development, in which the aim is to 
define the terms of a freedom. (English 70) 
The two correlate genres Connor identifies, I would point out, are central to nineteenth-century 
realism itself: the detective novel is thought to begin with Poe’s influential tales of empirical 
ratiocination, and the Bildungsroman is central to McCarthy’s own beloved Dickens, in such 
works as David Copperfield and Great Expectations. Connor identifies the postwar campus 
novel as heir to such realist traditions, or at least their broader philosophical impulses. 
And in many respects Groves fits into Connor’s schema of realist genres. It is, I think, 
primarily a narrative of the first type, dedicated to depicting the disruption of an institution, and 
thence an at least partial restoration of order to it. While Domna Rejnev seems to be the novel’s 
imperfect heroine, and Henry Mulcahy its sometimes oddly sympathetic villain, both characters 
ultimately recede into the background by novel’s end. The college itself, summed up by Vincent 
Keogh’s analogy of a hall of mirrors, becomes the true focus of the narrative. The “menace of an 
enigma” is neutralized, and much as in a detective story, Mulcahy’s lies are discovered in the 
end, restoring order to Jocelyn College. Yet lurking in the closing subplot of Maynard Hoar we 
may nevertheless see a narrative resembling Connor’s second, Bildungsroman-like type, wherein 
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an individual succeeds in extricating himself from the campus’s “gravitational pull.” Like Lucky 
Jim’s Jim Dixon would two years later, Maynard Hoar ends the novel by extricating himself 
from the mad alternate reality of Jocelyn; he has achieved maturity in this novel of political 
growth by rejecting progressivism’s ambivalence about law and justice. 
But one key to understanding The Groves of Academe—and thus its capacity to influence 
the campus novel at the start of its boom period in America, as well as its relationship to 
postmodern literature—is that through its satire of bureaucratic thought and labor it ultimately 
frustrates both these realist expectations. For if the novel ends with the status quo of Mulcahy’s 
renewed appointment, this does not mean that order is fully returned to the closed world of 
Jocelyn College. The irritant Mulcahy remains and he effectively triumphs, at least for the 
moment, over his enemies. One should have no optimism that the enigma of Mulcahy, so bound 
up with the problem of truth itself, has been solved and thence neutralized at Jocelyn. Nor is any 
unambiguous freedom defined by the most prominent individual to leave the college at novel’s 
end. Maynard Hoar does not free himself from either Jocelyn or higher education at large when 
he quits; he merely steps aside in the likely vain hope that some future president might be able to 
exercise hierarchical authority at thoroughly bureaucratic Jocelyn. Recalling Connor’s two ideal-
typical campus novel genres, then, we might say that the first campus novel is a detective story 
without a solution, and a Bildungsroman without growth. In the “totally fictitious” world of 
McCarthy’s proto-totalitarian, bureaucratic academe, the ineluctably political pursuits of truth 
and of a whole self—so central to realist expectations of narrative resolution—end in defeat. 
 Epistemological, ontological, political, and aesthetic irresolutions such as these make the 
campus depicted in The Groves of Academe begin to resemble the postmodern itself. With its 
constant confusion over the nature of truth, this inaugural campus novel anticipates in satirical 
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fashion the thoroughgoing skepticism characteristic of postmodern thought. As we have seen, 
seeking truth in the groves of Jocelyn College is at best an elusive activity, and at worst a fool’s 
errand. Politically, with what we might call its micropolitics of bureaucratic intrigue, McCarthy’s 
picture of academe anticipates the radical de-centering characteristic of postmodern literary and 
social theory as well. If Foucault, for example, admonished us to move past older questions of 
political sovereignty and law, and told us that in political theory we have yet “to cut off the 
King’s head” (“Truth” 121), in Groves Mulcahy does the job for us, forcing the President’s 
resignation and thereby symbolically leaving the political field of Jocelyn in the hands of 
innumerable scheming faculty bureaucrats. In this novel of bureaucratic intrigue, President Hoar 
would ruefully tell us, power is most certainly “a network of relations, constantly in tension, in 
activity, rather than a privilege that one might possess” (Discipline 26). It is even possible to 
look at this bureaucratic comedy of a campus run amok with (mis)information as an ancestor of 
postmodern cyberpunk and hypertext, with their computerized cities of interlinked data and 
interminable cross-referencing. The intricate network of human gossip, (pseudo-) knowledge, 
and petty faculty plots anticipates the crowded futuristic cityscapes and hyperlinked nodes. And 
much as in cyberpunk particularly, McCarthy’s depiction of a scheming campus regards the 
burgeoning “information society” nervously, in potentially dystopian terms, as a structure of 
reified, ideological thought control akin to that exercised by totalitarianism. In its influential 
depiction of campus politics, then, The Groves of Academe can be seen to anticipate a number of 
postmodern themes and even genres. 
If many postmodern theorists later came to celebrate absolute “undecidability” and 
différance, and likewise became fascinated with various micrological forms of power and 
political resistance (“rhizomes,” the “practice of everyday life”), in McCarthy’s satiric campus 
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novel we can thus see that such concepts did not always inspire admiration when first identified. 
It may be that such central strains of postmodern philosophical and social thought were in fact 
often simply radical transvaluations of the bureaucratic world McCarthy sought to satirize. What 
was conceived historically as the difficulty of seeking truth in a society dominated by 
bureaucratic intellectual labor could become the impossibility of truth per se; what was 
understood historically as the breakdown of democratic and juridical forms of authority under 
the spread of bureaucratized social networks could become a truism about the ubiquitous and 
diffuse nature of power in general. The social and political concerns of intellectual workers in an 
increasingly bureaucratic society could become universalized as “the postmodern,” in short. In 
the name of a cosmopolitan political responsibility that would soon become problematic in 
postmodern social thought’s emphasis on fragmentation and partiality, in any case, McCarthy 
had created a campus that looked like a photographic negative of the postmodern’s most 
optimistic image of thought and political action. Where later theorists would find the light of 
pure unpredictability and fragmentary play, she saw the darkness of proto-totalitarianism, the 
systematic bureaucratic disintegration of universal truth, responsibility, and the rule of law—of 
all that was required for democratic societies. Thus the groves of academe—in McCarthy’s 
rendering, the tangled webs of bureaucratic intellectuals’ self-deception and reified pseudo-
thought—may also have been the groves of postmodernism. With the postwar birth of an 
antibureaucratic campus novel, the postmodern could take shape in dystopian terms. 
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Chapter Six 
 
The Intellectual Class Unbound:  
Vladimir Nabokov’s Craft and the Birth of Postmodernism 
 
 
1. The Postmodern Campus Novel 
Though Mary McCarthy had spent the first two years of the 1960s openly worrying about 
the future of the novel in such essays as “The Fact in Fiction” (1960) and “Characters in Fiction” 
(1961), in the spring of 1962 she experienced a sudden burst of optimism. The “modern novel 
that everyone had thought was dead . . . was only playing possum,” she exclaimed breathlessly to 
readers of the New Republic (“Bolt” 34). A friend from long ago, Vladimir Nabokov, had 
published Pale Fire. She was absolutely enchanted with it. Readers who have seen the Vintage 
International edition of Pale Fire will recognize the charismatic words of McCarthy’s review, 
which still grace the front and back covers as a blurb. Nabokov’s novel is a work of “perfect 
beauty, symmetry, strangeness, originality, and moral truth,” McCarthy declares; it is “one of the 
very great works of art of this century” (34). Though certainly not all reviewers shared 
McCarthy’s astonished admiration, in the nearly fifty years since then the critical consensus has 
come around.1 Today Pale Fire is a cornerstone of Nabokov’s reputation; only Lolita challenges 
it as the novel most often recommended to represent Nabokov’s fiction as a whole. The novel is 
central to Nabokov’s oeuvre. 
                                                        
1 Amy Reading’s excellent article on the novel vividly recounts the initial critical confusion over whether Pale Fire 
proved Nabokov to be a “serious” writer (77-80). Some of McCarthy’s own friends were much less enthusiastic 
about the novel’s worth than she as well, as she found out after writing her review. In a letter praising her review as 
the only one that “really grappled with the book,” her ex-husband Edmund Wilson nevertheless pronounced himself 
“irritated and bored by all [Nabokov’s] little tricks” (qtd. in Kiernan 495). McCarthy’s old friend Dwight 
Macdonald, writing about the novel in Partisan Review, wrote bitingly that only Herman Wouk’s Youngblood 
Hawke offered it competition as “the most unreadable novel I’ve attempted this season” (437). Even more 
amusingly, he declared that he was “unable to explain [McCarthy’s] enthusiasm [for it] except by the hypothesis that 
she enjoys solving double crostics more than I do, and in fact that she thinks they are a form of literature” (441). 
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It also holds an important place in two wider literary canons. Written at the end of 
Nabokov’s nearly twenty years of work as a professor at Wellesley and Cornell—and taking the 
form of a sometimes bathetic poem composed by a professor named John Shade, followed by the 
laughably delusional annotations of Shade’s academic colleague Charles Kinbote—Pale Fire is 
also a classic satire of professorial labor in both its creative and “critical” forms.2 Thus the novel 
looms large not only in the Nabokov canon, but in the canon of postwar campus novels that were 
begun by Nabokov’s friend McCarthy and continued by himself, before the publication of Pale 
Fire, with 1957’s Pnin.3 (The character of Pnin turns up ever so briefly in Pale Fire, in fact, 
suggesting the continuity of academic worlds between the two novels.) But most significantly for 
this dissertation, Nabokov’s second campus novel is also, as John Burt Foster, Jr. notes, “often 
viewed as a masterpiece of emerging postmodernism in fiction” (231). This most celebrated of 
Nabokov’s novels is not only a prized midway entry in the annals of the campus novel, in short; 
for many it is a foundational postmodern novel as well. 
Not every critic is willing to label Pale Fire “postmodern” without reservation, of course. 
While critics such as Maurice Couturier have declared it an “archetypal postmodernist novel” 
(258), others, such as Brian McHale and Martine Hennard, have insisted that it occupies a cusp 
between modernism and postmodernism.4 Though I am more inclined to Couturier’s conclusion, 
                                                        
2 After emigrating to America, Nabokov began his academic career as a Resident Lecturer at Wellesley in 1941; he 
stayed there until spring of 1947, with only one year off—and in that year he gave lectures at an array of other 
colleges and universities. Then in the fall of 1948 he began over a decade of teaching at Cornell University. He 
retired from academic work only once the surprising royalties from Lolita had enabled him to do so, in January of 
1959. See Chapters 2 through 16 of the second volume of Brian Boyd’s biography, Vladimir Nabokov: The 
American Years (hereinafter referred to as VNAY). 
3 On the “campus novel” as a genre, see both the Interlude and Chapter Five. 
4 Briefly, Couturier defines the postmodernist movement as writers’ collective reaction both to the loss of faith in 
any “natural” social or even theological order following the atrocities of WWII, and to the rise of truly mass media 
that effectively supplanted traditional “reality” with Baudrillardian simulacra (255-56). He suggests that late-
modernist texts, new to these social circumstances, tend accordingly to be “militant” in suggesting this lawless 
world of unmoored images (257), while fully postmodernist texts simply assume it. Pale Fire, he argues, simply 
assumes the fundamentally interpretive nature of the world, and is thus an “archetypal postmodernist novel” (258). 
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both arguments undoubtedly have merit. And the debate is ultimately immaterial to my argument 
here. For I am not as interested in the literary-historical classification of the novel as I am in 
understanding how it reveals the social origins of those particular literary traits and discourses 
that came to be known as “postmodern.” And Pale Fire undeniably exhibits postmodern traits at 
the start of the postmodern era. Taking the form of a poem annotated by a madman, with the poet 
and critic both professors at an institution winkingly named “Wordsmith,” Pale Fire is in large 
measure literature about literature. It might even be called literature about literature about 
literature (a novel about commentary on poems). It is a work of metafiction, in short. Certain of 
its characters exist only on the page, Kinbote suggests early on: “We shall accompany Gradus in 
constant thought,” he writes,  
as he makes his way . . . through the entire length of the poem, following the road 
of its rhythm, riding past in a rhyme, skidding around the corner of a run-on, 
breathing with the caesura, swinging down to the foot of the page from line to line 
as from branch to branch . . . steadily marching nearer in iambic motion . . .                                                         
Brian McHale, on the other hand, is among the most prominent advocates of Pale Fire as a work straddling 
modernism and postmodernism. For him, modernism is primarily concerned with epistemological questions (can we 
know the world?), while the postmodern is more focused on ontological questions (what worlds, plural, exist?). He 
argues that Pale Fire is “a text of absolute epistemological uncertainty” (18), whose uncertainties lead inexorably to 
speculation on the existence of other worlds themselves. We do not know if Zembla exists or not in the novel, and 
thus we are forced to focus on it as a (possibly) separate world, completely invented as fiction. For him, then, Pale 
Fire is a text in which the proliferation of epistemological questions (a sort of modernism in the extreme, in this 
sense) seems to forcibly compel the ontological questions that dominate postmodernism. Thus it is “perhaps the 
paradigmatic limit-modernist novel” (19). Poststructuralist critic Martine Hennard similarly finds it to be “located on 
the frontier ‘in-between’ the modernist and postmodernist movements”; for her it questions, in predictably 
poststructuralist fashion, “the literary historian’s drive to distinguish them as separate modes of writing” (300).  
I have not mentioned the opinion of distinguished Nabokov critic and biographer Brian Boyd in the main 
text, both because it would be a distraction from my argument and because his view is an outlier in the criticism. 
Nevertheless, it represents an interesting third view regarding the literary-historical classification of the novel. He 
has written an entire book on the novel that claims to solve all the uncertainties that most other critics (Couturier, 
McHale, and Hennard alike) have judged to be constituent features of the text. Thus he self-consciously “confutes 
the claim that the novel is quintessentially ‘postmodern’” (Nabokov’s Pale Fire 5; henceforth cited as NPF). While 
he does not offer any classification of the novel in the place of “postmodernism,” I would argue that his ingeniously 
literal-minded explication actually reclaims Pale Fire as a work of realism, albeit one that takes the concept of an 
afterlife with ghosts seriously. As much as I admire Boyd’s detective work in finding Nabokovian allusions and 
puzzle-solutions, I don’t find it convincing on this score, and am more sympathetic to those critics who see the point 
of the novel lying in its “undecidability,” to use the poststructuralist terminology. 
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entering the hall of a hotel, putting on the bedlight, while Shade blots out a word, 
and falling asleep as the poet lays down his pen for the night. (78) 
Kinbote relates a dream he had once, too, in which he learns that his Queen Disa “had become a 
character in a novel” (212). Last and perhaps most importantly, such metafictional nods extend 
to Kinbote himself. In the novel’s last pages he suggests that he himself is nothing more than a 
literary invention: “My notes and self are petering out,” he tells us, implying the identity of 
writing and self (300). In what we would now call a classic gesture of postmodern metafiction, 
“Kinbote” then points the reader’s attention to someone sounding much like The Author: “I may 
turn up yet, on another campus, as an old, happy, healthy, heterosexual Russian, a writer in exile, 
sans fame, sans future, sans audience, sans anything but his art” (300-301). Pale Fire is thus a 
novel that undermines readers’ confidence in the “reality” of not just some but every one of its 
main events and characters, gleefully hinting at its own status as fiction. Furthermore it exhibits 
what we have since come to recognize as a classically postmodernist trope of indeterminacy (or 
poststructuralist “undecidability”). Kinbote’s extravagantly subjective “interpretation” of a 
poem, after all, eventually reveals that much (or maybe all?) of his commentary—his depiction 
of his life as royalty in the kingdom of Zembla—is the fantasy of a madman. Reflexivity, 
metafiction, indeterminacy, an emphasis on the inevitability of interpretation: the novel does 
representative postmodern things at the beginning of the postmodern era, even if one denies that 
such things cement its status as a postmodern novel. 
And no matter how we classify the novel, studying Pale Fire will also aid our study of 
the origins of postmodernism because it and its author were undoubtedly influential in the 
emergence of a self-consciously postmodern novel. As D. Barton Johnson notes, the “rise of the 
postmodernists—John Barth, William Gass, John Hawkes, Robert Coover, Donald Barthelme, 
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Thomas Pynchon, and Gilbert Sorrentino—coincided almost exactly with the Nabokov decade of 
the sixties,” the time of Nabokov’s greatest, post-Lolita fame (145). And as Couturier observes, 
though Nabokov had a long career before the sixties and was thus “only marginally a 
contemporary of the postmodernists” and indeed “knew little or nothing about them,” the 
representative postmodernists cited nevertheless “knew much about him and often were afraid of 
being eclipsed by him” (253-54). Postmodern authors like John Hawkes and John Barth regularly 
named Pale Fire as a formative influence on their own work, and the novel was thus a “key text 
for the movement” of postmodern literature as a whole (Johnson 145). Analyzing Pale Fire’s 
social roots and motivations will thus tell us something important about the roots of 
postmodernist discourse. 
This chapter reads Nabokov’s famed campus novel—and seminal postmodernist novel—
and makes two main points about the intimate relationship between early postmodernism and 
intellectual labor in the 1960s. First I argue that Pale Fire, like its predecessor campus novel The 
Groves of Academe, is a satire of bureaucracy, particularly in higher education. But rather than 
offering McCarthy’s universalist liberalism as the solution to bureaucracy’s ills, Pale Fire 
presents the holistic experience of a complex art as the charismatic antidote to higher education’s 
bureaucratic thought and soullessness. I argue secondly that Pale Fire’s characteristically 
postmodern metafiction and insistence on the inevitability of interpretation are rooted not only in 
this antibureaucratism, but in a deeper and utopian sense of the value and importance of a 
holistic intellectual labor—namely the creation (and not just consumption) of art. Though many 
on the laborist left today have assumed that postmodernism offers only a politically disabling 
skepticism, this concluding chapter suggests to the contrary that the earliest ludic postmodernism 
of the 1960s—even at its most apolitical—often constituted an exuberantly defiant celebration of 
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workers’ ability to make a product wholly from their own thought and labor, as against the 
narrowing forces of bureaucratic employment. 
 
2. Academe versus the Re-enchantment of the World 
Over the half-century of Pale Fire’s existence, critics have debated the “reality” of nearly 
every aspect of its plot. Does the country of Zembla exist in the novel, for example, or only in 
Charles Kinbote’s mind? Or more fundamentally: did two separate authors, poet John Shade and 
mad scholar Kinbote, write the poem and commentary—as it appears at first glance—or did only 
one of them?5 But one seemingly humble such question has gone entirely unnoticed. Is the 
institution of higher education that houses both John Shade and Charles Kinbote a college, or a 
university? Is it, in other words, a comparatively small and organizationally simple school for 
undergraduates, or a larger and more complex congeries of distinct schools with graduate 
programs? Pale Fire leaves the question decidedly open. In casual mentions of Wordsmith, 
                                                        
5 While in one scene Kinbote represents, with a seeming degree of realism, other faculty at Wordsmith casually 
discussing the country and Kinbote’s resemblance to its king (264-69), Kinbote’s narrative of Zembla over all seems 
indubitably fantastic. Thus several critics have discussed whether the country of Zembla can be said to exist in the 
novel at all. Boyd, for example, dismisses Kinbote’s narrative of faculty discussing Zembla and instead believes that 
Zembla is wholly invented by Kinbote. He quite ingeniously argues instead for Kinbote’s “real-world” existence as 
an exile from Russia via a Scandinavian university (NPF 90-98). Pekka Tammi argues against such 
straightforwardly “realist” solutions, believing that much of the fun of the novel lies precisely in its indeterminacy 
on this as on several other questions. In support of this approach, he quotes a letter Nabokov’s wife Vera wrote to a 
publisher: “Nobody knows, nobody should know—even Kinbote hardly knows—if Zembla really exists” (qtd. on 
575). 
Likewise the question of who has written Pale Fire, fictionally speaking, keeps critics busy. As against the 
straight-forward reading that the poem is Shade’s and the rest of the text (foreword, commentary, and index) 
Kinbote’s, “single-authorship” theories argue that the entirety of the novel is written solely by one or the other of 
them. Such theories are admirably if naturally leadingly summarized by Boyd, NPF 114-26. Boyd, formerly a 
Shadean (one who believes John Shade to be Pale Fire’s single author), has now added another possibility to the 
debate by arguing that the novel is written instead by multiple authors. These would be not only John Shade and 
Charles Kinbote, as the novel’s surface suggests, but also the ghosts of a posthumous John Shade and his deceased 
daughter Hazel, as well as a very much alive and self-consciously represented Nabokov himself. In this chapter, 
however, I simply assume the straight-forward interpretation of Pale Fire’s (fictional) composition by two authors, 
since the authorship debates do not touch directly upon my main points. 
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references to “the college” or “the university” are pretty well divided in the text.6 But more 
surprisingly, the institution’s proper name fluctuates in the novel. We are first introduced to 
Wordsmith’s name in passing reference to a historical photograph of “Wordsmith College at it 
was . . . in 1903” (20). Later, Kinbote tells us that Paul H. had been head of “the English 
Department of Wordsmith College” since 1957 (194). Kinbote also mentions hearing, at 6:00 
p.m. on July 5, 1959—i.e. in the recent past of Kinbote’s writing that summer—the “clocks of 
Wordsmith College” (158). However, elsewhere in Kinbote’s glosses he refers without 
hesitation, three separate times, to “Wordsmith University” (82, 92, 248). He also reproduces a 
letter he has written to Queen Disa in April of 1959—again, the recent past of the novel—where 
he gives his return address as “Wordsmith University, New Wye, Appalachia, USA” (257).7 
Whether discussing 1903 or 1959, in short, Pale Fire offers no firm picture of the institutional 
type or even name of its primary “real-world” setting.8                                                         
6 The text refers to a “college” on pages 19 (“preparing to leave for college in [a] powerful red car”), 25 (“the 
president of the college”), 92 (“the college was considerably farther from them than they were from one another”), 
186 (“college pranksters” at Wordsmith), 237 (a “college porter”), 248 (“I have just called up the college,” says 
Sylvia O’Donnell, a trustee there), 249 (O’Donnell compares the president of Wordsmith favorably to most other 
“American college presidents”), 250 (“the college hall stairs”), 283 (“the college directory”), and 291 (“the college 
indoor swimming pool”). 
But the text mentions a “university” on pages 256 (Izrumdov gives Gradus “the name of the university 
where [Kinbote] taught”), 257 (Kinbote discusses his “work at the university”), and 280 (Gradus asks “what hotel 
was nearest to the university”). Kinbote also informs us that Hazel Shade is taking a class with a Wordsmith 
psychology professor who studies his own students for a project he calls “Autoneurynological Patterns among 
American university students” (187).  
The somewhat greater frequency of references to a “college” probably stems from the fact that in 
America—Nabokov’s as well as Kinbote’s adopted home country, with its distinct usage—“college” is a more 
generic term than “university.” For example, Americans generally speak in the abstract of students “going to 
college,” rather than “going to university.”  
7 Though less compelling as evidence of the institution’s proper name, we may also note that the downtown part of 
New Wye is named “College Town” (poem l. 339, commentary pages 240, 280), and that Kinbote mentions “the 
College Library” (216). But even the latter reference is countered by a brief narratorial reference to looking up old 
newspapers in the “WUL”—presumably, Wordsmith University Library (275). (I call this a “narratorial reference,” 
rather than naming Kinbote specifically, because the particular voice that cites the “WUL” is almost certainly not 
Kinbote’s, given that Kinbote frequently bemoans his lack of access to a library at the cabin where he writes. On the 
importance of this moment to establishing the [fictional] authorship of Pale Fire, see Dowling’s online article 
“Who’s the Narrator of Nabokov’s Pale Fire?,” especially the section titled “Access to a Good Library.”) 
8 Predictably, then, the novel’s critics have mirrored this confusion of names in their work. Brian Boyd’s excellent 
book on Pale Fire points out the fictional campus’s similarity to Cornell University, where Nabokov taught for 
many years, and goes on to refer to it as Wordsmith University (79). He indeed imagines it as a university with 
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It seems doubtful that Kinbote has simply been careless about Wordsmith’s name. 
Despite his mental instability, everywhere else in the text his attention to narrative detail is full 
and firm. It also seems unlikely that we can ascribe Wordsmith’s nomenclatorial flux to 
Nabokov’s desire to assure Pale Fire’s status as something other than roman à clef. With its 
professors serving mostly as background, and in any case not “realistically” drawn, most readers 
wouldn’t think to search for real-world equivalents in Pale Fire. And it is hard to imagine 
Nabokov worrying about such things in the first place, since—unlike Mary McCarthy—he had 
no reputation for writing directly about real acquaintances. 
Why, then, is Wordsmith’s status as college or university ambiguous? I would argue that 
Pale Fire’s inconsistency in this regard reflects, and indeed comments upon, the increasingly 
homogenous nature of higher education in the mid-century. After all, as Christopher Jencks and 
David Riesman note in their classic study of the growth of American higher education, The 
Academic Revolution, the distinction between colleges and universities had become decidedly 
less meaningful over the course of the twentieth century. With the rise of an increasingly national 
and competitive industrial society after the Civil War, they argue, the ideology of “meritocracy,” 
however biased in its sense of what constituted “merit,” soon replaced older hiring judgments 
based frankly on ethnic and racial status, or regional origin. In practice, this ethos required 
workers to gain credentials that would prove their merit. Universities sprung up to provide the 
credentials. And the “traditional colleges” of old—until then primarily regional in focus and 
certainly not professionalized—struggled to become feeder schools to these universities. They 
                                                        
enough research specialization to include a Department of Scandinavian Studies (91-92). Many other critics, 
however—perhaps following the first reference they find in the text—have simply and without comment labeled the 
institution Wordsmith College (e.g. Tammi 574, Belletto 757, Condren 139, Reading 82, Reierstad 7). Alvin B. 
Kernan single-handedly represents the critical confusion—and remains more faithful to the text—when, in an article 
that stakes some of its central claims on Pale Fire’s sources in academic life, he mostly refers to it as Wordsmith 
University (101, 105, 107, 111), but nevertheless lets slip one reference to Wordsmith College (108). 
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hired credentialed faculty, and reformed their curricula to prepare undergraduates for graduate 
work at a university. They became what Jencks and Riesman call, in a phrase that previously 
might have sounded oxymoronic, “university colleges.” The competitive ethos of “meritocracy” 
thus bent the trajectory of colleges and universities remarkably close together.9 Pale Fire’s 
refusal to answer whether Wordsmith is a college or a university accordingly may be understood 
in part as the novel’s knowing reflection of an historical moment in which the distinction 
between the two types of institution simply mattered less than at any point before. 
But the institutional ambiguity of the novel reveals more than a moment in the history of 
American higher education, I would argue. It also reflects the novel’s suspicion that in the 
contemporary world all institutions had become increasingly undifferentiated, homogenized. 
More specifically, in the world(s) depicted by Pale Fire, contemporary existence itself has 
become institutional and bureaucratic: trivial, unimaginative, and rule-bound. Primarily through 
its depiction of Wordsmith, I will now argue, Nabokov’s novel thus offers an extended satire of 
bureaucratic organization as the cultivation of a mindset prone to both myopic specialization and, 
in the end, a kind of soullessness. If this is the novel’s critique of bureaucratic mind and spirit, 
Pale Fire’s primary response to this bureaucratic world, I will show, is the valorization of 
aesthetic experience. Both Shade’s poem and Kinbote’s Zembla, the novel’s affectionate (if in 
each case lightly mocked) symbols of art, serve as counters to the kinds of thinking and 
experience that the novel satirizes in its archetypal bureaucracy of higher education. 
Published six years before Jencks and Riesman drew attention to the phenomenal 
twentieth-century growth of American higher education, Pale Fire simply assumes an “academic 
revolution” as its social background. Kinbote describes the “Wordsmith College” depicted in a                                                         
9 This narrative is drawn from Jencks and Riesman 1-27; the rise of the “university college” is specifically discussed 
on pages 20-27. 
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1903 photograph as “stunned and shabby” (20); the college of old was a squat non-entity. But 
when Kinbote offers us a description of Wordsmith in 1959, he reveals how much the place has 
grown:  
Here are the great mansions of madness, the impeccably planned dormitories—
bedlams of jungle music—the magnificent palace of the Administration, the brick 
walls, the archways, the quadrangles blocked out in velvet green and chrysoprase, 
Spencer House and its lily pond, the Chapel, New Lecture Hall, the Library, the 
prison-like edifice containing our classrooms and offices . . . (92) 
Thus as a first observation we may note that Nabokov’s novel takes care to limn the history of 
American higher education in the twentieth century. The “real-world” setting of Pale Fire 
embodies higher education’s compositional transformation from the sleepy and comparatively 
unambitious colleges of old to the sprawling postwar “multiversities” that Clark Kerr described 
and promoted in the sixties.10 Kinbote’s very reason for offering no further description of 
Wordsmith—he claims that anyone who wishes to know more can simply stop by Wordsmith’s 
Publicity Office (92)—itself points to the newly-expanded size and complexity of institutions of 
higher education in the era. 
Kinbote’s description of Wordsmith furthermore implies that higher education has 
become a colorless bureaucracy akin to every other modern institution. He repeatedly suggests 
Wordsmith’s commonality with other, less flattering institutions. Housing resembles asylums for 
the insane: the “great mansions” are “of madness,” the dorms are “bedlams.” The classrooms and 
faculty offices—the places of teaching and learning—are likewise housed in an unattractively 
“prison-like edifice.” Every inch of this college or university is depressingly rigid, from the 
“planned” dormitories to the “blocked out” quadrangles, and onward to the unimaginatively                                                         
10 On the “multiversity,” see Kerr’s The Uses of the University, especially the first chapter. 
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named “New Lecture Hall.” The unquestioned centrality of administrators—bureaucrats—to the 
whole enterprise cannot be doubted from the outsize “palace” in which they reside. It is not 
coincidental, then, that after this description of an opulent but sterile college or university, 
Kinbote ends his note with an otherwise unexpected cry: “Dear Jesus, do something” (93). His 
plea for Jesus’s help accentuates the perhaps literal soullessness of higher education in the novel. 
Kinbote’s cry for divine intervention is at least in part the cry of his hope to escape a drearily 
bureaucratic institution. 
But a central conceit of the novel shows that Kinbote hasn’t managed to escape becoming 
a creature of that institution. For the entirety of Kinbote’s narcissistic commentary—founded on 
his assumption that Shade’s poem revolves around his supposed life as Zemblan royalty—may 
be understood as a parody of narrow, bureaucratically specialized, department-bound thought. 
Kinbote never names the department in which he teaches. But it is clear that he teaches in a 
department with a strong component of what we might call “Zemblan Studies.” His department 
head is Oscar Nattochdag, a “distinguished Zemblan scholar” (237), and Wordsmith trustee 
Sylvia O’Donnell notes that he has been hired to teach “Zemblan” (248). Thus the central joke of 
the novel, Kinbote’s assumption that nearly every line in Shade’s poem refers to his life as the 
king of Zembla, may be taken as a satire of the dangers of academic specialization: Kinbote 
interprets the whole world in terms of his research interest. In the vast majority of the text that is 
Kinbote’s detailed “exegesis,” Shade’s poem is refracted through the astonishingly myopic mind 
of a bureaucratic specialist in Zembla, with wildly entertaining and of course thoroughly wrong-
headed results.11 Thus with this early postmodern campus novel, we might say that Tess 
                                                        
11 As discussed in a footnote above, a number of critics believe that Kinbote has invented the entire country of 
Zembla, rather than just his supposed life as royalty there. Such arguments are debatable, but this is not the place to 
go into depth on the topic. (Readers seeking an admirably succinct introduction to the central and perhaps defining 
conundrums regarding the “reality” of events in Pale Fire should read Tammi’s article on Pale Fire in The Garland 
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Slesinger and the young Mary McCarthy’s mutual fascination with personal and political 
narcissism in the thirties and forties takes on a specifically institutional cast, with Kinbote’s 
scholarly expression of his narcissism serving as a comically exaggerated expression of the 
academic-bureaucratic norms of increasing specialization. 
The novel furthermore offers a small but quite telling display of its antibureaucratism in a 
memo written by Paul Hurley, the head of the English Department. Hurley warns his faculty that 
Shade’s “manuscript fell into the hands of a person who not only is unqualified for the job of 
editing it, belonging as he does to another department, but is known to have a deranged mind” 
(195). The phrasing here is worth parsing out. “Not only” is Kinbote “unqualified for the job of 
editing it,” Professor Hurley asserts, “but”—in other words, as a separate issue from Kinbote’s 
editorial competence—he “is known to have a deranged mind.” Outrageously (and comically), in 
other words, Hurley never considers the possibility that Kinbote’s sanity might have something 
to do, positively or negatively, with his competence as an editor. This is because Hurley can 
imagine no greater test of competence than departmental affiliation, ultimately. In Hurley’s 
mind, Kinbote is unqualified to edit the manuscript simply because he “belong[s] . . . to another 
department.” Kinbote’s sanity is a separate and secondary consideration. In a certain sense, 
Kinbote is thus exactly right to describe Hurley as a “fine administrator and [an] inept scholar” 
(194). A quintessentially bureaucratic manager, this administrator refuses to consider intellectual 
ability outside the terms of a department. In one brief sentence, Hurley’s memo thus reveals the 
novel’s sense that academic bureaucracy’s policing of departmental boundaries and overall 
narrowness of intellectual perspective undermines true scholarship and learning.                                                          
Companion to Vladimir Nabokov; the existence of Zembla is discussed on pages 574-75.) I only raise the point 
because the denial of Zembla’s reality might seem to cast doubt on my point about a “Zemblan Studies” joke in the 
novel. However, even if one believes that Zembla is entirely Kinbote’s invention, we can at least say with certainty 
that in Kinbote’s mind his department is that of Zemblan Studies, and so on this level of the text, the point of the 
novel’s antidepartmental satire holds. 
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It is Shade’s poem, however, that best reveals the novel’s antibureaucratic parody of 
higher education. On its surface, the poem meditates on the relationship between art (specifically 
poetry) and mortality. But in considerable measure and especially in its third canto, the poem 
also satirizes bureaucratic institutions and intellection—the institutions including, I would argue, 
Wordsmith itself. Canto Three opens with an intricate series of puns and plays on words: 
L’if, lifeless tree! Your great Maybe, Rabelais: 
The grand potato. 
   I.P.H., a lay 
Institute (I) of Preparation (P) 
For the Hereafter (H), or If, as we 
Called it—big if!—engaged me for one term 
To speak on death . . . (ll. 501-06)12 
Kinbote’s gloss tells us that the I.P.H. is a fictionalized version of an “institute of higher 
philosophy” in the southwest, whose terminal initials are “HP”—HP evidently standing for 
“Higher Philosophy,” since the institution has students who, in this era of breakthroughs in home 
stereo sound, jokingly call their school “Hi-Phi” (223). The insistence on “higher philosophy” 
may furthermore hints at an institution that specifically produces Doctors of Philosophy: the 
I.P.H. as an Institute (I) of Ph.D’s, in short. It is modeled on a university. 
If Kinbote tells us that the I.P.H.’s “real-world” analogue is a southwestern institute, 
symbolically it nevertheless suggests the institution of Wordsmith itself. As the passage notes, 
the I.P.H. can be jokingly pronounced as a single word, “If.” Via the canto’s first line, this word 
also recalls (homographically) the French “l’if,” or yew tree—a tree Western poetry often                                                         
12 Here and throughout this chapter, citations of the poem are marked by an explicit reference to line numbers (e.g., 
“l. 543” or “ll. 321-25”). Citations without an “l.” or “ll.” refer to page numbers. 
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associates with death, a concern central to both the Institute of Preparation for the Hereafter and 
Shade’s specific lecture topic there. (Hence also the passage’s allusion to Rabelais’s dying words 
about journeying to a “great Maybe”—the “grand peut-être” which Shade ironically deflates as a 
“grand potato.”) This much lies more or less on the surface of the poem: the I.P.H., “If,” is 
associated with the yew tree, l’if, in order to pun on the institution’s concern with the subject of 
death. But further punning and play on the word “yew” in the poem has gone unnoticed in the 
critical commentary. Most broadly, “yew” is a homophone for “U,” or university: in this way the 
poem suggests the I.P.H.’s affinity with other institutions of higher education (I.P.H. = if = l’if = 
yew = U). But more directly, the word “yew” is also an anagram (one of Nabokov’s favorite 
word puzzles) of “Wye.” Thus when Shade writes that his stint at the I.P.H. required a move 
“from New Wye / To Yewshade, in another, higher state” (ll. 508-09), we should note more than 
the poem’s obvious allusions to death and the existence of life after death; more than the 
metaphysical ring of “another, higher state,” and the ghostly association of “Yew” with “shade.” 
We should note that the Yew/Wye anagram associates Shade’s time at the I.P.H. of “Yewshade” 
with his ongoing career at the Wordsmith of “New Wye.” In other words, Yewshade exists in 
“another, higher state” than New Wye more than geographically (north of New Wye) or even 
metaphysically: Shade’s move to the I.P.H. is a poetic move to the “higher state” of aesthetic 
representation itself, to an abstracted reflection of the New Wye of Wordsmith, where he 
normally teaches. The I.P.H.’s imagined home in “Yewshade” in particular—the town name 
combining “Yew” and Shade’s own name—suggests that Shade’s time at the I.P.H. represents in 
disguise something of his experience of New “Wye.” The I.P.H. of Canto Three thus 
symbolically represents a “big if,” big l’if/yew/U, indeed. It represents not only the southwestern 
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“institute of higher philosophy” that Kinbote tells us is the I.P.H.’s real-world source, but 
Wordsmith itself. 
This association allows us to see that Shade’s poem parodies not just the I.P.H., but 
Wordsmith itself—and by extension all of contemporary higher education—as a quintessential 
bureaucracy. The parody of the I.P.H. and higher education offered in Canto Three indeed 
summarizes some of the novel’s key social critiques of bureaucratic thought and feeling. At the 
Institute, for example, death is not a mystery to be respected, but a problem to be solved with 
uncomprehending efficiency. Of the experience of death, the Institute can only ask, “What if 
there’s nobody to say hullo / To the newcomer, no reception, no / Indoctrination?” (ll. 538-40). 
In short, what if (IPH) death is not an orderly office or a dogmatic classroom? With that grave 
fear in mind, the Institute quickly reduces the great mysteries of spirit and afterlife to 
manageable, bureaucratic size. It 
offered tips 
(The amber spectacles for life’s eclipse)— 
How not to panic when you’re made a ghost . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
How to locate in blackness, with a gasp, 
Terra the Fair, an orbicle of jasp. 
How to keep sane in spiral types of space. 
Precautions to be taken in the case 
Of freak reincarnation . . . (ll. 551-53, 557-61) 
A bureaucracy at its core, in short, the Institute tackles the vast problem of death by breaking it 
into reified sub-problems, each of which may be addressed, no doubt, by a separate department 
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with relevant experts. Like the rest of the novel, the poem Pale Fire thus satirizes the 
bureaucratic tendency—typical, it implies, of institutions of higher education like the I.P.H. and 
Wordsmith—to reduce even intractable mysteries like death to a series of technical questions 
that miss and trivialize the significance of the whole.13 
Last but not least, the name of the town where Wordsmith itself resides also hints at 
higher education’s bureaucratic deficiencies. Just as in the case of the “I.P.H.” and “Yewshade” 
in Canto Three of Shade’s poem, the seemingly simple name of Wordsmith’s “New Wye” also 
offers an abundance of puns. Critics routinely observe that New Wye is a sly reference to New 
York (“New Y”), the state where Nabokov lived during his years teaching at Cornell University. 
But “New Wye” also implies, likely with some irony, the larger mission of any post-secondary 
institution that engages in research: a university or college constantly proposes new questions, 
new “why”’s, and hence always claims it has answers, “new why”’s, that perhaps prove it “knew 
why” all along.14 These puns also allow us to illuminate one meaning of the name of 
Wordsmith’s sister institution, the I.P.H. The questioning of the “if” pun in Canto Three runs 
parallel to the questioning “Wye” pun of Wordsmith’s address: both puns hint at the novel’s 
larger theme of an academic bureaucracy that produces questions and answers with clockwork 
routine rather than thought, of institutions that arrogantly claim to “know why” about the little 
matters while not evincing appropriate respect for vast and intractable mysteries. Pale Fire’s 
                                                        
13 Belletto makes a similar point: “The ‘grand potato’ / ‘grand peut-être’ pun does not seem to ‘stress lack of respect 
for Death,’ as Kinbote insists, but rather stresses lack of respect for institutions . . . that are designed to explain away 
the mysteries of the universe” (764). 
14 Nabokov himself sanctioned such a derogatory understanding of academic claims to knowledge when describing 
the goal of teaching literature to one of his classes: “I have tried to make of you good readers who read books not for 
. . . the academic purpose of indulging in generalizations,” Nabokov told his students. (He thereby condemned the 
academic habit of merely seeking new “why”’s.) Instead, he continued, “I have tried to teach you to feel a shiver of 
artistic satisfaction”—in other words, to read with more respect for those certainties that cannot be thought, or 
taught, rationally (“L’envoi” 381-82). 
My thanks to John Bradley for pointing out the new “why” as “new questions” pun. 
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parodies of the I.P.H. and of Wordsmith reveal the novel’s pervasive skepticism of narrow 
bureaucratic thought and feeling. 
This antibureaucratic animus in Pale Fire, I believe, even motivates what has frequently 
been regarded as its central theme, that of the joy and importance of art. The aesthetic theme has 
recently fallen out of favor in criticism on the novel. But for the novel’s first thirty years, critics 
regarded it as paramount. Frank Kermode’s contemporary review of the novel in the New 
Statesman, for example, read Nabokov as a pure “formalist” (146), and much criticism afterward 
followed suit by looking at Pale Fire as part of a larger Nabokovian Escape Into Aesthetics (the 
title of Page Stegner’s 1966 book). As Laurie Clancy opined in 1984, it is a novel that “seems to 
have been conceived out of the express desire to demonstrate the force of its author’s aesthetic 
theories” (125) and as a partial “hommage [sic] to art itself” (126). With the advent of 
poststructuralist criticism on the novel in the 1980s, Pale Fire’s aestheticism was more often 
than not merely rephrased into linguistic terms. These critics read the novel’s affection for both 
Kinbote’s imagination of Zemblan life and his insistence on seeing it in Shade’s poem as an 
anticipation of deconstructive criticism’s insistence on the critic as creative rival to the artist 
(Torgovnick in 1986), or as an exemplar of a distinctly postmodern fascination with the funhouse 
mirror of representation itself (Couturier in 1993, Hennard in 1994). Most criticism since the 
1990s, however, has fallen into two major groups, the metaphysical and the political. Following 
Vladimir E. Alexandrov’s intention in 1991 to “dismantle the widespread critical view that 
[Nabokov] is first and foremost a meta-literary writer” and suggest instead “that an aesthetic 
rooted in his intuition of a transcendent realm is the basis of his art” (3), one significant trend has 
been to examine Nabokov’s beliefs in potustoronnost’, loosely translated as “the afterlife.”15                                                         
15 Boyd’s influential 1999 book, which posits the ghostly influence of Hazel and John Shade on Kinbote’s 
composition, offers perhaps the most developed example of this trend. It also contains a footnote that nicely 
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Meanwhile, in the twenty-first century more political critics have argued for Pale Fire’s 
relatively liberal attitudes toward sexuality (Miller in 2002, Belletto in 2006), or for Lolita’s 
proto-feminist sympathy (Moore and—much more skeptically—Patnoe, both in 2002).16 
Generally speaking, critics have moved away from taking Nabokov’s formal proclivities at the 
author’s own quite frequent word, and toward insisting on a spiritualist and even a political 
Nabokov. The aesthetic Nabokov has fallen out of favor. 
But the original critical fascination with Nabokov’s formalism wasn’t misplaced, I would 
argue. It was merely one-sided. For in Pale Fire, aesthetic experience is presented as a counter to 
the intellectual flaws and soullessness of bureaucratic thinking we have been examining. And a 
thematic keynote of the novel—a theme we may recognize in the “new liberal” consensus of the 
fifties and early sixties more generally—is that the aesthetic offers a complex type of thought 
opposed to the ideological thought typical of bureaucratic social organization in higher education 
and elsewhere. Moreover, Pale Fire intimates that the experience of the aesthetic preserves 
something importantly ir-rational as against the organized and bureaucratic world represented by 
the Wordsmith campus: for Pale Fire, the aesthetic offers a human pleasure not subject to reason 
                                                        
summarizes the work of other critics who have pursued the afterlife theme in Nabokov: William Woodin Rowe, D. 
Barton Johnson, Julian Connolly, Gennady Barabtarlo, and Maxim Shrayer (NPF, 277 n.13). 
16 Since my own work contributes to political criticism on Nabokov’s Pale Fire, I should mention that while both 
Miller’s and Belletto’s articles offer real insights into the novel, to my mind they also represent a central flaw of 
Nabokovian political criticism thus far: they recruit Nabokov’s novels for the political left far too easily. For Miller, 
Nabokov’s constant destabilizations of sexual identity—for example, Kinbote’s lover Bob has a crewcut, which 
normally would signify a military, heterosexual masculinity—suggest that the novel gamely reveals the only 
tenuously constructed nature of sexuality. For Belletto, Nabokov’s thematic emphasis on the importance of the 
random and coincidental serves to undermine all ideologies depicted in the novel, including the “Cold War 
homophobic narrative” of homosexuality as unreliable, subversive, and potentially treasonous (757). In essence, 
both argue that Nabokov’s playfulness in the novel amounts to a political rejection of 1950s homophobia. Perhaps 
overly eager to foster appreciation for Nabokov in a literary academy that leans left in its politics, neither takes 
seriously enough—though Belletto is admirably more cautious about his claims than Miller—the simple, 
unpalatable, and much more persuasive interpretation that Pale Fire’s comic treatment of Kinbote’s sexuality mostly 
reveals a pervasive anxiety about homosexuality, and works mainly to contain discourses of homosexuality rather 
than to heroically subvert those of heterosexism. 
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alone. Pale Fire’s celebration of art is significantly motivated by, and ultimately inseparable 
from, its antibureaucratism. 
Not coincidentally, the end of the same canto mocking the I.P.H. offers the novel’s first 
and most significant passage on the aesthetic’s recognition of intellectual complexity as against 
bureaucratic ideology. Having recently suffered a near-death experience in which he sees a 
gleaming white fountain, Shade happens upon a newspaper article describing a woman who has 
also seen a fountain when near death. Does their common vision reveal something true about life 
after death? Shade travels a long distance to meet the woman, and discovers that the newspaper 
account of her experience featured a misprint. She had not seen what Shade had—a lovely white 
“fountain”—but a “mountain” instead. Rather than leading to despair, however, this realization 
provokes an epiphany for Shade about the meaning of life and death: 
... all at once it dawned on me that this 
Was the real point, the contrapuntal theme; 
Just this: not text, but texture; not the dream 
But topsy-turvical coincidence, 
Not flimsy nonsense, but a web of sense. (ll. 806-10, emphasis in original) 
The many iterations of the meaning of Shade’s epiphany here consistently oppose the simple to 
the complex, in favor of the latter. He finds the “real point” of mortal life not in a “text” visible 
and clear on a page (the word “fountain”), but in the “texture” of a rich reality surrounding it (the 
long trip to discover that it was supposed to read “mountain”); not in “the dream” of some ready-
made meaning of death (a reassuringly common experience of the afterlife), but in the reality of 
“topsy-turvical coincidence” and chance (a misprint); not in the “flimsy nonsense” of some 
straightforward meaning of death, but in the stronger “web of sense” that can be created (spun) 
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from life. Life is to be found in a rich, “contrapuntal” complexity, not a falsely comforting 
ideological simplicity. 
This rich experience of reality, as Shade elaborates it, is quintessentially aesthetic: 
Yes! It sufficed that I in life could find 
Some kind of link-and-bobolink, some kind 
Of correlated pattern in the game, 
Plexed artistry, and something of the same 
Pleasure in it as they who played it found. (ll. 811-15) 
After experiencing the coarse trivialization of death at the bureaucratic I.P.H., Shade realizes 
here that the meaning of life instead obtains in understandings that are simultaneously rational 
and playful. The meaning he has found involves the logic implied by “link,” but also the fanciful 
avian flight and song suggested by the rhyming word “bobolink.” It is the rational “correlated 
pattern” to be found in what in the end is a “game.” It is, in fine, “plexed”—com-plex—
“artistry.” For Shade, life’s meaning can only be found in aesthetic experience. The aesthetic 
experience of complexity affords what “pleasure” there is for those playing the “game” that is 
life itself.  
Shade persistently conveys this aesthetic experience of complexity with a metaphor of 
intertwinement. The word “plexed” itself derives from the Latin plexus, “braided,” and Shade 
extends the braid metaphor in the passage as he tells us that the beings fortunate enough to 
“play” the game of life—much as an artist does, “Making ornaments / Of accidents and 
possibilities” (ll. 828-29)—live in an “involute” (spiral, twisted) “Abode” (ll. 817-18). They exist 
in intertwined complexity itself, in short. While the I.P.H. worries that the afterlife assaults one’s 
sanity, promising to teach one “How to keep sane in spiral types of space” (l. 559), these wise 
 288 
and aesthetic beings instead live in their spiral abode happily, content with its strange richness 
and complexity. Nor are such metaphors of twisting confined to the third canto. They are hinted 
at early on in Canto One, for example, when we realize that Shade’s “favorite” tree (l. 49)—the 
shagbark that he often pauses under while composing verse (89)—is marked by its “black, spare 
/ Vermiculated trunk” (ll. 50-51). From the first canto onward, in short, a twisted tree provides 
the symbol of and inspiration for Shade’s art, which insistently strives to acknowledge a “topsy-
turvical,” “plexed” reality.17 The consistency of such metaphors thus suggests that unlike the 
bureaucratic I.P.H., Shade’s poem insists upon the complexity of a non-ideological, department-
transcending world that art must try to recognize. It insists on the irreducible diversity and sheer 
tangled messiness of the reality from which art fashions meaningful and pleasurable patterns. 
As Shade’s poem Pale Fire thus suggests the importance of intellectual-aesthetic  
complexity as against bureaucratic narrowness, so too does Kinbote’s undeniably aesthetic 
creation of the larger work (including foreword, commentary, and even index) called Pale Fire 
as well, most of which is given over to the loving creation of a legend about royalty in Zembla. 
Though Kinbote is satirized as a bureaucratic specialist in Zemblan Studies, as we saw earlier, 
we must also recognize at one and the same time that he is precisely antibureaucratic by virtue of 
all that he has created, as a work of art, about a Zembla existing outside his employment at 
                                                        
17 Nabokov also associates this comfort with aesthetic complexity with the experience of death and the afterlife. 
Shade clearly links his vermiculated tree to the death of his daughter Hazel: “The setting sun / bronzed the black 
bark, around which, like undone / Garlands, the shadows of the foliage fell. . . . White butterflies turn lavender as 
they / Pass through its shade where gently seems to sway / The phantom of my little daughter’s swing” (ll. 51-53, 
56-57). The images of sunset, shadows, and shade—as well as the allusion to Housman’s “To an Athlete Dying 
Young,” with his “garland” “briefer than a girl’s” (also alluded to by Kinbote on page 196)—all suggest Hazel 
Shade’s young death. If we accept Brian Boyd’s argument that the white butterflies imply Hazel Shade’s butterfly-
like transformation into another and better being after death (NPF 137), then we can see furthermore that the 
concepts of death and the afterlife in the novel, along with the images of an aesthetic existence suggested by images 
of twisting, together form a tangle of associations that all suggest the complexity of worlds—this one and the next. 
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Wordsmith.18 Just as much as Shade, Kinbote is an artist. In Nabokov’s writings elsewhere, he 
consistently expresses a belief in the artist’s preference for the specific over the general. To offer 
one example from scores, he asserts that “the main delight of the creative mind is the sway 
accorded to a seemingly incongruous detail over a seemingly dominant generalization” (“Art” 
374).19 Such beliefs surely find perfect life in Kinbote’s astonishingly detailed evocations of 
Zemblan language, land, and people. Upon even a first reading of Pale Fire, to say nothing of 
further immersions, the sheer detail of Kinbote’s imagination is striking. Kinbote lovingly 
proffers a whole Zemblan language with roots in other languages, and includes Zemblan 
translations of lines from Goethe’s Erlkoenig and Marvell’s “The Nymph on the Death of Her 
Faun” (239, 242). Throughout the text he conjures a fully mappable Zemblan geography. The 
country stretches eastward from the rural seaside communities of Western Zembla (where the 
Gutnish fisher-folk flourish), over the Bera Range, and onward to the more urban Eastern 
Zembla (where the towns of Aros and Grindelwod mingle with the capital city of Onhava), only 
fading into the water at the eastern coast’s Gulf of Surprise. It expands from the lonely town of 
Embla at the edge of the northern peninsula, with its quaint church, to the beautiful Emblem Bay 
in the southernmost part of Western Zembla, with its striped rocks. Last but not least, Kinbote 
provides nearly every curious relative of the royal family (not to mention a host of other                                                         
18 Laurie Clancy finds this dichotomous attitude toward Kinbote to be a novelistic fault. “Nabokov is never really 
quite sure what he wants Kinbote to be—the boring pedant of the tedious pseudo-scholarly commentary or the 
brilliant visionary Shade praises as the creator of a tinsel but glittering world of fantasy,” she complains (134). But 
this demands of Nabokov precisely the pin-downable realism that his novel flouts in every other respect. I am 
inclined instead to see the novel’s contradictory attitude toward Kinbote as wholly compatible with its shifting and 
multiple layers of “reality.” In a novel so fascinated with mirror-images and inversions, with the interconnections 
between real and imagined worlds, we should not be surprised (or disappointed) to see paradox in the depiction of 
characters as well as symbols. 
19 De la Durantaye’s “Kafka’s Reality and Nabokov’s Fantasy” also offers two fine paragraphs on this Nabokovian 
preference for the specific in literature, detailing both his pedagogical insistence that students comprehend the 
details of plot in a given work (the contents of Anna Karenina’s handbag, the course of the Liffey through Dublin), 
and his aesthetic condemnation of authors who traffic in large ideas while failing to achieve complete verisimilitude 
in a work (for example, the apparently unrealistic depiction of spring-time mosquitoes in Shanghai in Malraux’s La 
condition humaine) (318-319). 
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Zemblan notables) with a full and consistent, if still highly fanciful, back-story. The Index, for 
example, confirms and expands our knowledge of King Uran the Last, who ruled Zembla with an 
iron fist from 1789 to 1799, and it minutely details the life of Walter Campbell, the jack-of-all-
trades who tutored Kinbote from 1922 to 1931 before settling in Iran. These details, one must 
recognize, usually exist in the novel only for their own sensual sake, in firm excess of any 
thematic purpose. Whatever one’s opinions about the “reality” of Zembla, one must at least 
concede that in Kinbote’s hands the place takes on a full and complex aesthetic reality. An artist 
like Shade at last, against the dreariness of Wordsmith (“Dear Jesus, do something” [93]) 
Kinbote creates a rich menagerie of linguistic, geographic, and human detail incapable of being 
reduced to, or experienced as, ideology. 
Indeed, Pale Fire symbolically figures Zembla as art itself. Relatively late in the novel, 
Kinbote narrates his encounter with a visiting lecturer from Germany who is astonished by the 
close resemblance between Kinbote and the pictures he has seen of Zembla’s king. Fearing his 
identity will be revealed, Kinbote tells him that the name “Zembla” is “a corruption not of the 
Russian zemlya”—in English, “land”—“but of Semblerland, a land of reflection, of 
‘resemblers’” (265). All Zemblans resemble each other, so there is nothing special about his 
strong resemblance to the king, Kinbote misleadingly suggests. But Kinbote’s etymological 
explication also offers a broader point about Zembla as a land of reflection and resemblers. 
Zembla is indeed a land (zemlya) of mimesis (re-semblance), however refracted, indirect, and 
indeed sometimes unreliable such representations are implied to be in the novel. It is a land of 
aesthetic representation. Zembla’s very name hints at its aesthetic role as well. In addition to 
being a zemlya of “semblance,” its name runs from Z to A, the mirror-reflection length of the 
English alphabet itself; and it has the root of “emblem” in between—a point underscored when 
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Kinbote describes the geography of the country as stretching from “Embla Point to Emblem 
Bay” (212). Zembla is a land of emblems, then, of representation through language. It is 
Kinbote’s own resplendently detailed and complex work of art, and recursively it represents art 
itself. 
But for Pale Fire art is not only a matter of complex thought, of rich and surprising, 
twisted mimesis. It is also on some level irreducibly ir-rational. I use this word in a sociological 
sense: for Nabokov, art serves as a bulwark against Weberian rationalization. Weber defined 
rationalization as the “increasing theoretical mastery of reality by means of increasingly precise 
and abstract concepts” and the “methodical attainment of . . . definitely given and practical 
end[s] by means of an increasingly precise calculation of adequate means” (“Social” 293). I 
would argue that as faithful inheritors of Romanticism in this respect, both Nabokov and Weber 
feared the modern growth of rationalization—and its structural cause and effect, bureaucracy—
because its coldly impersonal efficiency erased possibilities of “love, hatred, and [the] purely 
personal, irrational, and emotional,” denying the possibility of “personal sympathy and favor,” of 
“grace and gratitude” in the world (Weber, Economy 975). No less than Weber, Nabokov 
deplored “the ‘disenchantment of the world’” (Weber, “Science” 155), its evacuation of the 
personal, irrational, and magical.20 
This Weberian context then sheds light on Pale Fire’s frequent insistence on the magic of 
the aesthetic. As critics have noted, Kinbote’s story of Zemblan royalty at times recalls both 
medieval courtly tales and later romantic novels.21 Upon his daring, story-book escape from                                                         
20 The phrase “disenchantment of the world” comes from Friedrich Schiller originally—not coincidentally, one of 
the Romantic movement’s most distinguished theorists of the aesthetic. Weber’s sociology of rationalization and 
bureaucracy, descended from such figures, was a touchstone of much social thought in the 1950s and early 1960s, as 
Nabokov was writing his novel. As I have discussed in Chapter Four, the work of C. Wright Mills in the fifties was 
clearly built on his earlier, 1940s immersion in Weber. Other classics of 1950s sociology—Whyte’s The 
Organization Man, Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd—also acknowledge their Weberian imprint. 
21 See for example Boyd, NPF 70. 
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Zembla—after being trapped in a castle’s turret, like a damsel in distress—Kinbote stays with a 
“gnarled farmer and his plump wife, who, like personages in an old tedious tale offered the 
drenched fugitive a welcome shelter . . . where he was given a fairy-tale meal of bread and 
cheese” (140). Likewise the capital of Zembla, where Kinbote’s castle is located, is Onhava. 
Kinbote tells us that the word “onhava-onhava” means in the Zemblan language “far, far away” 
(255). The heart of Zembla, in other words, exists where most fairy tales take place, in a “wild, 
misty, almost legendary Zembla!” (255). Zembla is thus often explicitly described in terms of the 
wondrous, otherworldly fairy tale and legend. 
Furthermore, Zembla’s existence as a counterweight to the bureaucratic rationalism of 
Kinbote’s life at Wordsmith may even be glimpsed in what we could otherwise expect to be 
Zembla’s most bureaucratic and rational aspect: its politics. Kinbote’s reign, he assures us, 
will be remembered by at least a few discerning historians as a peaceful and 
elegant one. . . . [T]he People’s Place (parliament) worked in perfect harmony 
with the Royal Council. Harmony, indeed, was the reign’s password. The polite 
arts and pure sciences flourished. Technicology, applied physics, industrial 
chemistry and so forth were suffered to thrive. A small skyscraper of ultramarine 
glass was steadily rising in Onhava. The climate seemed to be improving. 
Taxation had become a thing of beauty. The poor were getting a little richer, and 
the rich a little poorer . . . Medical care was spreading to the confines of the state . 
. . Everybody, in a word, was content. (75) 
The Zemblan utopia depicted here is a very specific and political one. It is an advanced 
constitutional monarchy—parliament plus Royal Council—with a capitalist economy held in 
check by a strong welfare state. While the “polite arts and pure sciences flourished,” the 
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capitalized disciplines of applied physics and industrial chemistry are merely “suffered to 
thrive,” successful but watched over by a benevolent state that features a progressive tax policy 
and increasingly universalized medical care. But even this specific social content is allied with 
Kinbote’s insistence on the aesthetic characteristics of Zembla. It is a place of almost classical 
“elegance” and “perfect harmony,” we are told, where even taxation—and here one can only 
imagine Nabokov chuckling as he wrote the sentence—“had become a thing of beauty.” Thus in 
Kinbote’s pre-Revolutionary Zembla, politics are not the art of the possible; they are art per se. 
Though the drearily planned campus of Wordsmith lacks any aesthetic warmth, even the most 
mundane and indeed rationalized aspects of Kinbote’s fervently imagined, compensatory Zembla 
are beautiful. In every detail, Kinbote’s dream of Zembla replaces Weber’s modern rationality 
with timeless art. 
 Kinbote’s (and one suspects, Nabokov’s) sense of art as a force opposing bureaucratic 
rationality is also often expressed in terms of magic. Kinbote and Shade both refer to Shade’s 
poem, for instance, as a piece of enchantment. Upon registering his disappointment that Shade’s 
poem isn’t really about Zembla, Kinbote at first laments that it was “void of my magic, of that 
special rich streak of magical madness which I was sure would run through it” (296-97). But 
after further consideration he soon believes in the poem’s aesthetic quality despite its lack of 
explicit references to Zembla. Thus when introducing the poem he can only describe the 
experience of watching Shade compose it by narrating a wondrous event: 
I experienced the same thrill as when in my early boyhood I once watched across 
the tea table in my uncle’s castle a conjurer who had just given a fantastic 
performance . . . I stared at his powdered cheeks, at the magical flower in his 
buttonhole where it had passed through a succession of different colors and had 
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now become fixed as a white carnation, and especially at his marvelous fluid-
looking fingers which could if he chose make his spoon dissolve into a sunbeam 
by twiddling it, or turn his plate into a dove by tossing it up in the air.  
 Shade’s poem is, indeed, that sudden flourish of magic: my gray-haired 
friend, my beloved old conjurer, put a pack of index cards into his hat—and shook 
out a poem. (27-28) 
For Kinbote, Shade’s process of composition is nothing short of magic.  
Shade himself recognizes his poem’s potential for magic when naming it: “But this 
transparent thingum does require / Some moondrop title. Help me, Will! Pale Fire” (ll. 961-62, 
emphases in original). Critics routinely point to the title of Shade’s poem (and Nabokov’s novel) 
as an allusion to “Will” Shakespeare’s lines in both Timon of Athens and Hamlet.22 (“[T]he 
moon’s an arrant thief, / And her pale fire she snatches from the sun” [Tim. 4.3.437-38]; “The 
glowworm shows the matin to be near, / And gins to pale his uneffectual fire” [Ham. 1.5.89-90].) 
But a second and less obvious allusion to Shakespeare is just as significant here. Shade’s hope 
for a “moondrop” title alludes to a speech by Hecate in Macbeth, in which the goddess angrily 
complains to the three witches that she has not been called upon to “show the glory of our art” 
(3.5.9), its true demonic power. She thus tells them what she will do to Macbeth herself: 
Under the corner of the moon 
There hangs a vap’rous drop profound;  
I’ll catch it ere it come to ground, 
And that, distilled by magic sleights,  
Shall raise such artificial sprites 
As by the strength of their illusion                                                         
22 See for example Boyd, NPF 33-34 and 177-78. 
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Shall draw him on to his confusion. (3.5.23-29) 
Shade’s hope for his poem with the “moondrop title” is that it will, like Hecate’s spell fashioned 
from a “drop” of the “moon,” show the glory of his art, raising art-ificial sprites who will create 
strong illusions that are simultaneously aesthetic and magical. 
Thus Pale Fire understands both Shade’s poem and Kinbote’s Zembla—its two most 
important emblems of the aesthetic—as not only intellectually complex and detailed, beyond 
ideology, but also and crucially as ir-rational, incapable of being reduced to the bureaucratic 
categories and rational sorting to which a college or university would subject them. In Shade’s 
moondrop poem celebrating a complexity that transcends the I.P.H.’s comic trivialization of 
death and life, and in Kinbote’s fantastic narrative of a Zembla that imaginatively frees him from 
the reality of his comparatively dreary existence at Wordsmith, Pale Fire offers the aesthetic as a 
counter to the intellectual simplifications and inhuman sterility of Weber’s modernity. Satirizing 
a sometimes narrow and soulless bureaucratic academe, Nabokov’s novel celebrates art as the 
enrichment and re-enchantment of the world. 
 
3. The Work of Postmodernism 
The reading of Pale Fire I have just offered might be understood as a distinctly 1950s 
interpretation of the work. In effect, it understands the novel as an aesthetic protest against the 
bureaucratic Organization and Organization Man of William H. Whyte’s sociology; and it reads 
Pale Fire as the champion of an art that must be preserved and indeed fostered in the face of an 
organized, dehumanizing world. Looking at literary history more broadly, then, one might say 
that I have read Pale Fire as a work of late but typically antimodern modernism. But as I noted at 
the outset, Pale Fire is also often thought of as a representative of early postmodernism, as a 
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work that heralds some of the most interesting fiction of the 1960s and 1970s. So here I will turn 
to the matter of Pale Fire’s place in literary history more fully. I will first show that Pale Fire’s 
postwar hostility toward bureaucracy accords with an early-postmodern celebration of Derridean 
différance, and hostility toward Foucault’s carceral spaces and “discipline.” There is a genetic 
relationship, I will argue, between the 1940s and 1950s antibureaucratism we have been tracing 
since Chapter Two (expressed variously in theories of intellectual workers as a bureaucratic 
class, speculations on the bureaucratic causes of literary realism’s troubles, and skeptical fictions 
of bureaucratic intellectual and academic labor) and the distinctly postmodern intellectual 
moment of poststructuralism. Second, I will argue that Pale Fire’s postmodern affinities are 
rooted not only in this antibureaucratism, but more specifically and positively in a potentially 
class-conscious understanding of artistic creation as unalienated labor—work that is both 
meaningful and publicly valuable, and that transcends even the supposedly immutable divide 
between mental and manual labor. In sum, I will argue that the poststructuralist themes and 
postmodern metafiction of Pale Fire reveal the social and political desires of intellectual workers 
who, in the face of their labor’s ongoing bureaucratization, insisted on the value of work that was 
autonomous, holistic, and meaningful. The 1960s zeitgeist of poststructuralism and early 
postmodernism, even as expressed by a largely apolitical author, had roots in intellectual 
workers’ most utopian desires for their labor. 
Pale Fire’s affinities with the poststructuralism that would emerge in America a few 
years after its publication seem obvious in retrospect. Offering a panoply of parallels between 
Nabokov’s text and the ideas of Nietzsche, Derrida, Kristeva, and Lacan, critic Martine Hennard 
offers the fullest brief for its poststructuralist credentials. The novel “inscrib[es] the postal 
supplement which reveals (and revels in the recognition) that meaning never arrives except as a 
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distorted, misread message” (300), she argues, and its “metacritical activity challenges the 
conventional distinction and conceptual boundaries between critic and creator, fiction and non-
fiction, writing and reading” (304). The novel thus suggests that all “textual activity . . . does not 
re-present: it generates and creates, ensuring further writing, reading and interpretation since 
language is the place and play of différance” (304). Kinbote’s conspicuously and self-
consciously written self, she observes as well, reveals the linguistic and provisional nature of 
identity (305-08). Hennard thus usefully identifies the poststructuralist sensibility regarding 
language and identity that permeates Pale Fire.23 
Such poststructuralist affinities are of a piece with the novel’s antibureaucratic 
celebrations of the aesthetic, I would argue. Perhaps most obviously, Pale Fire’s conception of 
art as a type of antibureaucratic thought that denies univocal, simplistic solutions—a point of 
view revealed most clearly in Shade’s celebration of “plexed artistry”—anticipates the 
poststructuralist celebration of conceptual flux and indeterminacy. If Shade’s poem insists that 
the meaning of life lies in the valuation of “not text, but texture,” poststructuralism would only 
insist that “text” always already is the endlessly relational “texture” of différance. Likewise, 
Shade’s favored game of “word golf”—wherein the serial alteration of one letter in a word 
moves players to the original word’s conceptual opposite—anticipates a poststructuralist 
conception of language. Kinbote illustrates the game in his Index. “Word Golf, S[hade]’s 
predilection for it, 819; see Lass,” an initial entry reads. Then we follow to “Lass, see Mass”; 
then “Mass, Mars, Mare, see Male.” Crucially, the entry for Male directs us again to “Word 
Golf,” thereby beginning the game again, to be played ad infinitum. The meaning of the original 
word “lass” is thus symbolically differed and deferred infinitely, à la différance. Moreover this                                                         
23 Marianna Torgovnick also argues—though less sweepingly than Hennard—for Pale Fire’s proleptic instantiation 
of poststructuralist themes. See her article “Nabokov and His Successors: Pale Fire as a Fable for Critics in the 
Seventies and Eighties,” published eight years before Hennard’s. 
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particular game additionally serves as a textbook illustration of deconstruction: Shade’s favorite 
game here undermines a binary opposition (lass/male) through an almost literal deconstruction of 
signifiers, letter by letter. Pale Fire’s antibureaucratic valuation of art and irrational play, 
revealed in both Shade and Kinbote’s creations, is close kin to poststructuralism’s insistence on 
the slipperiness of meaning itself. 
And if poststructuralist criticism on the novel like Hennard’s has focused on the linguistic 
and philosophical dimensions of the novel’s postmodernism, I would note that one could just as 
well find a less obvious poststructuralist social critique in the novel, again by noting its 
antibureaucratic themes. Pale Fire’s antibureaucratism specifically offers a persistent parodic 
critique of what Foucault would soon formulate as the disciplinary form of power. For a start, 
recall that Kinbote’s description of the Wordsmith campus calls “the impeccably planned 
dormitories . . . bedlams of jungle music,” and refers to the building in which he teaches as a 
“prison-like edifice” (92). In this aesthetically critical description of Wordsmith’s campus, we 
have a version of Foucault’s famous question in Discipline and Punish: “Is it surprising that 
prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?” (228). On a 
symbolic level at least, Kinbote’s dreary Wordsmith is indistinguishably school, mental hospital, 
and prison all at once. His antibureaucratic description of the campus architecture suggests the 
monotonous rudiments of a disciplinary society.  
But the usually unremarked subplot of Judge Goldsworth and Jack Grey provides the best 
evidence for a Foucauldian sensibility or animus in Pale Fire. Each of Judge Goldsworth’s 
comical habits offers yet another clue to the novel’s antibureaucratism, and proto-
Foucauldianism. He names his daughters, in order of birth, Dee, Candida, Betty, and Alphina 
(83): the evidence suggests that he has methodically planned to have four children, and then 
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named them using the order of the alphabet as his guide, moving backwards from D to A. 
(“Alphina”’s alphabetical resonance finally explains the method, in case anyone wasn’t clear.) 
Goldsworth furthermore leaves a flurry of detailed notes about every object in his house when 
Kinbote moves in. The slit for safety blade disposal in the bathroom mirror is full, he writes, and 
the refrigerator should not contain “national specialties” which might create a lingering odor 
(84). The place is additionally littered with Goldsworth’s “plumbing instructions, dissertations 
on electricity, [and] discourses on cactuses” (84), as well as a series of schedules that command 
the resident to feed the cat a specific kind of meat on each day of the week, and even to 
manipulate the curtains of various windows daily in order to prevent the sun from fading the 
upholstery (84-85). In effect, Judge Goldsworth’s exacting behavioral instructions—those of a 
bureaucratic rage for order at the smallest level—attempt to make a disciplinary prison of his 
own home. More chillingly, the meticulous and unkind judge creates an album in which he 
“lovingly pasted the life histories and pictures of people he had sent to prison or condemned to 
death” (83). Judge Goldsworth is thus an almost cartoonishly rational and orderly advocate of an 
unforgiving and inhuman “justice.” He is Pale Fire’s equivalent of Discipline and Punish’s 
Bentham. His satirized presence accordingly affords the novel a cutting critique of disciplinary 
mind and habits, and their cruel consequences in the world. 
The character of Jack Grey stands opposed to Goldsworth’s disciplinarity. Kinbote tells 
us that Grey (“Jacob Gradus” in his Zemblan narrative) has escaped from the Institute for the 
Criminally Insane, where he was imprisoned by Judge Goldsworth. Kinbote promptly puns on a 
hypothetical acronym for the Institute, writing “ici, good dog”; “here” in French, followed by the 
cliché of human encouragement to canines. For Kinbote, Gradus, an agent of the Zemblan police 
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state, is merely a dog-like follower, a bureaucratic cog unimaginatively taking orders (295).24 
But though in Kinbote’s fantasy Gradus is a hyper-rational emblem of bureaucratic thought, we 
should recall that the real-world Jack Grey is someone who has broken the rules of his 
institution, has escaped from the Institute that Goldsworth sent him to. Metaphorically, Kinbote 
and Grey are both madmen who have been trapped (mentally or physically) in an institution. 
Accordingly, the escapee Grey may be viewed more charitably than the would-be assassin 
Gradus: Grey is a victim of bureaucratic thinking, of disciplinary power, who escapes his 
institution in order to avenge himself upon the judge whose lock-step logic put him there. And 
though his attempt to murder Judge Goldworth is despicable—to the extent it is not excused by 
insanity—symbolically Jack Grey should nevertheless be a key character for any comprehensive 
social or political interpretation of the novel. For Grey suggests the rudiments of an 
antibureaucratic, antidisciplinary folk hero of Pale Fire, a “madman” emerged from some 
obscure corner of Discipline and Punish (or was it Madness and Civilization, published in 
French the year before Pale Fire?) to attack the rationalist power of Judge Goldsworth. The 
character of Jack Grey exists in the novel as a return of the bureaucratically repressed—a figure, 
in Foucauldian terms, of resolute antidisciplinarity. 
But even this neat interpretation—in the form of a binary opposition pitting the 
bureaucratic against the antibureaucratic, the disciplinary versus the antidisciplinary—is 
deconstructed by what Hennard notes is the novel’s near-constant insistence on the fact of error 
in the world. Jack Grey is not after all the novel’s antibureaucratic, antidisciplinary folk hero. 
This is the case not merely because one suspects that Nabokov sanctions Kinbote’s maxim that 
“the one who kills is always his victim’s inferior” (234, emphasis in the original). (Nabokov’s                                                         
24 In this sense Kinbote’s punning on an institutional name is similar to Shade’s similarly punning abbreviation for 
the Institute of Preparation for the Hereafter, or “if”: both artists use such puns to deflate the institutions they 
signify. 
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father was himself, like Shade, killed by an errant gunshot from a would-be assassin.) Jack Grey 
also cannot be Pale Fire’s antibureaucratic, antidisciplinary folk hero for the simple reason that 
he mistakes the object of his attack: he kills the poor poet John Shade instead of the grim 
hanging judge Goldsworth. In this Grey is much like his Zemblan alter-ego Gradus, who always 
misses his target. When the would-be assassin Gradus fells a tree across a Zemblan lane in order 
to trip and kill a motorcyclist, for example, the tree fails to block the lane completely, and so the 
cyclist survives (151). When Gradus later tries to kill Kinbote-impersonator Julius Steinmann 
during the Zemblan Revolution, the firing squad incredibly misses its stationary target and 
Steinmann finds his way to a local hospital (153). From there Gradus himself attempts to gun 
him down in the hospital ward, but his two shots miss (153). We should thus not be surprised 
that in the climactic moment of the Zemblan narrative Gradus misses King Kinbote, too. 
Knowing that in the “real-world” narrative Jack Grey misses his target of Judge Goldsworth as 
well, we may see that whenever political or even quasi-political violence occurs in Pale Fire, 
nothing comes out as planned. In the Zemblan narrative, the bureaucratic Gradus ironically aids 
the antibureaucratic cause by allowing the cultured and imaginative King Kinbote to survive. In 
the “real” narrative of Wordsmith, the antibureaucratic criminal Grey ironically aids the 
bureaucratic cause by killing a poet and allowing the hyperrationalistic Judge Goldsworth to 
survive. Even as Pale Fire invites antibureaucratic and antidisciplinary interpretations of the 
Goldsworth-Grey binary, then, in poststructuralist fashion it nevertheless denies the possibility 
that any action necessarily results in its intended effect. The novel’s would-be assassins, who aim 
to reduce possibilities in the world, who seek to fix one meaning or outcome via violence, always 
(already) miss their targets in Pale Fire—no matter how sympathetic their goals might be. The 
novel’s sense of the importance and inescapability of intellectual play and unpredictability, of a 
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jouissance so often stifled by bureaucratic social organization, is thus powerful enough to 
deconstruct even any political conclusions—especially violent ones—that might be drawn from 
the novel’s own antibureaucratic, antidisciplinary social impulses. 
One could elaborate such Derridean and Foucauldian readings of the novel much further, 
but that is not my intention here. Here I have merely wanted to establish that Pale Fire’s 
antibureaucratic themes lead easily to the poststructuralist-influenced readings of the novel that 
have already been made, or even those that could be made. This is so because these two 
intellectual trends are ultimately inseparable in the history of American ideas and culture. A 
1950s fear of bureaucratic institutions of intellectual labor and reified thought laid the 
groundwork for a 1960s celebration of art and all else that defied such strictures on thought, and 
instead imagined an intellectual, linguistic, social, and political existence without significant 
hierarchy and rules. The intellectual and cultural shift from deriding William H. Whyte’s passive 
and hierarchical Organization Man in 1956 to celebrating Derrida’s play-ful and rule-breaking 
bricoleur in 1966 involved a transitional pivot, and not a decisive break.25 This argument about 
poststructuralism’s antibureaucratic origins and impulses thus brings to fruition arguments I have 
made in the previous two chapters about the social origins of postmodernism more generally. 
Lionel Trilling’s mistrust of academic-bureaucratic routine in the 1940s and Mary McCarthy’s 
invention of an antibureaucratic, antitotalitarian campus novel in the 1950s both hinted at the 
self-conscious intellectual freedoms and institutional excoriations that would emerge in the 
                                                        
25 On the bricoleur, see Derrida’s “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” (especially 
285-87). Fredric Jameson similarly if indirectly points out poststructuralism’s antibureaucratic ethos in his analysis 
of Paul de Man’s conception of language as allegory. “[T]he function of [de Man’s] theory,” he suggests, seems to 
lie “in its effort to discredit the autonomy of the academic disciplines, and thereby the classification of texts they 
perpetuate, into political philosophies, historical and social speculation, novels and plays, philosophy, and 
autobiographical writing, each of which is claimed by a separate tradition” (Postmodernism 240). De Man’s figuring 
of language as “allegory”—arguably the signature move of deconstructive criticism as a whole—is on Jameson’s 
account an attempt to “discredit” the bureaucratic isolation of representative texts into separate academic 
departments (Jameson uses the more abstract word “disciplines”) themselves. 
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1960s under the banners of postmodernism and poststructuralism. With Nabokov’s own campus 
novel in 1962, however, we no longer need be merely anticipatory, for we have something that 
partakes of the postmodern moment itself. Pale Fire reveals that early postmodernism was 
inseparable from a midcentury antibureaucratic zeitgeist that rejected any attempt to reify and 
narrow intellectual labor and thought itself. 
Postmodernism may thus be understood in negative social terms, as a rejection of 
Organization and bureaucracy. But it is possible to conceive of its social origins positively as 
well. By embracing a view of art as work, Pale Fire’s postmodernism also shows surprising 
roots in the laborist concerns of the 1930s, those with which we began this dissertation. 
Specifically, I will now argue that Nabokov’s early postmodernism was rooted in a positive 
vision of intellectual (authorial) labor as unalienated labor. His iconic postmodern novel 
promotes a dignified form of work wherein the worker planned and executed the work, rather 
than merely and mindlessly performed piecemeal, Taylorized, bureaucratic tasks. Nabokov’s 
postmodernism is rooted in a vision of meaningful work, in an aesthetic form of labor that 
holistically creates beauty in the world and thereby secures the artist’s value to that world. 
Though Vladimir Nabokov and Hannah Arendt were contemporaries and had friends in 
common, I am aware of no evidence that suggests Nabokov read any of Arendt’s work. But The 
Human Condition’s sharp distinction between “labor” and “work,” published by Arendt only 
four years before Pale Fire, is nevertheless surprisingly apposite for discussing the novel’s 
celebration of the act (rather than the mere fact) of artistic creation.26 Arendt distinguishes                                                         
26 As I say, there is no proof that Nabokov read any of Arendt’s work. But we should nevertheless recall that Arendt 
and Nabokov had a common friend in Mary McCarthy (who along with her then-husband Edmund Wilson hosted 
the Nabokovs at their place in Wellfleet in the early forties), and that McCarthy had reviewed Arendt’s The Human 
Condition for the New Yorker, where Nabokov frequently published (see “The Vita Activa”). Thus it is possible that 
Nabokov read a summary of Arendt’s work via his friend’s review essay. Be that as it may, we do know that Arendt 
knew enough of Nabokov’s work to be irritated by it. In a letter to McCarthy, she noted with distaste that he wrote 
“as though he wanted to show you all the time how intelligent he is” (Letter 135). 
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“labor” from “work” by the purpose of each activity. “Labor” is the activity required to sustain 
bodily existence and nothing more. Essentially private—and for the ancient Greeks even 
somewhat shameful—labor is “the activity which corresponds to the biological process of the 
human body, whose spontaneous growth, metabolism, and eventual decay are bound to the vital 
necessities produced and fed into the life process of labor” (7). When laboring, “the human body 
. . . concentrates upon nothing but its own being alive, and remains imprisoned in its metabolism 
with nature without ever transcending or freeing itself from the recurring cycle of its own 
functioning” (115). The one who labors does not think about his or her activity, but only 
performs it thoughtlessly to keep alive. For citizens of the Greek polis, labor was thus the realm 
normally attended to by women and slaves (72). Its representative philosophical figure was the 
animal laborans. 
“Work,” by contrast, creates what Arendt calls “the human artifice” (136)—the built 
environment of lasting objects that humans establish against the ravages of the natural world. 
The human artifice includes not only shelter but all objects intended to provide a measure of 
permanence against the world’s fundamental instability. If labor produces only an individual 
body’s sustenance, work produces an object that outlasts any one human body and contributes to 
a sense of the continuity of human culture. While labor lives only for the private self and in the 
present time of the body’s immediate needs, work is inherently public and looks to the future of 
humanity. Work may in fact lead to the worker’s immortality, for the 
task and potential greatness of mortals lie in their ability to produce things . . . 
which would deserve to be and, at least to a degree, are at home in 
everlastingness, so that through them mortals could find their place in a cosmos 
where everything is immortal except themselves. . . . [B]y their ability to leave 
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non-perishable traces behind, men, their individual mortality notwithstanding, 
attain an immortality of their own and prove themselves to be of a “divine” 
nature. (19) 
The mortal who works in the Arendtian sense thus seeks to transcend mortality by offering a 
permanent contribution to the human artifice, an object whose value to humanity outlasts his or 
her mere body. The representative philosophical figure of this worker is homo faber.27 
Like The Human Condition, and on startlingly similar grounds, Pale Fire offers a 
stinging critique of “labor.” The truly hated character of Gradus best represents the animal 
laborans in the novel.28 Gradus performs his actions only for the sake of maintaining his body, 
rather than for some larger purpose, some striving for immortality in the world. Kinbote is right 
to see him as a “good dog”—a man who blindly follows orders above all else—for his chief 
pleasure is only in following orders. In addition to the minute bodily pleasure he feels when 
killing, which Kinbote compares to the pleasure of popping a pimple (278-79), Gradus enjoys his 
work for the Shadows only because he has “been given an important, responsible assignment 
(which happened to require he should kill)” (279). Possessing no true mental or other higher 
existence, he is, astonishingly, bored upon arriving in New York City: he occupies his time only 
by counting the numbers of floors in each skyscraper (274). “Spiritually he did not exist,” and 
“Morally he was a dummy pursuing another dummy,” Kinbote summarizes (278). Furthermore, 
unlike an Arendtian homo faber who seeks to create something that would live on after his death, 
the animal laborans Gradus has no temporal consciousness: on his way to assassinate the king,                                                         
27 “Labor” and “work” make up two out of the three parts of the vita activa—the Greeks’ philosophical conception 
of worldly life—which Arendt spends the bulk of her book defining. The third is “action,” the realm of the political, 
of collective effort between humans to create something genuinely new in the world (the celebrated Arendtian 
quality of “natality”). This category of temporal existence has the least relevance to the often apolitical Nabokov’s 
work, and so I have left Arendt’s explanation of it out of my discussion. 
28 As Mary McCarthy’s early review noted rightly, “The compassion of Nabokov stops violently short of Gradus, 
that grey, degraded being, the shadow of a Shade. The modern, mass-produced, jet-propelled, newspaper digesting 
killer is described with a fury of inanimate hatred” (“Bolt” 29). 
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“the forward projection of what imagination he had, stopped at the act, on the brink of all its 
possible consequences” (276), and even his decision to hide away some of his belongings in a 
train station locker offers only “the illusion of practical foresight” (276). Lastly, as Michael 
Glynn notes, “In the latter stages of Kinbote’s narrative, Gradus’s gross physicality is 
emphasized. He eats, he sweats, he micturates” (96). As Gradus roams the Wordsmith campus 
hunting for Kinbote at the end of the novel, for example, he suffers from a bad case of 
indigestion. This affliction’s importance to delineating Gradus’s character is revealed by the 
Swiftian obsession with which it is described by the otherwise genteel Kinbote. Kinbote 
insistently and uncomfortably tells us of Gradus’s “scalding torrent of indigestion” (280), “a 
renewal of stabs and queaks [that] caused him to strip his thighs again which he did with such 
awkward precipitation that his small Browning was all but sent flying into the depths of the 
toilet” (280), “the liquid hell inside him” (282), and “the inexhaustible lava in his bowels” (283). 
The latter half of the book thus reveals the animal laborans’ mere bodily focus. The loathsome 
Gradus, who lives in an eternal present and cares only for a job that allows his body to live, gives 
Pale Fire its chief emblem of the animal laborans. 
Standing opposed to this dessicated animal laborans are the novel’s artists, Shade and 
Kinbote. They share the immortality-seeking worldview of homo faber. The opening lines of 
Shade’s poem “Art,” quoted in one of Kinbote’s glosses, offer an example of this sensibility. 
“From Mammoth hunts and Odysseys / And Oriental charms / To the Italian goddesses / With 
Flemish babes in arms,” they read (284). In these four brief lines alone, Shade recognizes the 
longue durée of his subject: whole millenia of art history are touched upon, beginning with 
prehistoric cave drawings and ending only with the Renaissance, still hundreds of years before 
his poem’s own composition. And a few pages later, at the start of what is to my mind the 
 307 
novel’s most moving passage, Kinbote himself rhapsodizes about the immortal nature of art as 
he holds a full copy of Shade’s poem Pale Fire for the first time: 
We are absurdly accustomed to the miracle of a few written signs being able to 
contain immortal imagery, involutions of thought, new worlds with live people, 
speaking, weeping, laughing. We take it for granted so simply that in a sense, by 
the very act of brutish routine acceptance, we undo the work of the ages, the 
history of the gradual elaboration of poetical description and construction, from 
the treeman to Browning, from the caveman to Keats. (289) 
This passage summarizes many of the main themes of Pale Fire already discussed: the magical 
“miracle” of art, its ability to inspire complex “involutions of thought” (the twisting motif is 
invoked again here), and the dangers, expressed in Weberian, antibureaucratic language, of a 
“brutish routine acceptance” of all this. But to those themes this passage adds a specific concern 
with human immortality, our ability to create “the work of the ages” rather than merely the 
(Arendtian) labor of the moment. Like Shade and Arendt’s homo faber more generally, 
Kinbote—and Pale Fire with him—understands art as a contribution to a permanent human 
artifice.29 
And while much recent criticism has devoted itself to a certain conception of human 
immortality in Nabokov’s work, chasing with a sometimes numbing literalism the presence of 
spirits and ghosts in his oeuvre, it has ignored what I think is the more interesting form of human 
immortality in Nabokov’s work: not only the work of art, but the artist through it, is guaranteed 
secular immortality in Pale Fire. Kinbote is the primary exponent of this type of immortality in 
the novel. The otherwise pacifist Zemblan king, who believes, as we have seen, that “the one                                                         
29 Nabokov himself shared this belief. He went on record multiple times regarding the imperative of immortality for 
art, admonishing students, for example, that “the prime object of a playwright ought to be not to write a successful 
play but an immortal one” (qtd. in Boyd, VNAY 30).  
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who kills is always his victim’s inferior” (234), nevertheless believes that lethal violence is 
justified in some circumstances: namely, when one is “defending the life of his son, or his own, 
or the achievement of a lifetime” (279). The first two items in Kinbote’s list are conventional 
enough: killing is permitted in the defense of one’s own life, or a relation’s life. But Kinbote’s 
third circumstance expresses what can only be recognized as homo faber’s particular point of 
view: one may kill when “the achievement of a lifetime”—one’s work, in other words, one’s 
definingly human ability to achieve immortality in a mortal world—is threatened. In this light 
Kinbote’s seemingly unperturbed decision to scoop up Shade’s poem immediately after Shade’s 
senseless and sad death is not simply the comically narcissistic act it seems at first glance. His 
twice-uttered reassurance that “the poem was safe” in the midst of narrating Shade’s death is not 
simply the expression of selfish care for a poem he imagines to be about Zembla, or of 
comparative disregard for the importance of Shade’s life (295). Kinbote’s preservation of 
Shade’s poem is also a genuine and heartfelt act of altruism. It reflects his immediate and 
instinctive sense that Shade’s work—the achievement of his lifetime—must be preserved even if, 
and especially since, Shade’s life has already been lost. For the homo faber, for Kinbote and 
Shade alike, the product of one’s work matters as much or even more than the physical fact of 
life itself.30 When Kinbote subsequently stitches the index cards on which the poem is written 
into his own clothes, in order to hide it from others as he leaves Wordsmith for his cabin, he 
likewise offers a telling figure for the poem: “Thus with cautious steps, among deceived 
enemies, I circulated, plated with poetry, armored with rhymes, stout with another man’s song,                                                         
30 Arendt’s Human Condition extols the superiority of human work and deeds in comparison to mere biological life 
as well, lamenting the modern “assumption that life, and not the world, is the highest good of man” (318). The rise 
of Christianity in particular, she believed, had resulted in a single-minded emphasis on the value of mere biological 
survival, in this life and through a supposed life in the next world. The importance of contributions to a permanent 
and secular human artifice (homo faber’s concern), or of performing great deeds in public in order to collectively 
create something new in the world (the concern of Aristotle’s bios politikos, the man of politics), was now in danger 
of being forgotten. See 313-20. 
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stiff with cardboard, bullet-proof at long last” (300). His elaborate metaphor of poetry as 
armature literalizes a truth in the novel, for with Shade’s poem enfolding him Kinbote does 
indeed become “bullet-proof,” guaranteed of immortality. The poem not only preserves Shade’s 
immortality, but it affords Kinbote his own through the wildly imaginative commentary he will 
soon append to it. Both Shade’s poem and Kinbote’s “interpretation” of it create the possibility 
of immortality for their respective creators. And as the creative seekers of such immortality, 
Shade and Kinbote are Pale Fire’s chief exemplars of homo faber.31 
Concerning itself so thoroughly with the distinction between the essentially thoughtless 
and private labor of the body on the one hand (Gradus), and the conscious and valuable work of 
making immortal art on the other (Shade and Kinbote), this early example of the postmodern is 
thus deeply invested in the human value of work. But Pale Fire is just as deeply invested, I 
would argue, in the nature of that work—in the process of work-ing itself. And it is here that we 
may see the full extent of Pale Fire’s surprising devotion to concerns about the quality of labor 
                                                        
31 Nabokov’s belief in the work of art as a path to immortality surely also informs the recent brouhaha over whether 
or not his son Dmitri ought to have preserved and published the notes Nabokov made, not long before his death, for 
his next novel, The Original of Laura. Nabokov had directed his son to destroy the manuscript after his death, but in 
2008, after years of debating the matter, Dmitri ultimately decided to publish them. The decision was a matter of 
controversy in the pages of literary magazines and newspapers. 
 Nabokov père went on record a number of times regarding the worthlessness and indeed repulsiveness of 
manuscripts. In a 1962 interview, for example, he proclaimed that “Only ambitious nonentities and hearty 
mediocrities exhibit their rough drafts. It is like passing around samples of one’s sputum” (Strong Opinions 4). And 
more to the point here, in his work on Eugene Onegin, Nabokov declared that “Rough drafts, false scents, half-
explored trails, dead ends of inspiration, are of little intrinsic importance. An artist should ruthlessly destroy his 
manuscripts after publication, lest they mislead academic mediocrities into thinking that it is possible to unravel the 
mysteries of genius by studying canceled readings” (qtd. in Boyd, “Manuscripts” 340). One may be tempted to 
dismiss the author’s revulsion toward manuscripts as merely another quaint Nabokovian bugbear, something akin to 
his reflex hatred of Freud. But I think it is important to take this expressed animus against manuscripts seriously if 
one wishes to understand a central Nabokovian conviction about the purpose and value of life. Nabokov disdained 
manuscripts, I would argue, not for the comparatively narrow and vain reason that they undercut the notion of the 
artist’s genius. Rather, in an Arendtian sense he felt that manuscript drafts were dangerous, because their existence 
could only attenuate the aesthetic experience of a finished art object that might grant its mortal maker a kind of 
immortality. Manuscripts could only serve, in short, as a means by which artists might die. Whether or not and to 
what extent one takes such beliefs seriously should ultimately determine one’s opinion regarding whether The 
Original of Laura ought to have been published. 
For more on the decision to publish Nabokov’s novel, see for example Rosenbaum’s article in Slate 
magazine, “Dmitri's Choice,” written as Dmitri Nabokov debated what to do. 
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that are more typically thought of as Marxist. Though often ignored as mere throat-clearing 
before the novel begins in earnest, we should remember that the very first words of Pale Fire 
(after a winking epigraph from Boswell’s celebration of Dr. Johnson) are not “I was the shadow 
of the waxwing slain” (l. 1), but the drably prosaic observation that “Pale Fire, a poem in heroic 
couplets, of nine hundred ninety-nine lines, divided into four cantos, was composed by John 
Francis Shade” (13). The novel opens with Kinbote calling our attention to work, to the worldly 
act of writing. Kinbote goes on to offer a quite detailed and indeed tactile description of Shade’s 
labor process, noting that Shade wrote—like Nabokov, incidentally—on “medium-sized index 
cards.” (These are the same index cards that Kinbote affixes to his own body as a guarantee of 
immortality after Shade’s death, we may note in retrospect.) On each card, Kinbote lovingly tells 
us, “Shade reserved the pink upper line for headings (canto number, date) and used the fourteen 
light-blue lines for writing out with a fine nib in a minute, tidy, remarkably clear hand, the text of 
his poem, skipping a line to indicate double space, and always using a fresh card to begin a new 
canto” (13). The novel’s third paragraph continues to reveal Kinbote’s fascination with the 
artistic labor process, detailing Shade’s habit of copying out his completed lines daily at 
midnight (13). Not long into the commentary do we learn how Kinbote knows so much about 
Shade’s nighttime compositional habits: he has spent most of his evenings attempting to watch 
Shade, his next-door neighbor, write his poem. (Creepy, yes; but wholly indicative of how 
desperately Kinbote wishes to understand Shade’s labor.) Kinbote tells us that he “had learned 
exactly when and where to find the best points from which to follow the contours of his 
inspiration” (88), and that his “binoculars would seek [Shade] out and focus upon him from afar 
in his various places of labor” (88-89), attempting to seek and understand “the mysteries of 
generation” (89). He compares Shade’s moments of creative inspiration to that of a Zemblan 
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minister communing with God, telling us that in Shade’s face he saw “something of that 
splendor, of that spiritual energy and divine vision” (88). Both Foreword and Commentary thus 
reveal that Kinbote considers the question of authorial inspiration and labor—of how art is 
created—to be of vast and indeed spiritual importance. 
But the fascination is not Kinbote’s alone. Shade’s poem attends equally to the act and 
process of literary authorship. Its last canto—coming directly after Canto Three’s parody of the 
bureaucratic I.P.H. and then valorization of “Plexed artistry” (l. 814)—offers an explicit 
meditation on the labor of poetic composition, one that offers the novel an important and 
utopian, if overlooked, understanding of artistic creation as an activity that implicitly challenges 
the modern divide between mental and manual labor. Recognizing the novel’s Arendtian 
fascination with labor and work therefore also helps us see Pale Fire’s most radically utopian 
urge: it imagines authorship as not only a form of dignified work in the Arendtian sense, 
concerned with the creation of immortal objects in the world, but also as a form of unalienated 
labor in Marx’s sense, one transcending the supposedly fundamental divide between mental and 
manual labor. This exemplar of the early postmodern understands authorial labor as a special 
kind of labor that confounds modern understandings of work itself.  
The last canto of Shade’s poem opens with bold declarations: 
Now I shall spy on beauty as none has 
Spied on it yet. Now I shall cry out as 
None has cried out. Now I shall try what none 
Has tried. Now I shall do what none has done. (ll. 835-38) 
Shade thus begins his Canto audaciously, with claims of unprecedented beauty. But even as he 
does so, his lines simultaneously undermine any claim to absolute originality via a series of 
 312 
allusions. Shade’s pledge that he will “try what none / Has tried” and “do what none has done,” 
for example, seems to recall Milton’s similarly daring claim at the start of Paradise Lost, that he 
“pursues / Things unattempted yet in prose or rhyme” (1.15-16). And in Shade’s “Now I shall 
cry out” one may also hear the startling invocation of angels at the outset of Rilke’s Duino 
Elegies: “Wer, wenn ich schriee, hörte mich denn aus der Engel / Ordnungen?” (“Who, if I cried 
out, would hear me among the angels’ / hierarchies?”) (1.1-2). Shade’s opening claims of 
originality in his final canto allude to the opening declarations of his poetic ancestors in Milton 
and Rilke.32 
 This is not an instance of clumsy writing, though Shade is capable of that. Self-
consciously breaking his empyrean tone, Shade announces the canto’s theme in his very next 
lines: “And speaking of this wonderful machine: / I’m puzzled by the difference between / Two 
methods of composing” (ll. 839-41). With this theme of poetry’s sources and “methods” of 
creation in mind, we may see that Shade’s previous allusions are purposeful. Both Milton’s and 
Rilke’s lines allude to mythological sources of poetic inspiration. Milton’s declaration that he 
will write “Things unattempted yet in prose or rhyme” is, after all, part of his request to the Muse 
for inspiration and skill: “Sing Heav’nly Muse,” Milton intones at the outset, thereby hoping to 
gain “aid” for his decidedly “advent’rous song” (1.6, 13). The speaker of Rilke’s Duino Elegies, 
too, understands the angels to whom he would cry out as inspirations for the poetic beauty he 
hopes to create; for “Ein jeder Engel ist schrecklich” (“Every angel is terrifying”), and “das 
Schöne ist nichts / als des Schrecklichen Anfang” (“beauty is nothing / but the beginning of 
                                                        
32 Nabokov was familiar with and admired both these authors. He appreciated Milton enough to recommend him to a 
student as required reading for anyone who wished to produce poetry of value in English (Boyd, VNAY 317). His 
admiration of Rilke, however, was expressed with the back of his hand: he offered the poet as a yardstick for 
praising the truly superlative powers of Kafka. Kafka “is the greatest German writer of our time,” he told his 
students in a lecture (255). “Such poets as Rilke or such novelists as Thomas Mann are dwarfs or plaster saints in 
comparison to him” (“Franz Kafka” 255). 
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terror”) (1.7, 4-5). Far from being clumsy or arrogant, then, Shade’s ironically allusive 
declarations of originality in the first stanza of this canto—to try what none has tried, and to cry 
out as none has cried out—are quite purposeful homages. They recall, only half-ironically and 
self-deprecatingly, the lingering poetic presence of Milton’s heavenly Muse and Rilke’s 
terrifying angels, classical tropes of the artistic inspiration and labor that Shade proposes as his 
theme. 
The “two methods of composing” that Shade proceeds to describe suggest that artistic 
creation has something to do with the distinction between mental and manual labor. Shade 
describes “method A” as entirely mental (l. 853, emphasis in original): it “goes on solely in the 
poet’s mind” (l. 842). While absent-mindedly showering, for example, he writes lines in his 
head, comparing alternate versions and revising them, without the aid of pen and paper (ll. 841-
44). Method B, however, is tactile. He sits at a desk in his study and writes on paper, comparing 
versions and crossing out inferior alternatives and errors. Shade emphasizes its physical nature:  
In method B the hand supports the thought,  
The abstract battle is concretely fought.  
The pen stops in mid-air, then swoops to bar  
A canceled sunset or restore a star, 
And thus it physically guides the phrase 
Toward faint daylight through the inky maze.  
(ll. 847-52, emphasis in the original)  
Method A is akin to a purely mental labor, while method B is literally and figuratively a manual 
(hand-based) labor. 
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But in the third and fourth stanzas Shade finds each method to be problematic, 
incomplete and insufficient in itself. Method A “is agony!,” he complains (l. 853). It is too 
complicated, requires too much mental effort. Implicitly and metaphorically comparing it to 
method B, he suggests that the complexity of holding multiple drafts in one’s head for 
comparison is like using “three hands at the same time” (l. 863). But the tactility of method B is 
not sufficient, either:  
For there are those mysterious moments when  
Too weary to delete, I drop my pen;  
I ambulate—and by some mute command  
The right word flutes and perches on my hand. (ll. 869-72) 
The mental labor of method A cannot support the hard work and skill of revision, which requires 
some physical method; but neither can the physicality of method B bring forth the mental 
inspiration that the mind alone sometimes receives. Methods A and B of composing, while each 
coherent in themselves, are nevertheless presented in the last Canto as an antinomy. 
Shade then moves on again to writing that might seem clumsy: a series of self-
deprecating stanzas describe him sleep-walking and shaving. These apparent non sequiturs are 
anything but, however: they are metaphors for the resolution of the antinomy of artistic creation, 
of methods A and B. Shade’s account of himself sleep-walking begins by highlighting a double 
consciousness: “I once overheard / Myself awakening while half of me / Still slept in bed” (ll. 
874-76). Further dichotomies proliferate. Shade’s “spirit” manages to observe his bodily self 
having one existence outdoors, while the other is in bed (l. 876); he wears only one shoe when 
sleep-walking out on the lawn (half of a pair) (l. 879); and the whole event occurs just as the sun 
rises, suggesting a liminal period between day and night (l. 878). But as his spirit catches up to 
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the self on the lawn, he ultimately recognizes that “this half too”—the self on the lawn, like the 
one back in bed—“Was fast asleep” (ll. 880-81, emphasis in original). Nothing about the event is 
completely conscious. Shade at last wakes up with “both” halves of himself laughing, the 
contradictions seemingly resolved with joy (l. 881). How have they been resolved? Sleep-
walking has suggested to Shade the essential haziness of the distinction between waking life and 
dream, between body and mind. Sleep-walking represents for him a happy confusion between 
the physical and the mental. And realizing in the morning that “on the damp / Gemmed turf a 
brown shoe [still] lay!” (l. 883-84), Shade immediately makes this comic symbol of sleep-
walking’s liminality of body and mind into a central talisman of his art. He calls the damp, single 
shoe “My secret stamp, / The Shade impress, the mystery inborn / Mirages, miracles, 
midsummer morn” (ll. 884-86). Self-deprecating and aggrandizing at once, Shade’s description 
of sleep-walking and leaving a shoe on his lawn gets at something essential to his aesthetic labor: 
it is neither mental nor physical, neither method A nor method B, but both at once. 
Likewise his homely description of shaving also suggests the union of mental and manual 
labor. Slyly echoing the daring of his Canto’s opening, which introduced his subject of the 
methods of poetic composition, Shade now complains how difficult it is to shave:  
Now I shall speak of evil and despair  
As none has spoken. Five, six, seven, eight  
Nine strokes are not enough. Ten. I palpate  
Through strawberry-and-cream the gory mess  
And find unchanged that patch of prickliness. (ll. 902-06) 
Here again is the repetitive physicality, the manual labor, of method B’s multiple pen strokes. 
Like poetic composition, the poem suggests, shaving involves multiple and sometimes tortuous 
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revisions, physically combing over the same ground repeatedly in order to remove “prickliness.” 
Shade’s next stanza compares his own two-handed shaving technique (“I’m in the class of fussy 
bimanists” [l. 911]) to the single-handed shaver of commercials on television. Much as the single 
shoe of the sleep-walking metaphor reminded us of his dual existence in bed and on the lawn, 
Shade here repudiates any method that involves only one thing, one hand. Accordingly he makes 
an analogy between poetic inspiration—the mental labor of creativity—and the use of 
commercial shaving soap: 
Now I shall speak . . . Better than any soap 
Is the sensation for which poets hope 
When inspiration and its icy blaze, 
The sudden image, the immediate phrase 
Over the skin a triple ripple send 
Making the little hairs all stand on end 
As in the enlarged animated scheme 
Of whiskers mowed when held up by Our Cream.  
(ll. 915-22; ellipses in the original) 
Shade begins this passage with yet another allusion to the invocation of the muses and angels of 
inspiration from his canto’s opening: “Now I shall speak . . .” (l. 915). But he then compares 
such sources of poetic inspiration to the effects of shaving soap: both soap and artistic inspiration 
should make “the little hairs all stand on end” (l. 920). Shade acknowledges a few lines later that 
“that odd muse of mine” is thus a “versipel” (ll. 946-47)—“versipel” being a neologism derived 
from “versipellous,” which means (according to the Oxford English Dictionary) “Having the 
faculty of changing the skin.” In other words, much like his shaving soap, Shade’s muse “Over 
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the skin a triple ripple send[s] / Making the little hairs all stand on end” (ll. 919-20).33 Once 
again, Shade has created an elaborate metaphor to insist on the simultaneously manual and 
mental labor of literary creation. Like shaving, literary creation requires multiple efforts of 
physical revision (the painfully multiple “strokes” of shaving) and yet also the inevitable 
presence of a more purely mental inspiration akin to the “soap” that thrills the skin, raising hairs. 
For Shade, poetic composition, like shaving and sleep-walking, requires both method A and 
method B.34 
 The canto—and thus the poem itself—closes with the image of “Some neighbor’s 
gardener . . . / Trundling an empty barrow up the lane” (ll. 998-99). This last image effectively 
offers both the poem and the larger novel’s best homage to the union of mental and manual 
labor. In the context of the poem we must first see that the image of the gardener recalls a 
climactic event from the end of the first canto. There a young Shade, just beginning his eleventh 
year, lies on the floor and experiences the first of a series of fainting fits as he “watched a 
clockwork toy— / A tin wheelbarrow pushed by a tin boy” (ll. 143-44). Shade experiences his 
first personal intimation of mortality then: “A thread of subtle pain, / Tugged at by playful death, 
released again, / But always present, ran through me” (ll. 139-41). The “clockwork toy” of a boy 
with a wheelbarrow in Canto One thus suggests the passage of time leading to death.  
But Shade’s subsequent depiction of his childhood fit, a “sunburst” followed by “black 
night” (ll. 146-47), associates the wheelbarrow toy with much more than some blank foretaste of 
death:  
                                                        
33 Shade thus draws on a familiar feeling of aesthetic appreciation that Nabokov would a few years later commend to 
literary critics: “Rely on the sudden erection of your small dorsal hairs” (Strong 66). 
34 For more on the topic of shaving and inspiration in Pale Fire, see Dustin Condren’s “John Shade Shaving.” With 
more elaboration than I offer here, he also concludes that “the picture of John Shade shaving successfully, 
‘plow[ing] old Zembla’s fields’, is the picture of artistic bliss, of poetic creation, of the mind and the body attuned” 
(144—the placement of the comma after the quotation mark is sic). 
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That blackness was sublime.  
I felt distributed through space and time: 
One foot upon a mountaintop, one hand 
Under the pebbles of a panting strand, 
One ear in Italy, one eye in Spain, 
In caves, my blood, and in the stars, my brain. 
There were dull throbs in my Triassic; green 
Optical spots in Upper Pleistocene, 
An icy shiver down my Age of Stone, 
And all tomorrows in my funnybone. (ll. 147-56) 
Depicting this “sublime” experience of simultaneous times and spaces (including European 
countries especially known for their artistic traditions and aesthetic appeal), Shade’s surprisingly 
vivid and evocative description suggests an early and powerful aesthetic experience. 
“[C]orrupted, terrified, [and] allured” all at once (l. 163), Shade’s experience compels in him 
“shame” and “wonder” equally (l. 166). He feels the awfulness of death and yet also the aesthetic 
power and terror of the sublime, an “icy shiver” (l. 155) akin to the “icy blaze” of “inspiration” 
(l. 917) that Shade will later introduce in his last Canto’s description of a versipellous muse. The 
repetition of the image of someone pushing a wheelbarrow in the poem’s last lines thus recalls 
not only Shade’s childhood intimation of death, but the ultimately space- and time-less aesthetic 
experience that accompanies it. The final image of a gardener “Trundling an empty barrow up 
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the lane” brings to mind both the ineluctable fact of death and the artist’s ability to comprehend 
and thus in some measure triumph over it.35 
That is the reading offered to us if we take the poem as a self-contained object—a well-
wrought New Critical urn of internal evidence. But we must read the image also in the context of 
the rest of the novel, in which Kinbote reveals to us that the poem’s final image refers to his 
“real-life” gardener as well. By an astonishing coincidence, this gardener is present at the 
moment of Shade’s death—an event occurring only moments after Shade has written of “some 
neighbor’s gardener” in his poem (l. 998).36 With this in mind, we can see that the presence of 
the gardener in the poem further suggests the union of mental and manual labor, much as 
Shade’s images of sleep-walking and shaving do. As Kinbote tells us, this gardener has, and 
exercises, multiple mental and manual gifts. In Kinbote’s very first gloss (on the first line of the 
poem, “I was the shadow of the waxwing slain”), we encounter this gardener teaching Kinbote 
the names of American birds (73). Kinbote later tells us that the gardener knows the names of all 
the trees, and their appropriate habitats, on the New Wye avenue that displays all the trees 
mentioned in Shakespeare (291). Though he has most recently been “a male nurse in a hospital 
for Negroes in Maryland,” ultimately this gardener also “wanted to study landscaping, botany 
and French (‘to read in the original Baudelaire and Dumas’)” (291). Kinbote, of course, also 
enjoys the gardener as a “strong and strapping fellow” (291) who occasionally gives him a 
massage (159). Thus Shade chooses to close his poem with the image of a gardener who is, 
whether Shade knows it or not, another icon of the transcendence of the divide between manual                                                         
35 If we furthermore recall from Kinbote’s gloss that the adult Shade still possesses this toy from long ago (137), we 
may see the Arendtian point, too, that this final image of a gardener with a wheelbarrow functions as a reminder of 
the artist’s ability to create—as homo faber—long-lasting objects in the world. 
36 This is one of a number of uncanny coincidences that resonate, seemingly unintentionally, between Shade’s poem 
and Kinbote’s representations of the world outside the poem. Such bizarre coincidences are often noted in criticism 
of Pale Fire, especially when being adduced for a single-authorship theory (that either Kinbote or Shade wrote the 
whole, poem and commentary alike). Brian Boyd’s book on Pale Fire usefully enumerates ten of these coincidences 
in one place (NPF 112-13), placing the present coincidence seventh on his list. 
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and mental labor. The strong and strapping fellow who shovels dirt and lays out a flagstone path 
for Kinbote is also deeply knowledgeable about the natural world, and aspires to nothing less 
than a liberal education.37 Recalling this gardener in the poem’s last lines, Shade thus extends his 
earlier metaphor of shaving and art, that of “plough[ing] / Old Zembla’s fields” (ll. 936-37), 
suggesting that artist and agri-culturalist alike work with both hands and mind.38 The lively and 
multitalented gardener depicted at the end of both Shade’s poem and the novel’s plot accordingly 
serves as a condensed image of the nature of aesthetic creation. The work of the aesthetic, Pale 
Fire suggests, transcends even the distinction between manual and mental labor. 
This image of a man exercising his capacities for work to the full, in multiple directions 
involving body and mind alike, may in fact stand for the most utopian and potentially political 
urges of Pale Fire as a whole. For while Nabokov’s novel does not itself politicize its rejection 
of the mental-manual divide, we may nevertheless see some of its political potential in a class 
politics if we briefly look at Harry Braverman’s book Labor and Monopoly Capital, published 
twelve years later. Braverman notes that the second principle of Frederick Taylor’s scientific 
management was to divorce workers’ conception of their work from their execution of that work. 
In a process that sociologists after Braverman would call “deskilling,” Taylorist managers took 
workers’ holistic craft and broke it down into a series of disconnected motions under managers’ 
control, robbing workers of their understanding of the whole. In a complaint similar to Arendt’s                                                         
37 One may detect an element of caricature in the gardener’s perhaps only seemingly wide-ranging interests, of 
course: landscape and botany are in the same intellectual-horticultural neighborhood, and the detail about his 
otherwise surprising interest in French literature might be a subtle Nabokovian joke about this gardener’s specific 
attraction to Baudelaire’s Les Fleurs du mal and Dumas fils’s La Dame aux camélias. But even if we grant this, the 
gardener is undeniably an autodidact who loves knowledge of his subject, cultural and scientific, as much as the 
manual labor that accompanies it. 
38 Shade’s reference to Zembla, of course, also uncannily suggests a connection to Kinbote’s Zembla, which, as we 
have seen, serves as the novel’s primary metaphor for art in general. I would also point out here that Kinbote’s 
gardener is not the only agricultural icon in the novel who embodies the union of mental and manual labor. Kinbote 
tells us that Shade, “Delighting as he did in the right word”—the Flaubertian mot juste—“esteemed” farmer and 
taxidermist Paul Hentzner “for knowing the names of things” as the pair went on walks in the woods and fields of 
New Wye and Dulwich (185). Shade’s admiration for the farmer’s linguistic precision is thus similar to Kinbote’s 
esteem for his gardener, who teaches him the names of American birds and Shakespearean trees. 
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about the life of the animal laborans, Braverman argues that this “dehumanization of the labor 
process” reduced workers “almost to the level of labor in its animal form” (78). The Taylorist 
“separation of conception from execution,” he concludes, is now given “the common name of the 
separation of mental from manual labor” (79, emphasis in the original). The divide between 
occupations of mental labor and those of manual labor, he charges, is only the sad result of a 
managerial attempt to remove thought and planning—creativity, in a word—from the labor 
process at all levels. Thus we may say that Nabokov’s novel, with its satire of bureaucratic 
higher education and its unreserved disgust for the merely laboring character of Gradus, exhibits 
a deep-seated scorn for this loss of craft under the Taylorization of all industry, including even 
higher education, via the bureaucratic organization of labor. Pale Fire deplores what 
Braverman’s book calls “the degradation of work in the twentieth century,” or what Arendt 
would call thoughtless “labor.” Championing an holistic labor that instead transcends the mental-
manual divide, Pale Fire insists upon the value of an artist-craftsperson who conceives, and then 
creates, an object from beginning to end—whether that object is a garden or a literary world.39 
 Thus Pale Fire’s postmodern traits, we may now see, are rooted in far more than a 
suspicion of bureaucratic thought. The deconstructive and postmodern pleasure of Shade’s game 
of “Word Golf” and a self-consciously “Plexed artistry” find their origins in more than Pale 
Fire’s satire of bureaucratic narrowness; and the surprising narrative sympathy for the vigilante, 
anti-disciplinary rebellion of Jack Grey stems from more than a satire of Judge Goldworth’s 
devotion to bureaucratic institutions and control. Pale Fire’s postmodernism is also and                                                         
39 For Braverman on Taylorization, see especially Chapters 4-5. Thinking of the scope of this dissertation as a 
whole, it is interesting—but in the end not surprising—that Braverman cut his teeth in Trotskyist politics. He was 
active in the Socialist Workers Party from the late thirties through 1953, and then left (along with Bert Cochran, of 
the “Cochranite tendency”) to found the Socialist Union, publishing “The American Socialist” until 1959. Both 
Dave Renton’s chapter on Braverman in his Dissident Marxism (162-83) and Michael G. Livingston’s article “Harry 
Braverman: Marxist Activist and Theorist” make the case for Labor and Monopoly Capital as a Trotskyist work. For 
a Braverman-inspired work specifically on the rise of bureaucracy as an attack on the earlier form of craft labor, see 
Clawson, especially 126-201, and the summary on 256-57. 
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conversely committed to nothing less than a utopian vision of the pleasures of dignified labor. Its 
conspicuously metafictional moments—Kinbote’s hints that characters like Gradus and even 
himself exist on the page of a book alone, for example, or the sly reference to “an old, happy, 
healthy, heterosexual Russian” suspiciously like Nabokov—are prominent winks and nods that 
tell us yes, indeed, an author has created this, whomever that author might be. Such moments are 
signs of self-conscious planning and creating. They form pointed and fun references to the 
authorial labor (or Arendtian work) that has gone into imagining and then making, in a physical 
as well as mental sense, the novel we are reading. As Laurie Clancy notes, Nabokov’s vision of 
the artist is that of “a maker, a builder, what [he] calls in Ada ‘an habitually intoxicated 
labourer’” (11). Nabokov’s intoxicated, relentlessly highbrow metafiction points us toward the 
existence of an intellectual worker aware of, and even aggressively proud of, his labor.40  
Likewise, the novel’s persistent emphasis on undecidability, its eternal regress implying 
that there is no part of reality that stands apart from interpretation, offers readers as much as 
authors the opportunity to make meaning, again to work in the Arendtian sense. It insists that 
readers, like authors, look at the whole of the text, determine what solution works best and most 
pleasingly, and then create/interpret it from beginning to end. The much-vaunted competition 
                                                        
40 A significant part of Nabokov’s reception has in fact always revolved around this perception of his intellectual 
pride. The perception has not always been to his favor, of course. We have already seen in a previous note Hannah 
Arendt’s peevish remark that Nabokov writes “as though he wanted to show you all the time how intelligent he is” 
(Letter 135). In a more academic mode, Peter Rabinowitz registers a similar complaint when he supposes that 
Nabokov may “derive an almost sadistic satisfaction from knowing that his authorial audience”—his imagined ideal 
reader—“is intellectually well above his actual readers” (213). These critics haven’t liked Nabokov’s insistence on 
his own brilliance, his pride in his intellectual labor, but they do confirm it. 
Others have enjoyed Nabokov’s pride in his labor more straightforwardly, I imagine. I may risk some of 
my audience’s good will by noting anecdotally that for many Nabokov fans I have personally known—and I do not 
exempt myself here—a perhaps unseemly amount of the pleasure in reading him also comes from readers’ attempts 
to prove “how intelligent” and superior they are themselves, to imagine or confirm themselves as members of an 
elite. If for some critics Nabokov’s pride has been a turn-off, I suspect that for no small amount of others the 
pleasure of reading Nabokov may involve sharing Nabokov’s pride in himself as an intellectual worker. 
But whatever psychology one might wish to impute to Nabokov or his readers, my larger point stands. 
Nabokov’s aggressively highbrow style undeniably insists—proudly, even arrogantly—on the value of intellect, and 
thence of intellectual work. 
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between author Shade and critic Kinbote in Pale Fire is in this sense an illusion: the point of the 
novel is that both author and critic are afforded the true pleasure of work. In a world overrun by 
animal laborans, Pale Fire not only celebrates but elicits the holistic pleasures and aims of homo 
faber. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, McCarthy’s essays in the early sixties foreshadowed 
the postmodern world of skepticism and localized micropolitics in dystopian terms. In her work, 
the postmodern could be anticipated as a mere reflection of the narrow thoughtlessness of 
intellectual labor in bureaucratic institutions. The “totally fictitious” world of her proto-
postmodern campus in 1952 likewise corresponded to Arendt’s vision of totalitarianism. But we 
can see from Nabokov’s metafictional work that when it arrived, the openly fictitious world of 
the postmodern could also express—even unintentionally—a hope for intellectual work, and a 
sign of resistance to the way it was currently organized. The postmodern campus novel of Pale 
Fire could desire an Arendtian work that was not subject to false divisions between concepts, the 
tell-tale signs of bureaucratic thought. In Marxist terms, it could even celebrate any human 
activity, whether aesthetic or agricultural, that transcended a false division between mental and 
manual labor. Kinbote’s and Shade’s similar abilities to create falsehoods—“totally fictitious” 
worlds—were not the result of proto-totalitarian bureaucratic social organization; they were the 
antidotes to it. They were representative of, and could even conjure from their readers, an holistic 
type of labor that expanded beyond bureaucrats’ narrow purview, transcending departmental 
divides and even the most fundamental social divisions of labor.41 Pale Fire’s postmodern 
attributes, in short, testify to its creator’s insistence on the pleasure and value of work in its most 
dignified and indeed ambitious form. No less than the League of Professional Groups for Foster                                                         
41 As I have argued elsewhere, McCarthy’s awestruck enthusiasm for Nabokov’s novel, expressed in both her New 
Republic review and private letters at the time, implicitly recognizes this possibility as well. See my article “Realism 
By Other Means?” 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and Ford in 1932, the ludic, postmodernist Pale Fire in 1962 imagined a world in which brain 
workers were able to “perform freely and creatively their particular craft function” (League 18). 
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Epilogue 
 
The Politics of Postmodernism in the Sixties and Now 
 
 
 
In this dissertation I have argued that postmodernism in America emerged in significant 
measure from an intellectual and aesthetic milieu created by middle-class intellectuals, especially 
academics, who resisted the bureaucratization of their working conditions and hoped for an 
autonomous intellectual labor instead. As we saw in Part I, the theory of an intellectual class, 
hatched from the Communist Old Left’s wary hope for an alliance of autonomous “brain 
workers” with the proletariat, mutated through ever more skeptical takes on the “bureaucratic 
collectivist” urges of a New Class in order to become, in Trilling’s hands, the vague, vastly 
influential, and surprisingly conservative notion of “ideology.” As Part II has demonstrated, 
however, some specific critique of intellectuals’ working conditions lived on in the animosity 
toward bureaucratic structures of intellectual work—and corresponding celebration of 
autonomous intellectual labor—so characteristic of the fifties and sixties campus novel. The 
academically-filtered fears and hopes for intellectual labor characteristic of this milieu then 
became foundations for an early postmodernism. 
But the intellectual and literary tradition that Class Work has described, I would now 
note, was integral not only to postmodernism but to the watershed political moment of “the 
sixties” broadly understood. The antibureaucratic tradition detailed here specifically shaped a 
New Left that began on campus, and thus helped define a generation whose political youth has 
profoundly affected nearly every facet of American politics, society, and culture since then—
including of course postmodernism. Given its pervasive influence, then, in this Epilogue I wish 
briefly to sum up the tradition’s political weaknesses and strengths. A 2005 article by Sean 
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McCann and Michael Szalay, “Do You Believe in Magic? Literary Thinking after the New Left,” 
has sought to question and perhaps even discredit the legacy of the New Left and postmodernism 
on American political thought in the academy. Thus it offers a useful point of entry for my task 
here. It is not my intent to judge McCann and Szalay’s arguments about postmodernist politics in 
the time since the early sixties, as that would require a different historical narrative from the one 
I have written. But I do want to defend the New Left, and the roots of postmodernism, from 
some of McCann and Szalay’s accusations against them. While acknowledging the cogency of 
their critiques, ultimately I insist on the political value of the tradition I have defined here, both 
in the 1960s and today. 
McCann and Szalay begin by arguing that the New Left was essentially hostile toward 
states, and toward participation in partisan politics. Its hostility toward states was no doubt 
motivated and in part even justified by the failures of the federal government in this period, they 
recognize: Kennedy’s Cold War-focused negligence of domestic policy (on racial issues in 
particular), and especially Johnson’s dramatic escalation of the Vietnam War, robbed this 
student-based left of hope for change through established channels (438-39). But McCann and 
Szalay also argue that the New Left’s hostility toward the state and conventional politics was 
motivated by the specific frustrations of young professional workers who, despite college 
training and no lack of ambition, found themselves excluded from the corridors of state power 
(452-54). Furthermore, these frustrations could lead the New Left to hold surprisingly 
conservative beliefs: their suspicion of state and federal bureaucracies even put them in frequent 
dialogue with a nascent New Right (442). And after 1967 especially, when the war seemed 
unstoppable and urban riots prompted despair over race relations—but also when the 
counterculture seemed to reach its peak of influence in the “summer of love”—this New Left 
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that was always skeptical of governmental power increasingly became enamored of various 
forms of mysticism and magical thinking. “Human Be-Ins” and the attempted levitation and 
exorcism of the Pentagon at an antiwar march in October of 1967 characterized the new political 
style (436-38). This irrationalism and its corresponding suspicion of ordinary political action 
lives on, they charge, in a literary academy enamored of postmodern authors and theories that 
place an unwarranted faith in the power of culture to effect political change, and that stupidly 
dismiss partisan politics as an effective method of change. For McCann and Szalay, 
postmodernism was created by a muddle-headed New Left engaged in a surprisingly 
conservative rejection of state politics—an antipolitics, in truth, often motivated by dashed hopes 
for professional and political advancement. Postmodernism consequently suffers from a political 
outlook that imagines the analysis of culture, the work of professionals, to be somehow 
politically effective, on its own and without corresponding state action. 
Unsurprisingly, such an indictment of the political youth of many a baby boom professor, 
and the beliefs of many a literary academic of whatever generation, has provoked sometimes 
heated responses. For good reason in part: as history, much of McCann and Szalay’s essay is 
suspect at best, and bunk at worst. To their credit, they invited others to say so in the 2005 
special issue of the Yale Journal of Criticism where they published their essay. Sarah Winter 
comes to the heart of the problem when she argues that McCann and Szalay paint history with a 
startlingly broad brush. They “proceed by linking a series of similar statements in order to 
assimilate a disparate group of writers into a common intellectual and ideological trajectory” 
(473), she notes, and generously calls this an “unsatisfactory” method that “reduces . . . the 
specificity of these statements” (473). David Bromwich likewise calls out their frequent elision 
of the early New Left and the counterculture in particular, noting that C. Wright Mills, whose 
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work on the “cultural apparatus” figures large in “Do You Believe in Magic?,” offered “no 
religiosity . . . no magical thinking, no final hostility toward state action” (469).1 
McCann and Szalay blunder perhaps most embarrassingly in this regard, I would note, by 
ascribing a supposed “libertarian turn” (441)—along the lines of Ludwig von Mises and 
Friedrich Hayek, whom they describe as “the founding voices of contemporary libertarianism” 
(458)—to the New Left and then postmodernism. Their essay scans the works of Thomas 
Pynchon, Michel Foucault, Toni Morrison, Don DeLillo, Jean-François Lyotard, and Gilles 
Deleuze, and finds across them all a suspicion of states and of state-focused political 
organization and action. This constitutes almost their sole evidence for a postmodern “libertarian 
turn.” But their argument here reveals either a profound ignorance of libertarianism, or simple 
bad faith. For a mere suspicion of states and/or state politics does not prove libertarianism. A 
suspicion of, or even hostility toward states is common after all not only to libertarians, but to 
anarchists; to some types of communists and socialists; to some types of conservatives who are, 
unlike libertarians, also suspicious of large-scale capitalism; and even to (I suspect this applies to 
Morrison and DeLillo in particular) cynical or disillusioned liberals. But to be libertarian in the 
mold of von Mises and Hayek one must furthermore actively support the workings of an 
unregulated market. Largely because there isn’t any, McCann and Szalay never supply any 
substantive evidence of this support from the authors they discuss. Their portrait of postmodern 
                                                        
1 In this vein I would also point out that McCann and Szalay’s use of Paul Potter as their chief representative of 
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) is telling, and perhaps misleading. They cite Potter’s admittedly confused 
statements from the late 1960s and early 1970s—years after his turn as SDS President in 1964-65, and one of them 
simply to the effect that he was now concentrating on his personal life (447)—to prove their argument about the 
New Left’s antipolitical, antistatist beliefs. Picking Potter to represent SDS loads the dice, however: what of Potter’s 
fellow SDS President Tom Hayden, for example, who throughout the 1980s and 1990s pursued his New Left ideals 
as a California state legislator? 
In addition to “Do You Believe in Magic?,” see McCann and Szalay’s opening essay for the special issue, 
“Introduction: Paul Potter and the Cultural Turn.” 
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libertarians banded together in support of an untrammeled capitalism, red in tooth and claw, thus 
grossly distorts the historical record.2 
This being said, it is nevertheless important to salvage from McCann and Szalay’s article 
the truth of the political dangers they identify in postmodernist discourse. For example, we only 
need look at the previous chapter to corroborate McCann and Szalay’s argument about the 
prominence and potential dangers of magical thought in postmodernism. Nabokov’s Pale Fire 
celebrates the “magic” of Shade’s poem and Kinbote’s Zembla, the frisson of an art opposed to 
institutions of bureaucracy. And for Nabokov this awe of aesthetic magic was indeed part of a 
rejection of all politics conventionally understood. Nabokov’s pointed refusal to discuss or write 
about politics in any detail did not constitute an endorsement of libertarianism, of course; but 
undoubtedly it did encourage ignorance of what to him were the tedious details and machinations 
of state politics. Along with Kinbote, who couldn’t help but think of taxation as “a thing of 
beauty” (75), Nabokov’s antibureaucratic postmodernism in general promotes the charisma of 
magic at the expense of the rational “strong and slow boring of hard boards” that Max Weber 
recognized as the essence of state politics (“Politics” 128). From this innocuous start, the 
postmodernism I have sketched in this dissertation could indeed risk lapsing into what McCann 
and Szalay depict as an irrationalist antipolitics.3                                                         
2 The sloppy argumentation I have identified here may also be seen outside of McCann and Szalay’s work, 
unfortunately. In a recent interview in the online magazine Jacobin, for example, Walter Benn Michaels can be 
found suggesting that Foucault’s work, motivated by horror at what the Nazis had done in the name of a state, “sort 
of marks the beginning of neoliberalism in Europe”—again, as if skepticism of state power somehow automatically 
demonstrates support for the globalized “free” market. In a similar vein Benn Michaels goes on to argue that “You 
get a different vision of what postmodernism, for example, is when you begin to see postmodernism as the official 
ideology of neoliberalism.” This is undoubtedly true in a literal sense: one’s vision would indeed be “different” if 
one understood postmodernism to be the official ideology of neoliberalism. But it would not have improved, as 
Benn Michaels implies. 
3 While McCann and Szalay make their argument from the standpoint of a traditional liberalism, one could just as 
well imagine a similar complaint about irrationalism and antistatism in New Left and countercultural politics coming 
from a socialist or social-democratic position. Indeed, the New Left was faced with many such complaints at the 
time, as for example in socialist Irving Howe’s 1968 article, “The New York Intellectuals: A Chronicle and a 
Critique.” There Howe argued that the younger generation “breathes contempt for rationality, impatience with mind 
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Additionally and I think most importantly, McCann and Szalay are right to note that the 
antistatist urges of the New Left, and of postmodernism, could be (and were) all too easily 
recuperated for the New Right. As John McClure summarizes, “the movement [of the sixties] . . . 
so discredited state institutions and traditional strategies of disciplined social mobilization that it 
could not effectively resist Reagan’s assault on the social safety net” (127). These post-New Left 
biases against the state and traditional politics were sometimes rooted in the antibureaucratism I 
have traced here. Thus with misgivings similar to those of McCann and Szalay, I have pointed 
out the potentially conservative consequences of the New York Intellectuals’ antibureaucratic 
ethos. Even in the 1940s, Trilling’s keenly skeptical portrait of a self-interested New Class of 
bureaucratized intellectual workers provided foundations not only for the comparatively 
quiescent new liberalism of 1950s figures like Daniel Bell and Arthur Schlesinger, but for a 
1970s neoconservative backlash against an imagined New Class (read: New Left) of intellectual 
workers who sought to capture the bureaucratic state for essentially selfish purposes. Trilling’s 
portrait of the New Class supplied an important rationale to the influential neoconservative 
intellectuals who supported Reagan’s dismantling of the welfare state in the 1980s. Thus the 
cultural and political attitudes of an antibureaucratic postmodernism, built in part on Trilling’s 
foundations, no doubt helped the post-1970s New Right attacks on the state-run bureaucracies of 
social security, health care, welfare, environmental protection, and a host of other social goods. 
And while the antistatist sentiments of the New Left might have been appropriate or at least                                                         
. . . It despises liberal values, liberal cautions, liberal virtues” (47). Accordingly its politics, “insofar as it 
approximates a politics, mixes sentiments of anarchism with apologies for authoritarianism; bubbling hopes for 
‘participatory democracy’ with manipulative elitism; unqualified populist majoritarianism with the reign of the 
cadres” (45). And culturally, Howe charged most flamboyantly, the young generation was “impatient with literary 
structures of complexity and coherence,” wanting instead “works of literature—though literature may be the wrong 
word—that will be as absolute as the sun, as unarguable as orgasm, and as delicious as a lollipop” (47). Like 
McCann and Szalay, too, though more in sorrow than in anger, Howe takes Norman Mailer to task as a primary 
symbol of late-sixties irrationalism on the left (47, 49, and especially 50; cf. McCann and Szalay 435-38 and 
passim). For the socialist Howe in 1968 as for liberals McCann and Szalay in 2005, in short, the literature and 
politics of the 1960s believed too much in magic. 
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understandable for an era in which the water hoses of a state-run fire department were trained on 
Civil Rights protesters by state-hired police, and in which a state-run military relentlessly carpet-
bombed Vietnam, McCann and Szalay are right to ask how much the antibureaucratism and 
antistatism of the New Left—and of postmodernism—has served the left since Reagan won 
power by declaring that government was the problem and not the solution. 
Thus I agree with a number of McCann and Szalay’s political critiques of the New Left 
and postmodernism. But even as I agree specifically that the New Left’s antibureaucratism was 
vulnerable to a New Right that excoriated “the federal bureaucracy that Barry Goldwater 
dismissed as ‘dimestore New Deal’” (“Do” 442), I nevertheless must simultaneously insist that 
the political meanings of the antibureaucratic tradition I have detailed in Class Work cannot be 
reduced to, or held responsible for, the “libertarian” politics that McCann and Szalay highlight. 
Indeed, the antibureaucratic tradition I examine here led to some of the most inspiring successes 
of the New Left, and still has relevance today. 
When a group of activist students gathered in Port Huron, Michigan in June of 1962—
intellectually curious students who even might have read Mary McCarthy’s review of Pale Fire 
in that month’s New Republic (“A Bolt from the Blue”)—they produced a document whose 
conclusion urged students and faculty to “wrest control of the educational process from the 
administrative bureaucracy” in order to “make debate and controversy, not dull pedantic cant, the 
common style for educational life” (Students 374). This campus-based antibureaucratism was 
plainly inherited from the intellectual tradition examined in Class Work. A young Tom Hayden 
had, after all, created the first draft of The Port Huron Statement after immersing himself in 
1950s social and democratic theory—above all, that of his idol C. Wright Mills (Miller, 
Democracy 78-105). And Mills was closely attuned to the antibureaucratic concerns of the New 
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York Intellectuals in his formative years. He wrote frequently for Dwight Macdonald’s Politics 
in the forties, and, as I note in Chapter Four, he was a friend of his Columbia University 
colleague Lionel Trilling in the late forties.4 His pioneering translations of Max Weber during 
this same period no doubt also gave theoretical justification and firmness to his career-long 
skepticism of bureaucratic institutions, including the academy. 
And The Port Huron Statement drew on Mills’s antibureaucratic thought (among others’) 
in order to give birth to what would become bureaucracy’s great antipode in the radical student 
imagination: “participatory democracy.” This term was The Port Huron Statement’s electrifying 
contribution to the thinking and political practices of the young New Left; and it self-consciously 
attempted to solve a quintessential problematic of the fifties—the bureaucratic squelching of 
disagreement and debate via intellectual departmentalization and isolation—by imagining a 
ubiquitous deliberation of public affairs carried out in thousands of self-styled poleis across the 
country. “In a participatory democracy,” The Port Huron Statement proclaimed, “politics has the 
function of bringing people out of isolation and into community” (Students 333).5 This 
democratic hope for “debate and controversy” on campus and beyond, it must be said, offered 
nothing like—indeed it promoted something radically opposed to—McCann and Szalay’s 
imagined irrationalist antipolitics, or “libertarian” hatred of states. For whatever “participatory 
democracy”’s conceptual limitations, we must account for at least the most obvious of its 
political successes. The quasi-Rousseauian vision of political association, motivated in large part 
by the antibureaucratic tradition examined here, helped spur not only a Civil Rights movement 
that demanded universal access to democratic rights of participation (and got a long way there                                                         
4 Mills and Trilling’s friendship is documented in part by Mills’s various admiring references to Trilling in 1951’s 
White Collar (147, 153, 320) and more directly in the book’s acknowledgments (355). 
5 In using the term poleis to describe the aims of 1962’s Port Huron Statement, I am thinking particularly of 
Arendt’s roughly contemporary hope to bring people “out of isolation and into community” via a revival of the 
Greek polis in 1958’s The Human Condition (see especially 196-99). 
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with the Voting Rights Act of 1965), but a truly national movement that ended the Vietnam 
War.6 
McCann and Szalay thus unjustly ignore the political gains of an antibureaucratic New 
Left’s belief in “participatory democracy.” But they also have little good to say about the 
antibureaucratic dedication to professionalism that they argue was a self-interested motive of the 
New Left all along. Here is perhaps my most passionate disagreement with McCann and Szalay, 
and my most central defense of the tradition I have examined here. The activists of the New Left, 
McCann and Szalay argue, “despised . . . bureaucratic management and, in particular, its 
capacity to interfere with the independent operation of professional expertise” (452). They argue 
as well that such an “antibureaucratic sensibility” was “often consistent with the interests of 
aspiring young members of the postwar era’s burgeoning professional class and, more 
significantly, . . . [with their] investment in the professional ethos of autonomous vocation” 
(452). All of this is correct. The student New Left’s antibureaucratism resonated deeply with, 
and indeed encouraged, its class-based attachment to professional ideals of autonomy. But my 
objection is that McCann and Szalay write as if there were something bad about this. They 
cynically cast the New Left rejection of bureaucracy and promotion of autonomous work as 
something sprung only from its members’ temporarily blocked hopes for their own upward 
mobility, rather than as a more profound and genuine—class-based, yes, and potentially even 
class-conscious—belief in the value of autonomous and self-directed work.7 
                                                        
6 James Miller also suggests how the term “participatory democracy” offered a useful ambiguity for this generation, 
one that could galvanize and hold together large numbers of people despite likely political differences. Did 
“participatory democracy” suggest a supplement to representative democracy, or a substitute for it? Was it an 
Americanized euphemism for the old word “socialism,” or an exciting transformation of its meanings? The term’s 
elasticity was key to its effectiveness. See Miller’s chapter on the term in Democracy Is In the Streets (141-54). 
7 A portion of the student and largely middle-class New Left of course did in fact become quite class-conscious, as 
the spate of 1960s and 1970s theorizing about the “new working class” and “Professional-Managerial Class” 
attests—and as McCann and Szalay implicitly acknowledge in the midst of making their argument about the 
professional origins of the New Left (452ff., especially footnote 68). As this dissertation shows, this New Left 
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It has often been said that the New Left succeeded by taking the idea of democracy much 
more seriously than their teachers intended. Something similar might be said with regard to the 
New Left and professionalism: the New Left took seriously the ideal of intellectual autonomy, of 
the democratic freedom to think without economic or political interference, that was often only 
implicit in the middle-class professional ethos. One may see this, for example, in The Port Huron 
Statement’s passionate insistence that work should be “educative, not stultifying; creative, not 
mechanical; [and above all] self-directed, not manipulated” (Students 333). And in this sense the 
history narrated by Class Work, of the long emergence of postmodernism from the radical 
professionals of the 1930s through to the antibureaucratic professionals of the 1950s, may count 
as a prehistory of not only postmodernism but of the New Left. For the hope to gain autonomy 
for intellectual workers was the great bequest of the Old Left to the New. The dream of middle-
class brain workers’ control over their own labor—a dream common to both Culture and the 
Crisis (1932) and The Port Huron Statement (1962)—made for a profound continuity between 
two movements otherwise often separated by the cruel effects of a McCarthyism that had thinned 
a generation of activist knowledge and experience into near-irrelevance. Thus the 
antibureaucratic New Left hope for intellectual workers’ autonomy—consistent indeed with the 
middle-class ethos of professionalism native to a student-based movement, but not reducible to 
mere class striving—had nobler roots and greater political resonance than McCann and Szalay 
imagine. 
This continuity of conviction between Old and New Left, incidentally, should likewise 
provoke more caution when we hear the now all-too-easy knock against the New York 
Intellectuals’ attachment to their own “independence.” Alan Wald notes critically that it was the                                                         
flowering of class-consciousness was in many respects simply a revival of the 1930s and 1940s class-consciousness 
typified by the Old Left debates over an “intellectual class” or “New Class.” 
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“very ideology of becoming ‘independent critical thinkers,’ indeed intellectuals beyond the 
blinding grip of ideology itself, that became the chief means by which the New York 
intellectuals masked their shift in political allegiance” (New York 369). The New York 
Intellectuals’ latter-day refusal to declare any political commitment, he charges here, merely 
disguised their actual slide into a toothless liberalism or even a fanged neoconservatism. And he 
is right. But we should nevertheless remember that intellectual “independence” was also the most 
cherished hope of the “intellectual class” idea that first inspired the New York Intellectuals in 
their radical and still politically-committed youth. The desire for independence lay behind 
Culture and the Crisis’s assertion of intellectuals’ right “to live and to function” as thinkers and 
“not permit business men to teach us our business” (League 3). To be independent was to fulfill 
the intellectual class’s highest political aspirations: freedom to think and, yes, plan, without 
interference from the market—autonomy from capital itself. By the 1950s, no doubt, for many 
New York Intellectuals this ideal of independence had become a deradicalized and even 
depoliticized fetish. But not for all: some social critique of intellectuals’ unfreedom still lived on 
in the quite common liberal criticism of bureaucratic labor, expressed in part by the campus 
fictions we have examined in Part II. And thus the New York Intellectual ideology of 
“independence” could be refashioned by a new left in the sixties, one that would rediscover the 
Old Left’s knowledge that intellectual “independence” was a collective and political 
achievement, rather than an exclusively moral imperative. We must accordingly think the famed 
New York Intellectual “independence” of the fifties dialectically. It was both a depoliticized or 
even conservative ruse, and an only dormant expression of intellectual workers’ desire for 
autonomous labor. Harold Rosenberg’s famous put-down of the New York Intellectuals in 
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1948—a “Herd of Independent Minds”—might be interpreted more optimistically: the collective 
herd could yet turn out to be part of a politicized class struggling for autonomy at work.8 
Along these lines, and most centrally to the argument of this dissertation, we may defend 
the early postmodern from McCann and Szalay’s accusations of political conservatism as well. 
For early postmodernism advocated an ideal of intellectual autonomy quite compatible with both 
now-liberal New York Intellectuals and, perhaps even more so, a young New Left. In many 
ways, Nabokov is the toughest case imaginable for making an argument about early 
postmodernism’s New Left political affinities. His giddy celebration of the aesthetic seems a far 
cry from radical students’ attempts to realize “participatory democracy,” to be sure, and it is 
laughable to imagine him having much use for Tom Hayden or any other luminary of the student 
left that would emerge on the national stage so soon after the publication of Pale Fire. But 
Nabokov’s novel and The Port Huron Statement, for example, were works of the same 
postmodern moment. Consciously or not, the iconic work of nascent postmodernism and the 
founding manifesto of the New Left both inherited the Old Left struggles over the significance 
and organization of intellectual labor, and captured the same early sixties antibureaucratic 
zeitgeist of restless middle-class intellectual workers. If neither Kinbote nor Shade puts his body 
upon the gears of what Free Speech Movement activist Mario Savio called “depersonalized, 
unresponsive bureaucracy” (“End” 329), each nevertheless undeniably stands opposed to the 
reduced intellectual range of academic and other bureaucracies.9 Furthermore Pale Fire’s 
                                                        
8 See Rosenberg’s “The Herd of Independent Minds: Has the Avant-Garde Its Own Mass Culture?” 
9 I allude here to Savio’s famous exhortation during a December 2, 1964 sit-in at Sproul Hall, protesting the 
prohibition of political speech and action on the University of California, Berkeley campus: 
There’s a time when the operation of the machine becomes so odious, makes you so sick at heart, that you 
can’t take part; you can’t even passively take part. And you’ve got to put your bodies upon the gears and 
upon the wheels, upon the levers, upon all the apparatus, and you’ve got to make it stop. And you’ve got to 
indicate to the people who run it, to the people who own it, that unless you’re free, the machine will be 
prevented from working at all! (“Bodies” 327) 
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postmodernist, metafictional celebration of aesthetic creation, we have seen, promotes an 
ambitious intellectual labor that surpasses departmental limits in order to comprehend the whole 
of whatever it examines. Despite what some later theorists of “totality” would suggest, the 
primary political expression of this expansive intellectual urge in the early sixties was not that of 
totalitarian domination, but rather the reverse. As we saw in Mary McCarthy’s The Groves of 
Academe, the promotion of an holistic intellectual labor was part and parcel of a liberal 
universalist (and erstwhile literary realist) agenda to create the wide-ranging social curiosity 
necessary to any true practice of democracy, “participatory” or not. Whether in a proto-
poststructuralist epistemological skepticism that would question narrow, bureaucratized 
perceptions of the world, or in a ludic metafiction that celebrated the pleasure and value of free 
intellectual labor, then, the early postmodern could share with the New Left an opposition to 
bureaucracy in the name of both democracy and workers’ autonomy. Contrary to what McCann 
and Szalay imply, postmodernism’s first affinities were more with a nascent liberal and even 
socialist New Left than with any subsequent “libertarian” New Right. 
This brings me, for a final paragraph, to the present. In this dissertation I have sought to 
establish a prehistory of postmodernism that is not only true, but—to use that quintessential 
byword of academic reform in the sixties—“relevant.” Here then, as I have said, is not the place 
for a full accounting of postmodernism’s changing intellectual, literary, and political history after 
the early 1960s, or of McCann and Szalay’s skeptical take on that postmodernism’s meanings. 
But it is the place to insist that whatever we think of postmodernism now, the spirit of 
postmodern origins is due a revival. The antibureaucratic critique of intellectual narrowness and 
the corresponding advocacy of intellectual autonomy, so central to young postmodernist thought                                                         
Savio’s comment about “depersonalized, unresponsive bureaucracy” comes from a speech he made later the same 
day, in which he characterized a remote and antidemocratic bureaucracy as likely “the greatest problem” of not just 
the University of California campus, but of “our nation” itself (“End” 329). 
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and expression, remain vital. At the very least, they remain vital to the politics of higher 
education in an era of academic downsizing and speedup. Pressures to narrow intellectual and 
pedagogical focus have now become greater in response to an ever-tightening job market, and 
may get worse with looming administrative or state-sponsored attempts to institute quantifiable 
“outcomes assessments” for teaching—a bureaucratic monitoring of faculty labor that reduces 
student thought to the most instrumental of terms. Ideological and economic pressures now 
conspire daily to afford state and campus administrators more control over the labor of faculty, 
whose increased teaching and service loads often divert them from sustained thought in the first 
place. For us, then, the early postmodern insistence on the need for intellectuals’ independence 
should possess new urgency. The dream of intellectual workers’ autonomy and control over their 
own labor—this Old Left dream of the thirties, this New Left, postmodernist hope of the 
sixties—today remains an ideal worth fighting for, by every means available. The history of 
postmodernism thus may teach us still. 
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